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ABSTRACT 
Political Islam has been at the centre of Middle East politics since the late 
1960s and has since then changed the face of Muslim societies and namely of the 
political game. With the demise of communism and the end of the Cold War, a current 
of thought emerged in the United States saying political Islam was the new threat that 
confronts the West. Many analysts in the academic and political community have 
depicted political Islam as an hostile, and anti-democratic ideology that is closer in 
spirit to communism and fascism. Those analysts see it as aggressively anti-Semitic 
and anti-Western and charge Islamist movements of standing in direct competition to 
Western civilisation and challenging it for global supremacy. This dissertation focuses 
on the United States policy towards political Islam. It is premised on the assumption 
that as the sole remaining superpower and as a country that has major interests in the 
Middle East, it will the most affected by the development of Islamist movements bent 
on reordering the domestic and regional order. This study will look at Egypt and 
Jordan as examples of long-standing pro-Western countries and regional U. S. allies 
where the incumbent regimes are challenged by the Islamists. 
This thesis will argue that although the U. S. policy towards political Islam 
shows an "accommodationist" tilt, it is largely rhetorical and fails to address a number 
of important issues. In the case of Egypt and Jordan, this work will demonstrate that 
the United States overriding interest is the maintenance in power of the incumbent 
regimes lest the Islamists challenge important U. S. interests in the Middle East. The 
Clinton administration has toned down its promotion of the "democratisation agenda" 
for fear that the opening up of the political systems gives the Islamists an opportunity 
to gain power. 
The thesis is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the issue of 
political Islam and depicts the Islamist movements in Egypt and Jordan. The second 
part is concerned with the United States policy in the Middle East. The third part 
outlines America's encounters with political Islam, looks at the prevailing views 
regarding the nature of the phenomenon and chronicles the development of the 
"Green Peril" idea. In addition it characterises the U. S. policy towards political Islam, 
looks at the contemporary foreign policy priorities and examines in which way the 
existence of strong Islamist movements in Egypt and Jordan has affected U. S. policy 
towards those countries. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Political Islam has been at the centre of Middle East politics since the late 
1960s when a number of events sparked off a movement that, despite the diversity of 
views and the strategies adopted, saw Islam as being at the core of Muslim social and 
political life. This movement has since then changed the face of Muslim societies and 
namely the political game. The Islamists have managed - by pushing for the re- 
Islamisation of society - to shape individual and communal life. By entering the 
political realm, most of them have become powerful opposition forces, and, in some 
rarer cases, they have been able to share power. 
The development of political Islam went largely unheeded in the West. It was 
only after the Iranian Revolution with its follow-up of fiery, revolutionary Islamist- 
sponsored turmoil, that its strength was properly considered. The Iranian revolution 
and the wave of Shiite radicalism that marked the 1980s contributed in another 
important way, to the shaping in the West of a stereotyped image of political Islam: 
that of an anti-democratic, anti-Western force. 
With the demise of communism and the end of the Cold War, a current of 
thought emerged saying political Islam is the new threat that confronts the West. 
Many analysts in the academic and political community have depicted the rise of 
political Islam as a hostile, intolerant and anti-democratic ideology that is closer in 
spirit to communism and fascism. Those analysts see it as aggressively anti-Semitic 
and anti-Western and charge Islamist movements of standing in direct competition to 
Western civilisation and challenging it for global supremacy. 
The aforementioned picture provides the background to the present study 
which is intended as a reflection on the "clash of civilisations" and related theories 
from the perspective of the West: it aims to assess in which ways political Islam is 
considered a challenge to the West and to highlight the perceptions, in Western 
circles, of political Islam as a multidimensional threat. 
This dissertation focuses on the United States on the assumption that, as the 
sole remaining superpower and as a country that has major interests in the Middle 
East, it will be the most affected by the development of Islamist movements bent on 
reordering the domestic and regional order. This prospect is not welcomed by 
American policymakers interested in the stability of the region and in the maintenance 
of friendly pro-Western leaders in power. 
The study of the U. S. policy on political Islam seemed relevant as the conflict 
in Algeria, pitting the Islamists against the regime, unfolded and as it became clear 
that U. S. approach to the Algerian Islamist movement diverged from the French one. 
Whilst the latter favoured an uncompromising approach and the crushing of the 
Islamists, the American government adopted a more discreet and cautions position, 
avoiding to outrightly condemn the Islamists and even embarking on exploratory talks 
with the FIS representatives in the United States. The United States' almost fearful 
response to an Islamist movement waging a savage war against the Algerianstate, 
and the lack of U. S. assertiveness seemed inappropriate - bearing in mind the 
American unhappy experience in Iran. This situation provided the incentive to look at 
the unofficial and official U. S. approach to political Islam. 
The aim of this study is to elicit: 
a) how political Islam is viewed by the American politicians and government; 
b) to what extent and, in which ways, it is considered a threat to U. S. interests; 
c) what policies the United States has devised to deal with the phenomenon; 
d) in what ways the existence of strong Islamist movements in friendly Arab countries 
has affected and / or altered U. S. policies toward those countries. 
The dissertation will look at the case of Egypt ands Jordan in order to test 
hypothesis c) and d). Egypt and Jordan are long-standing pro-Western countries and 
pivotal regional states which have played an important role as moderating influences 
and as supporters of the peace process. In both countries, thelslamists are the main 
opposition force and the regime has been obliged to devise crafty approaches to keep 
them under control. They will serve to illustrate some of the issues facing the United 
States when dealing with political Islam, although the emphasis on this thesis is on 
the larger debate on the role of political Islam in U. S. foreign policy. 
This dissertation will highlight the episodes that brought the United States in 
touch with political Islam (starting in a most forceful way with the Iranian Revolution), 
and how those experiences shaped American perceptions on the nature of political 
Islam. The present study will also chronicle the process that led to the creation of the 
idea of militant Islam as the "Green peril". It will argue that in academic and policy 
circles the views on political Islam were divided between those who saw it as a benign 
phenomenon and those who considered it an anti-Western and anti-democratic force. 
A tentative U. S. policy toward political Islam dates back to 1992. This study 
documents the development of this policy and shows how it has been refined. In 
looking at the case of Egypt and Jordan, this dissertation will conclude that the U. S. 
policy on political Islam is not much more than a rhetorical stand whose purpose is to 
grapple with an emerging and unpleasant reality, from the perspective of the United 
States 
The research for this thesis was carried out in two stages. The first stage 
involved an examination of all the secondary sources available on political Islam, the 
U. S. policy toward the Middle East and the U. S. policy toward political Islam. The 
second stage took place when I began to search for and study the documentary 
evidence and to conduct interviews with individuals specialised on the subject or 
linked to the U. S. establishment. In the United States, I also had the opportunity to 
collect material in several university libraries and in the Library of Congress where 
most of the primary sources used in this work are located. I was fortunate to be able 
to discuss my dissertation with interviewees who gave me a unique insight into my 
matter of research. 
In organisational terms the dissertation is divided in three parts. Part One 
(chapters One to Two) deals with the issue of political Islam and depicts thelslamist 
movements in Egypt and Jordan. Chapter One explores the perspectives that point to 
the existence of a civilizational clash between Islam and the West. Chapter Two 
traces the evolution of Islamist movements in Egypt and Jordan and assesses their 
current situation. 
Part Two (chapters Three to Six) of the thesis is concerned with the United 
States in the Middle East. Chapter Three expounds the process of U. S. Middle East 
policy making and draws the distinctions between the Republicans and the Democrats 
approach to the Middle East. Chapter Four outlines the major trends of U. S. policy in 
the area. It examines U. S. efforts to contain the Soviet Union and to check the spread 
of Soviet influence in the Arab world. It considers a major U. S. interest since World 
War I: the access to Gulf oil. A part of this chapter is devoted to U. S. policies in 
defence of Israel and to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Chapter Five looks 
at the U. S. main allies in the Middle East. It looks at the American network of 
relationship, mainly Israel and Saudi Arabia. It also assesses the U. S. alliance with 
Egypt and Jordan. Chapter Six provides the background on current U. S. policies in 
the Middle East and examines the challenges to U. S. interests. 
Part Three (chapters Seven to Eleven) concentrate on U. S. policy toward political 
Islam. Chapter Seven outlines the setting of America's encounter with political Islam, 
looking at the Iranian Revolution and the subsequent hostage crisis, the American 
support to mujahidin rebels in Afghanistan, and U. S. confrontation with Shia groups in 
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Lebanon during the first years of the 1980s. Chapter Eight examines the arguments 
surrounding the debate on the nature of political Islam. It presents the views of the 
two major schools, the "confrontational" and the "accommodationist", and analyses 
the development of the "Green Peril" idea. It presents the intellectual backdrop to that 
view and the considerations in the security field underlying it. This chapter also covers 
the origins of a concerted campaign in the media, academic and political circles 
depicting Islam as a threat to the West. Chapter Nine is about U. S. official policy 
towards political Islam. It characterises the main thrusts of this policy and its 
implications for other U. S. policies. Chapter Ten looks at the contemporary U. S. 
foreign policy priorities. Political Islam presents major challenges to the United States 
in the case of the peace process, Algeria, Iran and Sudan. Finally, ChapterEleven 
analyses in which way the existence of strong Islamist movements in Egypt and 
Jordan has affected U. S. policies toward those countries. It concludes by depicting 
how the United States has responded to Islamist-sponsored change underway in 
those Middle Eastern countries. 
PART I- POLITICAL ISLAM 
6 
1. Civilizational Clash: Islam vs. the West 
1.1. Political Islam as an Ideological Challenge to the West 
The salience of political Islam as a force in politics can be traced back to the 
early 1970s. A series of events in the Muslim world - in the form of cumulative crises - 
generated a period of soul searching and self-criticism' . It resulted in an explicit 
return in private and in public life to Islamic practices and in the revitalisation of Islam 
as an all-encompassing ideology with a marked political penchant. 
The Iranian revolution of 1978-9 seemed a watershed for the whole Muslim 
world. The success of a genuinely "Islamic revolution" generated a wave of euphoria 
and sparked a deep sense of pride not only among Shia but also among Sunni 
militants. It was interpreted as a victory of Islam and as the defeat of foreign, Western 
forces. The 1980s were marked by intense Islamic activism even of a revolutionary 
type 2 so that, by the end of the decade, Islamism had profoundly marked the political 
landscape and Muslim contemporary society. 
In the West the unfolding of these events had contributed to moulding a 
perception of Islam as an antagonistic and hostile religion, and its actors as terrorists 
aiming at overthrowing the modern, Westernised world order. In Europe, the notion of 
an alleged Islamic menace has been reinforced by its proximity to the Muslim world 
and thus to its exposition to the spill-over effects of instability in this region. Events 
such as the terrorist bombings and assassinations in the main European capitals; the 
Rushdie affair; the Islamist current in North Africa and the revival of Muslim sentiment 
among the immigrant communities in Europe, have fuelled these feelings. In the 
United States, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York brought 
terrorism to the American soil. 
The Islamist reaction in North Africa came as a shock to the Europeans 
highlighting the civilizational gap between the two margins of the Mediterranean. The 
electoral strength of Islamic movements in Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and the Sudan 
forced many to consider the overall implications of the Islamist challenge to the 
I Chief among them was the Six-Day War with Israel known in Arab Literature as "the disaster". The 
end of the 1960s also witnessed a zgenerilised disillusionment with the West. with the Muslim leaders 
and their Western-inspired governments. A sense of failure was to set permanently in the Muslim 
world. See Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 164-5. 
2 For instance the activities of Iranian-sponsored groups (like Hizbollah in Lebanon), the Afghan 
Islamists and the radical Arab groups, generally dissidents of the Muslim Brotherhood (such as Jihad). 
Western world. Chief among these concerns were the security considerations arising 
from the impact of potential migratory pressures of North African populations in the 
direction of Europe. European leaders are already concerned about what is seen as 
an "internal threat" posed by the presence of over 6 million Muslims in England, 
France and Germany. Their increasing cultural assertiveness, coupled with an 
unwillingness (or difficulty) to assimilate within the dominant cultures feed the 
discontentment of those Europeans who fear the loss of ethnic and cultural 
homogeneity. 
The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War bolstered the 
views of some analysts that Islamic activism would emerge as the next threat to the 
Western world. Huntington predicted that in the new world order the conflicts of 
civilizations would be increasingly central and that Islam and the West would collide 
on many fronts 3. The 1991 Gulf War was understood by many as the rekindling of 
the ancient conflict between the Christian West and the Islamic world. The rhetoric 
employed to justify this conflict was thus seen as an ideological substitute of the 
former crusade against the Soviet Union °. 
On a more objective level, and as Halliday points out, Islamic activists have 
contributed to confirm Western stereotypes about the Muslims and their marked anti- 
Western proclivity 5. Islamist positions have coloured Western perceptions of an 
imminent Islamic threat. They have thus provided policymakers with indicators to 
assess the impact of Islamic activism upon the domestic, regional and international 
dimensions and served as guidelines for devising policies toward the Muslim world. 
It seems that what Westerners fear in Islam is its vitality as a religious and 
civilizational paradigms and hence of its potential as a major ideological challenge to 
the West: the Islamists' pretension to offer a coherent ideology for the social, 
economic, and political organization of Muslim societies challenges the Western view 
of the universal applicability of its liberal democratic philosophy in the post-Communist 
era" 7. In fact, Islamists openly reject Western values of secularism, democracy, the 
3 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations? ", Foreign Affairs (72), n' 3, Summer 1993. 
' F. Halliday, Islam und the. ivth of Confrontation (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996), p. 109. 
I Id. : p. 110. 
6 B. Lewis said that "until the revolution in Iran, there was a steadfast refusal on the part of the Western 
media to recognize that religion was still a force in the Ivluslini world" : Islum und the iVest (Oxford 
Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 135. 
7 Shireen T. Hunter, "The Rise of Islamist Movements and the Western Response: Clash of 
Civilizations or Clash of Interests? ", in L. Guazzone (ed. ), The Islwnist Dilentina (Reading: Ithaca 
Press, 1995), p. 341. 
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primacy of civil law, equality between men and women (or their equal participation in 
society), and between Muslims and non-Muslims. They have condemned the West's 
policy toward the Arab and Islamic world, its conduct of North-South relations and 
they have vowed to curtail or eliminate Western influence in the Muslim world. The 
current wave of Islamic activism favours the closure of Islamic society in itself and the 
repudiation of external influence. Islamists consider that the failure of the Muslim 
world is imputable to their departure from the straight path of Islam and their 
adherence to the Western model, with its secular, materialistic ideology. They think 
that the renewal of society requires the restoration of God's laws, that is, the 
application of the Sharia which would entail the rejection of Western-inspired civil 
codes. Mainstream Islamists condemn the Westernisation of society but not its 
modernisation. In this sense, science and technology are accepted but they are to be 
subordinated to Islamic beliefs in order to guard against the corruption of authentic 
values and the secularisation of Muslim society 8. 
Radical activists take even further their hatred of the Western world. They 
conceive of a common Western, particularly American, conspiracy or at least alliance, 
with Israel opposed to the Muslim world. For these Islamists the most urgent danger 
that comes from the West is the cultural one. They attack the Westernised 
educational systems that were planted by Western colonialism in the Muslim world 
and which produced culturally alienated elites. These systems were allegedly aimed 
at the gradual replacement of the Islamic value system so that Muslims would submit 
to American-Israeli domination. Radical Islamists believe that the West is interested in 
undermining the credibility of Islam as a system of government. The United States is 
accused of working against Islamic unity which would spread Islam in the rest of 
Africa and Asia and would threaten the security of southern Europe 9. 
The myth of a natural antagonism of the Muslim world vis-ä-vis the West finds 
resonance in the stereotypes of most Westerners. They originate in the time- 
honoured distrust towards Islam: "The recurring unwillingness torecognize the nature 
of Islam ... as an independent, different, and autonomous religious phenomenon 
persists and recurs from medieval to modern times"10 . The perceived 
Islamic threat 
has its foundation in the popular imagery of the historic clash that took place between 
Europe as Christendom and Arab, later Ottoman Turkish power, which was Islamic. 
$ Esposito, op. cit.: pp. 169-70. 
' See Walid M. Abdelnasser, The Islamic Movement in Egypt (London: Kegan Paul, 1994), pp. 146- 
172. 
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Rather than addressing the specific causes of present-day Muslim effervescence, 
Western populations prefer to believe in the historical pattern of Muslim belligerency 
and aggression, confirmed by terrorist acts against Western targets. 
Thus, the Islamist anti-Western leanings are the result of acivilizational clash 
vision. In academic and policy circles many consider political Islam as a threat to 
Western security, legitimacy and way of life. Bernard Lewis in a much publicised 
article affirmed that the present confrontational mood derives from the dramatic 
encounter of the Islamic and the Western world and from the complex of "humiliation, 
envy and fear" felt by Muslims in relation to the West. The Islamist movement is in 
Lewis' viewpoint not a circumstantial phenomenon but is the result of "a rising tide of 
rebellion against this Western paramountcy" " and "... the perhaps irrational but surely 
historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular 
present, and the world-wide expansion of both ... "12 Huntington also 
believes that 
there is a civilizational clash that derives from the incompatibility of Islam with such 
fundamental Western philosophical notions as democracy and modernity 13 . 
Indeed, proponents of this view think that Islam is irreconcilable with the 
universal goal of creating modem political systems based on democratic principles 
and on the respect of human rights. Islam admits no separation of religion and 
politics, propounds that sovereignty belongs to God and that the Quran and the 
Sharia are the only sources of law. As far as gender relations are concerned, the 
positions continue to be strictly conservative with women being considered as 
ultimately inferior to men. The protection of non-Muslim minorities is often neglected. 
It is equally true that reformists have tried to adapt traditional Islamic tenets to 
the modern world and in this endeavour they have emphasised the participatory and 
consultative aspects of Islam 14 . Hence they point to the potential of such concepts 
as shura (consultation, a functional equivalent of Western parliamentary rule), ijma 
(community consensus), and ijfihad (or reinterpretation of certain areas of the Islamic 
law in order to support notions of parliamentary democracy, representative elections, 
and religious reform). Most Islamists accept the relevance of popular will in the 
functioning of the Islamic state, albeit in a limited sense15 . Krämer concludes 
that "... 
10 Lewis, op. cit. : p. 133. 
" "The Roots of Muslim Rage", 77re Atlantic : Uonth(v (266), n° 3, September 1990: p. 49. 
= Op. cit. : p. 60. 
Huntington, op. cit. : pp. 22-49. 
14 Hunter, op. cit. : p. 332. 
IS Ibid. . 
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the Islamic mainstream has come to accept crucial elements of political democracy: 
pluralism (within the framework of Islam), political participation, government 
accountability, the rule of law and the protection of human rights. But it has not 
adopted liberalism, if that includes religious indifference. Change is more noticeable in 
the domain of political organization than of social and religious values"t6 . One can 
affirm that the possibility for accommodation between Islam and democracy is quite 
reasonable'' due to the fact that as a religion Islam is not unchanging and is open to 
diverse interpretations 18 . 
1.2. Causes of Islamist Anti-Westemism 
Both Western prejudices against the Islamic world and the Muslims" 
perceptions of the West coincide on one point: there is indeed a widespread antipathy 
toward Western and particularly American policies in the Arab and Muslim world. 
Islamist literature is replete with the image of the Muslims as pawns in the Western 
hands: "Many in the Arab and Muslim world view the history of Islam and the Muslim 
world's dealings with the West as one of victimization and oppression at the hands of 
an expansive imperial power"19 . It is 
ironic that, in an epoch when the Western world 
fears Islamic activism, it is the Muslim peoples that actually have the sense of being 
under siege. This feeling is in their view very real and historically justified. 
The anti-Western feeling dates not primarily from the distant historical 
memories of the Crusades but from the beginning of this century20. From then 
onwards Western supremacy became a reality in the everyday life of the Muslims 
through colonial and imperialist rule. Contemporary Islamists point to the colonialist 
experience as the main reason for the failures of Muslim societies. The impact of 
16 G. Krämer, "Islamist Notions of Democracy", Middle East Report, July/August 1993: p. 8. 
" Joffe dismisses this point by arguing that "... Western concepts of democracy are irrelevant either 
because the realities of Middle Eastern life are based on patronage-clientage relations or consultation 
and consensus-building (shura) or because Middle Eastern political culture traditionally is perceived to 
be concerned with moral legitimacy and justice rather than democracy"; "Relations Between the Middle 
East and the West", Te, 11iddle East Journal (48), n° 2, Spring 1994: p. 259. See also p. 260. 
13 B. A. Roberson, "Islam and Europe: An Enigma or a Myth? ". The . Middle East Journal 
(48), n° 2. 
Spring 1994: p. 292. 
" J. Esposito, The Islamic 77ireat (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 171. 
colonialism has been profound, and Muslims ascribe the destruction of their Islamic 
heritage, particularly their legal and educational systems, to foreign rule. Colonialism 
is also held responsible for the redrawing of colonial boundaries and the creation of 
nation-states along artificial lines. These facts impugn the Islamic prescription of 
universalism of the Umma and they are seen as one of the main reasons for its 
present weakness and lack of unity. The unnatural division of the Muslim world into 
individual states is viewed by the Islamists as the device the Western world resorted 
to in order to control a potentially powerful political and cultural entity 21 . 
Islamists also denounce Western economic imperialism. They believe that 
Western colonial powers have impeded the development of national industries in 
Muslim countries so that they would remain dependent on the Western markets. They 
accuse both Western and Zionist colonialism of aiming at plundering Muslim 
resources and of turning Muslim countries into markets for Western products. Another 
major grievance against the West was its opposition, after Arab emancipation from 
colonial rule, to indigenous forms of nationalism (economic or other), particularly Arab 
nationalism. 
One can not understand the legacy of Muslim anti-Westernism without looking 
at the problem of Israel in the Middle East and at the Palestine question. The Muslims 
feel an intense outrage at the role played by the Western world, particularly the United 
States, in the creation and fortifying of the state of Israel. They are driven by a deep 
sense of injustice which they perceive as having been dealt to the Palestinian people. 
After the 1967 Six-Day War, many Muslims began to identify Western support 
of Israel as part of a Judeo-Christian (or Zionist-Crusader) conspiracy against Islam: 
they believed that only a religious motivation could explain why Christians provided 
huge "Christian offerings to fanatics against Islam to fight it despite the fact that they 
believed that the Jews crucified Christ" -. They concluded that only a long-term 
Christian hatred of Islam could explain the Western alliance with the Israeli state. 
Islamists view Israel's intransigence since 1967 and its unwillingness to 
implement U. N. Security Council Resolution 242 as a consequence of Israel's 
empowerment by the United States, not only through direct financial and military aid, 
20 James Piscatori, "Religion and Realpolitik: Islamic Responses to the Gulf War", in J. Piscatori (ed. ), 
Islamic Fwrdamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis (Chicago, Ill.: The American Academy of Ans and 
Sciences, 1991), p. 14. 
" Maha Azzaun, "Islamist Attitudes to the Current World Order", Islam and Christian-Muslin 
Relations (4), n°2, December 1993: p. 248. 
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but also in the diplomatic action at the United Nations to prevent world opinion from 
resolving the conflict in a just way. 
Islamist dissatisfaction in the face of the lack of resolve of the international 
community to tackle the problem of the Palestinians explains the increase of 
extremism in the occupied territories. This sense of injustice has continued even after 
the signing of the 1993 Palestinian-Israeli peace deal. Violent activity byHamas and 
Jihad are considered alternative means to advance the Palestinian cause due to the 
widespread perception in the occupied territories that theP. L. O. and Y. Arafat have 
sold out. Islamists believe that the Washington accords lend legitimacy to the Israeli 
state, ensure its acceptance by the Arab regimes and serve primarily Israeli and 
Western interests both strategically and economically . 
Palestine is a central tenet of the Islamist movement. During the Gulf War the 
Saudi Sheikh Abd al-Aziz Bin Baz declared that "the Palestine problem is an Islamic 
problem first and last", and that Muslims "must fight an Islamicjihad against the Jews 
until the land returns to its owners" 24 . The fight 
for Palestine, in thelslamist's eyes, is 
a fight in the name of Muslim dignity; it is also a demand that Muslims be recognised 
as having full rights and equal status in determining their future. 
The war in Bosnia and the inactivity of the international community in the face 
of the genocide of the Muslim population is a more recent example of a perceived 
Western blow dealt against the Muslim world. Islamists wonder why the West was 
able to muster 750,000 troops against Iraq and then talk of difficult terrain in 
Yugoslavia. They think that Western reluctance to intervene in what it considered a 
civil war, masked in effect its disdain of the Muslim world: Western leaders were 
allegedly not interested in considering the existence of a Muslim majorityBosnian 
state in the heart of Europe 25 . They were only willing to give the 
Muslims 
humanitarian aid while denying them arms to defend themselves. 
Another aspect of the Western policy that has irritated Muslim populations, 
has been the U. S. policy developed after the Gulf War on amts control and the 
regional and international military balance of power in the Middle East. Its content 
= Y. Haddad, "Islamists and the "Problem of Israel": The 1967 Awakening", The . Diddle 
East Journal 
(46), n°'_, Spring 1992: p. 281. 
:3 Azzam, op. cit. : p. 251. 
Piscatori, op. cit. : p. 6. 
'S See Greg Noakes, "Republican Task Force Faces Backlash on Bosnia Report", The Washington 
Report on Middle East Affairs (XII), n° 2, July/August 1993: p. 30,86. 
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reinforces the belief that the West seeks to weaken Muslim countries by making them 
disarm or neutralise their military capability and that this process needs to be resisted. 
Muslims find evidence for this accusation in the fact that the United States has 
put a lot of effort in dismantling Iraq's chemical and nuclear programme. Although 
most Muslim countries condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, they opposed the 
allied forces' destruction of the Iraqi military machine. In the eyes of thelslamists it 
came to represent the strength of the Umma in the face of Western massive power. 
Besides, international institutions are accused of double standards because they have 
intentionally overlooked the Israeli nuclear arsenal. Actually, Arab countries 
possessing similar capabilities were forced to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty whereas Israel was excused of this obligation. 
The 1991 Gulf War brought to a head the grievances of the Islamic world 
against Western, especially U. S. policies. Islamist leaders attacked the American role 
in the crisis and explained the conflict as the machinations of anti-Islamic forces 
attempting to weaken a beleaguered and threatened Muslim world. Muslim 
Brotherhood leaders "called on the Muslims in all parts of the world to confront the 
aggressor infidels, join the battle of destiny, and support their brothers in Iraq to purge 
the holy land of Palestine and Nadj and Hijaz ... from the Zionists and 
imperialists" . 
Popular viewpoints pointed to the U. S. -Israeli conspiracy and collusion against 
Muslim interests and referred to the West's history of enmity to the region. There was 
a shared conviction that the West through the conflict was pursuing several goals: the 
low-cost exploitation of regional resources; strengthening its political dominance in the 
region; bolstering Israel at the expense on Arab states; supporting corrupt, non- 
democratic regimes, whose interests coincide with the larger U. S. goal of keeping 
control of the region politically and economically27 . Iraq's defeat and the subsequent 
plight of the Iraqi people confirmed Arab historical stereotypes of suffering and 
humiliation at the hands of the West. 
On balance, it seems that Muslim antipathy towards the West and anti- 
Americanism are not the result of a purely cultural hostility but are rather motivated by 
specific Western policies. Esposito says that "U. S. presence and policy, not a genetic 
Beverly Milton-Edwards, "A Temporary Alliance with the Crown: The Islamic Response in Jordan", 
in James Piscatori (ed. ), Icluntic Fundamenlalisnis ... : p. 98. 
=' M. Azzam, "The Gulf Crisis: Perceptions in the Muslim World", International Affairs (67), n° 3, holy 
1991: pp. 481-2. 
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hatred for Americans, is often the primary, motivating force behind acts against 
American government, business, and military interests" 28 . 
On the other hand, Western policymakers must bear in mind that current 
protest movements and especially the Islamist current have an activist agenda, want 
to change the character of existing regimes (many of them important U. S. allies), and 
pursue goals that are ultimately against Western interests. It would however be 
exaggerated to think that the Western presence in the Muslim world is in jeopardy. 
Even Islamists would be incapable of cutting off Muslim ties to the Western world 
since there are built-in complementarities between the two spheres. Besides there is 
the more elementary fact that Muslim countries remain economically underdeveloped 
and very much dependent on the West, particularly for technology, capital and know- 
how. Politically, Muslim countries remain divided and unable to achieve a modicum of 
political unity and economic solidarity. The supposition of an Islamic/Arab menace to 
the West is thus far-fetched. 
I Esposito, op. cit. : p. 207. 
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2. Political Islam in Egypt and Jordan 
2.1. The Islamist Movement in Egypt 
2.1.1. The Creation of the Muslim Brotherhood 
The origins of today's Islamist thought and organisations can be traced to the 
Egyptian group aI-lkhwan al-Muslimin, that is the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB). This movement constitutes the ideological and institutional epicentre of the 
Muslim revival in the Islamic world 29. The Muslim Brotherhood was created in 1928 
by Hasan al-Banna in the context of Egypt's continued military occupation by the 
British and popular disappointment with the corrupted and manipulated political 
leadership. While living in Cairo and Ismailia, Banna was struck by the corruption and 
degradation of Muslims, especially the young of his time, and their capitulation to 
Western economic, political and cultural domination. Banna concluded, in face of the 
evidence, that the solution to Egypt's problems lay in a return to Islam as a 
comprehensive order for all aspects of human existence'o 
Initially the movement founded by al-Banna concentrated on educational and 
devotional programmes but, over time, the Brotherhood grounded its teaching in a 
wide network of social service institutions that provided direct assistance to displaced 
rural migrants newly arrived in urban areas. Banna's Brotherhood had a distinctive 
character that set it apart from older Islamic institutions or movements: it was an 
Islamic organisation with reformist aims, based on an activist ideology, a pragmatic 
course of action and a markedly social orientation that succeeded in galvanising and 
organising a committed mass following ". 
The Brotherhood eventually gained political significance as it grew into a major 
social movement impacting upon the political-cultural discourse of society. The 
Brothers effectively established themselves as a mass movement in the 1940s by 
g R. H. Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995), p. 73. 
30 David Commins, "Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949)", in Ali Rahnema (ed. ), Piolreers of Islamic Revival 
(London: Zed Books, 1994), pp. 133-4. 
" Del nejian, op. cit. : p. 75. 
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responding to the needs of large numbers of Egyptians who were affected adversely 
by the disruptions of the war and the British occupation. 
The Brothers acted with similar vigour against the external threats to Egypt. 
When the government abrogated the Treaty of 1936, the Muslim Brothers took a 
leading role in the confrontation with the British in the Canal Zone32 . The Brothers 
earned even greater nationalist credit for their engagement in the fight against 
Zionism and the Jewish occupation of Palestine. The Palace eventually came to view 
the Brethren as one of its major enemies. The political antagonism reached a violent 
climax in 1948 when a member of the Brotherhood murdered the Egyptianprime- 
minister. In the following year, al-Banna was murdered, probably in retaliation, and the 
Brotherhood was officially suppressed. 
When the conspiracy of Free Officers erupted into the coup d'etat of July 
1952, the Brothers actively supported the military uprising. By the mid 1950s, 
however, this cooperation collapsed and the regime and the Brothers were locked in a 
deadly combat. The Brother's commitment to Islam made them a threat to the 
secular, pan-Arab goals that the military rulers had set to accomplish. The activist and 
aggressive nature of the Brother's commitment meant that they posed a real threat to 
the officers and their organisational skills provided the resources necessary to back 
up their threat. 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the regime treated the Brotherhood as its 
most dangerous opponent. Major Muslim Brother thinkers and activists were 
assassinated or executed and thousands of followers were held for years in political 
detention camps. 
The camps produced the most important contemporary Islamist thinker, 
Sayyid Qutb. Before being sent to his death by Nasser in 1966, he formulated the 
theory of opposition to the independent nationalist state still used today by militants all 
over the Sunni Muslim world. According toQutb the dominantsociopolitical system of 
the Islamic and non-Islamic worlds was that of jahiliyya, injustice, suffering and 
ignorance of Islam's teachings. Muslims were bound by duty to transforrjahi/i society 
through proselytization, dawa, and jihad. Qutb did not explicitly question the piety of 
all Muslims in the jahili framework. However, he considered it imperative that the 
Muslims emulate the Prophet's hijra by separating themselves from jahili society in 
order to constitute a strong vanguard (tafib) as a prelude to the establishment of 
1' 
God's authority on earth (hakimiyya) through the setting up of an Islamic state. This 
vanguard should assume responsibility for the task of ending repression, since Islam 
and jahiliyya can not coexist. The prevailing social order must thus be overtume&3 . 
In other words, Qutb created a "... formal Islamic rationale for a modem revolution" 34 . 
2.1.2. Islamic Resurgence Under Sadat 
It was not until after Nassees death in 1970, when Sadat proceeded to free 
the prisoners, that the Islamist visions of the world expanded beyond its core 
advocates to become one of the major forces in Egyptian politics. Besides the release 
of Islamic militants from prison, other acts opened the way for greater public visibility 
of activist Islam. The new constitution promulgated in 1971, for example, asserted 
that the principles of Islamic law would become a principal source of legislation. At the 
same time, Islamists were allowed more freedom in presenting their views publicly. 
The media increased the amount of programming devoted to religious subjects. 
Although formally outlawed, the Muslim Brotherhood published "al-Dawa" and "al- 
Itisan", popular magazines which were recognised as organs of the group. 
The leadership of the Brotherhood was the old guard of the surviving 
organisation. Emerging from prison in the early 1970s, the old guard presented a 
reformist rather than a revolutionary altemative. Hudaybi, the new general guide, had 
set the tone in his rejection of Qutb's willingness to engage in the act of identifying 
people as apostates (takfrr) 35 . The major shift 
in the Brotherhood's strategy was its 
decision to discard violence. While the movement continued to be committed to the 
goal of establishing a truly Islamic socio-political order, it pursued that goal without 
'Z The Brothers created a pars-military wing - the "secret Apparatus" - that engaged in violent action 
against the regime. 
" Y. Haddad, The Qur'anic Justification for An Islamic Revolution: The View of Savyid Qutb", The 
Middle East Journal (37), n° 1, Winter 1983; Roy, op. cit. : pp. 41-2; Gilles KepeL . 
Muslim Eetremismn 
in Egypt (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993). 
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and R. Scott Appleby (ed. ), Fundamentalisms and Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
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31 Voll, op. cit. : p. 380. 
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recourse to violence, by influencing Muslim masses and seeking a hearing among the 
rulers 36 
Some members never accepted the new strategy of non-violence. The young 
militants, educated in Nasser's prisons, were strongly influenced by the most militant 
aspects of the thought of Sayyid Qutb. They did not compose a single unified 
movement but were instead a shifting and loose collection of individuals sharing a 
similar activist thought. 
The most public, and least violent, of the more militant groups were the 
Gama'at lslamiyya (Islamic associations). This faction was implanted in university 
circles, where it was noted for its social work on behalf of students. The members 
organised tutorials, assisted students in acquiring textbooks and, as they gained 
strength, they demanded gender-segregated seating in classes and special separate 
facilities for women. Because they drove left-wing militants from the campuses, to the 
great satisfaction of the state authorities, they were initially welcomed by the state. 
Only gradually did the state realise that the Gama'at were a more serious challenge 
than the left-wingers had ever been. When they attempted to restrain the groups 
activities, a radicalisation took place, and a number of the more militant went into 
hiding". 
The clandestine Islamists were also fragmented in several groups. They were 
largely affiliated to two different traditions of militancy. One was a politically 
revolutionary tradition 3' embodied in the Islamic Liberation Organization (also known 
as the "Military Academy Group") and the Jihad Organisation. Proponents of this 
tendency believe that most Egyptians are devout Muslims but are the victims of an 
unbelieving state. The ruling political elite is held responsible for the present 
decadence and corruption that characterises the present society. No amount of 
preaching, of religious consciousness-raising or other benign form of persuasion 
would bring about the religious conversion of the leaders. Accordingly, these groups 
advocate that the struggle must be directed against the rulers to remove them or force 
them to submit to the Islamic will 39 . 
36 Saad E. Ibrahim, "Egypt's Islamic Activism in the 1980s", Third World Quarterly (10), n° 2, April 
1988: p. 644. 
Gilles Kepel, "Islamists Versus the State in Egypt and Algeria", Daedalus (124), n° 3, Summer 1995: 
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The Jihad group was by far the bloodiest and most deadly in its confrontations 
with the state. The group that assassinated Sadat had a chief ideologue, Abd al - 
Salam Faraj who expounded his ideological blueprint in a small booklet entitled "Al - 
Farida al - Gha'iba" ("The Hidden Pillar"). Faraj contended that the failure of Muslim 
rulers to govern by God's laws, as was their duty, provided the believers with the legal 
justification for declaring them in apostasy from Islam, an offence punishable by death 
according to Islamic law. The struggle against the impious leaders should be carried 
out through jihad which, according to Faraj, was a "pillar" of Islam that Muslims had 
overlooked when it came to fighting the enemy at home d0 . 
The second tradition rejected all of society as unbelieving and held that all 
institutions in society were not amenable to conversion. Shukri Mustafa, the leader of 
this current, believed that moral change was required from the grassroots upwards. 
Mustafa advocated a long-range strategy based on building a powerful nucleus of 
believers, patterned after the Prophet's community. The society would move against 
the authorities in jihad only when the membership of its cells had increased 
sufficiently to pose a credible challenge. The group known as Al -Takfir Wa al - Hijra 
(Repentance and Holy Flight) was suppressed by the state in the late 1970s, after it 
abducted and killed a former minister of Awqaf (religious affairs) 41 . 
During the final period of Sadat's rule, radical Islamic groups spearheaded 
active opposition to the state through radicalised student unions, direct and at times 
spectacular militant actions, and participation in communal strife. The Brotherhood 
painstakingly distanced itself from the violence-oriented activists and largely benefited 
from the fanaticism of such groups by cooperating with the authorities 42 . 
The Brother's semilegal existence allowed them to resume many of their 
former activities without depending on government sanction43 . They enlarged their 
popular base of support by filling the ideological and political vacuum left by the 
demise of Nasserism. The Brethren concurred with Sadat when they judged the 
Nasserist current to be the strongest political force opposing their own movement. 
Simultaneously, they sought to prevent the radicals from contesting their leadership of 
' J. Jansen, The Neglected Duty (NY: Macmillan, 1986), p. 165,167,169,203. 
" Ibrahim, op. cit.: pp. 653-4. 
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20 
the Islamic current. To achieve these broader aims, the Brothers supported the 
regime's campaign to discipline the members of the radical Islamic fringe. 
However the Brothers were unable to accept the complete identification with 
the regime and never compromised in matters of principles. In the years between 
1977 until Sadat's death, the Brothers offered the most vigorous and widely 
disseminated public criticism of the regime. They declaredSadat's grand reorientation 
of the 1970s a failure, attacking the American connection, accommodation with Israel, 
and key aspects of the economic and political liberalisation. The combination of these 
elements constituted a grave threat to the integrity of Egypt's Islamic civilization 44 
On balance, Sadat's attempt to manipulate Islamic forces in order to legitimise 
his rule backfired on him. He intended to contain the Brotherhood by keeping it under 
close observation but it grew bigger and stronger and was thus able to infiltrate many 
unions, councils, state agencies and religious institutions. On the other hand, Sadat's 
sponsoring of the Islamic movement fostered the emergence of radical groups that did 
not espouse the Brotherhood's plan of a peaceful transition to an Islamic society. 
They advocated violence and jihad against a regime that they considered impious. 
This cost Sadat his life. 
2.1.3. The Islamist Movement: A Challenge to the State 
Sadat's successor introduced a new approach to the Muslim politics of Egypt. 
Mubarak tried to reinforce the Islamic credentials of the state whereas controlling and 
directing the development of the Islamist movement 45 . He allowed for the partial re- 
Islamization of society and granted moderate Islamist groups a generous margin of 
manoeuvre. At the same time, he continued to suppress forcefully any group that 
advocated violent tactics and that posed a direct threat to the state. In doing all this, 
Mubarak tried to pursue a low-profile policy. 
The Egyptian leadership came to realise that the Islamic movement was an 
indigenous movement in its own right and did not necessarily constitute a disruptive 
force in Egyptian society. Hence, under Mubarak's presidency, the conservative 
" S. E. Ibrahim, "An Islamic Alternative in Egypt: The Muslim Brotherhood and Sadat", Arab Studies 
Quarterly (4), n° 1/2, Spring 1982: 80-90. 
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Islamist faction that originated from the Muslim Brothers acquired increasing 
influence. The strategic decision of the Brothers leadership in the 1970s for limited 
cooperation with the regime laid the foundations for their expansion in the 1980s into 
nearly all aspects of public life. The Islamists therefore concentrated their efforts in 
gaining a foothold in the political arena. 
Thus, in 1984, in the face of the continuous government refusal to 
acknowledge the MB's legal existence, the Brotherhood sought to enter Parliament 
under the auspices of the Wafd party. The coalition managed to win sixty-five seats 
(out of 450), seven of which were for the Brotherhood. The coalition came second 
only to Mubarak's National Democratic Party (NDP) and served as the major 
opposition in the People's Assembly for three years. In the April 1987 elections, the 
Brotherhood shifted its alliance and formed a coalition with two smaller parties: the 
Socialist Labour Party (SLP) and the Liberal Party (LP). The new coalition that took 
the name of Islamic Alliance, became a major opposition force to the government and 
gave a sizeable number of its parliamentary seats to Islamist candidates 46 
At this juncture the MB had become the chief partner in the alliance. In 
Parliament, the Islamist candidates pushed for the application of the Sharia and 
presented drafts of Islamic legislation. Entering Parliament gave the Brotherhood a 
direct experience in political life and created legitimacy for the Brotherhood in the 
eyes of the masses 47 . 
The Brothers have therefore steadily embraced a strategy of moderation and 
gradualism designed to accommodate the system. They have recognised the need to 
work within the existing political setting for the advancement of their goals. Their 
endeavour is designed to elevate the organisation to the status of a recognised 
political party and remove the restrictions on the group's activities 48 . 
In addition to their demands for full party status, and as an alternative to 
political participation at the national level, the Brethren have intensified their 
involvement in politics at the professional associations and syndicate level. The 
`S Voll, op. cit.: p. 384. The NDP won 69.6 percent of the vote and captured 448 of the elected seats in 
the Chamber. The coalition won 17 percent of the vote and 56 seats. 
Ibrahim, "Egypt's Islamic Activism": p. 646. 
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Brotherhood has gained control of the doctors', engineers', and pharmacists' and 
lawyers' professional associations. These victories are significant indicators of the 
Brothers' infiltration of civil society and, particularly, of the modem segments of the 
population 49 
In the last years of the 1980s, radical Islamist unrest surfaced again, 
particularly in the upper Nile Valley and in the Fayoum oasis where Sheik Omar Abd 
el Rahman had settled. Released from prison after being found not guilty ofSadat's 
assassination, this former member of the Jihad group transmitted his radical, anti- 
regime views to a new breed of Islamic extremists. 
Little is still known about the nature and inner workings of these radical 
groups. They are alternately credited as belonging to two organisations: theGama'at 
al-Islamiyya and the Jihad 50 . The 
former is composed by "... a collection of 
associations and movements directed by self-proclaimed "emirs" in various towns and 
large villages in Egypt" 51 . They seem to 
be organised in regional clusters of groups 
rather than a national network and their preeminent spiritual leader is Sheik Abd eI- 
Rahman. The Jihad group is what it is left of the original Jihad, active since the late 
1970s. It appears to be divided into at least two separate factions: the remnants of the 
initial group led byAbbud al-Zumar, currently imprisoned in Egypt, and a new faction 
calling itself Vanguards of Conquest (Talaa'al al-Fateh or the New Jihad Group), 
which appears to be led by Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, who is currently outside Egypt. As 
Voll points out, "it is the willingness to confront the authorities directly, and violently if 
necessary, that characterizes the groups that maintain the Jihad tradition in the era"52. 
What began as a problem of sporadic violence in the middle Egyptian region 
around Asyut, escalated to a wave of violence in the capital itself. During the summer 
of 1993, the violence of the armed groups increased twofold as they launched a 
°' Sana Abed-Kotob, "The Accommodationists Speak Goals and Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood 
of Egypt", International Journal of Middle East Studies (27), 1995: p. 329. 
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Regional Revenge? ", The Z'Iiddle East Journal (48), n° 4, Autumn 1994: p. 609,625. The fact is that the 
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campaign to overthrow the Mubarak government which included: attempts on the lives 
of the Ministers of Interior and of Information, and of the Prime Minister. The Islamic 
Group traditionally targets mid and lower-level security personnel, Coptic Christians, 
and Western terrorists. The Jihad group appears to concentrate primarily on high- 
level, high-profile Egyptian government officials, including Cabinet ministers. It also 
seems more technically sophisticated in its attacks than the Gama'at, notably in its 
use of car bombs. The strong-arm tactics they use are aimed at undermining the 
state's credibility, security and economy in order to create an environment of 
instability propitious to the overthrow of the regime. 
The government's crack down on the extremists has been harsh to the point of 
eliciting popular resentment. In 1993 the government established military courts to 
try Islamists in order to bypass slower civilian procedures: they have issued harsh 
verdicts, including many death sentences of Islamist suspects. However, the 18 April 
1996 massacre of Greek tourists in front of a Cairo hotel has shattered the consensus 
among the nation's elite that the security forces' heavy-handed tactics brought the 
Jama'at under control. 
The mainstream Islamist movement was not indifferent to the intensification of 
violence: in fact, many ulema close to the Muslim Brothers seemed to encourage the 
actions of militants of the Jihad and the Gama'at. The state thus decided, "... at the 
end of 1993, to break its gentleman's agreement with the conservative Islamist 
movement... " 53 . It has therefore lumped violent and non-violent movements 
together 
and has undertaken aggressive actions against both. The Egyptian government has, 
particularly since 1995, stepped up moves to crush the Muslim Brotherhood which it 
accuses of being involved with the violence of the Jama'at 54 . 
In the course of 1995, the regime launched a wider campaign to remove the 
Brotherhood from overt political existence. It mounted a full-scale political assault on 
the Islamists' last significant bastion of expression - the professional associations - by 
enacting legislation that gave the judiciary virtual control over their internal electionsss 
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schemes that ensured a massive victory to NDP candidates in the November 1995 
elections to the People's Assembly 5s 
The conviction of 54 Muslim Brothers of banned political activity, in November 
1995, signalled the end of the official tolerance of the banned organisation51 . The 
government has subsequently engaged in another round of confrontation with its chief 
political opponents, by accusing some members of the Brotherhood of "reactivating 
the organization" and "seeking to corrupt political life" through setting up a political 
party - the Wast - as a front for the Brotherhood 58 . 
The Mubarak regime has been badly damaged by the current wave oflslamist 
violence which poses a serious challenge to the state. It has been unable to stamp 
out the Islamist guerrillas operating from the Cairo suburbs and intouristic areas. The 
militants of these guerrillas now number hardly more than a few thousand, but they 
have become a heavy burden on the state, obliged to devote considerable energy to 
fight them. 
The existence of the radical fringe groups has hurt the regime in another way: 
"The state has had to bargain for increased support of the conservative religious 
movement, which has exacted a high price for its backing, meting it out with a 
stinginess proportional to the weakness of the state"59 . The Brotherhood has thus 
benefited, by default, from the fanaticism of the marginal extremists groups: it can 
exchange its support to the state's policy of confrontation with the radical groups for 
the state's commitment to the reislamization of society 60 
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2.2. The Islamist Movement in Jordan 
2.2.1. Origins of the Islamist Movement 
Like in other parts of the Muslim world, the Jordanian Islamist movement was 
an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. The first branch was set up under 
the British mandate in May 1946, in Jerusalem, then a part of the Jordanian West 
Bank. In November 1945, King Abdullah patronised the inauguration of the General 
Offices of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. The movement had already obtained 
legal status as a "society". In 1953 the movement obtained legal status as an 
organised group. It thus evolved from being a charitable society into a general and 
comprehensive Islamic committee. Under its new status, the MB was given access to 
spread its call in the mosques and public places, to open branches all over the 
country, in short, to function in absolute freedom 61 
It stands out that from the beginning the MB flourished with the monarch's 
blessing, unlike its counterparts in the rest of the Arab world. Adbullah's gesture 
showed the regime's willingness to extend official support to the movement, but also 
his determination to bring it under the state's tutelage. The MB served the official line 
in return for freedom of action and access to some important sectors of society. The 
symbiosis between the MB and the regime rested on shared perceptions regarding 
the interests of the nation. The MB concurred with the King's religious role - as a 
direct descendant of the Prophet - and with his personal commitment to Islam. 
Another advantage, from the Islamists' point of view, is that Jordan under King 
Hussein, became a secure haven for Muslims fleeing repression from more secular 
states such as Egypt, Syria and Iraq 62 . 
Through their regular participation in elections, including those boycotted by 
the secular parties, and their support for the regime when it clashed with the Arab 
socialist and nationalist opposition, the Brothers were publicly seen to be in alliance 
with the Government. The Brother's identification with the regime was particularly 
strong in the 1950s when the King came under pressure from the secular leftist 
61 H. Hourani, T. Awad, H. Derbies and S. Kilani, lslamic Action Front Party (Amman: Al - Urdun Al - 
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forces. A strong bond between the monarchy and the Brotherhood was cemented in 
April 1957, following the failed coup attempt in the army. The Brotherhood backed the 
King's repressive measures and in return, when the regime prohibited all political 
activity, the Ikhwan were exempt from this decision 63 . From the 1950s the MB was 
Jordan's only legal political organisation 64 
In spite of this cooperation, the Brotherhood and the Hashemites were not 
natural allies. Although the MB paid lip service to the aims and guidelines of the 
regime and avoided any form of open confrontation, especially with the King, a 
fundamental conflict of ideas and interests existed from the start. As the movement's 
blueprint centred on the reformation of society along Islamic lines and the 
implementation of the Sharia, it criticised the state for failing to implement the 
principles of Islamic law in the running of the state. A major source of the 
Brotherhood's grievance was the regime's adoption of Western values, of secular 
ideologies and its close ties with the Wests . The movement attacked King Hussein's 
openly pro-Western stance, his flirtation with the idea of joining the Western- 
sponsored Baghdad Pact and his adherence to the Eisenhower Doctrine. 
There was clearly a great deal of mutual distrust and suspicion. At times of 
crisis this expressed itself in overt opposition to the regime on the part of the Brothers, 
and in suppressive measures against the movement on the part of the authorities. 
The Hashemites have combined a policy of conciliatory gestures with a strict 
monitoring of the Brothers' activities. Nonetheless, the latter invariably displayed a 
great deal of self-restraint in their criticism of the regime, whilst the latter's measures 
were never as harsh or as far-reaching as those taken against the Communist on the 
Baath 66 
The Brotherhood's alliance with the government was instrumental in both 
parties' strategy of containing another Islamist contestant: the Hizb al - Tahrir. The 
Islamic Liberation Party (ILP) was founded in Jerusalem in 1952 by a group of 
religious functionaries who had broken away from the MB, chief among them was 
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Sheikh Taqii Eddin al - Nabahani. Al - Tahrir was refused legalisation on the basis that 
the party's programme did not recognise the Jordanian constitution. It was completely 
banned and its activities restricted. 
Al - Tahrir's methods for achieving its objectives differ from those utilised by 
other Islamic movements. It refuses to compromise its objectives, which is the source 
of its political shortsightedness. The ILP's ultimate ideal is the revival of the Islamic 
Caliphate. In practice, it espouses primarily political goals since it aims at 
overthrowing the region's regimes and establish in their place the rule of the Caliph 
(successor to Prophet Mohammed) all over the Muslim world, based on the example 
of the first four Caliphs 67 . Unlike the 
MB, the ILP does not concern itself with the 
individual's reformation until the society, as a whole, has been transformed. Thus the 
creation of a universal Islamic state is the precondition for the implementation of a 
purely Islamic spirit 68 
Al - Tahrir has thus rejected the principle of territorial nation-states and of Arab 
nationalism. Only Islamic nationalism can serve as the basis for the existence of a 
nation whose ultimate realisation would be that of a unified Muslim state. By rejecting 
the principle of hereditary succession and nationalism as the overwhelming political 
norms underlying the state, the ILP challenges the very legitimacy of the Jordanian 
regime. The members only accept the Quran and the Sunna as platform and 
constitution. Contrary to the Brotherhood whobelieve in the need for interaction with 
the government, the ILP categorically rejects any involvement in mainstream 
politics69. The movement's trajectory has been unremarkable, apart from its alleged 
implication in April 1993 in a plot to assassinate the King 70 . 
2.2.2 The Islamist Surge 
In the aftermath of the Iranian revolution, there was a surge of religious 
activism. The state was quick to sense the growing Islamic sentiment and escalated 
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the level of Islamic activity. The creation in 1981 of the Al al - Beit, the Academy for 
the Study of Islamic Affairs, and the holding of symposia on Islamic issues, reflected 
the growing importance the regime attached to being seen to uphold Islamic 
traditions. The monarch tried likewise to restrict the expansion and influence of the 
activists by placing structural barriers to their advance and at the same time he 
claimed for himself the religious high ground 71 
Actually, by the 1980s the MB had become deeply entrenched in majorareas 
of Jordanian life. The 1970s had been a decade of economic bounty and it enabled 
the Brotherhood to build its infrastructure. It also benefited from its unrivalled position 
of supremacy as the country's only legal organisation with a political expression, 
especially after the ousting of the Palestinian movement72 . The running of medical 
clinics, schools, and security centres enabled the Brotherhood to conquer a popular 
constituency of its own. The Brothers were well entrenched in the Ministry of 
Education. They became strong in the university campus and controlled the 
appointments of faculty staff at the University of Jordan, became influential in the 
professional associations, and had something of a watchdog role over the content of 
school curricula and television programmes 73 . 
Despite the growth of its popular appeal, the MB was still kept on a tight leash 
and was manipulated by the regime. In the early 1980s, the Brotherhood's assistance 
to members of the Syrian Ikhwan served the King's interests and was, very likely, 
endorsed by him. But when regional politics drove Hussein closer to Syria, he agreed 
to suppress the Brotherhood in return fora reconciliation with Damascus. A period of 
severe suppression ensued, especially on university campuses. After the riots, the 
state tightened its control over the country's universities. Three hundred members of 
the MB were arrested and stricter control was imposed on Muslim preachers74 . This 
marked the end of the modus vivendi between the government and the Brotherhood. 
By this time, the country was passing through an acute economic crisis due to 
reduced external rents from the Gulf following declining oil prices. The Brotherhood 
took advantage of the state's weakness in order to gain leverage trying to present 
itself as an alternative to the incumbent government. In and outside the parliament the 
group stridently called for an end to corruption, mismanagement and waste proposing 
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the redistribution of wealth. It led an aggressive opposition to the government's 
policies75 . 
The Ikwhan were able to put to advantage their political experience in the 
1989 elections, which resulted from the monarch's decision to shore up its legitimacy 
through a measure of popular participation in public affairs. The MB won 22 seats and 
independent Islamists won a further 12, making the Islamic bloc the largest in the 80- 
seat Lower House. The success of the MB was closely related to its well-developed 
organisation. It was able to capitalise on an already established social network and an 
organisational structure encompassing mosques, schools and welfare services. It 
even had its own religious programmes in the media76 . The simplistic slogan of 
the 
Brotherhood - "Islam is the solution" - appealed to large segments of the population, 
including the Palestinians, who also relied on the lkwhan's uncompromising call for a 
liberation of all Palestine. 
The King was surprised and dissatisfied with the electoral results. In forming 
the Cabinet, he included only three Islamists elected to the Lower House. The MB 
was not represented in the government since it insisted on securing the vital ministries 
of interior, education, justice and information. The formation of the Cabinet seemed to 
be an attempt at weakening the cohesion of the two major alliances in the Parliament 
- the Islamic and the Democratic bloc. The King also seems to have realised at his 
juncture the need to open up the political spectrum to political parties in order to 
undermine the MB's predominance. He was quoted as saying: "The past situation 
which allowed some to move freely and deprived others of freedom is over' ". 
Six months after the election, indepth negotiations and talks were underway 
between leaders of the MB and other prominent Islamists to form a bloc which, in 
December 1992, became the Islamic Action Front (IAF). The bloc succeeded in 
having, in November 1990, a Brotherhood member elected Speaker of the Lower 
House (Abd al - Latif Arabiyyat). The IAF introduced legislative proposals on 
corruption, segregation of the sexes in schools and universities, prohibition of the sale 
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of alcohol to Muslims, introduction of an Islamic dress code, and the institution of a 
zakat (compulsory almsgiving) tax 78 . 
The outbreak of the Gulf deepened the level of political cooperation between 
the Islamists 79 and the King. The monarch allowed the Brotherhood to manage the 
crowds at public meetings and to lead the protests against the American intervention. 
In response to the way in which the Islamic movement galvanised popular opinion, the 
government announced, in January 1991, a new Cabinet in which the Islamic 
movement was represented for the first time: "This historic step reflected the need of 
the King and his supporters to coopt the powerful Islamic Movement by bringing it into 
the highest echelon of the political system" 80 . Five Brothers and two independent 
Islamists were given the portfolios of Education, Health, Justice, Religious 
Endowments, Agriculture, Transport, Communications and Social Development. 
Hussein used the Brotherhood to channel popular anger at the Western 
intervention against Iraq but dropped thelsiamists from his cabinet in June 1991. The 
reason for the King's decision was the Islamists' opposition to Jordan's involvement in 
the Madrid peace conference. They used the parliamentary tribune to boycott this 
event and voted overwhelmingly against Jordan's participation in the peace process. 
The MB refused to be part of the new government formed byTaher Al - Masri which 
was in power at the time of the Madrid Peace Conference, and actually instigated its 
downfall as they once again moved into the role of the opposition. 
Faced with an assertive Islamic movement bent on derailing the peace 
process, the King decided to change the rules of the political game. In the summer of 
1993 he scraped the old system of voting whereby voters were allowed as many 
votes as there were parliamentary seats in their district. This was contrived to 
eliminate bloc voting, the key to the Brotherhood's victory in 1989. A second vital 
change in the legal atmosphere was the passage of the Political Parties Law of 
September 1992 which allowed parties to petition for legal status for the first time 
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since 1957. The law was aimed at weakening the Islamists electoral strength, by 
allowing other parties to compete for power 81 . 
With the legalisation of political parties, the MB chose to form a pseudo- 
independent party which adopted the name of the former Islamist parliamentary 
coalition 82 . In the November 
1993 elections, the IAF lost one-third of its seats, 
although it remains the largest group in the Lower House. The Brotherhood won 16 
seats and independent Islamists 6. The decline in seats won by Islamists was largely 
due to the changes in the electoral law8' . It was also the result of the 
Islamists' loss 
of some prestige. During the 1989 elections Islamist candidates were seen as the 
champions of change. Once in parliament, however, their performance was lack- 
lustre. They tended to focus on moral issues, calling for sexual segregation at 
swimming pools and a ban on alcohol, while ignoring important issues such as 
poverty, economic development and education. This probably explains why the 
overriding themes in the 1993 elections were more realistic than those of 1989 8' . 
Despite its overall retreat, the IAF performed surprisingly well, given the 
attempts to stifle it. Islamist candidates lost in some districts, but the IAF's gains in 
others were impressive. They won the greatest number of votes in four of Amman's 
six electoral districts, including two out of the three seats in the capital's Second 
District. They also won three of the four Muslim seats in Zarga, Jordan's second 
largest city '. 
The current Islamist scene has been characterised by the emergence of some 
radical groups, which do not represent the main currents of Islamic activism in Jordan. 
The failure of the traditional opposition to stand up to the regime (namely on issues 
such as the peace with Israel and the King's reluctance to fully democratise the 
political system) creates a breeding ground for extremist splinter movements to 
emerge and engage in violent action. Such groups - such as the ILP, Islamic Jihad 
(Bayt al - Muqaddis), Muhammad's Army and the Vanguards of Islamic Youth - have 
allegedly been involved in acts of violence against the regime, Western targets and 
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what they consider un-Islamic institutions. However, they are marginal groups and 
lack the widespread popular backing required to be built up as viable contestants for 
power87 . 
2.2.3. The Impact of the Islamist Movement 
The Islamist mainstream's aim of achieving a gradual Islamisation of society 
through effecting change in the social, educational and legal sectors has been largely 
attained. The MB's unparalleled political mobility and influence, enabled it to develop 
a strong monopoly over society and the country's various institutions. This enabled it 
to attract new members and participate in decision-making. The movement has 
succeeded in gaining a foothold in the political, economic and cultural fields, and 
particularly in the field of education. Over the years, the MB has succeeded in 
enjoying freedom at the political level, and was thus able to establish complete control 
over the Ministries of Education and Awqaf, other educational and religious 
institutions and, importantly, the national network of mosques. 
The Islamist movement has established a position as a viable political factor in 
Jordan, but it does not necessarily translate into a political mandate for its opposition 
to the regime. The regime is worried that the growing Brotherhood strength might 
threaten Jordan's interests in the on-going Arab-Israeli peace process and the 
country's fledgling democratic process. The turning point in the relationship between 
the government (more accurately, the King), and the Islamic movement came with the 
initiation of the peace process in Madrid in 1991. On religious as much as on political 
grounds, Islamists are adamantly opposed to a negotiated settlement with Israel. 
IAF's leader, Farhan has frequently described recognition of Israel as a "crime" and 
he affirmed that Palestine "is an Islamic land and no organization or regime or Arab 
state or Arab leader has the right to relinquish one inch of the land of Palestine, 
because it is the land of the Islamic nation" 88 
The subsequent signing of the Jordan-Israel peace agreement in October 
1994 took the Islamists by surprise and incensed them. The Islamists have tried to 
take advantage of popular discontent with the Treaty in order to enlarge their political 
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constituency. They have used the Lower House for boycotting the normalisation of 
relations with Israel 89 . As the government has restricted the political and public 
space within which the Islamists can operate, the latter have turned to Jordan's 
professional associations as an arena within which to voice dissenting opinions 90 . 
For the time being, the King has been able to muzzle the opposition. He has 
done so by a series of repressive moves unprecedented in Jordanian history. IAF 
deputies and other Muslim activists have been banned from delivering sermons in 
mosques. Mass rallies and marches by the opposition have been banned, the use of 
the media has been severely restricted and the security services have detained 
people for protesting against the peace treaty. 
The King has particularly warned the IAF against misusing Islam, which 
"cannot be against peace, it cannot side with darkness against light or with death 
against life", and vowed that the pulpits of mosques "may not ... serve as places for 
irresponsible expression in the name of Islam"91 . The monarch still holds the upper 
hand as far as the implementation of the treaty is concerned. As at other junctures, 
Islamists were reluctantly forced to respect their informal alliance with the palace and 
to follow its dictates. They have thus voted in parliament in favour of the treaty. 
As far as the domestic political process is concerned, Islamists, though 
seemingly supportive of the democratic process, are worried that newly legalised 
parties might prosper from a democratic system and emerge to constitute a threat to 
the Brotherhood's leading position in the country's polity. On the other hand, lslamists 
question the sincerity of the government's commitment to democracy when it 
92 harasses opposition parties and attempts to undermine their bases of support 
Repeated confrontations and continued government pressure on the IAF and the 
Brotherhood are spawning increasing bitterness and resentment. IAF deputies 
complain that the government has never discarded the practices of an uglier, less 
democratic era. 
On balance, the Islamist movement has not acted as a disruptive force posing 
a threat to the regime. Traditionally, the Islamic movement has pursued a non- 
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confrontational strategy aimed at participating in the official political framework. 
However, "it is foreign policy that could weaken, and possibly break, the traditional link 
between the King and the Muslim Brothers" 93 . Although Islamists have neither 
challenged the regime nor are strong enough to abort the Jordan - Israel peace 
agreement, they could create powerful obstacles to the continuation of the on-going 
peace process 94 . 
93 Gudrun Kramer, "The Integration of the Integrists", in Ghassan Salame (ed. ), Democracy Without 
Democrats? (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994), p. 221. 
94 This prospect is all the more real as criticism of the government's performance has extended beyond 
the organised Islamist and Leftist groups to traditional loyalists of the regime. L. Andoni, "Hussein's 
Toughest Dilemma", Middle East International, n° 500,26 May 1995: pp. 7-8; "Jordan is Being Driven 
to the Brink, Leading Dissident Warns King Hussein", Mideast Mirror (11), n° 26,6 February 1997: 
pp. 13-5; "Islamic Action Front Official on Flights to Israel, Turco-Israeli Accord", SNB, 
ME/2582/MIED, 10 April 1996: p. 8; "Islamic Deputy Calls for Cabinet Role for Islamists to "Monitor" 
Ties with Israel", SIiB, ME/2851/MED, 24 February 1997: p. 7. 
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2.3. Egyptian and Jordanian Islamists: A Contrasting Perspective 
2.3.1. Islamist Strategies and State Responses 
Egyptian and Jordanian Islamists have pursued different aims and adopted 
different approaches in their quest for the implementation of an Islamic order. and 
these variations derived from their particular orientation. The incumbent regimes have 
dealt with the Islamists in accordance with the prevailing ideological orientation of the 
state and political circumstances. Their responses have alternated between 
repression or toleration of the Islamists' political activities depending on the perceived 
challenge posed by the latter to the regime's supremacy. 
The existence of the Islamist groups in Egypt has been characterised by 
exclusion from political power due to government policies or particular ideologies or 
activities '5. The Muslim Brotherhood played a visible political role from the 1930s until 
the advent of Nasser but was not drawn into official parliamentary life. The 
Brotherhood's involvement in politics was most pronounced from 1945 to 1965, when 
it was implicated in assassinations of political opponents in both royal and 
revolutionary Egypt. It was such an attempt on Nasser's life that broke the 
movements's back and marginalised it in Egyptian politics for nearly 20 years. 
The Muslim Brotherhood's history in Jordan is altogether different. The group, 
which was founded in the 1940s with King Abdullah's blessing, enjoyed a close 
relationship with the monarchy. This rapport has at times been marked by 
disagreements over specific political issues, but these divergences have not damaged 
the relationship between the monarchy and the Brotherhood, which has provided the 
regime with an Islamic lustre 1. 
Thus while the MB in Egypt suffered from repression and had to survive in 
clandestinity, its counterpart in Jordan enjoyed considerable autonomy as the 
country's only legal organisation with a political expression. In the early 1970s, Sadat 
released Brotherhood leaders from prison and allowed them a reasonable measure of 
freedom. The leaders of the movement made the strategic decision to discard 
 Maha Azzam, "Egypt: The Islamists and the State Under Mubarak", in Abdel S. Sidahmed and 
Anoushiravan Ehteshatni (eds. ), Islamic Fundamentalism ( Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), p. 
110. 
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violence and opt for change by peaceful means. This decision was not accepted by a 
number of younger members and it led to the breakthrough of several groups from the 
Brotherhood's ranks. The anti-regime leanings of the Islamic Liberation Organisation 
and the Jihad Organisation were apparent in their deadly confrontations with the 
state, culminating with the assassination plot that took the life of presidentSadat on 6 
October 1981. 
The polarisation of the Islamist spectrum in Egypt between moderate and 
extremist groups is thus a reality that dates back to the early 1970s. UnderMubarak, 
the Jihad and other like-minded groups resumed their confrontation with the state 
through acts of defiance and violence. Meanwhile, the MB had clearly accepted 
political pluralism and parliamentary democracy as the road forward. Though still 
illegal as regards formal political participation, the movement formed coalitions with 
other political formations and became the major opposition in thePeople's Assembly. 
After the 1987 parliamentary elections, the MB became the dominant partner in the 
coalition. Access to official political life gave the movement visibility, political 
experience and enabled it to push for the implementation of its electoral platform 
which called for the implementation of the Sharia. 
2.3.2. Islamist Performance in an Altered Domestic Setting 
The Egyptian Islamists profited from the regime's political overtures to widen 
its constituency and its margin of manoeuvre in various instances of thesociopolitical 
life. In Jordan, the Islamist movement was able to put to advantage its accumulated 
political experience in the 1989 elections which marked the resurrection of 
parliamentary life under the King's policy of democratisation. The greatest success of 
the Jordanian Islamists came however during the Gulf war which deepened the level 
of political cooperation between them and the King. In January 1991, a Cabinet was 
formed in which the Islamic movement was represented for the first time. 
The 1990s have witnessed the declining fortunes of thelslamist movement in 
both Egypt and Jordan. In the latter country, the Islamists have spearheaded the 
opposition to the peace treaty with Israel and to normalisation of relations with the 
Beverly Milton-Edwards, "Climate of Change in Jordan's Islamist Movement", id.: p. 126. 
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Hebrew state. King Hussein has prevented the Islamists from becoming an assertive 
opposition by changing the electoral rules that had once given them access to power. 
In Egypt, the Islamists considerable political weight and the intensification of extremist 
violence against the state have put the regime on the defensive and have led 
Mubarak to hinder Islamist activity by all means at his disposal. 
In Egypt and Jordan, Islamists constitute powerful opposition forces that the 
incumbent regimes have to deal with. In both countries, the mainstream Islamist 
movement is tamed and, at the moment, under the control of the regime. In the case 
of Jordan, the Islamists have been allowed into the political process but their margin 
of manoeuvre has been highly limited and their capacity to voice dissenting opinions 
restricted. Egypt has opted for channelling Islamists into social and economic welfare 
activities where their work is appreciated and hindering them from entering the official 
political process. Contrary to Jordan, where the extremists fringes are effectively 
silenced, the Egyptian government has been faced with a widespread insurrection of 
radical Islamist groups that pose a real challenge to the state. 
PART II - THE UNITED STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
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3. U. S. Middle East Policy Making 
3.1. The Process of Middle East Policy Making 
The process by which U. S. decisions concerning the Middle East are made is 
complex, involving a great variety of actors and organisms often holding divergent 
positions and uneven abilities to exert leverage over the decision-making mechanism. 
At the centre of this process is the president (and the White House staff) since he has 
ultimate responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs 97. 
Actually, various governmental agencies are involved in the policy-making 
process: the State Department, the Defense Department, the Treasury Department, 
the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, and the Congress, 
among others. Adding to this complexity, the executive's action does not "... occur in 
a vacuum but in the context of world and regional politics and against the background 
of American domestic forces that condition policy-making" 99. 
In order to integrate these disparate forces, and evaluate the way they 
constrain and condition the process and substance of policy making, three distinctive 
approaches are offered. They stress the role of different elements in the process of 
policy formation and are often unidimensional explanations of this phenomenon. A 
best overall picture will be formed if they are considered as complementary. 
The bureaucratic and organisational theories 59 stress the power of the 
bureaucracy and its influence over the environment in which the executive is bound to 
take decisions concerning its foreign policy. This theory also points to the importance 
of the rivalries and different perspectives within and among the various agencies that 
play a role in the field of foreign affairs loo 
As far as the Middle East is concerned, analysts refer to the traditional rivalry 
between State Department and the White House, with the occasional involvement of 
the Defense Department. A classic example of this occurrence is the context in which 
" W. B. Quandt, "Domestic Influences on United States Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The View 
from Washington", in Belling, op. cit. : p. 264. See also Stephen E. Ambrose, "The Presidency and 
Foreign Policy", Foreign'1Jfrirs (70), n' 3, Winter 1991/92: p. 137. 
93 Lenczowslci, op. cit. pp. 4-5. 
See Spiegel, op. cit.: pp. 334-386. 
goo Quandt, Decade : p. 24. 
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the Jewish state was created: Truman's decision to recognise the state of Israel was 
vehemently opposed by his secretaries of state and defence, as well as by the whole 
apparatus behind them. 
The State Department has traditionally been an advocate of an even-handed 
policy toward the Middle Eastern states. It has often been thought of as sympathetic 
to Arab interests and as a fierce critic of the hands-off support provided by the 
executive and the Congress to Israel. Within the State Department, the Bureau of 
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs harbours the "Arabists", the experts that 
presumably urge a pro-Arab and more balanced Middle East policy on the Secretary 
of State and his under-secretaries. Seldom, it succeeds in pressing its views on the 
administration, as was the case with the plans in 1969 and 1970. The most frequent 
pattern, however, is that of its recommendations not being adopted by the executive 
and neutralised by the more powerful pro-Israeli pressures 101. 
Since the Truman era, these bureaucratic agencies have repeatedly, but 
unsuccessfully, criticised the high amounts of aid to Israel. Under Johnson, for 
instance, the Washington bureaucratic community was united against the 1968 
Phantom arms sale to Israel and the president still overlooked their views; during the 
Nixon administration, the bureaucracy tried again to prevent a new Phantom arms 
deal with Israel. Despite this opposition to Israeli pre-eminence in Washington and to 
the strength of Jewish forces in domestic politics, the various agencies generally do 
not challenge the basic U. S. policy towards Israel. Virtually all accept as a dogma the 
United States commitment to Israel's security. 
It should however be noted that bureaucratic efficacy in affecting policy is 
undermined by the divergent positions concerning specific policy courses, among the 
various agencies and within each of them. By and large, bureaucratic influence is 
quite limited 102. The "permanent government" is sometimes able to influence the 
executive, to mould options through the analytical papers it produces but, usually, the 
direction of foreign policy is set by higher officials 111. 
The one area in which bureaucrats usually succeed better is in delaying or 
accelerating policy formulation and in implementing decisions than in making 
decisions 104. A classic example of policy sabotage occurred during the May 1967 
1' Id.: pp. 25-6 and Quandt, "Domestic... ": p. 265. 
`0= Ibid. 
. 1° Spiegel, op. cit. : p. 386. 
10' Ibid. ; Quandt, Decade : pp. 27-8. 
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crisis: the Near East Bureau sought to undermine the "Red Sea Regatta" supported 
by the president, thus seriously constraining presidential choices. 
The domestic politics perspective stresses the role of domestic forces in the 
public arena and their impact on decision making. In a democratic society, like the 
United States, the political system is open to the competitive participation of interest 
groups and minorities. They try to achieve their goals by lobbying and exerting their 
influence on the members of Congress, and by trying to gain access to the executive. 
Congress, together with the press and the media, help shape public opinion which 
must be taken into account not only in the process of domestic decision making, but 
also in formulating and implementing foreign policy decisions. 
Mass public opinion generally does not matter much in the policy equation 
except in times of crisis. In a context like this, a president can appeal to higher 
national ideals and put aside domestic political considerations that would normally 
constrain his action, in order to engage military forces abroad. However, if the crisis 
drags on for long with a heavy cost in material and human resources, the executive's 
margin of action is reduced and public opinion thus becomes a force to be reckoned 
with. This confirms Quandt's assertion that the "... American mood concerning 
international affairs is remarkably volatile" 'os 
Another aspect that should be stressed is that the American media106 and the 
public are largely pro-Israel and prejudiced against the Arabs. The traditional pro- 
Israeli sentiment is a result of several factors: the Judeo-Christian attachment of the 
American public; sympathy for the plight of the Jewish people during World War II; the 
prejudice and ignorance toward the Arab and Muslim world; and the Jewish and pro- 
Israeli organisations" success in creating real and supposed bonds between the 
American and the Israeli people 107. Occasional exceptions to this pattern may be 
found: the media coverage of the intifada in the occupied territories had a profound 
negative impact on the American public as far as the Israeli policy was concerned. 
Public sentiment towards this country seems to be changing: a September 1994 poll 
conducted by the Council for the National Interest concluded that more than 53 
percent of the American public supported phasing out aid to Israel as soon as 
possible roe 
`os Id.: pp. 17-8. 
106 This pro-Israeli stance has changed after Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. See William A. Dorman. 
"; Media, Public Discourse and U. S. Policy" in Ainirahmadi (cd. ), op. cit.: p. 295. 
107 Rubenberg, op. cit. : p. 15. 
103 The Washington Times, December 6,1994. 
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A second factor to be considered in the domestic public arena is the role 
played by interest groups. Analysts generally point to the overwhelming power of the 
pro-Israeli lobby 101, especially during the presidential and congressional elections. 
Their unique success is commonly attributed to their remarkable organisational skills, 
to their huge material and financial resources and to the singular passionate 
commitment that the American Jewry displays toward Israel. Tillman says that their 
strength lies "... in the solid, consistent, and usually unified support of the Jewish 
community of the United States" 10. Rubenberg advances other explanations 
accounting for this phenomenon, namely: the congruence of the lobby's objectives 
with elite and mass perceptions; the ability of the lobby to tie Israel into the cold war 
anti-communist consensus; the evolving role of Congress on Middle East issues and 
the concomitant ability of the lobby to influence Congress; the lobby's ability to 
provide votes in greater quantities than its apparent size would suggest and at critical 
election periods "'. 
Many analysts would concur with Rubenberg's assertion that "... the power of 
the Israeli lobby over the formation and execution of U. S. Middle East policy has 
become a virtual stranglehold""', and would agree that its activity has been largely 
detrimental to the U. S. interests: "As a result of the lobby's activities and the high 
degree of receptiveness to its importunities on the part of Congress, successive 
presidents have been compelled to make a difficult choice - between adopting policies 
weighted on the side of Israeli wishes at the expense of other national interests and 
attempting to frame policies based on the totality of American interests, with resulting 
controversy and political risk to themselves" "'. 
Quandt acknowledges the existence of a powerful pro-Israeli lobby and a pro- 
Israeli predisposition in Congress and in the White House. Spiegel says that all 
presidents "... treated the pro-Israeli lobby as a political force to be reckoned with'"''. 
There is a common tendency by the several administrations of shunning away from 
1o9 The phrase "Israeli lobby" refers to the group of major Jewish organisations that concern themselves 
with Israel and with influencing the U. S. foreign policy towards the Israeli state. Chief among them are 
AIPAC (the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee), actually registered as a lobby, and the 
Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations. See Rubenberg, op. cit.: p. 354. 
"o Tillman. op. cit. : p. 54. 
11 Rubenberg, op. cit. : p. 15. 
Id. : p. 375. In the same vein, see also Paul Findley, They Dare toSpeak Out: People and Institutions 
Confront Israel's Lobby (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill, 1985). 
' Tillman, op. cit. : p. 62. 
114 Quandt, op. cit. p. 20; Spiegel, op. cit.: p. 388. 
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estranging or confronting Jewish activists in electoral periods, especially during the 
presidential campaigns. 
Despite the evidence, Spiegel concludes that the power of the Jewish lobby is 
a "myth" that politicians have an interest in perpetuating, either because it 
demonstrates their contribution to the Israeli cause, or because it shields them from 
criticism "s Both he and Quandt downplay the lobby's importance and argue that its 
influence has its limits: the activity of the lobby certainly raises the salience of pro- 
Israeli issues, but its impact and the feedback it provokes, has to do with the 
"preexisting beliefs" of the president or Congress, rather than with the demands of the 
interest groups "s. The study of the pattern of decision making within the executive 
branch evidences the fact that "... individual decisions are ordinarily made for reasons 
unrelated to domestic politics and then packaged so as to flatter the administration" 
117 
Other interest groups such as oil companies and pro-Arab lobbies do not enjoy 
the same degree of success and are less effective than the Israeli lobby in pressing 
for their interests. Oil companies have refrained from taking political positions on 
Middle East issues, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict although they are directly 
affected by the situation in the area. They have concentrated on bilateral U. S. -Arab 
relations and on obtaining commercial benefits, such as favourable tax write-offs. 
As for the Arab community in the United States, it has since 1907 created 
institutions designed to advance their interests in the political process. Their activity 
has a limited impact due to the lack of emotional commitment of Arab Americans and 
due to the divergences within the Arab American community, a reflection of the 
divided character of the Arab world itself 18. 
In order to be effective, interest groups must attempt to find allies in the 
political system interested in furthering their goals. These allies are mostly found in 
Congress, which is the most accessible part of the policy-making machinery 19. 
Congress, however, has a limited scope of action in the formulation of foreign policy. 
It does not determine the specifics of diplomacy and its intervention in the Arab-Israeli 
peace process has been negligible. On the other hand, it possesses some relevant 
"s 1d.: pp. 389. 
16 Quandt, op. cit. : p. 20. At times, it seems that both the President and the Congress are themselves 
representatives of the interest groups. 
I" Spiegel, op. cit. p. 388. 
"R Tillman, op. cit. p. 69. 
19 Quandt, op. cit. p. 21. 
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means of leverage: the approval of the levels of foreign aid, of major arms sales and, 
because of the War Powers Act, Congress is entitled to veto deployment of American 
troops for combat situations abroad beyond an initial 60-day period 120 
Congress has consistently exercised leverage on aid for Israel. It has regularly 
increased its amount above administration requests and has influenced arms sales 
favourably to the Jewish state. It has blocked arms sales to Arab countries, and more 
often objected to specific deals. Every U. S. military sale to Arab regimes has been 
facilitated by still greater provisions to Israel. The Congressional debates surrounding 
Carter's decision to sell sixty F-15s to Saudi Arabia in 1977 and the Reagan's 1981 
sale of AWACS to the same country, illustrate the difficulties of challenging the mass 
pro-Israeli sentiment in the legislative body. 
Quandt indicates that a determining feature of the American political system 
on foreign policy is the electoral cycle. This cycle, spanning a four-year period 
includes congressional elections every two years and the start of the pre-election 
period generally by the end of the third year. The author argues that successful 
presidents are bound to gear their moves according to this electoral cycle 121" 
Initiatives concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict are carefully studied to be launched at 
any given time (maximising the benefits and minimising the risks to the president's 
stand) due to the intractable nature of the conflict, to the complexity of the issue, to 
the high level of public interest and to the deep presidential involvement. Thus, the 
outcome of these initiatives affects the president's standing and his chances for 
reelection '22. 
The electoral cycle follows a consistent pattern: during the first year, 
presidents go through the process of learning about Middle East issues in their 
regional and global setting. They usually launch new initiatives in foreign policy. The 
second year is dominated by the congressional elections, which while rewarding 
success and support for the Israeli cause, penalises controversial moves. By the third 
year, presidents tend to press on rewarding initiatives and, alternatively, if the 
prospects do not look good, to disengage, often carelessly, from the political process. 
During the fourth and last year, presidents shy away from launching new plans, try to 
1=0 Quandt, Camp David : p. 7. 
Id. : p. 8. 
Id : p. 10. Neff highlights the importance of the peace process for the Clinton Administration, 
especially in a presidential election year. "Peace in the Middle East has been the greatest regional goal 
of the administration, and especially of Christopher, who is ending his public career": Middle East 
International, n° 521,15 March 1996: p. 8. 
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avoid controversy, go to great lengths to please the pro-Israeli forces and avoid 
displeasing the Arabs by deferring their demands '23. 
The domestic political forces passed in review generally constrain but do not 
determine the formulation of American Middle East policy124. They "... are likely to 
make issues more prominent, to define possible costs of a given course of action, and 
to set outer limits beyond which policy makers will venture only at their peril"125. They 
shape the environment surrounding decision makers, but they do not dictate policy 
courses. 
The presidential leadership perspective focuses on the interplay of individuals, 
especially the president and his chief advisers, and tries to draw out the dominating 
worldviews of the top decision makers 126. Spiegel argues that American foreign policy 
is determined by: the basic assumptions of the president; the individuals on whom he 
relies for advice; the decision making system that results from the specific functioning 
of each administration and which converts ideas into policies. Consequently, 
American Middle East foreign policy is the result of presidential activity and 
assumptions, which are to a greater or lesser extent influenced by the key 
personalities that surround the president, their conceptual frame of reference and the 
way they interact. Domestic political forces, the press, the media, Congress and the 
bureaucracy exert an important influence and pose certain constraints to presidential 
action; however, they do not basically alter the executive's undertaking. This 
approach considers that "... all presidents enter the White House with specific 
assumptions that prove remarkably resistant to the effects of outside forces - interest 
groups, events and crisis in the area, the bureaucracy"127. 
As a result, the greatest changes in U. S. policy occur when a new 
administration takes office thus bringing in a new foreign policy team. The ideological 
predispositions of the occupants of the White House are the features that make up for 
a new approach to world affairs. The record of American Middle East policy shows 
that the greatest changes in policy directions occurred when a new president 
assumes office from a different party: it happened concretely in the passing of the 
Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon, Carter and Reagan administrations " 
128 
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3.2. Patterns of Republican and Democratic Middle East Policy Making 
An analysis of the most relevant patterns of Republican and Democratic 
approach to the Middle East confirms Pipes' assumption that American policy towards 
the area has a non-ideological character. He argues that "Israeli and Arab 
sympathisers are found across the spectrum of mainstream political life, without 
reference to party affiliation, philosophical standpoint, or global foreign policy 
objectives" 12' and that "... election platforms to the contrary, there is no Republican or 
Democratic position on the Middle East" '30. 
He further claims that Middle East politics fall outside the usual 
conservative/liberal debate, since there is no clear cut ideological predisposition that 
would favour either the Arab or the Israeli side. In fact, it is possible to detect in 
Congress the disruption of the traditional polarity of right/left politics, and, instead, to 
find single issue coalitions that attract support from across the whole spectrum of 
political forces. This absence of polarisation gives the president a wider margin of 
action and greater flexibility even in the deployment of armed forces to the region 13' . 
This deemphasis of ideology in American Middle East policy is explained by 
the non-ideological nature of American interests in the region: the pre-eminence of 
financial and security concerns generally stand above partisan considerations, while 
religious beliefs (especially sympathy for the Israeli cause) are a field where personal 
132 feelings dilute concern about national interests . 
These considerations notwithstanding, there is a constant feature that shapes 
party politics: a stronger commitment to Israel on the part of the Democrats than on 
the Republicans. Democratic presidential candidates are also more dependent on 
Jewish financial contributions and on the Jewish vote than their counterparts. It 
seems that since 1916 no Democrat has been elected president without winning at 
least 70 percent of the Jewish vote "'. 
This feature of the Democratic approach to the Middle East is put forth in the 
table below, which also presents other major thrusts of the Republican and Democrat 
'29 Daniel Pipes, The Long Shadow (Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1990): p. 242. 
'30 Id.: p. 243. 
'" Id.: pp. 257-8. 
"=1d.: p. 250,253. 
"' "Thomas A. Dine (executive-director of AIPAC) quoted in Rubenberg, op. cit. : p. 357. 
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administrations' foreign policy toward the region. Each administration is characterised 
according to the following general parameters '34 : 
1. pro-Israeli tilt / sympathy for Israeli goals 
2. pro-Arab tilt / sympathy for Arab goals 
3. level of involvement in Middle Eastern issues / in the Middle East 
4. level of involvement in Arab-Israeli peacemaking 
5. Middle Eastern issues in the context of the global balance of power 
DEMOCRATS 
TRUMAN - sympathy for Zionist aspirations 
1945 - 52 - the Middle East: low priority concern 
- concern with the Soviet threat in the area 
KENNEDY - "strategic relationship" with Israel 
1961 - 63 - sympathy for Arab nationalism 
JOHNSON - pro-Israeli tilt 
1963 - 68 - support to pro-Western / conservative regimes 
- high involvement in the Middle East 
- focus on a solution to the Arab conflict 
14 Only the relevant parameters are applied to each administration, according to the main concerns 
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CARTER - pro-Palestinian 
1976-80 - the Middle East understood as the Arab-Israeli dispute 
- high involvement in peacemaking 
CLINTON - close alliance with Israel 
1992 -1996 - high involvement in the Middle East peace process 
EISENHOWER - antipathy for Israeli pressures 
1952 - 61 - opposition to Arab nationalism but improvement in 
relations with the Arabs (as a means to limit Soviet 
expansion) 
- high level of involvement in the Middle East 
- the Middle East as an arena for containing the Soviets 
NIXON - Israel as a proxy state 
1968 - 74 - the Middle East: high priority area 
- high involvement in Middle East peacemaking 
- the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict as 
subordinate to global balance of power considerations 
FORD - cooling of relations with Israel 
1974 - 76 - high involvement in Middle East peacemaking 
REAGAN - Israel as a "strategic asset" 
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REAGAN - Israel as a "strategic asset" 
1980 - 88 - high involvement in the Middle East/Persian Gulf 
- high involvement in peacemaking 
BUSH - devaluation of the Israeli connection 
1988 - 92 - the Middle East as the exponent of the "new world 
order": military intervention in the Arabian Peninsula 
Persian Gulf 
- high involvement in peacemaking 
The chart shows that Democratic presidents were more favourable to Israeli 
goals (due largely to electoral considerations, like Truman and Kennedy), with the 
noteworthy exception of Carter, who repeatedly confronted Israeli supporters. 
Republican presidents often antagonised the Israelis (mainly Eisenhower and Bush; 
Nixon and Ford at certain stages of the disengagement negotiations), although during 
electoral periods all favoured an approximation. Reagan was the only Republican 
president who came to office with a strong pro-Israel bias (Nixon and Ford, although 
consolidating the U. S. -Israeli relationship, tried to pursue an even-handed approach to 
the Arab-Israeli dispute). 
Republican presidents were more involved than the Democratic ones with 
Middle Eastern issues and the peace process and gave higher priority to this area. 
This feature has to do with the fact that Republicans presided over some of the most 
critical periods in the Middle East (the 1954 crisis, the War of Attrition, the Yom Kippur 
War, Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, theintifada and the Gulf War). As a result of 
the tension engendered in the Middle East, of global balance of power and domestic 
considerations presidents like Nixon, Ford, Reagan and Bush had to grapple with the 
intricacies of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Nixon/Ford presidencies produced the 
disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt and Egypt and Syria. The Bush 
administration launched the negotiating process that in 1993 delivered the second 
most important Palestinian-Israeli accord after the Camp David autonomy framework. 
The Democrats were normally less engaged with the affairs of the area. 
Truman only reluctantly dealt with the Palestine issue; Johnson had to cope with the 
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1967 crisis and its denouement, and gave only a lukewarm contribution to the 
resolution of the Arab-Israeli peace process (Resolution 242). Carter, however, put 
the Arab-Israeli dispute at the forefront of his diplomatic agenda, while Clinton cashed 
in on the initiative of his predecessor. He has continued the process mainly on the 
Syrian-Israeli tracks, showing little personal involvement on the Israeli-Palestinian 
question. 
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4. Major Trends in the U. S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East 
4.1. The USSR's Bid For Hegemony in the Middle East 
4.1.1. Initial Attempts at Containment: the Truman Doctrine, the Baghdad Pact, and 
the Eisenhower Doctrine 
Until World War I American activity in the Middle East concentrated mainly on 
cultural matters. U. S. policy in the area concerned itself with the protection of 
American citizens and of their rights to preach, to teach and to trade. American 
missionaries were the principal envoys of its country and established fine educational 
institutions, thus serving as a vehicle of Western cultural penetration in the area'. 
During the interwar period, American presence in the Middle East was largely 
that of oil companies in search of concessions. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 
World War I created the opportunity for the United States to penetrate the political and 
economic life of the region. The United States endorsed the principle of the Open 
Door policy which prohibited the governing powers of restricting the participation of 
other countries in the commercial interests of the area. The mandate system fulfilled 
all the requisites to allow for the entry of capitalist forces in the area and for the 
stability required to do business. 
After the War, the Soviet Union sought security in the South. The Soviet Union 
and previously Russia had had long-term interests in the Middle East although it was 
primarily since World War II that Soviet involvement became both intensive and 
extensive. One of the distinctive features of Russian imperialism throughout history 
was its expansion into territories contiguous to former Russian areas, resulting in the 
creation of a territorially compact empire. The Middle East was of the highest strategic 
and political importance. It provided waterways that were of major importance to the 
'" John C. Campbell, Defense of the . diddle East (NY: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 29. 
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Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, so maintenance of the right of free passage 
was a central Soviet interest '36. 
World War II increased Soviet interest in the Middle East and facilitated a 
more effective pursuit of its goals in the area. The Kremlin declared that "the area 
south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognised as 
the centre of the aspirations of the Soviet Union"137. Thus, the dominant concern of 
American foreign policy in the immediate post-war period was finding effective ways 
to check Soviet expansionism. When applied to the Middle East, this meant using all 
means available to prevent the Russians from filling the power vacuum being created 
by gradual withdrawal of old colonial powers. 
The interrelated objectives of containing Soviet attempts to gain the upper 
hand in the Middle East and preserving access to the region's strategic facilities and 
vital resources required the development of effective tactical doctrines to attain the 
designated goals. The focus of the U. S. Middle Eastern policy was twofold: 
- the promotion of peace and stability; 
- the recruitment of regional partners to assist the United States in containing 
the Soviet Union. 
The first orientation consisted in guaranteeing the territorial status quo and 
keeping the established political order in place as much as possible. Local disputes 
and radical processes of change were considered to provide appropriate grounds for 
Soviet/Communist activity. In fact, the wave of nationalism was among the earliest in 
colonial areas and could be expected to intensify after the war 138 
The policy of containing Soviet advances developed gradually during the post- 
war years. Early in 1945 the Soviet government terminated its long-standing treaty of 
1925 with Turkey and made outright demands for basis on the Straits and for a 
sizeable part of Turkey's territory. Coming in the period when the Western powers 
were doing their utmost to lay the basis for long-term cooperation, these demands 
provided a clear test to the will and ability of the West to call a halt to further Soviet 
expansionism. 
16 See R. C. Nation, "The Sources of Soviet Involvement in the Middle East: Threat or Opportunity? ", 
in Marc V. Kauppi and R. C. Nation, The Soviet Union and the Middle East in the 1980s (Lexington, 
Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1983), pp. 42-8. 
"' Quoted in Alexander J. Bennet, "The Soviet Union", in Bernard Reich (ed. ), The Powers in the 
Middle East (NY: Praeger, 1987), p. 111. 
"g John S. Badeau, The American Approach to the Arab World (NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 
1968), pp. 17-18. 
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Parallel Soviet pressures were being exerted on Iran: Russia attempted to set 
up puppet regimes in Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan after the agreed date for the 
evacuation of Allied forces. This delicate situation was reinforced by the presence of 
Soviet troops which constituted a menace to the integrity of Iran. The Soviets also 
intended to pressure Greece to provide a naval base in the Dodecanese islands, a 
request that was not well received because of the active Russian support of 
communist guerrillas in the north of the country. 
President Truman and his principal advisors, particularly Secretary Forrestal, 
saw the Soviet moves as a direct threat to American security. In the year of 1946 they 
took several crucial decisions that gave proof of a determination not to let Soviet 
power move into the Middle East 139. 
American steadfastness also reflected a definite conception of the importance 
of the Middle East itself to the United States. President Truman expressed this idea in 
1951: "The Near and the Middle East contain vast natural resources ... lie across the 
most convenient route of land, air and water communication ... might become an 
arena of intense rivalry among outside powers ... "140. The view affirming the strategic 
importance of the area was reinforced when it became clear that Britain was unable to 
keep on supporting Greece and Turkey. 
Acting Secretary of State Acheson believed in a version of the "domino theory" 
in the context of the Middle East: should Greece and Turkey fall to the Soviet Union 
other states would soon follow the same path, irrevocably entering the orbit of that 
superpower. 
Thus, with the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine14' and the implementation 
of Public Law 75, which authorised aid to Turkey and Greece, the United States 
joined the power struggle which had been taking place in the Near East throughout 
1° The decisions taken by Truman regarding the situation in the Middle East are the following: 
- the sending of the battleship `; Missouri" to Istanbul; 
- the rejection of Moscow's formal demands for a new regime of the Turkish Straits including their 
"joint defense" by the USSR and Turkey; 
- the strong stand on Iran, which led to the withdrawal of 
Soviet forces and the eventual collapse of the 
Soviet-sponsored regime in Azerbaijan; 
- the rejection of Soviet demands on Greece and the 
Italian colonies in the peace treaty negotiations. See 
Campbell, op. cit., p. 33 and Monteagle Steams, Entangled Allies (NY: Council on Foreign Relations 
Press, 1992). 
140 Quoted in Naseer H. Aruri, "U. S. Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict", in Hooshang 
Amirahmadi (ed. ), The United States in the Middle East (NY: State University of New York Press, 
1993), p. 91. 
141 The doctrine said that: "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are 
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures... ", Steams, op. cit. : p. 19. 
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World War II and the post-war years. The progressive decline of British presence in 
the Arab world, forced the United States to consider the organisation of joint defence, 
and therefore to face the difficult problems involved with concealing divergent 
interests, some of them already contaminated by the rising wave of Arab nationalism. 
By the early fifties, the American government was most concerned with the 
military aspects of what Secretary of State was later to call "northern tier" of nations 
(Pakistan, Iran and Turkey), the countries that were the most aware of the Soviet 
"menace" and the most likely to take steps against it. According to Dulles, 
containment was to become an aggressive encirclement strategy142. In 1954 the U. S. 
government invited Turkey and Greece to join NATO (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation) as full members. In February 1955 Turkey and Iraq signed the Mutual 
Cooperation Pact which was open to all other states concerned with "peace and 
security" in the region. The Baghdad Pact was thus created with the British 
adherence; the mentor of this organisation, the United States, did not become a 
member although it was represented on various committees of the alliance 143. 
The Baghdad Pact had a decisive influence in the emerging alignments of the 
Middle East. This Western initiative to organise the defence of the Middle East had 
ignored the strong feelings of Arab nationalism and the major political trends in the 
Arab world. The whole conception of the Pact brought about an immediate 
deterioration of American relations with those Arab states in which Nasser had then a 
strong influence first Syria, then Saudi Arabia, and for a time Jordan. Overall, and as 
Campbell remarks, "the gap between the northern tier and the southern tier of states 
had been fatefully widened, creating opportunities for Soviet penetration of the Arab 
world which Moscow was not slow to exploiti144 
In September 1955, Nasser concluded an arms purchase agreement with 
Czechoslovakia through the intermediary of the Soviet Union. Nasser turned to the 
Soviets after desultory negotiations with the United States: he came to the conclusion 
that he could not expect to keep his country's independence by accepting the 
American help. The following years Nasser took drastic decisions that would 
142 "The basic objective was to build a series of interlocking alliances along the peripheries of the Soviet 
Union. In the Middle East the plan was to establish a link between NATO in Europe and SEATO in the 
Far East by drawing countries friendly to the West and suspicious of the Soviet Union into a common 
security system. "; Alan R. Taylor, The Superpowers and the Middle East (NY: Syracuse University 
Press, 1991), p. 58. 
103 Iran and Pakistan also entered the Pact. With the withdrawal of Iraq in 1958, the alliance system 
became the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) and practically ceased to exist. 
1°' Campbell, op. cit. : pp. 61-2. 
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irreversibly mark his course of action: he accepted the Soviet aid for the construction 
of the Aswan Dam and he nationalised the Suez Canal Company, the event which 
was the immediate cause of the 1956 Sinai campaign. 
In face of these facts, President Eisenhower deemed necessary to make a 
declaration stating that the security frontiers of the United States extended to the 
Middle East as they did to Europe and Asia, while raising the aid programs and 
making them a more flexible instrument of policy for the future 145. Eisenhower 
proposed, in short, that the United States should uphold its resolve to support the 
sovereignty of each and every nation of the Middle East against the aggressive 
designs of the Soviet Union. 
The first test of the Eisenhower Doctrine occurred in Jordan in April 1957 
where the Hashemite King Hussein's pro-Western stance was challenged by his own 
prime minister, Nabulsi, a defender of Arab nationalism 146. A second attack on a 
nationalist movement took place in Syria in the Fall of 1957, which led the United 
States to believe that Syria's neutralist move carried an explicit threat to the stability 
of its neighbours 147. A full-blown intervention under the Eisenhower Doctrine finally 
took place in Lebanon in 1958148. 
At the close of the year 1959 the United States had perhaps less direct 
influence in the Arab Middle East than at any time. The American administration's 
"S The message addressed to the Congress on January 5,1957 enunciated the following intentions: 
- Congress authorisation to the President to employ, as he deemed necessary the anned forces of the 
United States to secure and protect the integrity and independence of any nation or group of nations in 
the Middle East requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by 
international communism; 
- authorise the Executive to undertake programs of military aid to any such nation controlled by 
international communism; 
- authorise cooperation with them in the development of economic strength for the maintenance of their 
national independence. See Campbell, op. cit. : p. 122. 
`6 Although this affair was primarily internal, the State Department called attention to "the threat to the 
independence and integrity of Jordan by international communism as King Hussein himself stated" and 
announced an emergency grant of $10 million to the Jordanian government. See Campbell, op. cit. : p. 
129. 
147 A series of Syrian actions -a trade agreement with Moscow, the expulsion of three American 
diplomats for their involvement in a conspiracy against the Syrian government, and several other 
incidents - led officials in Washington to believe that the oil pipelines running through Syria were 
about to fall into communist hands and that the Soviets were on the verge of turning Syria into a Soviet 
base. 
148 In 1957, catalysed by the Lebanese government's own domestic and foreign policies, civil strife 
erupted between Lebanese Arab nationalists and pro-Western Maronites. Initially, the United States was 
reluctant to intervene, but on July 14 a coup d'etat took place in Iraq, home of the Baghdad Pact, and 
the monarchy was replaced by General Qassem, a reputed Nassente. When the new Iraqi government 
allied itself with the United Arab Republic, fear of spreading instability in the region led Eisenhower to 
send troops to Lebanon. Washington eventually removed its troops and the country reverted, with the 
former's approval, to non-aligned status. 
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overriding concern with the threat of the Soviet Union and international communism, 
led to a misperception of the nature and strength of Arab nationalism - an essentially 
indigenous movement anchored on the reality and experience of the peoples of the 
region, whose circumstantial alliance with communism rested on purely pragmatic 
considerations. 
4.1.2. The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Potential for Soviet Interference 
A major avenue for Soviet thrusts in the Middle East was the exploitation of 
the Palestinian issue, perceived as the Achilles heel of American policy in the Middle 
East. Soviet support for the Palestinian movement increasingly became a function of 
the Soviet-American competition. American staunch support for Israel served 
Moscow's ends, since it alienated Arab governments and peoples. 
In fact, Israel served as the main vehicle for Soviet ascendancy in the Arab 
world. Goldmann affirmed: "the existence of Israel is vital to the USSR's position in 
the Arab world because, in view of the strong hostility to communism felt by most of 
the Arab people, had it not been for Russia's support for the Arabs in their conflict 
with Israel the Arabs would have become clients of the West" 149. 
Soviet support for the Palestinian cause evolved after 1954, when Soviet 
delegates began to support the Arab position in an increasing number of U. N. (United 
Nations) debates. However, Moscow did not support PLO's pretensions in full, in 
particular the official PLO position calling for the destruction of Israel. It had 
consistently adopted the position that the Israeli state was there to stay and that 
changing this fact by a war was politically impossible and practically not feasible. The 
Soviets" main concern was the preservation of unity among Palestinian ranks in order 
to maximise anti-Israel force in the region 150. 
The Soviet attitude regarding the major Arab-Israeli conflicts followed a 
consistent pattern. Although standing by its Arab allies, Soviet policy was in general 
led by caution at times of crisis by carefully limiting its own support and involvement 
and otherwise trying to restrain its Arab partners from rash and dangerous action. 
149 Nahum Goldmann, "Israeli Policy: Proposals for Action", Journal of Palestine Studies (IV), Winter 
1975: pp. 128-9. 
150 See Bennet, "The Soviet Union": pp. 113-4. 
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Glassman writes that "... while Russian behaviour has evolved in a less cautious 
direction, particularly in the period of the Yom Kippur War, there has been no overall 
absence of restraint on the part of Moscow. Soviet supplies of potentially decisive 
arms, such as regionally strategic weapons and weapons permitting overwhelming 
offensive results on the ground, have often been highly restricted"151 
When Arab-Israeli tensions reached a stage of acute crisis and hostilities 
threatened or actually broke out, the United States and the USSR risked being 
directly involved in the conflict. As Peter Mangold points out "... every Middle Eastern 
conflict has raised the spectre of superpower confrontations" 152" The one really 
dangerous near confrontation took place during the 1973 War. After the Israelis had 
succeeded in crossing the Suez Canal and began the encirclement of the Egyptian 
Third Army, they gained Kissinger's agreement to a cease-fire (Resolution 339). Both 
sides accepted it although the Israelis were in a position to turn back an Egyptian Red 
Cross convoy from Cairo carrying medical supplies and blood plasma for the Third 
Army. Desperate, Sadat called upon the Russians and Americans to enforce the 
cease-fire by sending their own forces. On October 24,1973, the Soviets sent a note 
to the American government suggesting either a joint intervention or, should the 
Americans decline, a unilateral Soviet move to do so. The administration called for an 
American military alert that would increase the worldwide readiness of both 
conventional and nuclear weapons: "It was potentially the most serious confrontation 
with the Soviet Union since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962" ". 
Other episodes illustrate the potential of Soviet-American collision. The 
destruction of the American intelligence-gathering ship "Liberty" in the Mediterranean 
during the 1967 war initially led the Americans to believe that the Soviet Union - and 
not Israel - was behind the attack on the ship. In any event, the "Liberty" incident - in 
conjunction with the U. S. -Soviet contest over the Golan Heights - put into perspective 
the linkage between the Arab-Israeli conflict and superpower's relationship 154. 
"' Jon D. Glassman writes that the extent of Soviet support and involvement in its Arab allies' wars 
depended on (a) the degree of support that the Soviets were willing to give to Arab "progressives", (b) 
the degree of success the Arab clients enjoyed, (c) the degree to which the Western powers were viewed 
as a source of military danger to the U. S. S. R.. SeeArms for the Arabs (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1975), p. 191. 
Superpower Intervention in the Middle East, (London: Croom Helm, 1978: p. 164. 
Steven C. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1985), p. 263 
111 See Cheryl A. Rubenberg, Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination 
(Champaign, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1986), pp. 125-6 and Stephen Green, Taking Sides: 
Amnerica's Secret Relations with a Militant Israel (Boston: Faber and Faber, 1984), pp. 212-42. 
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During the War of Attrition, in 1969-70, the threat of a direct clash between 
Soviet and Israeli forces kept open the possibility of American involvement if the 
Israelis were seriously affected. In fact, by early 1970 Egypt was being battered by 
Israeli "deep penetration" raids, in order to force Nasser to divert some of its forces 
from the highly-exposed canal area, but also with the aim of discrediting the Egyptian 
leader at home'. Offering careful explanations to the United States, the USSR 
began to take over Egypt's air defence with Soviet missile crews and Soviet-piloted 
fighter planes. An American-mediated cease-fire went into effect along the canal on 
August 8,1970, suspending the War of Attrition, but leaving the Soviets as the main 
keepers of Egyptian's air defences. 
The 1970 Jordan crisis proved to be another occasion susceptible of drawing 
superpower confrontation. The United States feared that the conflict in Jordan might 
ignite an Arab-Israeli war if Israel were forced to step in order to help King Hussein 
suppress the internal revolt. The possibility of a U. S. -Soviet confrontation would 
become a reality once Egypt and the Soviet Union decided to intervene in order to 
help their Syrian ally. As the situation evolved, there was nothing to indicate that the 
Soviet Union was seriously considering any direct move. In fact, and as Quandt 
remarks, Nixon and Kissinger overreacted to the situation and overemphasised "... the 
global U. S. -Soviet dimension of the crisis. The Soviets had comparatively little at 
stake in Jordan. Once Syrian units did enter Jordan in the September crisis, the 
Soviets adopted a cautious policy. They made no threats. Instead, they warned 
against all outside intervention in Jordan, called for a cease-fire, and pointedly took 
credit subsequently for making demarches in Damascus to bring the fighting to an 
end" '5. 
It is accurate to affirm that, despite the course of the events, neither 
superpower had an interest in the actual wars of 1967 and 1973. Both, however, were 
drawn, with less than deliberate consent, into the role of non-combatant belligerents 
and, subsequently, as mediators to end the crisis. As Jacob Bercovitch points out: "If 
there is a paradox in superpower-client relations in the Middle East, it is to be found in 
the fact that increasing client dependence on the superpowers (mainly for military and 
economic aid) coincides with increased independent initiatives by the client states - 
Iss See William B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions (Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1977), 
p. 95. 
156 Quandt, op. cit.: p. 124-5. 
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initiatives that are often at variance with, or in defiance of, the patron's interests... "". 
Thus, the supply of modem weaponry enabled the Middle Eastern states to embark 
on military adventures harmful to Soviet interests, with the further drawback of 
potentially drawing the USSR into wars it did not want to fight (1956,1967,1973). 
Although the Soviet Union has been the main arms supplier to the Arab 
confrontation states, the Soviets have consistently sought a political rather than purely 
military settlement of the Middle East conflict, and by their involvement in the 
diplomacy of the Arab-Israeli conflict from the partition plan of 1947 to the drawing up 
of Security Council Resolution 242 in 1967 and the convening of the failed Geneva 
Conference in 1973 158. The Soviets were, however, increasingly excluded from the 
peace process as Secretary of State Kissinger took centre stage with his "step by 
step" policy of limited disengagement agreements. Moscow was not in a position to 
deliver a peace settlement, because it lacked the leverage over both sides (Israel/the 
Arabs), nor was it willing to support a military solution, because it feared a 
confrontation with the United States 159. 
The October 1,1977 joint statement on the Middle East relaunched for a short 
period the Soviet role as co-chairman of the long delayed Geneva Peace 
Conference. 160 However, this initiative was short-lived and faded under the wave of 
criticisms from the Israeli and pro-Israeli lobbies in the United States. 
During the 1980s the Soviets were largely absent from the peace process. 
Under Gorbatchev's new thinking, the Soviets made it clear that they no longer had 
any specific positions on an Arab-Israeli settlement aside from a general principle: 
that of Israel's right to security, along with the Palestinian right to self-determination. 
15' Jacob Bercovitch, "Superpowers and Client States. Analysing Relations and Patterns of Influence", 
in Moshe Efrat and Jacob Bercovitch (eds. ), Superpowers and Client States in the Middle East: The 
Imbalance of Influence (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 28. 
"8 Seth P. Tillman, The United States in the Middle East (Bloomington, In.: Indiana University Press, 
1982), p. 251. 
's9 See Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., "The Soviet Role in the Middle East: An American View", in The 
Middle East Journal (39), n° 4, Autumn 1985. 
'6o The major innovations of this deal included the endorsement by the Soviet Union of "normal 
peaceful relations" between Israel and its Arab neighbours instead of the mere termination of 
belligerency referred to in Security Council Resolution 242, while the United States, for its part, 
acknowledged the Palestinians to have "rights" and not only "interests" (a rather neutral designation). 
The statement called for a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and it provided for 
Israel military withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 war, resolution of the Palestinian 
questions including assurance of the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinian people; termination of the 
state of war and the establishment of "normal peaceful relations" among the parties; measures to 
guarantee the security of borders between Israel and its Arab neighbours including the establishment of 
demilitarised zones and the stationing in them of U. N. troops as observers. See Tillman, op. cit. : p. 231. 
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Moscow would rather find acceptable any arrangements agreed upon by the parties to 
the conflict's'. 
In the aftermath of the Gulf crisis, the Soviet Union was finally allowed to 
cooperate with the United States in the post-war peace efforts. By this time, 
Gorbatchev appeared to be demanding no more than symbolic participation and it 
virtually endorsed every American, Egyptian and even Israeli move 162. 
4.1.3. The Decline of Soviet Influence in the Middle East 
Soviet influence in the Middle East reached its zenith in the period between 
the 1967 and the Yom Kippur War. Sadat's defection to the American orbit constituted 
a major setback for Soviet policy in the area. Egypt constituted the linchpin of 
Moscow's policy in the Middle East and of all Third World countries, it had benefited 
from the largest amount of Soviet assistance. 
In the late 1970s, the negative reaction in much of the Arab world to Sadat's 
dramatic moves toward peace with Israel opened up opportunities for the Soviets to 
improve their tenuous position in the Middle East. Though they had some success in 
identifying with the Arab opposition to Sadat by expressing their own hostility to Camp 
David and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, they were never really able to orchestrate 
an Arab front movement against the peace process. The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War 
in 1980 dealt a serious blow to Soviet plans: not only did it cause a major split in the 
Arab world and diverted attention from the Arab-Israeli conflict, it also led to an 
improvement in U. S. ties to Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states 163V More 
importantly, the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan tarnished Moscow's anti-imperialist 
image and discredited the USSR as the Arab countries' natural partner. 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan rekindled U. S. fears about a new thrust of 
Soviet expansionism. The Carter Doctrine and Reagan policies in the Gulf were 
formulated as warnings that any attempt to move into the Persian Gulf arena would 
16' Galia Golan, Moscow and the Middle East (London: R. I. I. AJPinter, 1992), p. -12. 
'6 Id.: p. 44. 
'63 Robert 0. Freedman, , Moscow and the Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 
p. 11. 
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be actively resisted by the United States. However, Soviet policy quickly re-assumed 
its more traditional non-assertive stance 164 
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the subsequent American intervention 
renewed the tensions between the superpowers. On two separate occasions in 1983 
Moscow faced a possible confrontation with the United States because of Syrian 
actions in Lebanon. However, in both instances Moscow chose not to back the 
provocative actions of its Syrian ally. In fact, this event marked the low point of Soviet 
influence in the Middle East. Not only did the USSR fail to provide any meaningful 
political or military assistance to the PLO and the Syrian army, it also failed to 
dissuade the United States to commit its forces to Lebanon165. Atherton argues that 
"the Soviets, who have historically sought to exploit regional conflicts and tensions to 
strengthen their position, have been unable to exploit turmoil in the Middle East over 
the past several years to their advantage"'ss 
As the decade drew to a close, growing Soviet disengagement from regional 
conflicts and the withdrawal of support to radical movements, emerged as 
consequences of Gorbatchev's "new thinking". The 1990 Gulf crisis brought the 
Soviet Union to the centre of major developments in the Middle East in a dramatic 
way. The Gulf War, coming at a time of acute economic crisis and domestic political 
upheaval in the USSR., confirmed the eclipse of the Soviet position in the Middle East 
167. The collapse of the USSR dealt a deadly blow to the external policy of the new 
Russia. Between 1991 and 1993 it was hard to perceive whether Russia even had a 
Middle East policy. Meanwhile, the United States had emerged as the top external 
player in the region. 
On balance, evidence of Soviet behaviour shows that Moscow's policies in the 
Middle East did not conform to a pattern of aggressive and reckless expansionism 
and that, most of the time, Soviet policy carefully avoided confrontation with the 
164 Richard Cottam argues that in general the Soviet behaviour in the Middle East was marked by a 
certain passivity and was defensive rather than expansionist. The invasion of Afghanistan was the most 
aggressive action in the Middle East since the Azerbaijan intervention in 1945. See "U. S. policy in the 
Middle East", in Amirahmadi, op. cit.: p. 46. 
gas Robert 0. Freedman, "Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since Camp David", in Robert 0. 
Freedman (ed. ), The Middle East Since Camp David (Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1984), p. 22. 
166 fired L. Atherton, Jr., "The Soviet Role in the Middle East: An American View", The Middle East 
Journal (39), n° 4, Autumn 1985: p. 706. 
167 Robert 0. Freedman, `; Moscow and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait", in Robert 0. Freedman (ed. ), The 
; Cuddle East After Iraq s Invasion of Kuwait (Gainesville, Fl.: University Press of Florida, 1993), pp. 
125-6. 
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United States. Contrary to mainstream American political thinking after World War II, 
168 the U. S. S. R. never "mortally challenged" the United States in the Arab world 
4.2. Defence of the Oil Interests 
4.2.1. Oil: "Strategic Power" and "Material Prize" 
American interest in the oil resources of the Middle East developed after World 
War I when the U. S. and the British competed for control of the oil resources of the 
region, with each backing the pretensions of its corporate nationals 169. American 
claims were shored up by the Open Door principle 10. By the beginning of World War 
II the United States had already forced the British to concede oil interests in Kuwait, 
Bahrain, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. 
The most significant concession was that of Saudi Arabia. In 1933 the first 
agreement between an American oil company (later to be known as ARAMCO, the 
Arabian-American Oil Company) and Saudi Arabia. By the end of World War II an 
American official in the Middle East considered Saudi oil resources "a stupendous 
source of strategic power, and one of the greatest material prizes in world history'" 71 . 
They were nominally in American hands. 
The demand for fuel led by the economic reconstruction of Western Europe (in 
support of the Marshall Plan) and Japan grew rapidly. A 1951 study - the "Paley 
Report" - acknowledged the increasing degree of U. S. dependence on foreign 
suppliers of oil. It also asserted that the protection of the oil resources in the Middle 
168 This phrase was included in NSC-68, a highly influential document drafted in 1950 by State and 
Defense Department officials; see Tillman, op. cit. : p. 239. 
169 J. Stork says about U. S. government assistance to the penetration of U. S. firms in the Middle East: 
"No other industry ... 
has ever created quite the same degree of symbiosis with the government, one 
reflected in the mutuality of policies and exchanges of personnel The major oil companies then became 
the chief and most visible advocates of a foreign policy that stressed American national interest in 
gaining access to foreign oil resources"; diddle East Oil and Energy Crisis , 
NY, Monthly Review 
Press, 1975: p. 19. 
"I Id. , p. 
14; Ainasrawi, op. cit. : p. 57. 
171 Quoted in Foreign Relations of the United States 1945, vol. VIII (Washington: U. S. Government 
Printing office, 1969), p. 45. 
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East, and the respective lines of communication, would remain a vital Western 
interest and would determine U. S. strategy and military deployments "2. 
Perceived Soviet threats to the oil fields of the Persian Gulf shaped U. S. 
strategy to the region until the Suez crisis. By the 1950s the emerging Arab nationalist 
movement became an additional (and most likely) danger to U. S. hold over the oil 
resources of the region 13. U. S. policy was thus guided by the basic conviction that 
radicalising political tendencies of any sort would challenge Western favoured access 
to cheap and reliable supplies of oil, the very key to the economic growth of the 
industrialised world. U. S. opposition to the nationalist movement had an early 
manifestation in Iran, when in 1953 the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) executed a 
plan to overthrow Mossadegh and to thwart the nationalisation of the oil sector. 
Another tangible display of this concern was U. S. policy to integrate the region in its 
global system of alliances and to preempt a possible shift by a regional state away 
from the American orbit. The U. S. support to "moderate" (i. e. pro-Western) regimes in 
the Middle East, as it contemplated the most important oil producers, was largely 
successful. 
Up until the 1973 crisis the importance of oil resources to United States 
security was not accurately perceived. American dependence on imported oil began 
to be felt in the 1960s. By 1973, America's imports had reached 35 percent of the 
internal requirements, and most significant was the fact that the U. S. ' internal 
production was reaching the limits of its capacity 14. After the 1973 dramatic oil 
shortage "... oil emerged from being essentially a commercial-financial interest of 
American business and economic interests to become a significant component of the 
U. S. national interest affecting political and strategic interests and calculations of 
policy" 15. 
The huge financial surpluses generated by the 1973 price increases (and oil 
profits in general) have benefited the United States in many ways: 
"= Ian O. Lesser, Oil, the Persian Gull and Grand Strategy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), p. 25. 
173 In 1960 John C. Campbell wrote that: "Any ambitious Arab politician must be attracted by the 
temptation to seek popularity on the issue of Arab national rights to the resources which lie under Arab 
soil .... 
Nationalist fervor could crystallize on the oil question as easily as it did on Suez. "; op. cit. : p. 
257. 
"4 H. Kissinger, For the Record (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1981), pp. 
299-300. 
15 B. Reich, "United States Interests in the Middle East", in H. Shaked and I. Rabinovich (ed. ), The 
Middle East and the United States (London: Transaction Books, 1980), p. 62. 
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- the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves - "petrodollars" - were largely 
invested in the U. S. economy. This gives the oil producers, in particular the Saudis, a 
tangible stake in preserving the health of the major industrial economies on which the 
continued value of their foreign assets depends. It also explains the Saudis' role, from 
about the middle of 1974, in pursuing price moderation and in regulating the oil 
market16; 
- Gulf oil provides a very large international market for important sectors of the 
industrialised economies (construction, engineering, namely the sale of military 
equipment). Market opportunities have been enhanced by the fact that the oil states 
import heavily from the United States and have also required capital goods for their 
ambitious development plans 177; 
- finally, the control of oil supplies to Japan and Western Europe (61.8 and 30.6 
percent respectively of their oil supplies came in 1990 from the Middle East) - 
enhanced by the U. S. role as protector of the Gulf oil states - constitutes an important 
political means of influence in relations with those states 178 . 
4.2.2. Oil as a Political Weapon 
Two weeks after the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war, Saudi Arabia announced 
an embargo on oil shipments to the United States and the Netherlands in protest 
against their support of Israel. The effect of this decision was limited. A far-reaching 
one was taken in early November: the Saudis and other Arab oil producers stated that 
they would reduce production by 25 percent from September 1973 levels until Israel 
decided to withdraw from the occupied territories. Not only did Saudi production drop 
sharply to just above 6 million barrels per day (mbd. ); in December OPEC quadrupled 
the price of oil to $11.65 a barrel 19. 
"6 Paul Aarts' higher estimates put investment by Gulf states in the United States, before the Gulf 
crisis, at some SI trillion: "The New Oil Order", Arab Studies Quarter/v (16), 2, Spring 1994: p. 3; 
Dankwart A. Rustow, "U. S. -Saudi Relations and the Oil Crisis of the 1980s", Foreign Affairs (55), 3, 
April 1977: pp. 503-4; Kissinger, op. cit. : p. 321. 
"' Reich, op. cit. : p. 68; Peter Gowan, "The Gulf War, Iraq and Western Liberalism", New Left Review, 
187, May/June 1991: p. 48. 
178 The estimate comes in Aarts, op. cit. : p. 9; see also Gowan, op. cit. : p. 48. 
19 W. B. Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980s (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1981), p. 128. 
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The oil embargo and the resulting shortages made possible the price rises that 
hurled the West into a protracted recession. It also marked the effective end of the 
traditional Saudi position of drawing a line between oil decisions and political issues 
t80. King Faisal was reluctant to use the "oil weapon" until 1973, but ever since then a 
strong case could be made that Saudi oil policy became largely a function of the Arab 
appraisal of the Middle East situation. The Saudis emphasised the political 
dimensions of their oil decisions, especially by linking the oil embargo to the need for 
the United States to pressure Israel and satisfy Arab demands. In fact, the Arab 
states lifted the oil embargo after Kissinger had actively embarked on the "shuttle 
diplomacy" and brought the disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel. 
Several officials in the Nixon administration advocated a policy of confrontation 
with the Arab oil producers. They even considered the feasibility, military and political, 
of a takeover of key oilfields by the U. S. or another foreign power1e'. As American 
dependence on imported Middle Eastern oil grew and as the possibility of a resolution 
to the Arab-Israeli conflict seemed distant, analysts in the Carter administration built a 
scenario of military intervention. A Senate study issued in 1977 suggested the 
possibility of Iranian intervention on behalf of the U. S. government should Soviet 
actions or political changes in the Arab Gulf states jeopardise the oil supplies of the 
U. S. and its allies 182. The increasing emphasis on a military intervention in the Gulf 
region led to the formulation in 1980 of the Carter Doctrine and had its corollary in the 
American-led multinational expedition against Kuwait in 1991. 
In the period between the conclusion of the Camp David accords and the 
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty (December 1978 to July 1979) Saudi oil policy was once 
again dictated by political motives. Saudi decision to cut production to 8.5 million 
barrels (down from 9.5 mbd. ) was certainly meant to signal Arab dissatisfaction with 
the Camp David process 183 and with American pressures for adherence to it. 
Furthermore, the Iranian revolution increased the Saudis' suspicions about the 
reliability of the U. S. ally and tightened their ties to Arab unity and Islamic 
orthodoxy1 . 
The use of oil as a political weapon was thus limited to the two periods 
mentioned above. Since 1976 Saudi Arabia has generally pursued policies of price 
Aso Tillman, op. cit.: p. 76. 
Id.: p. 95; see also Spiegel, op. cit.: p. 224. 
'8= Tillman, op. cit. p. 96. 
Quandt, op. cit. p. 131. 
184 Tillman, op. cit.: p. 108. 
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restraint within OPEC. Moreover, it acts as a regulator of the cartel (swing producer) 
adjusting its own production levels to meet the industrial world's needs and using their 
large excess capacity to bring market pressures to bear on high-price producers''. 
As a matter of fact the Saudis increased production in the Summer of 1979 (due to 
the loss of Iranian production) to alleviate the world oil shortage and again in the Fall 
of 1980 to protect the petroleum market from the effects of the Iran-Iraq War'". In the 
wake of the 1991 Gulf war, Gulf producers responded immediately to the U. S. call to 
increase their production to the maximum to cover the gap left by the U. N. embargo of 
Iraqi and Kuwaiti crude oil exports 187 
Arab oil prices have steadily declined after 1981 and especially 1986 when 
prices fell almost 50 percent from 1985 levels. Oil prices rose during the 1991 Gulf 
crisis but, once it became clear that the United States and its coalition partners would 
use force against Iraq, prices dropped precipitously. Following the end of the war, 
prices were actually lower then they had been prior to the invasion and they remained 
far below OPEC's target price of $ 21 a barrel 188. 
Actually Arab oil producers have over time realised the benefits of price 
stability and moderation. Artificially maintained high prices harm oil's long-term 
competitiveness in relation to other energy sources and, they encourage the 
development of non-OPEC oil supplies. Furthermore, due to their foreign investments, 
these countries have a stake in the stability of the Western economies. After the 1991 
crisis, Gulf producers were brought face to face with Washington's hegemony in the 
region and thus became more dependent on its role as protector against radicalism 
and the possibility of aggression or subversion in the Arabian peninsula1B9. 
, ss Id.: pp. 79-80. 
, s61d.: p. 80; Rustow, op. cit.: pp. 503-4. 
187 Aatts, op. cit. : p. 5; William C. Ramsay, "Oil in the 1990s: The Gulf Dominant", in P. Marr and W. 
Lewis (ed. ), Rising the Tiger (Boulder. Westview Press, 1993): pp. 54-55. 
188 Aarts, op. cit. p. 6; E. Davis, "The Persian Gulf War", in Amirahmadi, op. cit. : p. 262. 
1B9 Aarts, op. cit. pp. 5-6; Tillman, op. cit. : p. 81. 
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4.2.3. The Gulf Dominant 
The Persian Gulf region has since the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine 
become the focal point of U. S. concerns in the Middle East due to the importance of 
its oil resources. 
In 1979, the revolution in Iran signalled the collapse of the Nixon Doctrine: one 
of the "twin pillars" of this policy - the Shah's Iran - had been overthrown and the other 
- Saudi Arabia - was weak militarily-wise190. In 1980, faced not only with the collapse 
of its position in Iran but also with the Soviet move into Afghanistan, the Carter 
administration declared that the oil resources of the Gulf were a "vital" interest of the 
West, and that the United States would take whatever steps were necessary to 
defend that interest. To provide a more credible and less risky deterrent, the president 
announced the creation of a "rapid deployment force", intended to take prompt military 
action to resolve crises either in the Middle East or elsewhere. 
In January 1983 the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) was given a 
separate command of its own: the Central Command, headquartered in Florida, was 
assigned responsibility for the region designated as Southwest Asia, which consists of 
the Gulf and adjacent areas. The aim of this force was to make possible the airlifting 
of both manpower and supplies from the United States compounded with the 
utilisation of the equipment already in the region19'. 
In parallel with the development of CENTCOM the United States sought to 
reinforce its ties with friendly regimes, mainly on the basis of generous military 
assistance. A relevant development of this period is that the emphasis initially placed 
on the Soviet threat to the region gradually shifted to the more obvious potential of 
internal unrest in producer nations and regional disputes as causes of oil supply 
disruption ". The Carter administration strengthened the military posture of Saudi 
Arabia by, namely, selling it five AWACS in a move intended to serve as a visible sign 
, 9o S. Lakoff, "Power and Limit: U. S. Strategic Doctrine in the Middle East", in A. Braun (ed. ), The 
Middle East in Global Strategy (Boulder. Westview Press and London: Mansell Publishing, 1987), p. 
80. 
19' Lakoff, op. cit. : pp. 82-3; Elizabeth J. Gamlen, "United States Strategic Policy Toward the Middle 
East: Central Command and the Reflagging of Kuwait's Tankers", in Amirahmadi, op. cit. : pp. 218-9. 
The United States sought (with little success) to reach agreements for limited access of U. S. forces and 
some prepositioning of equipment to facilities in Kenya, Oman and Somalia. Bases in Saudi Arabia 
were expanded and stocked with U. S. -made weaponry to be used with Saudi consent. 
19= Gamlen, op. cit. : pp. 222-3. 
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of the U. S. commitment to the Saudi Kingdom as well as a means to detect hostile air 
incursions into the Gulf 193. 
The vulnerability of this area became patent as the Iran-Iraq war raged on. In 
mid 1983 U. S. concern about war in the Persian Gulf increased as Iran began issuing 
warnings that it would close the Strait of Hormuz and prevent all oil exports from the 
Gulf. Iraq launched the first phase of the "Tanker War", prompting Iranian retaliation 
against shipping dealing with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait alleging that these countries 
had provided effective support to Iraq. In this context, the U. S. Secretary of Defense, 
Caspar Weinberger, addressed Kuwaiti requests for help by accepting to reflag 
Kuwaiti vessels and provide them with naval protection. This action was intended to 
limit both Iranian attempts at subversion of the Gulf states and Soviet influence in the 
Gulf '9`. 
The massive U. S. military presence in the Persian Gulf - North Arabian Sea 
led to the escalation of hostilities with Iran and, in fact, contributed to an increase of 
the disruption of Gulf oil shipping. Although this operation helped bring about Iranian 
defeat in the war with Iraq, it did not materialise U. S. aspirations to a permanent and 
substantial foothold in the region ". 
U. S. support to Iraq reinforced its regional standing and served as the 
background for its aggression of Kuwaiti territory in August 1990. For the first time 
U. S. presence in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf was requested by the 
regional states. The war against Iraq was partly justified by economic calculations: the 
fact that Iraq's control of 20% of the world's oil put at risk oil supplies to the United 
States and its allies and that it threatened the largest oil producer, Saudi Arabia'". 
The outcome of the war consolidated a process of regular consultation 
between Washington and the Gulf oil producers. This group dubbed GOPEC (Gulf 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries) occupies now a hegemonic position 
within OPEC. They possess sufficient unused production capacity to play a dominant 
"' See J. Stork and M. Wenger, "U. S. Ready to Intervene", ALERIP Reports (14), 6/7, July/September 
1984: p. 46. 
"' See Gamlen, op. cit.: pp. 224-8. 
I°s Id. : p. 236. 
196 Some authors argue that the United States' main motivation for intervening in the Gulf was not the 
Iraqi threat to the Persian Gulf oil resources. See Davis, op. cit.: p. 255,262; Aatts, op. cit. : p. 2. 
Shibley Telharni asserts that evidence about patterns of trade in Middle East oil shows that states in the 
region sell oil independently of their ideological affinities and political-military alliances: Power and 
Leadership in International Bargaining (NY: Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 72-3, and, 
"Between Theory and Fact - Explaining U. S. Behavior in the Gulf Crisis", in T. Y. Ismael and J. S. 
Ismael, the Gulf War and the New World Order : p. 154. 
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role in the world market. They have become increasingly dependent on American 
political and military support for their continued existence. The United States, as a 
growing oil consumer, will heighten its dependence on foreign oil supplies19'. This 
commonality of interests will continue as long as thestatus quo in the Gulf region is 
maintained, that is, stability, under the American aegis. 
4.3. The Defence of Israel and Termination of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
4.3.1. The Creation of Israel: Truman's Support of Zionist Aspirations and the 
Creation of Israel 
The U. S. interest in and resolve to assure the survival and security of Israel 
and termination of the Arab-Israeli conflict is deeply rooted in history and has been 
consistently reaffirmed by every administration since Truman. However, American 
commitment in the defence of both parties' concerns has been highly unbalanced and 
biased. As Joe Stork points out, the successive administrations have tended "... to 
subordinate the issue of Palestinian self-determination to Washington's strategic 
relationship with Israel ... . Within this dynamic, the United States has consistently 
endeavoured to marginalize the Palestine Liberation Organization, occasionally by 
cooptation but generally by supporting the efforts of Israel to crush the PLO ... 
" and 
on "... assigning to Jordan the role of custodian for Palestinian national rights"198 
According to the same author, the stratagem that the various U. S. administrations 
have used to give an appearance of persevering involvement in the Arab-Israeli peace 
search is the mechanism of the "peace process". It is designed to bring the parties to 
the conflict - Israel, the Palestinians and the "front-line" Arab states - to a negotiated 
settlement. In reality, it serves to forestall any compromise that might put an end to 
the situation of permanent friction because it consistently denies some fundamental 
Palestinian claims and, namely, that of self-determination 199. 
197 Aarts, op. cit.: pp. 5-6. 
198 See "U. S. Policy and the Palestinian Question", in Amirahmadi (ed. ), op. cit.: p. 125. 
'99 Id.: p. 126. 
70 
American involvement with Israel starts in earnest with Truman. He had 
initially stuck to the traditional view that regarded Palestine as a British matter - the 
British held the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine and thus was formally 
charged with the responsibility for the future of the territory. The combination of war in 
Palestine between the Arab and Jewish communities, British abdication of its role in 
the Spring of 1947, and growing pro-Zionist political agitation in the United States 
radically altered the situation. 
The Truman administration accepted the U. N. S. C. O. P. 's (Special Committee 
on Palestine) plan to divide Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states, in 
economic union whereas Jerusalem would be administered by the United Nations"' 
U. S. recognition of Israel was announced on 14 May 1948 while the U. N. General 
Assembly was discussing an alternative American proposal, put forward by the 
Department of State and Defense, and favouring a U. N. trusteeship over Palestine201. 
The juxtaposition of these two events, as Reich argues, highlights the enduring 
dilemma of U. S. action in the Middle East and towards Israel in particular: "the lack of 
an overall scheme or policy that would provide a basis for specific commitments or 
decisions" 202 
Truman's decisions to support the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine 
was made against the advice of most of the State Department and of the president's 
advisors. They thought that this decision would damage U. S. relations with the Arabs 
(there was the question of the American oil companies in the area; this commodity 
was also a major component of the Marshall plan for the economic recovery of 
Europe; the Americans wanted to preserve their access to the military bases in the 
region, especially to the base of Dhahran, in Saudi Arabia); that it would increase 
extremists attitudes in the Arab world and would be favourable to Soviet penetration in 
the region 203 
President Truman's inclination towards the Zionist cause had to do initially with 
the humanitarian problem of aiding the displaced European Jewish community after 
ro0 The Arabs would get 43 percent of the land, the Jews 57 percent. At the time, the Jews made up less 
than one-third of the population of Palestine. On November 29 the General Assembly recommended the 
partition plan by a vote of 33 to 13. The USSR voted in favour of the resolution reversing its earlier 
position on Zionism. 
=` It was a manoeuvre to forestall the implementation of the partition plan and was meant to send the 
sib to other countries in the U. N. that America's endorsement of the plan was unenthusiastic. See 
Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), 
pp. 304. 
`2 Bernard Reich. Quest for Peace (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1977), p. 21. 
. 03 Spiegel, op. cit.: p. 26. 
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World War II. Truman believed in the need to fulfil the pledge of the Balfour 
Declaration, concerning the creation of some form of Jewish homeland in Palestine204. 
He was also concerned about the domestic political implications of the partition issue. 
Within the Democratic Party in particular, pro-Zionist Jewish financial contributors 
helped convince the president that political advantages might accrue if appropriate 
decisions were made on the issue of Palestine. As he later confided, he was under 
the influence at the time of a substantial and influential American Jewish lobby 
exerting inordinate pressure on him205. As a result of this combination of factors, he 
declared during a meeting with U. S. ambassadors to the Middle East: "I'm sorry 
gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the 
success of Zionism: I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my 
constituents" 206 
After the Israeli war of independence, the American policy sought to maintain 
regional security and stability while preventing the development of an arms race that 
might generate local conflicts with the potential of involving the superpowers. The 
United States, England and France - the main arms suppliers of the region - 
presented their policy on arms supply and related defence matters in the Tripartite 
Declaration. In that document, they declared that requests for arms or war materials 
by Israel or the Arab states would be considered if the recipient country pledge not to 
undertake any act of aggression against another state 207. This came to be the 
philosophy underlying U. S. policy toward the region until the Suez crisis. 
Until the 1956 conflict, American policymakers tried to pursue a more impartial 
policy toward the region, in part in order (as the Secretary of State realised on his 
"0A "My purpose was then and later to help bringing about the redemption of the pledge of the Balfour 
Declaration and the rescue of at least some of the victims of Nazism. I was not committed to any 
particular form of statehood in Palestine or to any particular time schedule for its accomplishment. The 
American policy was designed to bring about, by peaceful means, the establishment of the promised 
Jewish homeland and easy access to it for the displaced Jews of Europe. "; Harry S. Truman, Years of 
Trial and Hope 1946 - 1953 (Suffolk. Hodder and Stongliton, 1956), p. 167. 
_os See Bernard Reich, The United States and Israel (NY: Praeger, 1984), p. 183. Spiegel refers that 
Truman was highly influenced by some members of his admini tron. He says that the Zionists 
activists "... were intensely involved with Congress, the press, and both political parties. ". During the 
1948 presidential campaign, Truman was attacked by his adversary Dewey who criticised the 
administration's vacillation on Palestine. The incumbent president immediately released a statement 
saying that "he stood «squarely on the provisions covering Israel in the Democratic platfonw>, 
expressed the «hope» that the United States would soon aid Israel with financial assistance, and 
promised to grant de jure recognition as soon as a permanent Israeli government was elected"; op. cit.: 
pp. 17-8,43. 
"6 Quoted in Sheldon L. Richman, ""Ancient History": U. S. Conduct in the Middle East Since World 
War II and the Folly of Intervention", CATO Policy Analysis, n° 159,16 August, 1991: p. 10. 
2' Reich, Quest for Peace: pp. 22-3. 
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Middle Eastern trip in 1953) to "allay the deep resentment against it that has resulted 
from the creation of Israel" 208. Dulles realised the importance of oil and, consequently, 
the political support of the Arab countries was considered vital in order to stop Soviet 
penetration in the area. The United States sought in particular to increase the stability 
in the area, notably by putting an end to the ongoing Arab-Israeli skirmishes. The 
Johnston Plan - for the development of the Jordan Valley - was considered as an 
important step for the creation of favourable economic conditions and thus for peace 
and stability in the area 209. 
The period was marked by certain strains between the United States and 
Israel: a significant one developed after the 1955 Soviet-Egyptian arms deal, when 
the American government refrained from providing Israel with arms to counterbalance 
Nasser's (in accordance with the spirit of the Tripartite Declaration) and urged it to 
turn to the U. N. for its security. 
4.3.2. From the Suez Campaign to the 1967 War: Birth of the Strategic Relationship 
and First Middle East Peace Plans 
In October 1956, following repeated incursions into Israeli territory and acts of 
violence perpetrated by the Palestinian fedayeen, Israel, with French and British 
support, invaded Egypt ignoring American pleas for forbearance 210. Eisenhower's 
opposition to the conduct of Israel, Great Britain and France was not totally based on 
considerations of international law. Eisenhower's underlying reasons had to do with 
hostility to the old-style colonialism of those European countries, and the prevention of 
both Soviet opportunities for expansion and Arab alienation from the United States. 
Significantly, it was on the U. S. motion that, on October 31, the UN Security Council 
ýa Id.: p. 25. 
ro9 The plan was designed to settle a heated controversy that had developed between Israel on one side 
and Syria on the other, over the divisions of the waters of the Jordan Valley. Johnston's enterprise did 
not attain any siggnificant results; id. : p. 27,62. 
=10 Israeli aggression of Egyptian sovereignty was also based on her exclusion from the use of the Suez 
Canal. Aggrieved by Nasser's act of defiance in nationalising the Canal Company, Britain and France 
issued an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel to withdraw within twelve hours to a distance of ten miles from 
the Canal. As Nasser rejected it, on October 31 British and French air forces launched air attacks on 
Egyptian territory. See George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 1992), p. 50,43. 
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called on Israel to withdraw from the recently invaded Egyptian territory and that it 
issued an appeal to other nations to stop aid to Israel 21 . 
By March 1957 Israel had withdrawn from all the occupied areas, but not 
before the United States had given assurances that UN troops would be stationed on 
Egyptian territory to ensure free passage of Israeli and Israel-bound ships through the 
Straits of Tiran and to prevent fedayeen activity. The U. S. government also 
acknowledged that the Gulf of Aqaba was international waters and that no country 
would be entitled to prevent passage in the Gulf and through the Straits. Thus, the 
United States came to be involved in the resolution of the crisis and gave guarantees 
that would be subsequently invoked by Israel 2'Z. 
In dealing with the Third World, Kennedy took a decidedly more friendly stance 
toward states seeking an independent path between East and West. Kennedy tried to 
approach the Arab states in a more sympathetic way, regardless of their ideological 
definitions or network of relationships Z". The Kennedy team did not overlook the 
policy of containment, but rather that containment would be more effective if the 
United States deemphasised the issues that caused divergence. 
The new president directed its efforts toward Nasser: he hoped to encourage 
the Egyptian leader to cooperate with the United States, which might -result in 
Nasser's being more conciliatory toward Israel. However, the Yemen War destroyed 
the new Kennedy approach to the Arab world, and his policy eventually came to 
resemble the Eisenhower-Dulles defence of the conservative forces in the Middle 
East. 
Kennedy abandoned a initial preference for a balance of power between Israel 
and the Arabs in favour of a strategic relationship 214. In 1962, the administration 
informed the American ambassadors to the Middle East of the impending sales of 
Hawk antiaircraft missiles to Israel. As Spiegel remarks: "For the first time, the United 
See Rubenberg, op. cit.: p. 70. 
='= Cheryl Rubenberg says: "The war proved highly successful for Israel". The fedayeen bases created in 
the aftermath of Israel's 1955 attack on Gaza were destroyed and were not used for the next ten years; 
the Straits of Titan were open to Israeli shipping, contributing to Israel's significant economic growth 
in the subsequent years; Israel and the American National Interest (Champaign, Ill.: University of 
Illinois Press, 1986), p. 86. 
=" "He definitely did not want to identify the United States with the forces of reaction and tradition in 
the Arab community of nations. ", Lenczowski, op. cit.: p. 73. 
=" Israeli concerns over Russian arms shipped to Egypt (because of its intervention in the Yemen War) 
and Iraq had led the Israeli leaders to ask for the Hawk missile late in the Eisenhower era. The request 
was refused on the basis of the traditional American policy of not encouraging an arms race in the 
region. Kennedy believed that by fostering Israeli military superiority vis-A-vis the Arabs, peace would 
more likely obtain in the region. See Spiegel, op. cit.: pp. 107-8 and Rubenberg, op. cit.: p. 91. 
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States agreed to an arms deal with the Jewish state. This new relationship with Israel 
had major long-term implications for American policy toward the Arab-Israeli 
disputei215 . It marked the 
beginning of Washington's endeavour to keep a regional 
balance of power favourable to Israel. The president further committed the United 
States when he told Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir that his country was engaged in 
a "partnership" with Israel. Kennedy stressed Israeli responsibilities and American 
expectations from this relationship and he sought Israeli cooperation for the 
attainment of American objectives, especially in the Middle East216. Thus, a new era 
of cooperation between Washington and Jerusalem was inaugurated on the basis of 
common interests and of an "informal alliance" 217 
The arrival of Lyndon B. Johnson in 1963 at the White House was in many 
ways adverse to the pursuit of U. S. interests in the Middle East. Unlike his 
predecessor, Johnson had no sympathy for Arabs aspirations and its relations with 
Arab nationalist leaders, particularly Nasser, deteriorated markedly over time. 
Furthermore, under this administration, U. S. policy took an explicit turn in favour of 
Israel. During the first three years of his presidency the United States shifted its role 
as a moderate supplier of defensive weapons to highly sophisticated offensive arms 
for Israel's military establishment. In 1966 American military aid to Israel rose 
sevenfold from $12.9 million in 1965 to $90 million, more than doubling the cumulative 
amount of aid provided since 1948 ($40.3 million) 218. 
The June War of 1967 confirmed this trend. This event marked the definite 
loss of some of the prestige the United States had gained during the Suez crisis, thus 
becoming the most hated country of the Middle East and the epitome of imperialism. 
Johnson's behaviour during the weeks that preceded the war was at least ambivalent. 
It certainly encouraged Israeli leaders to go to war against Egypt, especially the 
='s Spiegel, op. cit. : p. 107. 
='a "In the Middle East we have the twin problems of being historically and obviously associated with 
Israel and, especially in this Administration, building on that association through our actions with 
respect to the Jordan waters, Hawks, and aid while at the same time we have other responsibilities in the 
diddle East. Israel, the United States and the free world all have difficult survival problems. We would 
like Israeli recognition that this partnership ... produces strains for the United States in the Middle 
East". "We are interested that Israel should keep up its sensitive, tremendous historic task. What we 
want from Israel arises because our relationship is a two-way street. Israel's security in the long run 
depends on what it does with the Arabs, but also on us"; id.: p. 109-10. 
217 Ibid.. 
=`s Lenczowski, op. cit.: p. 106. 
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military chiefs, who picked on Nasser's move as an excellent opportunity to launch a 
pre-emptive strike against Egypt 219. 
Israeli officials frequently consulted with U. S. officials in the days before June 
5; they were looking for support by invoking Eisenhower's statement that if force were 
used to close the Strait of Tiran, Israel would be within her rights under article 51 of 
the U. N. Charter to respond with force 220. On June 2 Evron, minister of the Israeli 
ambassador to the United States, met Walter Rostow (National Security Advisor) in 
order to seek reassurance that the United States would not oppose if Israel started 
the hostilities. In the days preceding the outbreak of hostilities, Israeli officials had the 
perception that the Johnson administration, although not openly encouraging Israel to 
go to war, was not interested in openly restraining it. Brecher writes that: "At the same 
time the perceived impression was that if Israel took the initiative ... the United 
States 
would not take an unfriendly view" ". Israeli Foreign Minister Eban wrote in his 
autobiography that in his visits to Washington he found "... the absence of any 
exhortation to us to stay our hand much longer" 222. 
When the war started, the United States refrained from criticising Israel's 
aggression and, at the U. N., the American delegate, Ambassador Arthur Goldberg 
helped Israel to fulfil its political objectives concerning no return to the prewar 
boundaries. The U. S. delegate opposed a proposed U. N. order for the return of forces 
to their initial lines, thereby helping Israel consolidate its grasp over its freshly 
conquered territories. The United States also gave Israel substantial help, including 
=19 After the 1956 Sinai campaign, there was a lot of friction on the border between Israel and Syria. 
The cause of this unrest was Israeli settlement activity in the demilitarised zone established after the 
1948 war, disputes about fishing rights in Lake Tiberias, guerrilla incursions into Israel, and Israeli 
development of a water project involving the Jordan River. Israel retaliated against the guerrilla activity 
(carried out by al-Fatah, the Palestinian National Liberation movement, led by Yasser Arafat and still 
not a part of the PLO) with violent raids into Syria and even Jordan. The immediate cause of the 1967 
war was motivated by Nasser's moving of troops into the Sinai due to a false alert of the Soviets of an 
alleged Israeli invasion of Syria. On May 22 Nasser blocked (verbally) the Strait of Titan which leads 
from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aqaba and to the Israeli port of Eilat. See Richnnan, op. cit.: pp. 19-20, 
and Richard B. Parker, "The June 1967 War. Some Mysteries Explored", Tire Middle East Journal (46), 
n° 2, Spring 1992: pp. 177-97. 
=° Quandt, Decade : p. 44. 
=` Michael Brecher, Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 
420. 
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diplomatic support that facilitated Israel's conquest of Jerusalem, the West Bank, and 
its attacks against Syrian territory2'. 
Israel's stunning solo performance in the 1967 war helped the United States 
consolidate its hegemony in the Middle East by crippling its main adversary in the 
area and Soviet client - Nasser - and by bringing immediate relief to threatened 
friendly Arab countries. It enabled the United States to use its Middle East position as 
a leverage to influence the Soviet's behaviour in the global arena at a time when the 
Americans were facing military defeat in Vietnam 22'. Another outcome of this war was 
that "... for the majority in the policymaking elite, Israel's spectacular military 
performance validated the thesis that Israel could function as a strategic asset to the 
United States in the Middle East. The belief about Israel's strategic utility was 
expressed in U. S. policy through the provision of virtually unlimited quantities of 
economic assistance and military equipment, a de facto alliance between Washington 
and Israel, and in American support for virtually every Israeli foreign policy 
objective"225. 
One of the possibilities left open by the 1967 conflict was the search for a 
sweeping resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Johnson administration 
persistently sought to use the superiority gained by Israel in the Six-Day War to 
achieve a final peace settlement. The Americans presumed that they needed only to 
oppose diplomatically efforts that were being made to compel Israel to withdraw 
unconditionally. This did not mean that the United States backed Israel on its 
pretensions to keep a hold on the territories - rather that they should be exchanged for 
a genuine peace agreement. Johnson's main concern was the establishment of a 
peace framework detailing the principles for a future settlement. On June 19,1967 the 
president committed the United States to an Arab-Israeli peace based on five 
fundamental principles: 
- the right to national life 
- justice for the refugees 
' Lenczowski, op. cit.: p. 109 and Rubenberg, op. cit.: p. 123. On June 8 Israeli troops and planes 
attacked Syria and, on June 10 Soviet Premier Kosygin threatened intervention if Israel did not stop. 
The Johnson administration showed its resolve to confront the Soviets by turning the Sixth Fleet 
toward Syria. This was the first near-confrontation between the superpowers in the course of Arab- 
Israeli wars. Stephen Green contends that the United States took a direct part in the war by providing 
aerial reconnaissance assistance that helped the Israeli forces capture strategic ground in a very short 
time; Living by the Sword (Brattleboro, Vt.: Amana Books, 1988), p. 210. 
=8 Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1978), pp. 582-3. 
221 Rubenberg, op. cit.: p. 126. 
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- innocent maritime passage 
- limits on the arms race 
- respect for political independence and territorial integrity of all states 226. 
In the course of the following five months, American efforts were directed at 
the approval of a U. N. resolution incorporating these principles. On November 22, the 
Security Council adopted resolution 242 that called for a "just and lasting peace" 
between Israel and its neighbours. As Tschirgi affirms, this resolution, intended to 
appease the Arabs and to please the Israelis, was characterised by vagueness: it 
neither addressed the core issues of contention - namely, the extent of the Israeli 
withdrawal and the new delineation of frontiers -22' nor the procedures and the time 
schedule for the negotiations to take place. It was "... a carefully crafted masterpiece 
of ambiguity that won approval because of its ability to accommodate conflicting 
interpretations" 228. 
4.3.3. The 1973 War and Kissinger's Step-By-Step Diplomacy: A Precarious Middle 
East Settlement and Israel's Consolidation as a "Strategic Asset" 
The years between 1967 and 1973 were marked by considerable violence and 
instability in the Middle East - the backlash of the wounds left open by the war. By 
1969 regional developments seemed to demand an effective peace initiative. The War 
of Attrition intensified along the Suez Canal; the growing strength of the Palestinian 
movement and its guerrilla activity was visible in Jordan. The new president Richard 
Nixon came into office with the intention of changing the state of American-Arab 
relations as left by L. Johnson. The administration gave high priority to dealing with 
the instabilities of the Middle East. 
No administration, including Eisenhowers, had entered office with a 
conception of the Middle as more relevant to American interests229. Emphasising 
=6 Quandt, op. cit.: p. 64 and Dan Tschirgi, The American Search for Mideast Peace (NY: Praeger, 
1989), p. 14. 
=' The Palestine question, subsumed under the "refugees" terminology, was perceived as a 
humanitarian issue whose political importance accrued from the fact that it might be a factor of tension 
between Israel and the Arabs states - not as a matter of national identity and aspiration to self- 
determination. 
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world balance of power and determined to pursue a foreign policy based on a 
framework imbued with ideological presuppositions, Nixon and his mentor, Kissinger, 
relied on three approaches to achieve their goals: power politics, linkage and detente. 
Based on a realistic foreign policy grounded on theraison d'etat and national interest, 
both politicians wanted, by the means of detente, to create a climate of political 
accommodation with the USSR. In effect, detente was aimed at diffusing tensions 
between the superpowers and at containing Soviet expansionism around the globep°. 
The concept of linkage pointed to the fact that various global issues interesting both 
powers could be linked together so that the advances achieved in one sector could be 
tied to progress in another 2". 
The Middle East was viewed in the light of the global competition with the 
USSR. The resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict was central to improving the 
American position in the Arab world, to reducing Soviet influence and the potential for 
Soviet-American confrontation in the area. 
The goal of an Arab-Israeli settlement was generally shared by the members 
of the Nixon administration, although the strategies pursued differed substantially. 
Nixon's first term was marked by the opposing views and the fierce competition 
between the Secretary of State, William Rogers and the then National Security 
Advisor Henry Kissinger. 
Kissinger did not speed up the process of reaching a peace settlement. He 
believed that only when Russians or one or more of the key Arab states had 
moderated their demands could the peace negotiations proceed. The National 
Security Advisor was mainly worried with reducing Soviet involvement with the Arab 
countries and discrediting the USSR as an effective ally and co-partner of the Arabs 
in a likely settlement between the Middle East contenders 232. He urged Nixon to 
discourage the State Department from going ahead with Soviet-American initiatives 
that were based on Israeli concessions regarding the territories conquered in the 1967 
war in exchange for a peace guaranteed by both superpowers. Kissinger believed that 
an outcome of this nature would be viewed as a victory for Arab radicals and, mainly, 
210 Rubenbere, op. cit.: p. 139. 
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for the USSR 1. He was inclined to share the Israeli view that only a show of 
strength by Washington and Jerusalem could improve the American position and 
Western interests in the area. Kissinger adhered to the idea that Israel constituted a 
strategic asset to American interests and actively pursued a policy of reinforcing 
Israel's regional power so that it could fulfil its functions as a regional surrogate of the 
United States. 
Secretary Rogers' intent of pursuing a "balanced policy" in the Middle East 
originated a far-reaching peace plan. It supported the provisions of Resolution 242 
endorsing the principles of non-acquisition of territory by war, calling for withdrawal 
from territories occupied in the 1967 war, and establishing secure and recognised 
boundaries. Rogers proposed a trade-off in which Israel would withdraw from the 
occupied territories and the Arabs would agree to enter into some form of contractual 
arrangement guaranteeing a permanent peace with Israel. Although the Secretary of 
State did not satisfy Arab demands that Israel withdraw to the 1967 frontiers, he came 
close by proposing that modifications in the 1967 borders should be "insubstantial" 
and only for "mutual security". Rogers advanced other proposals that further 
dissatisfied Israel: it raised the refugee question and stressed the need to address the 
aspirations of the refugees; it suggested that Israel and Jordan should participate in 
the civic, economic and religious life of Jerusalem '_'''. 
Because of its central provision that occupied territories should be returned to 
the Arabs in exchange for peace, the Rogers plan was met with strong hostility in 
Israel. Furthermore, Nixon and Kissinger dissociated themselves from the plan and 
worked together to undermine it. Nixon later wrote in his memoirs: "I knew that the 
Rogers plan could never be implemented but I believed it was important to let the 
Arab world know that the United States did not automatically dismiss its case 
regarding the occupied territories or rule out a compromise settlement of the 
conflicting claims. With the Rogers plan on record, I thought it would be easier for the 
" Seymour M. Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Viron White House (NY: Summit Books, 
1983), p. 216. 
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Yost went further by presenting proposals for an Israeli-Jordanian settlement. According to his plan, 
Israel would return to its pre-1967 frontiers in exchange for guarantees, improved access to the holy 
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Arab leaders to propose reopening relations with the United States without coming 
under attack from the hawks and pro-Soviet elements in their own countries" 1. 
Nixon's commitment to Israel started before he was elected: in a speech to a 
Jewish assembly during his electoral campaign on September 8,1968, Nixon 
advocated the sale of supersonic Phantom F-4 jets to provide Israel with technological 
military superiority. In an effort to gamer Jewish votes, President Johnson announced 
his intention to sell Israel fifty of these jets. He therefore established the U. S. role as 
the principal supplier of non-defensive, sophisticated military equipment. This policy 
was consistent with the Nixon Doctrine, articulated by the president in July 1969 and 
aimed at easing out the United States from entanglements in Southeast Asia. 
Under that doctrine the United States would rely on local powers to keep 
internal regional order and furnish "military and economicassistance when requested 
and appropriate". The United States, affirmed Nixon, would continue to provide a 
nuclear umbrella if a nuclear power threatened an American ally; otherwise, the nation 
directly threatened should assume the primary responsibility of assuming its defence 
and preservation 23s. This policy was aimed at arming proxy states that would further 
American purposes without the need for U. S. troops. 
As the first term evolved, two states seemed particularly able to play this role 
in the Middle East: Iran and Israel. Iran, with the aid of American advisors and 
personnel, was to replace the British as they left the Persian Gulf in the early 1970s. 
As for Israel, Nixon later said: "We arefor Israel because Israel in our view is the only 
state in the Mideast which is pro-freedom and an effective opponent to Soviet 
expansion. This is the kind of friend Israel needs and will continue to need .... " 
237 
. 
The supply of American arms and military equipment to Israel rose steadily 
until the 1973 war. After Israeli denunciation of Egyptian violations of the cease-fire on 
the Canal zone (August 1970), President Nixon authorised a $7 million package of 
arms for Israel to use against the Egyptian missile sites. On September 1, Nixon 
agreed to sell Israel at least eighteen more Phantom jets to compensate Israel for the 
canal violations; hours later an amendment passed in the Senate gave the president 
almost unlimited authority to provide Israel with arms to counter Soviet weapons in 
Egypt. Furthermore, in December 1971, as Kissinger took hold of the Arab-Israeli 
diplomacy, the United States agreed to supply Israel with new Phantoms and 
's Quoted in Spiegel, op. cit. : p. 188. 
236 Lenczowski, op. cit. : pp. 117-8. 
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Skyhawks over three years to avoid the polemics that erupted when short-term deals 
expired. This arrangement became the first long-term arms deal between Washington 
and Jerusalem tee. 
The importance of Israel as an American proxy in the Middle East became 
especially patent after the Israelis cooperated with the United States in the Jordanian 
crisis of September 1970 and helped to thwart an attack by the Russian-backed 
Syrian regime 239. U. S. -Israeli relations were quickly brought to an unprecedented high 
level and aid was provided by Washington without restrictions: "The crisis and its 
denouement demonstrated to them in a concrete and dramatic fashion the value for 
the United States of a strong Israel. 11240 . 
Simultaneously, the conventional wisdom of 
the State Department - in favour of an "even-handed" approach and regarding 
American support for Israel as an impediment to U. S. -Arab relations - was seriously 
damaged. 
In mid-1972 Sadat, whom the Nixon administration did not take seriously as a 
political leader, expelled the 15,000 Soviet advisors that were in his country. After the 
1973 elections, Kissinger maintained secret negotiations with the Egyptians and kept 
a special channel with the Soviet ambassador. The proposal Kissinger made, which 
included the establishment of Israeli military posts in the Sinai, was rejected by Sadat. 
In reality, Kissinger resisted America's active involvement in the peace-making 
process, preferring a stalemate and maintenance of thestatus quo, just like Israel 241. 
Sadat summed up his frustration in a statement he made in early April: "If we do not 
take things into our own hands, there will be no movement ... Every door I have 
opened has been slammed in my face by Israel - with American blessings ... The 
Americans have left us no other way out ... Everything is being mobilized for 
resumption of the battle - which is now inevitable" Z°Z. 
During the Yom Kippur /Ramadan War, Kissinger already assuming almost 
exclusive control of the policy-making apparatus, ordered four ships of the Sixth Fleet 
Spiegel, op. cit. : p. 211. 
On the eve of the day the Jordanian monarch ordered air attacks on the invading Syrian forces 
(September 21), Israeli ambassador to the U. S. A., Y. Rabin conveyed to Kissinger the cabinet's 
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to within 500 miles of Israel and in the U. N. tried to advance Israeli interests by tying 
up the Soviets and delaying a cease-fire resolution. The Israelis asked for arms, but 
Kissinger was reluctant to comply believing that Israel would quickly defeat its foes, 
and that the U. S. should avoid a visible involvement in the war. As the war continued, 
it became difficult for the administration to keep its refusal without loosing the 
confidence of Israel and its supporters at home. Nixon and Kissinger finally made the 
decision on October 9 to resupply Israel because of the massive Soviet airlift to Syria 
243. The supplies and equipment may have not decided between victory and defeat, 
but they boosted Israel's morale. The magnitude of the airlift was indeed impressive. 
Several hundred individual missions and tons of equipment, an effort longer than the 
Berlin airlift of 1948-49 244 
Kissinger also worked through the U. N. Security Council in the elaboration of 
resolutions that clearly benefited the Israeli army. The first, passed on the October 22, 
was negotiated by Kissinger and the Soviets 245. The Israelis were outraged at the 
joint accord because they had not been consulted 246 
To compensate them, Kissinger allowed a few hours "slippage" in the cease- 
fire deadline. This margin of time came to be a six-day offensive during which Israeli 
troops crossed the Suez Canal, and completed the encircling of Egypt's Third Army in 
the Sinai. When the offensive was over, Israel had reached the Gulf of Suez and 
occupied 1,600 square kilometres of Egyptian territory 247. 
One consequence of the huge U. S. arms shipments to Israel, and Nixon's 
decision on October 19, to ask Congress to appropriate $2.2 billion in emergency aid 
to Israel (including $15 billion in outright grants), was the O. P. E. C. (Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries) oil embargo 248. On October 20, Saudi Arabia 
Quoted in Rubenberg, op. cit. : p. 157. 
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announced that it would stop selling oil to the United States; Iraq, Abu Dhabi, Algeria, 
Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar followed suit. 
By the end of the war, Kissinger had attained diplomatic leverage with both 
Cairo and Jerusalem. He had restrained Israel from destroying the Egyptian army and 
had avoided a total Israel victory. During the war Kissinger had established a good 
communication with Sadat, who consistently held out the possibility of better relations 
with Washington and had conveyed his own interests in a peaceful settlement with 
Israel 249. Despite this improvement in American-Egyptian relations, from that time on 
Israel became the single largest recipient of American aid. "Whereas the total U. S. aid 
to Israel in 1972 amounted to $350 million, by 1974 it reached the figure of $2,630 
million, and from the mid-1970s it hovered around $2 billion a yeae'250. 
The months that followed the October war saw unprecedented American 
involvement in the search for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Kissinger tried 
to manipulate the military stalemate toward a political disengagement that satisfied 
both parties. On November 5 Kissinger inaugurated a phase of complex peace 
negotiations involving several Middle Eastern actors and known as "shuttle 
diplomacy". Kissinger's objectives in the talks were: 
- to create a good understanding with the Egyptians and to convince them of 
the benefits of a settlement with Israel; 
- to demonstrate to the Arab oil producers the United States' ability to put an 
end to the Arab-Israeli conflict; 
- to convince the Israelis that peace would be a better means of achieving their 
goals than by making war; 
- to maintain the support of the Jewish domestic constituency 25'. 
Initially, Kissinger focused on the question of disengagement and the 
separation of forces between Egypt and Israel. The second agreement, dealing with 
the separation of forces in the Golan Heights, was concluded between Israel and 
Syria on May 31,1974. 
The second stage proved more complex. Kissinger found the demands made 
by Egypt and Israel unreasonable and the differences between the latter proved 
irreconcilable. In March President Gerald Ford announced a reassessment of U. S. 
policy to determine appropriate "next steps" in light of the complexity of the 
=" Spiegel, op. cit. p. 266. 
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international system, including the communist victory in Cambodia and Vietnam. He 
also intended to pressure Israel to a moderate position; in fact, he was convinced that 
Rabin wanted peace. 
The reassessment triggered a loud protest of the pro-Israeli forces and 
brought about the first major confrontation with the Ford administration. Seventy-six 
senators sent a letter to Ford calling for undiminished economic and military aid to 
Israel. They criticised the administration's intention of withholding future military 
requests of military equipment from Israel and bolstered Israel's negative attitude 
regarding withdrawal from the Sinai. The letter strongly undercut the whole gist of the 
proposed "reassessment" and revealed congressional uneasiness over the 
administration's attribution to Israel of the responsibility for the breakdown of the talks 
252 
Finally in September 1,1975, the Sinai II agreements were signed by Egypt 
and Israel. It was the Israeli/American "Memorandum of Understanding", though, a 
confidential document not subject to Senate ratification, which became most 
controversial. In that document, the Ford administration agreed to most of the aid 
Israel had requested for the forthcoming year. It provided for substantially increased 
military assistance to Israel, including delivery of large new quantities of sophisticated 
weapons 251 and to compensate Israel economically for the oil lost for the return of the 
Gulf of Suez oilfields 254. Political guarantees were also given to Israel. Chief among 
them was what amounted to an American security guarantee: the United States was 
to hold consultations with Israel in case a third party (meaning the USSR) intervened 
militarily255. 
Lenczowski mentions other pledges: "not to initiate any moves in the Middle 
East without prior consultation with Israel; not to diverge from U. N. Security Council 
resolutions 242 and 338 as the sole basis for peace negotiations; to insist that all 
negotiations should be bilateral as between Israel and the Arab countries and not 
multilateral (as the brief Geneva Conference foreshadowed); and not to recognise the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) or negotiate with it without Israeli consent 
and until the PLO formally recognised Israel's right to exist and promised to adhere to 
s=1d.: p. 296. 
33 Lenczowsld says that this pledge "... opened the door to generous deliveries of sophisticated 
American weapons to Israel, so that in the period between the October 1973 war and June 1977, the 
Israeli military forces doubled their strength and Israel's airforce, with 574 combat aircraft ... 
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U. N. resolutions 242 and 338" 216 . This clause was the most relevant political 
concession of the agreement and it evidenced American compliance to Israeli security 
requirements. Since the Palestinians were denied participation in the peace 
negotiation, armed struggle and guerrilla activity continued to be considered legitimate 
means (to many in the PLO) to furthering their goals. 
On balance, the "shuttle diplomacy" activated by Kissinger had the advantage 
of breaking intractable issues into smaller less complex components that were 
susceptible of being discussed and settled. It was hoped that a success in one 
particular issue would create momentum for the next. This approach worked until after 
military disengagement agreements were negotiated after the 1973 war. Once 
discussions centred on substantive issues and on matters pointing to political 
accommodations between the Arabs and Israelis, the impetus was lost. U. S. 
diplomacy under Kissinger was conducted to achieve quick, sectoral diplomatic 
successes designed to bolster the President's domestic credibility - especially during 
the crucial period of Nixon's Watergate crisis 17. 
The major liability of Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy was the fact that it 
was never intended to produce a comprehensive peace settlement, but rather to face 
the impending danger of a renewal of the hostilities. One must also add the point that, 
in its conception, it avoided the central issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict - the 
Palestinian dimension of the process. Kissinger maintained that the Palestinian 
problem was an intra-Arab affair and, thus, should be dealt with in the context of a 
Jordanian-Israeli settlement (and not with Israel) tea. 
In any case, the 1975 agreements initiated a period of relative stability in the 
Middle East and because it laid the groundwork for the search of an overall peace 
settlement. For the first time, the resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute had become 
zss Aruri, op. cit.: p. 101. 
ýsa Lenczowski, op. cit. : p. 152. 
Spiegel, op. cit. : p. 313. 
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America's top foreign policy priority; it enhanced the prestige of Kissinger and Ford 
and it constituted their most outstanding foreign policy achievement in 1975 259. 
4.3.4. Carter's New Approach: Camp David and the Failure of a Comprehensive 
Peace Settlement 
Carter entered the White House determined to work for a comprehensive 
Middle East peace. In fact, the Carter administration was the first to direct its major 
foreign policy initiatives in the direction of the Middle East, understood mainly as the 
arena of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Despite the admiration and affinities he felt for Israel 
- due to his Southern Baptist religious convictions - Carter defended that the pursuit of 
peace should centre on the exchange of most of the occupied territories for Arab 
political concessions. Apparently he saw no clash between his commitment to 
Palestinian rights and his enduring support for Israel ". 
The Carter administration believed that cooperation with the Soviet Union 
would help to achieve the goal of Middle East peace. A settlement was considered 
the means to stabilise the oil supply and prevent a more serious oil crisis. National 
Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote in 1975: "It is impossible to seek a 
resolution to the energy problems without tackling head-on - and doing so in an urgent 
fashion - the Arab-Israeli conflict. Without a settlement of that issue in the near future, 
any stable arrangement in the energy area is simply not possible''. In fact, "the oil 
question now replaced the U. S. S. R. and anticommunism as Washington's pre- 
eminent concern" 262. Saudi Arabia became consequently a favoured ally. 
Carter de-emphasised the tense relation with the Soviet Union and saw it as a 
potential cooperative partner for his Middle Eastern endeavours. On October 1,1977, 
both superpowers issued a communique stressing the need for achieving a just and 
lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The plan included Israeli withdrawal 
from occupied Arab lands, a resolution of the Palestinian issue, normalisation of 
relations between Israel and the Arab states, and international guarantees provided at 
least in part by the USSR and the United States. The point of the proposal was to 
=s9 Reich, Quest. : p. 351. 
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reconvene the Geneva Conference, which had failed due to the efforts of Henry 
Kissinger 263. The statement did not mention a Palestinian state, it did not call for 
direct PLO participation in the Geneva Conference and it did not require Israel to 
return to the 1967 borders or to abandon East Jerusalem 264. 
When he took office, Carter focused on the Palestinian's concerns. In the 
Spring of 1977 he made several references to a Palestinian political entity: "There has 
to be a homeland provided for the Palestinian refugees ... ". Although he appeared to 
be endorsing a Palestinian state, he explained his position when he stated that "... 
some provision has got to be made for the Palestinians, in the framework of the 
nation of Jordan or by some other means"265. Later Secretary of State Cyrus Vance 
and Carter made it clear that they would deal directly with the PLO only if it accepted 
Resolution 242, even with a proviso concerning Palestinian rights. In their opinion, the 
Palestinians were not simple refugees, but had been unjustly forced out of their 
homes by the Israelis 266 
These declarations evidenced Carter's ingenuity and even lack of political 
expertise. The Soviet-American statement, in particular, was vehemently condemned 
by Israeli leaders who saw in it the first step towards an imposed settlement and the 
violation of Kissinger's pledge not to deal with the Palestinians. The Israeli officials 
were incensed with the fact that the phrase "legitimate rights of the Palestinians" 
included in the document pointed to a possible displacement of Israel by a Palestinian 
state. 
Carter's efforts were further thwarted by the arrival at power in the Summer of 
1974 of the right-wing Likud coalition. The new government, headed by the revisionist 
Prime Minister Menachem Begin, intensified the repression of the Palestinians on the 
West Bank and accelerated the building of settlements on their land -a policy 
equivalent to annexation. This aggressive policy was in reality a translation of Begin's 
Herut party blueprint to a Greater Israel (Eretz Israel) that stretched across the Jordan 
River. Carter condemned the creation of settlements in the West Bank, declaring the 
26ý Spiegel, op. cit.: p. 320. 
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cochairmanship and was designed more as a pro fomla gesture. 
264 Rubenberg, op. cit. : p. 201. 
. as Spiegel, op. cit.: p. 332. 
X66 Id. : p. 335. 
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practice to have no legal validity and to constitute an "obstacle to peace". Despite 
private angry outbursts, Carter took no punitive actions against Israel 267. 
A decisive phase of Carters diplomacy began with Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. 
When the Egyptian president addressed the Knesset on November 20, he extended 
recognition to Israel, and proposed peace based on a comprehensive settlement. The 
initiative was then passed on to the Israelis: on a return trip to Egypt, Begin carried a 
proposal that did not correspond to his host's expectations. The Begin plan, as it 
came to be known, addressed Egyptian concerns over the Sinai and included an 
autonomy plan for the Palestinians called "Home Rule for Palestinian Arabs, 
Residents of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District". 
The distance between Begin and Sadat induced Carter to involve himself in 
the negotiations, as Israel failed to make further concessions and as Sadat's peace 
initiative lost momentum. Carter was about to give up on Begin but then decided to 
bring him and Sadat to the presidential retreat at Camp David, where from 
September, 4 until September 17, he personally managed the negotiations. As 
Tillman stresses, Camp David was "... a final, desperate throw of the dice by an 
American administration at the end of its patience and of the resources it was 
prepared to use"268.. The agreements that came out of the conference on September 
17,1978 were a "Framework for Peace in the Middle East", and a "Framework for the 
Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel". 
On March 26,1979 Carter joined Sadat and Begin in Washington for the 
signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. The treaty invoked the Camp David 
framework and followed most of its stipulations. It constituted a remarkable 
achievement of American diplomacy but it had many shortcomings. The formulations 
that emerged were closer to a separate peace than to Carter's goal of a 
comprehensive solution including the Palestinians. Carter's most far-reaching decision 
had been to separate the Sinai issue from the more general framework. 
6' Spiegel refers that the most serious manifestation of opposition to the Israeli Government's creation 
of new settlements in the occupied territories occurred on March 1,1980. The United States voted in 
favour of a Security Council Resolution calling upon Israel to dismantle the existing settlements and to 
cease the planning and building of new ones. Under intense pressure from Israel and domestic pro- 
Jewish supporter, the administration reversed its vote as a bureaucratic "error". Spiegel writes that: 
`, most analysts agreed that the president would have won the (New York) primary except for the 
controversial U. N. vote that reminded Jewish voters of Carter's tough stand against Israeli settlements 
and in favour of Palestinian rights ... 
"; op. cit. : pp. 377-78. 
ý` Tillman, op. cit. : p. 25. 
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Quandt argues that by the second year of his term, Carter had realised that he 
could obtain little concessions from Begin and had become aware of the costs of a 
confrontation with Israel in terms of his domestic support: "These realizations had 
convinced him to pull back from his original ambitious plan for a comprehensive peace 
and had made him particularly cautious in dealing with the Palestinian question" 259. 
The accords cost Sadat much Arab support and, eventually, his life. In March 
1979 Egypt was suspended from the Arab League, and even the moderate Arab 
states accused Sadat of deserting them for a bilateral treaty with Israel. President 
Sadat was obviously the weakest part in the negotiations and he was the one who 
had the most to lose if the process failed. The issue of Palestinian self-determination 
was eluded and the provisions regarding administrative self-rule were too vague. "The 
major and perhaps decisive flaw from the Egyptian point of view was the lack of any 
explicit linkage between the Egyptian and West Bank agreements. It was possible, 
therefore, that Egypt might first conclude with Israel a treaty of peace while a 
comprehensive settlement concerning the West Bank and the fate of the Palestinians 
might wait indefinitely" 270. 
As for Israel, it chose the lesser of two evils: it returned the Sinai to its former 
enemy and in the process neutralised any possible threat from its southern flank - 
henceforth, it was able to pursue its military adventures against its northern 
neighbours without fear of an attack from the militarily strongest state in the Arab 
world 271 . By sacrificing the Sinai, Israel managed to perpetuate its hold over the 
highly prized Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem. Indeed, Begin did not feel himself bound 
to the treaty he had signed: shortly before that he announced that Israel retained the 
right to remain on the West Bank indefinitely and that a provision freezing the Judea 
and Samaria settlements was only for three months 272. In the negotiations that 
started within one month of the signing of the treaty and that contemplated the future 
2'3 of the West Bank and Gaza, no progresses were made . 
William B. Quandt, Camp David (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1986), p. 258. 
=70 Lcnczowski, op. cit. : p. 178. 
Rubenberg, op. cit. : p. 249. 
Quandt says that on September 17, the final day of the Camp David meeting. Begin had spelled out 
that a freeze on settlements would take place for a three-month period; op. cit. : p. 252. 
'" During the autonomy talks, the administration could not settle conflicting Israeli and Egyptian 
interpretations of the Palestinian council In July 1980, the Knesset also voted to reaffirm a united 
Jerusalem as the Israeli capital and Sadat abandoned the autonomy talks in protest. The negotiations 
remained thereafter in abeyance as first the United States and then Israel underwent election campaigns. 
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Additionally, as a prerequisite of their signing a peace treaty with Egypt, the 
Israelis demanded a series of guarantees from the United States. In a Memorandum 
of Understanding, the American administration pledged to be "responsive" to Israel's 
military and economic needs, and reaffirmed and extended its 1975 commitment to 
provide Israel with oil in case Israel were unable to obtain it itself: "The alliance that 
emerged between the United States and Israel as a result of that memorandum 
represents one of the high points in Israeli diplomacy vis-ä-vis the United States" 27. 
4.3.5. From Reagan to the Intifada: Collusion with Israel and Stalling in the Peace 
Process 
When Reagan entered office in January 1981 the Arab-Israel conflict ceased 
to enjoy its usual priority as the region's main concern. The fall of the Shah in January 
1979, the ensuing revolutionary chaos in Iran, the seizure of American hostages by 
the Iranian revolutionaries in November 1979, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
in December 1979, taken together formed the background to an altered strategic 
position in the Middle East and particularly in the Persian Gulf. The principal focus of 
U. S. policy turned to the threat of Soviet penetration of the economically and 
strategically vital oil-rich Persian Gulf 275. The Reagan team stressed terrorism as a 
major political threat and considered Moscow as the major sponsor of this problem 2's. 
Alexander Haig, the Secretary of State, declared on March 18, his 
administration's priority in developing "a consensus of strategic concerns throughout 
the region among Arab and Jew and to be sure that the overriding danger of Soviet 
inroads into this area are not overlooked "Z". It entailed increased reliance on Israel 
as a surrogate military instrument in the Middle East and the building up of the military 
capacities of the Arab component of the projected anti-Soviet defensive arrangement 
(Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, Israel, and the Arab Gulf states). These disparate allies 
Rubenbere, op. cit. : p. 245; see also Tillman, op. cit. : p. 33. 
The Reagan administration's policy represented an expansion of the Carter Doctrine: it identified a 
potential Soviet threat to the Persian Gulf and affirmed U. S. determination to take whatever steps 
necessary to protect its interests. 
: "'6 Haig stated that "international terrorism will take the place of human rights" on the State Department 
agenda; Stork, "U. S: Policy... ": p. 140. 
Y" Quoted in Tillman, op. cit. : p. 37. 
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were expected to transcend their regional hostilities and unite against the threat of the 
Soviet Union and its proxies 278. 
The new administration came to office with a strong commitment to Israel279. 
During the campaign Reagan had proclaimed that "Israel is a strategic asset", which 
underscored the fact that in the context of the desiquilibrium created by the collapse 
of the Iranian monarchy, Israel was considered the main American ally and Soviet 
stumbling bloc in the area. It also meant the rejection of an earlier assumption that the 
resolution of the Palestine-Israel conflict was crucial to the U. S. goal of maintaining its 
strategic position in the Middle East and, especially, the Persian Gulf 280. 
In June 1981, Israel's electorate returned the Likud to power. The Likud's 
programme of expanding and consolidating Israel's presence in the occupied 
territories was increasingly complemented in the late 1970s by Israel's growing 
military involvement in South Lebanon and its open support of Lebanese Christian 
militias to the north 281. The objective was the destruction of the PLO; the 
establishment in Lebanon of Maronite (Phalangists) rule that would recognise Israel's 
claim to Lebanese territory from the northern Israeli border to the Litani river, and to 
force Syria, which had been in Lebanon since 1976, to withdraw, leaving the 
Palestinians unprotected. 
On June 6,1982 Israel launched a massive invasion of Lebanon. The Reagan 
administration knew the Israeli plans, particularly Secretary of State Alexander Haig, 
an admirer of Gen. Sharon (Israeli Defence Minister) and a fervent advocate of a 
strategic alliance with Israel. Some authors affirm that Haig gave the "green light" for 
s Joe Stork, "Israel as a Strategic Asset",. ILERIP Reports (12), n° 4, May 1982: p. 8. To that end, the 
United States offered to sell additional equipment for F-15 aircraft and AWACS (Airborne Warning 
and Control Systems) aircraft to Saudi Arabia (despite strong Israeli protests and pro-Israeli sentiment 
on Capitol Hill). also tried to set up a Jordanian logistics force (JLF) as a rapid deployment force for 
the Gulf was considered an instrument for keeping the Straits of Hormuz open. Once more, 
Congressional and Israeli opposition killed the deal. 
=79 During the campaign, Reagan had declared about the Camp David peace process that he would 
"continue to support that process as long as Israel sees utility in it". He also gave assurance that he 
would use "all appropriate instruments" including the American veto in the U. N. Security Council, "to 
insure that the PLO has no voice or role as a participant in future peace negotiations with Israel". 
Shortly after he was elected, Reagan further declared that the building of new settlements in the 
occupied territories was "not illegal"; Tillman, op. cit. : p. 36,170. 
no Stork, "U. S. Policy... ": p. 139. 
°` In March 1978 Israel invaded Lebanon with the pretext of retaliating against guerrilla attacks. The 
actual purpose was to establish a security zone in southern Lebanon under the supervision of the 
Lebanese army officer Saad Haddad. Israel withdrew its forces underCarter's and U. N. 's pressure. See 
Richman, op. cit. : p. 32. 
92 
the invasion282 although he claims that in a meeting with Sharon he confirmed Israel's 
right, in principle, to respond to acts of terrorism as long as they were indisputable 
internationally recognised provocations on the part of the PLO283 . Ryan and Tschirgi 
suggest that the Reagan administration saw the benefits that would derive from the 
Israeli move: the crushing of what Haig labelled a "terrorist" organization and a Soviet 
client - the PLO -, and the harming of the main Israeli enemy and the Soviet proxy in 
the region - Syria 284 . 
In mid-August, the United States helped to arrange an agreement that 
included a cease-fire and the PLO evacuation to other countries under supervision of 
a multinational force and of U. S. Marines. In a context of diplomatic strength - 
Palestinian retreat and Syrian defeat in Beirut - the Reagan administration felt that the 
conditions offered the possibility of building a stable Lebanon, a pillar of peace in the 
Middle East2ls. Shultz, the new Secretary of State, found that there was a linkage 
between the resolution of the Lebanese conflict and the eradication of the root causes 
of the conflict between Arabs and Israelis. 
On September 1, after the last PLO forces left Beirut, President Reagan 
unveiled his peace plan crafted by his new Secretary of State, George Shultz. In his 
televised speech, the president for the first time referred to the Palestine problem as 
"more than a question of refugees", opposed Israeli settlements in the occupied 
territories and firmly endorsed the formal U. S. policy since 1967 that a negotiated 
settlement must involve an exchange of territories for peace. The focus of this plan 
were the proposals regarding the final status of the West Bank and Gaza: Reagan 
opposed both Israeli annexation of these territories and an independent Palestinian 
212 William B. Quandt, "U. S. Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict", in William B. Quandt (ed. ), The 
, 1liddle East: Ten Years After Camp David (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1988), p. 
364. 
See Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1984), p. 335; Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Israels Lebanon War (London: George Allen 
& Unwin, 1984), pp. 73-6; Sheila Ryan, "Israel's Invasion of Lebanon: Background to the Crisis", 
Journal of Palestine Studies, SummeriFall 1982: pp. 27-31 and 34-7, and David Schoenbaum, The 
United States and the State of Israel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 283. 
284 Ryan, op. cit. : p. 29 and Tschirgi, op. cit. : pp. 163-5. 
"S Haig thought that " [A) settlement in Lebanon would have significant consequences ... 
Syria and the 
PLO, the heart of Arab opposition to Camp David, had been defeated with the PLO's 'military option" 
gone, Israel's arguments against granting a wider measure of autonomy to the Arabs of the West Bank 
and Gaza would be negated ... 
(creating) a fresh opportunity to complete the Camp David peace process 
... 
"; quoted in Tschirgi, op. cit. : p. 164. Tschirgi explains that, in this context, Washington would 
remain opposed to any form of Palestinian statehood, favouring instead a Jordanian role in the affairs of 
the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza: p. 175. 
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state. He preferred Palestinian self-government on the West Bank and Gaza in 
association with Jordan. 
The plan was rejected by Begin and his Cabinet because it compromised their 
claims to Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza and differed from their 
interpretation of the Camp David accords. The Arabs, at the Arab League Fez 
summit, offered a plan of their own, thus rejecting the Reagan proposal. It called for 
the creation of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories under the leadership of 
the PLO and with Jerusalem as its capital 286. 
Following the announcement of the plan, Reagan tried to persuade King 
Hussein to put Jordan forward as a viable representative of the Palestinians in future 
negotiations with Israel. In the following months, the King concluded that there was no 
basis for developing a joint negotiating position without PLO and Arab League 
support. After Reagan's reelection King Hussein tried to resurrect the Jordanian-PLO 
platform as a new attempt to relaunch American interest in the peace process. This 
time the monarch pursued the idea of an international conference that would discuss 
the possibility of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation 287. Actually, he was interested 
in American participation, signalling the need for U. S. contacts with a group of 
Jordanians and Palestinians. President Reagan rejected that possibility arguing that 
he did not want the United States to become an engaged partner in the negotiations. 
Instead, he urged the parties to enter into direct talks 288. 
6 The Fez Plan recognised Israel implicitly and was a "watered-down version" of the 1982 Fahd Plan. 
The main element of this plan was that the Arab world accepted U. N. Resolution 242, including the 
right of every country in the region to live in peace. This was obviously and implicit recognition of the 
state of Israel, an attempt to deal with that country. See Spiegel, op. cit. : pp. 420-1; Mohamed Heikal. 
Secret Channels: The Inside Story oJArab-Israeli Peace Negotiations (London: HarperCollms, 1996): 
p. 367, and Barry Rubin, "U. S. Policy on the Middle East in the Period Since Camp David", in 
Freedman, The Middle East Since Camp David (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1984), p. 73. 
2' Shimon Peres, acting Prime Minister supported this idea. He held a secret meeting with King 
Hussein in London on October 5,1985. He proposed that an international conference should be 
immediately followed by direct talks between Jordan and Israel; Heikal, op. cit. : p. 375. 
2$ Quandt, op. cit. : pp. 369-71. 
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4.3.6. From the Intifada to the Washington Agreement: From Palestinian 
Hopelessness to a Diplomatic Breakthrough 
It would take the Palestinian intifada that erupted in December 1987 to revive 
the Reagan administration interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict. American Jewish 
leaders and Israeli politicians urged Shultz to become more actively involved. In 
Congress, Israel's supporters seemed troubled by the consequences of the Israeli 
policy of repression, put in practice in the occupied territories by the Defence Minister 
Y. Rabin. 
For several months the American and European public were exposed to daily 
reports of Israeli ferocity and Palestinian helplessness. Significantly, there were signs 
that a gap was growing between public opinion and official U. S. policy with respect to 
the Palestine-Israel conflict 289. 
Faced with this explosive unrest, Shultz launched in January 1988 a peace 
proposal that outlined the goal of a comprehensive peace. The negotiations were to 
be conducted on the basis established in Camp David, but with a faster timetable. 
Shultz suggested that the final status of the occupied territories should be decided 
within one year of elections for a self-governing Palestinian authority29°. The proposal 
spoke of U. S. -Israeli-Jordanian cooperation in establishing limited Palestinian self-rule 
in the West Bank and Gaza. The plan was adamantly rejected by Shamir291 and most 
Arabs felt that the plan was flawed. It failed to recognise the magnitude of the 
Palestinian issue and to insist on the "territory for peace" formula that had been 
central to Reagan's 1982 proposal. 
As with the Reagan Plan, Shultz did not pursue his initiative with much 
insistence, and within a month he referred to it as being merely a process that would 
leave "something constructive for my successors" 292. 
9 Naseer Aruri, "The United States and Palestine: Reagan's Legacy to Bush", Journal of Palestine 
Studies (XVIII), no 3, Spring 1989: pp. 104. Egypt's President Mubarak came to Washington and 
urged the Americans to urgently take measures in order to neutralise the extremist wave in the region. 
" At Camp David, it had been decided that the final status of the occupied territories should be decided 
within five years of elections for a self-governing Palestinian authority. See Aruri, op. cit. : p. 20 and 
Quandt, op. cit. : p. 376. 
11 Shamir argued that the plan was a departure from Camp David, rejected the principle of the 
exchange of territory for peace, and the idea of an international conference. 
92 Kathleen Christison, "The Arab-Israeli Policy of George Shultz", Journal of Palestine Studies 
(XVIII), n° 2, Winter 1989: p. 42. 
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The Reagan administration's inaction was countered by a major change in the 
PLO's position on key aspects of its traditional platform. On November 15, the PNC 
(Palestine National Council) proclaimed an independent Palestinian state in the West 
Bank and Gaza. Later, on December 7, Arafat confirmed the PLO's acceptance of 
Israel's existence and its rejection of terrorism. Shultz was at last satisfied and 
announced on December 14 that the United States was ready to begin a substantive 
dialogue through the American ambassador in Tunis 293. 
Taylor argues that "the reluctance Shultz displayed in arriving at this major 
change in the official American attitude toward the PLO reflected the degree to which 
Washington has become rigid and unreasonable in its policies on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict" 294. 
The November 1988 elections in the United States brought to power George 
Bush, and James Baker as his Secretary of State. Neither of these men shared the 
same dogged attachment to Israel and they showed no reserve when facing down the 
Shamir government over its policies. Bush and Baker felt an intense dislike for 
Shamir and the Secretary of State called on Israel to "lay aside, once and for all, the 
unrealistic vision of a greater Israel", cease construction of settlements in the 
occupied territories, forswear annexation of territory, and reach out to the Palestinians 
"as neighbours who deserve political rights" 295. 
Early in the administration, the settlements issue became a focal point of 
President's Bush attention. He was outraged when Shamir publicly affirmed in 
February 1990 the need for a "big Israel" to accommodate the influx of Soviet Jews. 
Bush learned that 10 percent of the immigrants were moving to East Jerusalem 
(whose annexation the United States never recognised) after Shamir assured him 
privately. that fewer than 1 percent were living in the occupied territories". U. S. 
" He further added: "Nothing here may be taken to imply an acceptance or recognition by the United 
States of an independent Palestinian state. The position of the United States is that the status of the 
West Bank and Gaza cannot be determined by unilateral acts of either side, but only through a process 
of negotiations"; quoted in Heikal, op. cit. : pp. 396-7. 
290 Taylor, op. cit. : p. 105. 
:S Kathleen Christison, "Splitting the Difference: The Palestinian-Israeli Policy of James Baket", 
Journal ofPalestine Studies (XXIV), n° 1, Autumn 1994: p. 42. 
216 The massive exodus from Russia which had begun in mid-1989 decreased by the end of 1991. 
Settlement construction slowed in the last months of the Shamir government as supply outstripped 
demand. Rubenberg argues that Washington pressured Moscow on behalf of Israel to permit the Jews to 
leave the Soviet Union. The Union States restricted the entry of these immigrants, thus directing them 
to Israel; "The Gulf War, the Palestinians, and the New World Order", in Tareq Y. Ismael and 
Jacqueline S. Ismael (ed. ), The Gulf War and the New World Order (Gainesville, Fl.: University Press 
of Florida, 1994), p. 319. 
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criticism of the settlement issue contributed to the downfall of the Likud-led coalition 
government in March 1990. However, due to the Labour's inability to form its own 
coalition, Shamir came back forming a more intransigent Likud government. He 
dropped the West Bank-Gaza election plan which served as the basis for U. S. efforts 
at peace. 
Eventually, Baker allowed U. S. policy to remain closely linked to that of 
Shamir rather than designing a distinctive and original peace proposal that would take 
into account the existing positive elements 297. Baker launched his own five-point plan 
which reassured Israel that its participation would be conditioned on the formation of 
an "acceptable" Palestinian negotiating team. The Baker plan proposed U. S. -Israeli- 
Egyptian cooperation in the selection of a Palestinian delegation. This satisfied 
Shamir and effectively precluded PLO participation in the negotiations. As Stork and 
Khalidi point out: "The Baker scheme proposed a process of exasperating complexity 
and indirectness... " and the Palestinians "... immediately perceived in this ludicrously 
convoluted plan the outlines of crucial issues of substance, such as the status of 
Jerusalem and the issue of Palestinians outside the occupied territories" 298 
With the Baker initiative at an impasse by the end of 1989 (due to Israeli 
reluctance to agree to its formula), American-Israeli relations began to deteriorate. In 
early March, Baker applied indirect pressure on Shamir by announcing he favoured 
cuts in U. S. aid to Israel and Egypt to make funds available to countries in Eastern 
and Central Europe 299. 
Baker's inability to make progress on the negotiations was partly due to the 
views of the Middle East advisory staff just below the top level30°. Some of them had 
participated in the drafting of a report by the pro-Israel think tank, the Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy. "Building for Peace" advocated a gradualist approach. It 
urged a slow "ripening process" involving confidence-building moves by Palestinians 
and Israelis that would ultimately build a foundation for direct negotiations301. This 
Baker asserted that Shamir's plan was the only game in town. Christison, op. cit. : p. 43. 
ý$ Joe Stork and Rashid Khalidi, "Washington's Game Plan in the Middle East", Middle East Report 
(20), n° 3/4, May/August 1990, pp. 10-1. 
Taylor, op. cit. : p. 109. 
30° Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, Dennis Ross and Aaron Miller of the State 
Department's Policy Planning Staff, and National Security Council Middle East specialist Richard 
Haass played an important role in defining Middle East policy. See Taylor, op. cit. : p. 107; Khalidi and 
Stork, op. cit. : p. 9 and Steve Niva, "The Bush Team", Middle East Report (19), n° 3, May/June 1989: 
p. 31. 
301 One of the authors, Alfonso Chardy affirmed that the content of the report is reflected in the Baker 
Approach; Rubenberg, op. cit. : p. 333. 
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approach obviously met Shamir's preferences for delaying negotiations and 
immobilise rather than facilitate any movement towards a political settlement. 
The United States also did not fully exploit the dialogue with the PLO. Only 
five meetings were held during the first eight months of the dialogue, and for some 
capital issues - for instance, the form of Palestinian representation in the negotiations 
and which Palestinians were to take part in the elections proposed by Israel - the 
United States used Egypt as an intermediary with the PLO, thus preempting a 
confrontation with Israelis or pro-Israeli Congress members302. Furthermore, on June 
20, President Bush announced the suspension of the American dialogue with the PLO 
on the grounds that Arafat had not specifically condemned the May 30 raid by the 
Palestine Liberation Front on Tel Aviv beaches. Bush, himself under pressure from 
Congress and the pro-Israeli lobby, argued that Arafat's refusal to condemn the act 
was a violation of his pledge to renounce terrorism. 
The Bush administration's lack of resolve to force a solution of the Palestinian 
problem coupled with the hopelessness of the 'Palestinians living in the occupied 
territories, forced Arafat to choose a new alignment. As he came under increasing 
pressure to abandon the peace process, Arafat aligned himself with Saddam Hussein 
who had emerged as a visible threat to Israel 303. 
Soon after the war against Iraq came to an end, Baker and President Bush 
made it clear that an Arab-Israeli settlement was near the top of their diplomatic 
agenda304. The United States launched a diplomatic initiative of a skill and intensity 
that had not been seen since the Carter administration. The United States emerged 
from the conflict as the unchallenged, pre-eminent external power in the Middle East; 
many Arab states including Syria together with Israel were now tacit allies of the 
United States; finally, support for the Palestinian cause waned in many Arab capitals 
702 Christison, op. cit. : p. 44. 
103 Arafat's relationship to S. Hussein dates back to the start of the Iran-Iraq war. Arafat felt isolated 
since Egypt had made peace with Israel and relations with Iran and Syria remained tense. 
J0' In his address to the U. N. in October 1,1990, Bush said that if Iraq withdrew from Kuwait, he 
believed that there "may be opportunities ... 
for all states and the peoples of the region to settle the 
conflicts that divide the Arabs from Israel" (a rather evasive formulation since Bush did not use the 
words "Palestine" or "Palestinians"). He reiterated his commitment in his address to Congress on 
March 6,1991 when he declared that: "A comprehensive peace must be grounded in resolutions 242 
and 338 and the principle of territory for peace. This principle must be elaborated to provide for Israel's 
security and recognition , and at the same time 
for legitimate Palestinian political rights"; Bush quoted 
in Robert E. Hunter, "U. S. Policy Toward the Middle East After Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait", in R. O. 
Freedman (ed. ), The Middle East After Iraq s Invasion of Kuwait (Gainesville, FL: University Press of 
Florida, 1993), p. 68, and in Heikal, op. cit. : p. 405. 
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and Palestinian interests suffered a significant setback as a consequence of a new 
intensity and openness in relations between Arab states and the United States 305. 
The Bush administration resumed discussion of an international conference. 
The parties invited were Israel, Syria, Lebanon and the Jordanian-Palestinian 
delegation. Given the PLO's weakened position. Arafat was forced to accept that no 
member of the PLO would be included in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation for 
peace talks with Israel 306. Israeli demands meant in effect that the conference would 
be chaired by the United States, not the U. N., along with a less vocal Soviet Union; 
that the conference would be largely symbolic without any binding power and that it 
would set the stage for separate, bilateral talks between Israel and individual Arab 
states 301. On the opening session of the Madrid conference, on October 30,1991 
Prime Minister Shamir reiterated his rejection of the principle of land for peace and of 
demands for a halt to settlement construction. 
Before the Gulf War Bush had expressed his opposition to Israeli settlement 
expansion. In May 1991 Shamir's government asked Washington to guarantee loans 
of $10 billion to pay costs arising from the influx of Soviet Jews. In September the 
Bush administration decided to defer Israel's request 308. This stand effectively 
discredited the Likud government, thus helping to bring about a Labour victory 309. 
The Washington talks, consisting of several rounds of talks, did not produce 
any major breakthrough in the Palestinian-Israeli track. Moreover, the Israeli 
campaign overlapped with the primaries of the U. S. presidential election. Israeli 
delegates in Washington were more cautious than ever. The American team, on the 
other hand, did not want to alienate further the Jewish constituency during the election 
period. 
The victory of the Labour party in Israel (with Yitzhak Rabin as Prime Minister 
and S. Peres as Foreign Minister) immediately eased the tensions in the U. S. -Israeli 
70$ See Rubenberg, op. cit. : p. 325-8. 
'06 The Israelis had to be assured that they were not obliged to negotiate with anyone they considered 
unacceptable. This was partly offset by the principle laid by the American negotiators that only 
Palestinians could choose their delegation members, that they were not subject to veto from anyone. In 
practice, Palestinians were able to circumvent these restrictions by attaching a "steering committee" to 
the Palestinian delegation, composed of people with links to the PLO, like Faisal Hussein and Hanan 
Ashrawi. With the help of Amman, they also included a Palestinian Jordanian with family roots in East 
Jerusalem. See Heikal, op. cit. : p. 407. 
307 Rubenberg, op. cit.: p. 322. 
308 The issue eventually was resolved in Israel's favour on 11 August 1992 when President Bush 
considered that Rabin had done enough to qualify for loan guarantees, and passed a recommendation to 
Congress. Rubenberg, op. cit.: p. 311; see also Heikal, op. cit. : p. 423. 
309 Rubenberg, op. cit. : p. 311; Heikal, op. cit.: p. 423. 
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relationship. When Rabin visited the United States in August, President Bush 
signalled the beginning of a new period and highlighted the close friendship between 
the two countries and the strategic importance of Israel. He affirmed that he was 
ready to move forward with military cooperation between the two countries and 
asserted Washington's traditional policy of assuring Israel's qualitative military edge 
over its Arab neighbours"o 
When the Clinton administration took office, hopes increased of developments 
in the negotiations as the new Israeli government seemed willing to trade at least 
some land for peace. However, as months passed, both Israel and the PLO were 
growing weary of the unproductive official talks. By the eighth round of Washington 
talks in December 1992, Israeli officials no longer pretended to be negotiating with a 
Palestinian delegation unconnected to the PLO 31. 
Heikal affirms that the deadlock in the talks produced attempts to bypass it. 
"Apart from Washington, numerous other lines of contact were open ... . No 
fewer 
than nine different channels ran through Cairo, where aides to President Mubarak 
were highly active in arranging meetings" "Z. The most productive of all came to be 
the "Oslo Link". 
The Oslo agreements constituted the biggest breakthrough in Middle East 
negotiations since Sadat made peace with Israel in 1979. The agreement was 
arranged in two parts. Part one was a plan for Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and 
Jericho. It set a period of four months for Israel to withdraw its military forces and 
occupation administration from Gaza Strip and the town of Jericho. The withdrawal 
marked the start of a five year transitional period. It was established that by the end of 
the second year negotiations were to start on final status 33. The second part of the 
declaration consisted of an agreement on mutual recognition and ending the state of 
war between Israel and the PLO. 
The agreement although not entirely sanctioned, received the support of most 
Arab leaders (with the exception of the Syrian President Assad) and of the population 
of the occupied territories. The PLO executive committee was divided and some 
members were angered by the concessions Arafat had made without consulting them. 
In fact, the agreement deferred the Palestinians' aspirations to an independent state 
Rubenberg, op. cit. : p. 332. 
Heikal, op. cit. : p. 433. The Israel official policy still banned contacts with the PLO. 
"=1bid. 
. 313 For the content of the agreement see Louise Lief et al., "Israel and the PLO: A New Beginning", U. S. 
News and World Report, September 13,1993: pp. 24-5 and Heikal, op. cit.: pp. 453-3. 
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314 and did not satisfy their desire to have East Jerusalem as their capital. The accord 
also failed to address the question of frontiers and settlements and dealt with the 
refugee question in a vague way. 
4.3.7. Clinton and the Endorsement of Israeli Aims 
In the Middle East, the Clinton administration during the first term of office 
concentrated its diplomatic efforts on the Syrian track, tried to build up the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) by mobilising funds for it and intervened directly whenever serious 
crises, likely to jeopardise the peace process, erupted. 
The most conspicuous characteristic of the Clinton administration is the fact 
that it has in fact fully endorsed Israeli pretensions and has not made use of its 
guarantor rights over the peace process. Ever since the signing of the Declaration of 
Principles (DOP), Washington has acted as if it were not a co-sponsor of the peace 
process. The reality is that the US no longer pursues a distinctive policy on the Arab - 
Israeli conflict. Most of the times it simply endorses Israel's policies. Under Clinton, 
the U. S. has given up the defence of certain core issues of the past half-century and 
declared that a final solution is up to the parties themselves. Even the once strong 
condemnation of settlements as illegal has been abandoned. Settlement construction 
and extension are considered natural activities. 
Since the Declaration of Principles was signed almost 50,000 more Israelis 
live in the occupied territories 315. Settlement activity continues particularly in East 
Jerusalem, where the Jewish population has increased by 40,000 to 160,000 since 
1990 316 The Israeli government has created other problems for the Palestine 
National Authority by imposing collective punishment, closing down Gaza and the 
West Bank, with or without reason, and by delaying deployment from Hebron. Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seems even more intent on delaying the peace 
34 Heikal says that: "The effect of the Oslo agreement had been to cancel the state[provided for in the 
1988 Tunis declaration], by accepting something inferior", op. cit. : p. 469. 
"I The number of settlers grew from 96,000 to 145,000. Donald Neff, "Netanyahu Gets the Royal 
Treatment in Washington", Middle East International, n° 530,19 July 1996: p. 5. 
316 Marc Safinan, "No Peace in Jerusalem", Council for the National Interest (electronic file transfer). 
process: not only has he "unfrozen" settlement building in the West Bank and Gaza, 
he has also renegotiated the Oslo deal on the question of Hebron 3' . 
In effect, Israeli relations with the Clinton administration are the best that Israel 
ever had with any administration and political coordination on all possible issues 
between Jerusalem and Washington reached its peak under Clinton. The President 
made it clear that it would treat Israel more favourably that it would the Palestinians. 
Martin Indyk, who in May 1993 spelled out the administration's Middle East doctrine, 
asserted that the continuation of the U. S. role of full partner in the peace process 
would "involve working with Israel, not against it" "8 . Washington thus refused to 
exert any pressure on Israel. The U. S. endorsement of Israel's policies is to a large 
extent a function of domestic and electoral advantages: Zionists contributed 60 per 
cent of Clinton's campaign funds and 80 per cent of their votes in 1992 319. 
Washington's embrace of Israel has resulted in the continuing deterioration of the 
peace process and of the political climate in the Middle East. 
Graham Usher, "Dark Channels", : Vfiddle East International, n°533,6 September 1996: pp. 6-7. 
313 John Law, "Indyk Points the Way for Clinton", Middle East International, n° 452,11 June 1993: p. 
4. 
s'9 See the list of Clinton's pledges to Israel made during the three-day visit of former Prime Minister 
Shimon Peres to the United States: Donald Neff, "Clinton's Total Commitment to Israel", Middle East 
International, n° 525,10 May 1996: p. 4. 
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5. U. S. Allies in the Middle East 
5.1. The Recruitment of Regional Partners 
5.1.1. The American Network of Relationships 
In the post World War II era, American interest in the Middle East developed 
gradually. The most important stimulus to U. S. involvement in the area was the 
activity of the Soviet Union. Early efforts to co-opt regional partners to assist the 
United States in containing Soviet moves in the area translated in Truman's and 
Eisenhower's attempts to build an American-sponsored Middle East alliance system. 
Although these efforts failed, the United States was able to secure some 
strategically located partners. Turkey was the first country to develop a close 
relationship with Washington, since, together with Greece, it was the object of the 
1947 Truman Doctrine. It later became a member of the short-lived Baghdad Pact, 
but its special position in the American security system derives from the fact that it 
has been the only NATO ally in the Middle East. Turkey's collaboration in the Gulf 
War, in pursuit of the American defined aims, enhanced its standing as a reliable ally. 
Iran was the country where the United States first intervened directly. John 
Foster Dulles and his brother Allen Dulles (director of the CIA) orchestrated the covert 
operation that ousted Mossadegh and returned the Shah to power. Iran became a 
major recipient of American aid and, until the fall of the Shah, functioned effectively as 
an American proxy. Within the framework of the Nixon Doctrine, Washington provided 
it with enormous quantities of American weapons and Teheran acted to further 
American interests. 
Taylor rightly points out that the crumbling of this relationship, in the wake of 
the 1979/80 Islamic revolution in Iran, epitomizes °... a globally oriented surrogate 
policy reduced to shambles by Washington's inability or unwillingness to take a 
country's internal dynamics into account as part of a regional approach" 320. 
3=o Taylor, op. cit. : p. 115. 
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Other countries occupy a secondary position in the American surrogate 
system. Morocco and Oman have special agreements with Washington providing 
access to military and naval facilities. Both countries are strategically located and 
consider their relationship with the United States important for their national security. 
Extended cooperation with the Moroccan monarch has turned thatMaghreb country 
into a virtual U. S. ally. The United States also has good relations with Tunisia and the 
Gulf Sheikdoms 321. Following the Gulf War Arab Gulf states have dramatically 
developed their security ties with the United States. This section will focus on two 
American Middle Eastern partners whose association with the United States has been 
characterised by long-standing shared interests and resilient endurance: Israel by 
virtue of its "special relationship" and Saudi Arabia due to the importance of its oil 
resources. 
5.1.2. Israel 
The United States-Israeli relationship is indeed unique and differs from the 
standard United States foreign relations. It is based on perceived ideological, 
emotional and historical affinities and is reinforced by a shared empathy between the 
American and Israeli peoples 312. It explains why "the magnitude of U. S. support for 
Israel - militarily, politically, economically, and diplomatically goes beyond any 
" 31 traditional relationship between states in the international system. 
American commitment to Israel's survival, security and well-being has been 
strengthened over time and has translated into impressive amounts of aid. From 1949 
until 1996, the United States has provided over $65 billion in economic and military 
aid to Israel (in loans and grants) 324. Government aid between 1979 and 1983 
averaged about $2.7 billion a year, but from 1986 on it increased to about $3 billion a 
325 year 
321 Id.: p. 119. 
'== B. Reich. "Reassessing the United States-Israeli Special Relationship", Israeli Affairs (1), n° 1, 
Autumn 1994: p. 65; Reich, The U. S. and Israel : pp. 65-8. 
'=' Rubenberg, op. cit. : p. 330. 
3=4 S. L. Twing, "A Comprehensive Guide to U. S. Aid to Israel", The Washington Report on Middle 
East Affairs (XIV), n° 8, April 1996: p. 7-49. 
321 Lenczowski, op. cit. : p. 255. Twing estimates that the total U. S. aid to Israel (in loans and grants) for 
FY96 amounts to $5.5 billion: op. cit. p. 49. 
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Israel's strategic value became a widespread notion following the 1967 War, 
when policymakers began to conceive of Israel as an instrument of American power, 
a strategic asset to U. S. regional interests. After the 1970 Jordan crisis, Kissinger 
became instrumental in propagating the idea that Israel constituted a bulwark 
protecting pro-American regimes from domestic insurrection. During the Nixon tenure, 
U. S. arms transfers grew significantly and the United States provided the Jewish state 
with absolute diplomatic and political support, during and after the 1973 War. It was 
only during the Reagan Administration that the concept of strategic cooperation 
between the two states became institutionalised. 
In reality, the American commitment to Israel has not translated into a legally 
binding document joining the two states in a formal alliance. Hence frequent 
references of the president and political leaders to Israel as an ally do not imply a 
legal commitment to take up arms on its behalf326. U. S. commitment to the survival of 
the Israeli state has been partly codified in specific documents associated with the 
1975 Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement (Sinai II), the Egypt-Israel Peace 
Treaty process (particularly the accompanying U. S. -Israel letters and memoranda? 27, 
the 1981 (reconfirmed on April 1988) U. S. -Israeli Memorandum of Understanding on 
Strategic Cooperation. This last document in particular "represented a major move of 
American involvement on Israel's side" 328. "Strategic cooperation" included joint 
military exercises in the Mediterranean; joint readiness activities; cooperation in 
research and development, and in defence trade; the storage of medical supplies in 
Israel for possible use by American forces assigned to the Middle East in an 
emergency, and a free trade agreement 9. 
Despite the lack of a mutual security treaty or of a formal alliance system, the 
American commitment on behalf of Israel is indeed remarkable. Many analysts 
stressed the benefits of this relationship by arguing that Israel acted as a bulwark 
against Soviet penetration, that it has maintained regional stability through its military 
power and that, for these same reasons, it ensured the survival of pro-American Arab 
regimes 330. 
326 Lenczowski, op. cit. p. 261. 
327 Reich, "Reassessing ... 
": p. 71. They addressed possible Soviet military threats. 
3'`8 Lenczowslä, op. cit. p. 262. 
3: 9 S. Green states that from 1981 "the military-industrial complexes of the two countries have been 
effectively merged, and the bases have been laid for Israel's becoming the third most advanced ... 
military power on earth. No other U. S. military alliance, including those with NATO countries, is as 
strong or as broad based" : Living by the Sword : p. 225. 
; 10 Rubenberg, op. cit. : p. 2. 
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It seems clear, however, that the Israeli contribution to the advancement of 
American interests in the Middle East has been far less positive than is widely 
acknowledged. In fact, Israel has rather constituted a liability to American interests in 
the region. 
In reality, Soviet penetration in the area was to a great extent a result of the 
policies pursued by the Israeli state. As Rubenberg points out: "each increment of 
growth in Soviet influence in the region has been directly related to Israeli policies, 
beginning with Israel's large-scale, unprovoked attack on Gaza in February 1955, 
after which Nasser turned to the Soviet Union for arms":: ". The Soviets expanded 
their presence in Egypt after the Israeli invasion of that territory in 1967; they 
intensified their involvement during Israel's escalation of post-war hostilities along the 
Suez Canal; they consolidated co-operative relationships with other Arab states after 
the 1967 and 1973 wars and the subsequent radicalisation of Israeli actions. The 
1982 invasion of Lebanon was the last instance of Israeli aggression against her 
neighbours, the outcome of which was characterised by: an upsurge of Soviet power 
and of rejectionist Arab states such as Syria, and the decline in U. S. influence and 
prestige in the Middle East 12. 
The U. S. -Israeli association has been negatively viewed by the Arab states, 
thus impeding Washington's ability to achieve stable and constructive relationships 
with the Arab states. Traditional pro-American regimes like Jordan and Saudi Arabia 
have mostly refrained from openly allying themselves with the United States, for fear 
of domestic criticism333. 
In the wake of the 1973 War, the Saudis punished the United States for its 
support of Israel by raising oil prices and cutting production; they distanced 
themselves from the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and, 
in 1981, despite their fear of the Soviet Union, declined to join in the Reagan 
Administration's proposed "strategic consensus". 
It would be equally inaccurate to state that Israel furthered American interests 
by protecting conservative Arab regimes from domestic insurrection. One can point to 
the fact that Israel has consistently mobilised its lobby in the American Congress to 
"1 Id.: p. 7. 
"= Ibid.: p. 7. 
333 The Gulf War was an exception, as far as Saudi Arabia is concerned. 
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defeat Jordan and Saudi requests for arms, even when they proved crucial for 
regional stability 3'°. 
Israel's inability to protect these regimes and to enhance the American 
position was played out during the 1991 Gulf War. The United States asked Israel to 
keep a low profile in order to avoid splitting the Arab anti-Iraq coalition, and when 
President Bush asked that Israel not respond to the Iraqi Scud attacks Israel complied 
335 The administration preferred to enlist other regional states, such as Turkey and 
Egypt (and even Syria), for both military forces and logistical support. 
In the post-Gulf and post-Cold War era, Israel will retain its centrality in 
American policy, due not so much to strategic reasons but to the four decades of 
political and cultural ties 336 With the demise of the Soviet bloc, some analysts put 
forth the view that Israel has less to offer as a strategic ally than others. Hence, they 
argued, the intensity of the American commitment to Israel will undergo some kind of 
change. Israel will be expected to tackle difficult issues concerning its security and 
economic domestic situation. A co-operative attitude to solving the Arab-Israeli 
dispute would greatly enhance the Israeli case in the United States, in an era when 
the American commitment to Israel is questioned by some and when economic 
stringency dictates restraint in foreign aid. 
That prospect did not materialise . In effect, 
Israeli relations with the Clinton 
administration are the best that Israel has ever had with any administration and 
political co-ordination on all possible issues between Tel Aviv and Washington 
reached its peak under Clinton. 
5.1.3. Saudi Arabia 
The United States and Saudi Arabia have developed a mutually beneficial 
relationship, based on a primary concern: oil. Interests in this commodity took a 
unique form during World War II, when the British seemed about to get a bigger share 
of the oil riches. In order to provide needed financial assistance to the Saudi 
374 The decision by President Bush to sell 72 F-15s to Saudi Arabia in 1992 is a case in point. Prime 
Minister Rabin opposed the sale alleging that it would adversely affect Israel's security. 
335 Bernard Lewis, "Rethinking the Middle East", Foreign Affairs (71), n° 4, Fall 1992: pp. 110-1. 
336 P. Mary, "Strategies for an Era of Uncertainty: The U. S. Policy Agenda", in P. Marr and W. Lewis, 
op. cit. : p. 228. 
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government (and thus secure a predominant position for American oil companies), 
President Roosevelt issued a directive to the Lend-Lease administration in which he 
stated that "in order to enable you to arrange Lend-Lease aid to the government of 
Saudi Arabia, I hereby find that the defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of 
the United States" '3'. American financial and military assistance started to flow 
lavishly in the direction of the Saudi kingdom. 
The U. S. -Saudi relationship developed on the basis of a mutuality of interests, 
both political and economic. American technology, management, equipment and 
expertise were seen as requisites for modernising Saudi economy, society and the 
defence apparatus. The Saudis and the Americans also converged in maintaining 
regional stability by checking the spread of communist and radical nationalist 
influences in the Middle East. The bottom line was that the Saudis would expand their 
oil output to meet the needs of the capitalist world and sell such oil at a reasonable 
price in exchange for American protection and assistance 338. The 1973-4 oil embargo 
constituted a brief exception to this arrangement. 
In the wake of the embargo, the United States sought to draw Saudi Arabia 
into its political and economic orbit in order to create disincentives to future oil 
embargoes. For this purpose a joint economic commission was created with Saudi 
Arabia in June 1974. The new Saudi-American interdependence translated into a 
1000 percent increase in U. S. -Saudi trade between 1972 and 1976339. The 1974 
agreement enabled the United States to play a major role in a wide variety of Saudi 
economic, military, and social affairs, such as the creation of a joint commission on 
economic cooperation to promote programmes on industrialisation, trade, manpower 
training, agriculture, and science and technology, the formation of an American-Saudi 
industrial development council, mutual cooperation in the field of finance and the 
transfer of technical and advisory services 340. 
One of the most significant areas of cooperation and trade was the military 
sector. From the mid 1970s on Saudi Arabia embarked on an ambitious programme 
of military preparedness and modernisation. Because the Americans were, among all 
foreign powers, more engaged in Saudi oil production and other technological 
innovations, the Saudis relied on America as a principal provider of arms and builder 
of its military facilities. This proved to be a sensitive matter, where Saudi perceptions 
3' Alnasrawi, "U. S. Foreign Policy": p. 60. 
3311 Id.: p. 67. 
331 Spiegel, op. cit. : p. 226. 
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of its defence needs and American (i. e. Congressional) views about the regional 
balance of power clashed 341. 
The controversy arose in the Carter and Reagan Administrations. In 1978, 
president Carter announced a "package" arms sale for the Middle East (Egypt, Israel 
and Saudi Arabia) that included sixty F-15s - the most advanced fighter plane in the 
United States arsenal - to Saudi Arabia. The proposed sale was seen as an American 
incentive to Saudi Arabia in order to draw it into the Camp David negotiations and as 
a reward to a friendly regime. The initiative met with strong opposition from pro-Israeli 
forces in Congress, on the ground that the military equipment would destabilise the 
Arab-Israeli balance of power and that it represented a real threat to the special 
relationship between Israel and the United States. 
In 1981, the Reagan Administration announced the sale of five AWACS to 
Saudi Arabia. The sale of these radar-equipped planes was decided in the context of 
the destabilisation in the Persian Gulf provoked by revolutionary Iran, whose regime 
was hostile to Saudi Arabia on account of its monarchical nature and because the 
Saudi kingdom was financially supporting Iraq in its war with Iran. Reagan had indeed 
pledged to defend Saudi Arabia against internal and external threats: "We will not 
permit Saudi Arabia to be an Iran ... " 
342. It was a complement of the Carter Doctrine. 
The sale was approved following the president's personal intervention with a 
number of senators 343. The test of wills over the AWACS was again repeated in 1986 
and 1988. Frustrated with Congressional opposition and in an urgent need to upgrade 
its air defence system by acquiring aircraft and other military equipment, Saudi Arabia 
turned to Britain and signed a major arms agreement with that country 344. 
For both countries the maintenance of the security relationship is of vital 
importance, but each party had different concerns. The Saudis preferred a highly 
visible U. S. assistance in the form of sales of sophisticated weapons, while rejecting 
American requests for a larger military presence. They resent being treated with less 
deference than Egypt and Israel, both U. S. allies whose needs are readily taken into 
account. The United States, for its part, has had difficulties in responding to Saudi 
requests due largely to domestic constraints. The reluctance in satisfying Saudi 
340 Alnasrawi, op. cit. : p. 68. 
J41 See Lenczowski, op. cit. : p. 259-60. 
34= Tillman, op. cit.: p. 121. See also pp. 98-122. 
"' The passage of the amts authorisation had a price: all sorts of restrictions were placed on the use of 
the AWACS planes; the F-15s were sold smaller than standard fuel tanks and denuded of bomb racks. 
344 Lenczowski, op. cit. : p. 260. 
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demands is partly rooted in the impression that the Kingdom can not be considered a 
reliable ally. The oil embargo, pro-Arab attitudes and a militant anti-Israeli stance have 
clouded popular perceptions of Saudi Arabia X45. 
Another area of disagreement in the U. S. -Saudi relationship had to do with the 
resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although the Palestinian issue has not been 
necessarily the most important problem in bilateral U. S. -Saudi relations, and although 
the Saudi attitude towards the Palestinians in general, and the PLO in particular, is 
ambivalent (but not unsympathetic), it certainly constitutes a bone of contention. 
Common membership in the Arab umma and the Saudi belief that the greatest threat 
to regional instability is the unresolved Palestinian question, make up for the salience 
of this issue 111. 
The United States was dismayed by Saudi actions in the wake of the Camp 
David accords. Saudi leaders acquiesced in joining in the total embargo of Egypt, 
decided at the Baghdad meeting in late March 1979. They were disappointed by the 
lack of will or ability of the United States to carry through the Camp David process to 
anything meaningful beyond the Egyptian-Israeli settlement ". 
The 1990-1 Gulf crisis dramatically altered the setting of the U. S. Saudi 
relationship. For the first time, Riyadh invited American troops to Saudi Arabia to 
defend the Kingdom. This country had traditionally insisted on an "over the horizon" 
U. S. presence with no guarantee that in a crisis it would agree to grant access. In the 
wake of the 1991 War, Saudi Arabia became dependent on the American 
commitment to its defence. Riyadh decided to do the previously unthinkable - depend 
on bilateral security arrangements with the United States. A heightened though 
discrete American presence is ensured by arrangements forprepositioning military 
equipment and for joint exercises and assistance in training to double the size of the 
Saudi army34B. Riyadh has also became the biggest arms importer of the region: 
between 1991 and 1993, Saudi Arabia bought $24,7 billion worth of U. S. armament, 
which include the most advanced conventional weapons 3i9. 
The Kingdom intends to become the newAmerican surrogate in the Gulf and 
is now more willing to do America's bidding even at the price of strained relations with 
"s Quandt, Saudi Arabia : pp. 142-3. 




347Id.: pp. 111-2. 
31 Efforts to preposition equipment for a "rapid reaction" armoured brigade have been resisted by Saudi 
authorities on the grounds that the presence of U. S. defence forces aroused popular opposition; see 
Donald Neff, "Bombing in Riyadh", Middle East International, n° 513,17 November 1995: p. 11. 
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its Arab allies 0. There is now a regular consultation between Riyadh and 
Washington, particularly on oil policy. Washington's predominance is highlighted by 
the fact that Saudi Arabia has repeatedly informed Washington on proposals it was 
going to make within OPEC. 
5.2. Egypt and Jordan: Their Standing in the U. S. Policy in the Middle East 
5.2.1. The United States and Egypt: A Wavering Relationship 
Egypt's entry in the American sphere of influence constitutes a success story 
in the annals of U. S. Middle Eastern relations. During the 1967 WarNasser severed 
diplomatic relations with the United States. Sadat's accession to the presidency 
brought about a noticeable improvement in Washington-Cairo relations. Within four to 
five years, Egypt developed special relations with the United States. Since 1978, the 
United States has become a "partner" in Egyptian-Israeli relations, the major supplier 
of arms, and the primary donor of economic assistance to Egypt. 
The 1973 War was the turning point in U. S. -Egyptian relations. Sadat had for 
long mistrusted the Soviets and felt frustrated over their inability to provide enough 
arms for Egypt to defeat Israel in the 1967 and 1973 wars. WhenSadat took office he 
signalled to Washington his willingness to end the Soviet military presence in Egypt 
and of co-operating with the United States in order to negotiate some kind of peaceful 
settlement with Israel. Only after the Yom Kippur War did Kissinger pay heed to 
Sadat's intentions and engaged in intense "shuttle diplomacy" which brought about 
two disengagement agreements between Egypt and Israel. 
Sadat boldly turned Egypt to the United States with political and economic 
objectives in mind. He wanted to secure U. S. support in the peace negotiations with 
Israel, for he thought that only that superpower was able to deliver such a result. He 
intended to recover Sinai due to its economic importance (oil and the Suez Canal) 
and its strategic value as a buffer zone with Israel. He also hoped to obtain U. S. 
349 Ibid. . 3so Martin Indyk, "Watershed in the Middle East", Foreign Affairs (71), n°1, America and the World 
1991/2: p. 78. 
military aid, economic assistance, technology, and investment to promote economic 
growth 35'. 
In the wake of the October war, the Egyptians signed an agreement with 
Washington that guaranteed American investment in Egypt and permitted American 
banks to open branches in the Republic. All this was part of the "open door" (infitah) 
economic policy which was designed to create conditions attractive to foreign 
investment capital. Economic liberalisation was the other side of the coin ofSadat's 
post-1973 foreign policy: it intended to demonstrate to the Western world and to 
conservative Arab regimes that the Nasserist revolutionary zeal was over. 
This new Egyptian setting succeeded in producing lavish capital inflows not 
only from the United States and other industrialised countries, but also from the I. M. F. 
(International Monetary Fund) and Arab oil producers. From 1973 to 1976, Egypt 
received from Washington $1.6 billion; from 1975 to 1979 the United States increased 
its level of aid to compensate for the reduction in budgetary support granted by 
Persian Gulf states. American aid, funnelled mainly through the Agency for 
International Development (A. I. D. ) mounted from $370 million to $950 million 352. 
American support to Egypt increased with the advent of the Carter 
Administration. Carter materialised the promise of military aid: he furnished Egypt with 
its first F-5Es and other offensive weapons, despite strong congressional opposition. 
By the time Sadat engaged in the Camp David meetings, Egypt's purchases of 
American weapons amounted to $937 million 35'. 
Camp David was the cornerstone of the political association between the two 
countries and it was largely the result of the unique personal working relationship 
established between Carter and Sadat. The accords addressed Egyptian 
requirements: they compensated Egypt for losses resulting from the Arab economic 
boycott and re-equipping the Egyptian military with large number of U. S. armoured 
personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery, anti-aircraft missiles, advanced combat 
aircraft and ground-to-ground missiles, with deliveries of weapons linked to the 
progresses registered in carrying out the Camp David accords. Within weeks of the 
peace treaty Cairo and Washington signed a comprehensive military agreement which 
's' W. B. Quandt, The United States and Egypt (Washington D. C.: The Brookings institution, 1990: p. 
14; A. E. Hillal Dessould, "The Primacy of Economics: The Foreign Policy of Egypt", in Bahgat 
Korany and A. E. H. Dessould, The Foreign Policies of Arab States (Boulder Colo.: Westview Press, 
1991), pp. 166-7. 
15= Paul Jabber, "Egypt's Crisis, America's Dilemma", Foreign Affairs (64), no 5, Summer 1986: pp. 
965-6. 
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provided for the delivery of $2 billion worth of American weapons to Egypt, for co- 
production of American arms in Egypt, and the use of military facilities in that country 
by American armed forces 354. 
With Sadat's assassination in October 1981, Egypt's influence in Washington 
declined. On the other hand, the new American president, R. Reagan had different 
priorities from those of his predecessor. The Egyptian president, H. Mubarak did not 
hold Sadat's "American-centric" woridview, but believed instead that Cairo needed 
to open its channels to a multiplicity of power centres, in particular, to restore Egypt's 
relations with the Arab world. In doing so, it needed to distance itself from its 
American patron and to erase the negative image created by its compliance with 
Israeli demands in the Camp David accords. 
The 1980s were marked by a series of strains in the U. S. -Egyptian 
relationship. The 1982 invasion of Lebanon caused a wave of anti-American 
sentiment in Egypt since the public perception was that the United States had 
condoned the Israeli action. Responding to domestic outrage, Mubarak withdrew its 
ambassador from Tel Aviv and froze further normalisation of Egyptian-Israeli relations. 
This caused unease in Washington and in the next four years, despite American 
pressure for Mubarak to return to the spirit of the Camp David accords, the Egyptian 
president refused to do so. 
The relationship was again severely tested by the events of the 1985Achille 
Lauro affair and the interception of an Egyptian plane by U. S. military planes"' The 
widespread official and popular condemnation of this incident in Egypt left a lingering 
feeling of resentment. 
One important source of Egypt's frustration had to do with Reagan's failure to 
follow through on Camp David commitments. Egyptians realised that not only had 
Washington downgraded the peace process and gave up the role of an "honest 
broker", it had also become an unstinting supporter of Israeli policies and an uncritical 
adherent of some of the Israeli leader's substantive ideas 357 . Egypt's role in any 
'S' Dilip Hiro, Inside the Middle East (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), p. 305. "4Id.: pp. 306-7. 
 Dessouki, op. cit. : p. 167. 
356 The italian cruise ship was seized on October 7,1985, off the coast of Egypt by armed Palestinians 
from the Palestine Liberation Front. While off the coast, the gunmen killed an American, Leon 
Klingho[%r. The Egyptian authorities took custody of the hijackers and sent them to Tunis to be put on 
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resumed peace process came to be seen as secondary and at best supportive of 
Jordan, which was targeted by Washington to represent the Palestinians. Egypt 
resented American's intentions of side-stepping the issue of Palestinian 
representation since it saw Cairo's future role in the Arab world linked to achieving an 
acceptable Palestinian settlement and to active participation in the process 358 
Shultz's readiness to open an official dialogue in 1988 encouraged the 
Egyptians to work closely with the PLO to help Arafat move toward meeting American 
conditions. Having patched up its ties to the PLO, Cairo emerged in the late 1980s as 
a player in the Arab-Israeli game once again. Thus, when Reagan left office bilateral 
U. S. -Egyptian relations were on a better footing. 
Egypt's close alignment with President Bush's anti-Iraq coalition during the 
Gulf crisis has contributed greatly to the overall strengthening of the relationship. 
Mubarak "short-circuited" Arab diplomacy in favour of a U. S. military intervention and 
sent 35,000 Egyptian troops (the second largest contingent) to the battlefield35'. This 
won Cairo the favour not only of the petro-monarchies but of the American patron: in 
the Fall of 1990, Washington gave Egypt over $10 billion in aid including forgiveness 
of outstanding military debt ($7.1 billion) plus cash and new military hardware 10. 
Cairo's close cooperation with Washington in trying to pave the way for the 
opening of Israeli-Palestinian talks and to the Madrid Peace Conference had once 
again given it a role as a peace broker. Egypt also worked hard to bring Syria into the 
framework of peace negotiations and to find a reasonable formula for Palestinian 
representation. Egypt's role in the formal peace talks was necessarily limited: it 
participated in the multilateral talks, especially on arms control. It has played a more 
efficient role in serving as a channel for Israeli messages to other Arab leaders, as an 
inducer for the Arab parties to go to the negotiation table and as a partisan of 
moderation. 
U. S. -Egyptian relations will, however, continue to depend on much more than 
cooperation in the peace process. It was Egypt's willingness to move boldly in a 
Middle East peaceful settlement that gave it a privileged place in American foreign 
policy. Paradoxically, Egypt has also become a hostage of that process: if no 
311 Quandt, op. cit. : p. 31. 
 Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "Egypt, Syria and the Arab State System in the New World Order", in 
Haifaa A. Jawad (ed. ), The Middle East in the New World Order (London: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 
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substantial movement in the negotiations is registered, the Egyptian-Israeli 
cornerstore for regional stability could begin to crumble. This would entail pressure 
from other Arab states and from its own Islamic movements to curtail its relationship 
with Israel. In that case, U. S. -Egyptian ties would also suffer. Such a course has been 
observed by Eilts who remarks that "whenever the Egyptian-Israeli link deteriorated 
for whatever reasons, U. S. -Egyptian ties were reflexively strained"36'. In fact, bilateral 
U. S. -Egyptian ties should be "... seen as one side of a triangle, the other sides of 
which link the United States to Israel and Israel to Egypt" 312. While in times of crisis 
Israel maintains its leverage over Washington, Cairo lacks a comparable capability. It 
is thus a vulnerable partner. 
Other factors are likely to have a negative impact on the American-Egyptian 
relationship as well. Economic issues have become the dominant concern in the 
bilateral dialogue. Egypt has benefited from the second largest amount of aid provided 
by the United States to a foreign country 363. About three-quarters of all American 
economic aid to Egypt has been provided through the Economic Support Fund (ESF), 
most of which has come in the form of grants. On the military assistance side, 
Washington has since 1979 provided $1.3 billion each year in Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS) 4. Since fiscal year 1985 this aid has also been provided on a grant basis. 
Years of avoiding the sort of structural reforms that other countries have 
undertaken, weakened the Egyptian economy. The economy stagnated during the 
1980s, while external debt rose nearly 150 percent, from $21 billion to $50 billion. In 
1991, with arrears to foreign creditors mounting Egypt, was forced to agree to a 
reform programme monitored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
361 Eilts, op. cit. : p. 127. 
36' Quandt, op. cit. : p. 5. A recent case in point was Egypt's insistence that Israel sign the NuclearNon- 
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This stand caused considerable tension with Israeli leaders and the White 
House made the continuation of the existing level of aid to Egypt conditional on its signing the treaty 
(naturally without Israel's adherence). See Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, "Menacessur 1'Egypte", Le Monde 
Diplomatique, n° 492, March 1995: p. 11; Jane Hunter, "Egypt and the Non-Proliferation Treaty", 
Middle East International, n° 497,31 March 1995: pp. 17-18. Under intense U. S. pressure, Arab 
countries led by Egypt and Algeria on 11 May 1995 backed down from earlier attempts at boycotting 
the Treaty and withdrew on the last day a resolution condemning Israel for its nuclear programme: Jules 
Kagian, "Israel Exempt", Middle East International, n° 500,26 May 1995: pp. 10-11. 
163 Between fiscal years 1974 and 1990 the United States provided about S 17 billion in various form of 
economic aid and a total of S 17.8 billion in military assistance. In fiscal year 1993, total U. S. assistance 
levels to Egypt were $815 million in Economic Support Fund grants. Public Law 480 food aid 
amounted to S50 million, down from S 150 million annually in previous years. See Quandt, op. cit. : p. 
41 and United States Department of State, "Egypt", Background Notes (5), n° 7: p. 6. 
364 Quandt, op. cit. : p. 32,36. In 1993, the level of military assistance to Egypt remained the same. 
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Banks. The cancellation of foreign debts from bilateral creditors were conditioned on 
Egypt's complying with the international lending agencies' stipulations 16. Egypt 
completed its IMF and World Bank programmes in March 1993 and a new three-year 
IMF Extended Fund Facility, concentrating on structural reforms, was approved by the 
IMF in September 1993. 
The United States echoing the IMF has increasingly used aid as a direct 
leverage to get Egypt to reform its economy. The Republican Congress elected in 
1994 questioned Egypt's value in a post-Cold War Middle East, where it no longer is 
considered a strategic asset in the struggle against Soviet influence'. Mr. Jesse 
Helms, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated in 1995 that the 
current level of financial aid to Egypt finds no current justification. So far the possibility 
of reducing current levels of aid to Egypt has not materialised 368. 
In the United States a number of analysts and Congressmen have expressed 
doubts about the nature of Egypt's role in the U. S. Middle Eastern policy. The issue at 
stake is the domestic stability of the regime at a time when it is facing an irresistible 
build up of the fundamentalist forces. As the United States grapples with the 
phenomenon of "political Islam" in the Arab world, Egyptian officials have made a 
compelling case to U. S. policymakers and Congressmen that bolstering their 
economy and preventing extremists from taking advantage of the ongoing economic 
crisis will require a continuation of U. S. aid levels. 
The predominant view in the Clinton administration, however, is that a friendly 
and stable Egypt remains vital to U. S. regional interests. Egypt provides critical air 
access to the Gulf; the Suez Canal is a vital strategic waterway, and Egypt's 
moderate policies are needed as a balance to emergent radicallslamist forces in the 
region 369. 
One should conclude that "while both countries share strategic interests, they 
are no longer bound by a common strategic threat or a shared vision for the future" 
aas Zelmys Dominguez, "Egypt: Its Role in the Postwar Middle East", Revista de Africa y Medio 
Oriente (4), n° 1,1992: p. 6. 
366 See Stanley Reed, "The Battle for Egypt", Foreign Affairs (72), n° 4, September/October 1993: p. 
95. 
367 Quandt, op. cit. : p. 1. 
368 The foreign aid bill moving through Congress in October 1995 contemplated no cuts to Egypt: it 
remained at the $2,1 billion level; Donald Neff, "Congress and the Embassy", Middle East 
International, n° 512,3 November 1995: p. 6. 
369 See Gregory L. Aftandilian, Egypt's Bid for Arab Leadership (NY: Council on Foreign Relations 
Press, 1993), p. 79; P. Marr, "Egypt's Regional Role", Strategic Fonun, n° 24, April 1995: p. 4. 
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"o Development of a common strategic vision is essential to bolster the U. S. - 
Egyptian relationship in the new era: the fight against extremism, Islamist or other, 
might as well provide the motive. 
5.2.2. Jordan and the United States: Perseverance Against Adverse Odds 
The U. S. -Jordanian relationship took shape in the midst of the 1956 crisis 
during which Nasserist and socialist forces threatened King Hussein's leadership. 
Within the framework of the Eisenhower Doctrine, units of the Sixth Fleet were 
ordered to the eastern Mediterranean and Hussein was assured an initial sum of $10 
million in financial aid. Fortified by this support, the King was able to assert authority 
over his armed forces and dismiss the Nabulsi government. This event marked 
Jordan's entry in the American orbit. 
During the 1958 crisis, in the wake of the Republican coup in Iraq, the United 
States intervened again to preserve Hussein's throne. Washington stepped up 
economic and military assistance to Amman. Between 1958 and 1965, American aid 
to Jordan, amounted to an average of $64 million a year3". Besides budget support, 
the United States contributed to the development of many sectors of the Jordanian 
economy. A less substantial military aid made it possible for Jordan to double the 
strength of its army to 45,000 men 372 
Congruence with American objectives was not a constant pattern of Jordanian 
policy. In the crisis that preceded the Six Day War, the King made peace withNasser, 
joined the Syro-Egyptian Defence Pact and placed his armed forces under Egyptian 
command. In the resulting debacle, Jordan lost East Jerusalem and the West Bank of 
the Jordan River. Jordan's stance in the war placed considerable strain on Jordan- 
American relations. However, King Hussein had not severed relations with 
Washington during the course of the war. Following the conflict, he decided not to turn 
to the Soviets to equip his armed forces. This regained his former special position 
with Washington: the American arms shipments were resumed in early 1968. 
Marr, "Egypt's Growing Challenges", Strategic Foram, no 4, August 1994: p. 1. 
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During the interwar period, King Hussein emerged as a moderate leader and 
worked vigorously to improve Arab relations with the United States. He also launched 
several diplomatic initiatives manifesting Jordan's willingness to recognise Israel in 
exchange fora return to the internationally recognised borders 37. 
By the late summer of 1970 Jordan was in the throes of civil war, with 
Palestinian commandos threatening to take control of the country. The Nixon 
Administration acted swiftly to bolster the King's position. The Palestinians' repression 
brought down upon Hussein the condemnation of nearly all Arab states and the 
suspension of their financial subsidies. The United States stepped into the breach by 
resuming both economic and military aid on an enhanced scale. 
Jordan-American relations came out unscathed during the October 1973 War 
due to Jordan's limited participation in the conflict. This won Jordan a dramatic 
improvement in economic and military aid. The growing assertiveness of Congress in 
foreign relations account for the new tensions that emerged in 1975 as Jordan tried to 
purchase from America a sorely needed air defence system, to be financed by Saudi 
Arabia. The sale of mobile Hawk anti-aircraft missiles to Jordan was vehemently 
protested on Capitol Hill. Pro-Israeli congressmen argued that the absence of an air 
defence had prevented Hussein's participation in the 1973 War. A deal was finally 
struck, but the use of the missiles was subject to multiple restrictions 34. 
Throughout the 1970s Hussein encouraged Kissinger's peace initiatives but 
had only a marginal participation. The arrival of President Carter at the White House 
changed this picture, bringing Jordan back into play. The Camp David agreements 
called for Jordan's cooperation in talks on an interim period of autonomy for the 
Palestinians of the West Bank and in eventual negotiations about the West Bank's 
future status. However Jordan resisted U. S. pressures to join in the Egyptian-Israeli 
talks. Hussein repeatedly voiced his criticisms of the process by saying that it was 
"limited" and "doomed" to failure and that Israeli forces should withdraw from the 
occupied territories before he could join the negotiations375. The Jordanian monarch 
criticised the provisions of the accords relating to the West Bank and refused to 
assume the role of "protecting the Israelis" from the population of that area 3's 
"' Hiro, op. cit. : p. 321. 
34 Spiegel, op. cit. : p. 303-4. 
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Reagan's Middle East policy disappointed Hussein, who grew increasingly 
frustrated at U. S. insensitivity to the realities of the regional situation. He blamed the 
Americans for their all-out support of Israeli policies in the occupied territories and in 
Lebanon. Reagan's speech on September 1,1982, had broached the possibility of 
some form of association between the West Bank, Gaza, and Jordan. The U. S. 
president tried to persuade the King to join in his peace plan but Hussein quickly 
concluded that there was no basis for developing a joint negotiating position with the 
PLO. Following Reagan's reelection, Jordan and the PLO tried to revive the 
September 1,1982 initiative. By the time Hussein arrived in Washington in May 1985, 
the stage seemed to be set for the Reagan Administration's return to the peace- 
making game. However, the King realised that the Americans were not interested in 
carrying it through and that they had never been enthusiastic about the idea of dealing 
with a joint Jordanian-PLO delegation 37 
Reagan also failed in winning congressional support for a big new arms 
package to Jordan - something Reagan had promised the King in writing in December 
1982. The package was part of a programmme to set up a Jordanian Logistics Force 
(J. L. F. ) intended to assist in the Western defence of the Gulf. The administration's 
public abandonment of the programme added fuel to KingHussein's frustration with 
Washington. The stipulation that arms shipment be conditional on Jordanian 
acceptance of Camp David (among other conditions), led the King to suggest that 
Americans had a "double standard everywhere" and to accuse the United States of 
having "succumbed to Israeli dictates", as well as those of "AIPAC and Zionism"37e 
By the end of the 1980s Jordan's ability to withstand U. S. pressures and to maintain 
an independent behaviour diminished as Arab aid was affected by the fall in oil prices. 
Jordan's reluctance to join the anti-Iraq coalition during the Gulf crisis came as 
a shock to those who knew it as the most pro-Western Arab state. In early 1991 the 
Bush Administration and Congress punished the King by suspending military and 
economic aid which amounted to $55 million. Also, Secretary of State James Baker's 
March 1991 trip to the Middle East pointedly omitted a stopover in Amman "s 
However, by late April King Hussein had succeeded in convincing the Bush 
Administration that hurting Jordan would adversely affect U. S. interests and that 
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Jordan's role remained vital to the enforcement of the blockade against Iraq and to an 
Arab-Israeli settlement. Hussein's participation in peace diplomacy was aimed at 
gaining the financial and political support of the Western nations and Japan and of 
securing Washington's protection against prospective Israeli acts of hostility 380. 
Jordan was invited to head the joint Jordanian-Palestinian team to the Madrid 
Peace Conference and to the Washington rounds of peace talks. King Hussein, like 
most Arab leaders, was astounded by the outcome of the Oslo meetings and 
dismayed at the concessions that the PLO had made. In this context Hussein decided 
to resume negotiations with Israel in view of a bilateral peace agreement. In July 
1994, King Hussein and Rabin declared the state of war between their countries to be 
over. Hussein was thus able to insulate Jordan from the turmoil in the occupied 
territories, while ensuring that his country would henceforth be able "to become 
economically stronger and politically more united" 381 
The Jordan-Israeli peace treaty has aroused widespread domestic criticism. 
However, there was no alternative to making peace with Israel, and for Jordan to go 
its own way after the Palestinians opted for the Oslo accord. Close ties with Israel are 
a must, for strategic and economic reasons. As far as the official view is concerned, 
warmer relations with Tel Aviv have been crucial to reopening the gates to 
Washington"82. 
In this vein, the King has since February 1995 set in motion a process of 
normalising relations with Israel. Domestic opposition leaders and Jordan's Arab 
neighbours have expressed concern that the government is dragging the country into 
an unprecedented security alliance with IsraeI363. This course naturally pleases the 
strongly disposed pro-Israeli Clinton Administration. 
Jordan is now fully engaged in a process of reconciliation with the United 
States and is trying to restore its role as an American ally. The kingdom expects to 
reap the economic advantages of its peace treaty with Israel, and there would be a 
terrible backlash if the United States could not deliver on its pledges to help Jordan 
and persuade other countries to do so. King Hussein is counting on American 
willingness to reduce Jordan's debt on an increase in military and economic 
Aso Id.: p. 101. 
Heikal, op. cit.: p. 528. 
'$= See George Hawatmeh, "In the Thick of It", Middle East International, n° 515,15 December 1995: 
p. 10; Lamis Andoni, "Two Goals Achieved", Middle East International, n° 517,19 January 1996: p. 9. 
120 
assistance 3&t. Jordan also hopes that the Clinton Administration will encourage third 
parties (the European Union and Japan) to step up aid, in the form of debt reduction 
and financial support for both the budget and specific economic projects. 
In the first months of 1996, two events indicate that Jordan has succeeded in 
its choice of tying the country, as never before, to a U. S. -led political and military 
strategic alliance. The United States offered to provide Jordan with F-16 war planes 
and upgraded M60 tanks: the U. S. Secretary of Defence Perry's promise to supply 
Jordan with these equipment was meant as a signal to neighbouring Arab countries 
that Jordan has an important role to play in the region as U. S. ally3"S. Jordan also 
took the unprecedented decision in early February to allow the Americans to use the 
country as a base for F-16 flights over Southern Irag36. In spite of being a heavily 
constrained player, Jordan has managed once again to turn an unfavourable situation 
to its advantage and to tie its fate to the remaining dominant power in the region: the 
United States. 
ýS3 Before the start of the Sham al - Shaikh Conference, Jordan had focused almost exclusively on co- 
ordination with the U. S. and Israel. See Lamis Andoni, "Walking a Tightrope". Middle East 
International 
, n° 
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6. The Post-Cold War Middle East: Between American Hegemony and the Age of 
Chaos 
6.1. Challenges to U. S. Interests in the Middle East 
The political-military landscape of the Greater Middle East region has 
undergone a far-reaching transformation since 1990. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, 
the Americans were presented with an historic opportunity to reshape the region, 
owing to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the defeat of Iraq, and the acceptance of 
the Madrid/Oslo peace process by the PLO and other Arab states. Overall, the Gulf 
War provided Washington with enhanced influence in the Middle East. It enabled the 
United States to deploy its forces in Persian Gulf states and strengthen the ties 
between Washington and the region's critical powers: Egypt, Israel, Turkey and Saudi 
Arabia. Three events - the October 1991 Madrid peace conference, the 13 September 
1993 signing of the Declaration of Principles between the PLO and Israel, and the 
July 1994 Jordanian-Israeli accord -seemed to mark the beginning of the end of the 
Arab-Israeli confrontation. 
The Clinton administration's overriding concern in the Middle East is 
maintaining local military and political balances of power favourable to U. S. friends 
and allies. One way of achieving this goal is to prevent the emergence of a hostile 
regional hegemon in any sub-region of the area. Any domination of the Persian Gulf 
by one state, especially a hostile state like Iraq or Iran, would threaten vital U. S. 
interests, because that state would be in a position to manipulate oil prices and to use 
the oil revenues to develop weapons of mass destruction. It would also destabilise the 
ruling pro-Western Gulf regimes. 
While a Pax America prevails in the Middle East, the region today is a hotbed 
of trouble for the American hegemon. As Assistant Secretary of State for Near 
Eastern Affairs, Robert Pelletreau, has stated: "there are few areas of the world that 
combine such strategic importance to the United States with such chronic 
instability"387. He lists the main obstacles to stability in the region as being proliferation 
threats, border disputes, the problems of domestic instability and economic 
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underdevelopment, human-rights problems, terrorism, extremism and fanaticism. 
Thus, when the Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman, SamNunn stated that 
"this is a world of regional wars, of spreading ethnic religious and tribal warfare", in 
which more countries are acquiring the capability to unleash mass death, he had the 
Middle East in mind 388. Martin Indyk, the former senior director for Middle Eastern 
affairs at the National Security Council and U. S. Ambassador to Israel, summarised 
well Washington' fears regarding developments in the region when he stated that "in 
the next decade the Middle East could become a nuclear'wild west" where economic 
distress, radical ideologies and military capabilities combine to present much more 
formidable threats to U. S. interests" 389 
Washington is concerned with the implications of turmoil in this region: "It can 
threaten the security of close friends and partners such as Israel and Egypt and the 
GCC states. It can threaten our NATO partners in Europe. It can threaten our ability 
to protect vital oil supplies from the Gulf. It can bring new outbreaks of terrorism to our 
shores. And it can fuel a race to acquire weapons of mass destruction m390 . In short, 
regional instability may jeopardise major U. S. interests and have serious spillover 
effects into other areas of the world. 
The decline of regional deterrence previously provided by superpower security 
guarantees has caused many nations to turn towards doctrines of self-reliance in 
security. The 1991 Gulf War deepened, rather than ameliorated, regional security 
concerns and the result has been an increase in regional defence budgets. The 
unprecedented and disturbing fact in the current rearmament cycle is the escalatory 
danger of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) acquisition. Increasingly, Middle 
Eastern political and defence elites are coming to see WMD as uniquely suited to 
filling the emerging security vacuum. SSMs (surface-to-surface missiles) are the 
platform of choice for WMD weapons, as they can carry nuclear, biological, or 
chemical payloads with minor modifications to the missile's configuration. Lewis says 
that for Middle Eastern states "the most important is that conventional armaments are 
'ß' Robert H. Pelletreau, "American Objectives in the Middle East", Remarks Before the CENTCOM 
Annual Southwest Asia Symposium, Tampa, Florida, 14 May 1996: p. 1. 
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not an effective equalizer. Rather, the nation with accurate SSM delivery systems has 
both an equalizer and a potential advantage over most of its adversaries" 391 
Advanced delivery system technology and most of the materials required to 
make weapons of mass destruction will be accessible to small states and sub-state 
organisations. That will not confer the ability to seize territory but will make available 
the potential for producing severe social and economic damage392 . The introduction 
of advanced systems will significantly expand the security defence zones, as was 
demonstrated by Iraq's missile attacks against Israel: "the improved SSMs will provide 
attacking forces with substantial target flexibility, ranging from military targets to 
population centers" 393. The weakness of the non-proliferation regime and the multiple 
sources of potential conflict in the Middle East generate fears about the reckless use 
of these weapons. 
Nuclear weapons acquisition by Iran and Iraq are viewed with special concern. 
For the Americans, the test case for halting proliferation in the Middle East is Iraq. 
Other countries have pursued chemical and biological weapons development with as 
much fervour as nuclear weapons. Besides Iraq, at least five governments in the 
region are suspected of pursuing nuclear weapons: Syria, Libya, Iran, Egypt, and 
Saudi Arabia. Israel, India and Pakistan are already nuclear-weapons states. 
NATO member states are particularly concerned about the proliferation of 
modem delivery systems amongst states along the southern reaches of the 
Mediterranean region. A RAND report predicts that within ten years every southern 
European capital will be within range of ballistic missiles based in North Africa or the 
Levant 394 
. NATO members are largely bereft of the early warning, air defence, or 
retaliatory capabilities necessary to deter the "over the horizon" threat emanating from 
the Middle East or North Africa. 
Pentagon planners have engaged in efforts to change strategic thinking in 
view of the uncontrollable proliferation trend. Thus, in December 1993 Washington 
redefined its military doctrine and adopted the DefenceCounterproliferation Initiative 
39' William Lewis, "The Military Balance: Change or Stasis? ", in PhebeMarr and William Lewis (eds. ), 
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(DCI) 39 The aim of the programme is devising new weapons and equipment for U. S. 
and allied troops to use against reckless enemies in a dangerous new environment. 
Former Defense Secretary Les Aspin stood up for the programme alleging that 
today's rogue states "can be expected to have different doctrines, histories, 
organizations, command and control systems and purposes ... In addition, 
proliferators may have acquired [ nuclear, biological and chemical weapons] for the 
express purpose of blackmail or terrorism and thus have a fundamentally different 
calculus not amenable to deterrence"396 . 
Another category of challenges confronting the United States in the Middle 
East concerns the endemic conflicts between and among regional states. First of all, 
a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict would result in the reduction of threats to U. S. 
interests as well as significant improvements in the regional political scene. If some 
progress is not registered, the United States would find it increasingly difficult to 
insulate its relations with Israel from its dealings with the rest of the Arab world. In this 
scenario, one would expect the deterioration of relations with Persian Gulf states and 
the moderate pro-Western governments. Extremist forces, especially those 
embedded within Islamic movements, would gain ground and probably become 
dominant in some countries 397. 
The setback to the Arab-Israeli peace process delivered by the policies of the 
Netanyahu government already seems to be reducing divisions within the Arab world 
and prompt rethinking on foreign policy. In this new environment, the United States 
must anticipate a weakening of regional resolve in confronting Iraq and Iran. 
Furthermore, Arab governments are expected to be more reluctant to accommodate 
the expanding U. S. presence in the Gulf region 398 . 
In the occupied territories, extremist forces are gaining ground. There are 
growing signs that the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) is regaining much of 
the popularity it lost following the spate of suicide bombings in Israel in early 1996. 
The trend seems to be a manifestation of profound disappointment with the stumbling 
and unpromising peace process and with the uncompromising stance of theLikud 
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government 399 . The precarious regional stability is jeopardised as both sides in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict seem to be quietly preparing for war" 
A further danger to the United States is that it will become the target of 
extremists. Washington's endorsement of the Israeli shelling of Lebanon (Operation 
Grapes of Wrath) in April 1996 as an anti-terrorist act prompted university students in 
Cairo to bum the American flag. The administration's acceptance of the Israeli 
explanation that the shelling of the U. N. base at Qana, which resulted in dozens of 
civilian casualties, was an accident was considered especially insulting. One Arab 
newspaper condemned "the degree of disregard and contempt to all Arabs shown by 
the American president" 401 . Another newspaper wrote that President Clinton has 
offered his protection for Israeli occupation and expansionism and warned that "the 
ramifications of this position will make themselves felt, possibly in the not too distant 
future" 402 . 
Another conflictual area, representing Washington's top priority, is the Persian 
Gulf region. An outbreak of an armed conflict or a significant shift in the regional 
balance could affect Western access to oil at reasonable prices. The Arab and 
Persian divide of the Gulf stand for different and historic and cultural conceptions and 
clashing interests constituting major grounds for conflict103 . Iran and Iraq are seen in 
Washington as outlaw states, capable of posing a threat to the United States of a 
magnitude that justify the resources it has devoted to countering both under the "dual 
containment" policy. 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states relations, although facing similar 
challenges, are riven with dissension. Tensions among the southern Gulf Arab states 
is a major reason for the GCC failing to develop into an effective regional security 
organisation. There are countless intra-GCC disputes, ranging from mundane to fairly 
serious. Economic issues, such as oil production quotas, and territorial issues are 
especially significant sources of discord. Historical tension between Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar has been caused by border disputes. The same happens with Oman, due to 
Saudi claiming of large portions of Omani territory. Oman and the UAE (United Arab 
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Emirates) also have numerous disputed spots along their borders404 . Most GCC 
states resent Saudi Arabia for its domination of the GCC and for its heavy handed 
dealings with its neighbours in the past. Personal jealousies and tribal animosities are 
a well-known characteristic of intra-GCC relationships and they prevent higher level of 
trust between states. Despite the recent historical record (namely Iraq's invasion of 
Kuwait) and the many military threats in the region, inter-GCC defencecooperation 
has grown only slowly °05. The recurring disagreements have generated a weak 
commitment to building a pan-GCC force in sufficient size and strength to enhance 
the credibility of collective defence capabilities and combined national force 
structures' . 
Other challenges to resolving pan-GCC defence need are: the still embryonic 
structure of the six countries' defence force; the inability to coordinate decisions on 
major weapons procurement and spreading the defence burden; the diminished 
financial ability of some customers to pay for purchases already committed to; the 
delay in moving toward "jointness" in the training and exercises of GCC military 
forces40' . 
The current economic and social situation of the Middle East presents fresh 
challenges for governments in the region, as well as for the United States and the 
West. Population pressures, reduced export revenues, urban environmental 
problems, and growing economic and social needs are taxing government capacities. 
There is a risk that the most extreme manifestations of government collapse will lead 
to failed states. Steinberg says that in the current international order the primary 
source of threat is not the impulse for imperial orirredentist expansion but rather the 
danger of internal disintegration "0" . Extremist movements already seek to overthrow 
the existing government in Algeria, and to a lesser extent in Egypt. 
Elsewhere, dissident ethnic or sectarian groups desire secession from existing 
states. The Gulf War created new political realities for ethnic groups in the region. It 
seems to have given rise to a new sense of purpose and opportunity to the region's 
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ethnic minorities, thus opening the possibility of reshaping the regional agenda on the 
question of ethnicity 409. The case of Iraq set the parameters for this re-evaluation. 
The intervention of the international community in protecting Iraqi and Shiite 
populations as well as the weakening of the Iraqi state as a result of the sanctions 
and of Washington's "dual containment" policy, might have unforeseen and 
unpredictable consequences. If carried to the extremes, they could result in the 
collapse of the Iraqi state. This, in turn, would endanger the stability and security of 
the Gulf region and the Middle East, leaving Iran, by default, the major power in the 
Gulf. Turkey would have to deal with its Kurdish population seeking to change the 
distribution of power. A weakened Iraq would also invite interference by Syria, Turkey, 
and Iran in its domestic affairs, further thwarting the current regional balance. 
The likelihood of widening ethnic and sectarian conflicts in the Middle East is 
closely related to the question of resources, to their distribution and to the process of 
development. The economic outlook will be bleak for the next decade. Demographic 
growth will exacerbate the economic problem with a high birth rate insuring that the 
area's youthful population will predominate. The most likely scenario is rising youth 
unemployment, which may translate into political unrest, and add to pressures on 
weak and ineffective governments. Recruits for Islamic movements are often drawn 
from this pool of unemployed youth 410 
For the region as a whole, per capita GNP fell by an average of 2.3 percent 
annually from 1980 through 1992, a cumulative 25 percent drop" . The oil producing 
nations have run into serious external debt problems. Saudi Arabia is borrowing 
heavily abroad to finance budget deficits. Continuing expenditure reductions (affecting 
arms purchases) and new taxes will be needed in order to avoid unsustainable foreign 
debt in the long run 412 . Still income disparities in the Middle East remain glaring: the 
most populous Arab country, Egypt, has a per capita income that is only 3 percent 
that of the richest, the United Arab Emirates 4" . 
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Allocation of scarce resources, especially from rivers flowing across state 
boundaries, is a source of tension in the region. Rising water scarcity jeopardises 
autarchic food-security strategies. This concern is especially acute in the face of the 
prospect of growing food dependency in the immediate future. Middle Eastern 
countries (especially those that do not have oil) need to make sweeping changes in 
their economies, that, owing to their structural nature, will require fundamental 
reordering of key sectors and the modification of established policies. Indeed, most 
Arab states have highly inefficient statist economies, though of late they have 
engaged in some form of structural adjustment. The combined pressures of jobs, 
food, water, and money will inexorably press against rigid political systems, eroding 
political stability 414 . 
Current developments indicate that political consciousness will be universal, 
particularly among the young, who will demand more government accountability and 
political participation. In fact, the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War have 
contributed to the bankruptcy of the authoritarian regimes in the Arab world. In most 
Arab countries there were varying degrees of popular demands vis-ä-vis respective 
Arab regimes. Krämer notes that "democracy has become a catchword of Middle 
Eastern politics" and that it "constitutes a common theme for all political movements, 
irrespective of the socioeconomic order and the foreign policies they advocate" 415 
Facing their mounting internal loss of legitimacy, Arab leaders have chosen to 
introduce a tactical liberalisation °16 as a safety valve to prevent a radical change of 
their political systems 41. They have however refused to fully democratise the system 
(in the sense of allowing the legalisation of political parties, the equal access to the 
mass media and free and fair elections) since it might pose a direct challenge to their 
rule 418. The purpose of liberalisation is "system maintenance in a situation of acute 
socioeconomic crisis, by co-opting wider circles of the political public, distributing 
responsibilities for future austerity policies more broadly, directing political and 
414 Richards, op. cit. . "s Gudrun Krämer, "Liberalization and Democracy in the Arab World", Middle East Report (22), n° 1, 
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religious organisations into controllable channels and excluding all those outside the 
"national consensus" defined by the regime" 419. 
The traditional relationship between the rulers and the ruled is fragmenting and 
public opinion is becoming increasingly polarised under the light oflslamist scrutiny. 
In the Gulf Arab states, political radicals using Islam as "the answer" are gaining 
support and influence. They demand the establishment of truly Islamic government, 
an end to rule by unjust, corrupt, unlslamic leaders, and the elimination of foreign - 
especially U. S. - influence and interests s20 . 
Several developments could provide Islamic radicals with the opportunity to 
widen their popular base and gain influence over decision making. Looming 
succession crises might give them this chance. There are few well-established 
mechanisms for leadership change. If it intersects with imploding political and social 
forces, a change of leadership could have profound implications for a state's 
orientation. A succession unpopular with large segments of the population could, in 
the case of key regional states now supporting U. S. objectives (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan, and Pakistan) alter the status quo, seriously undermining U. S. interests 421. 
6.2. The Gulf: U. S. Strategy Under Fire 
America's interest in the Gulf remains appropriately unchanged with the end of 
the Cold War. A key national security concern is to guarantee the uninterrupted flow 
of oil to the world market at prices that do not damage the economies of the United 
States and the advanced industrial countries. The disappearance of the Soviet military 
threat removes the chief reason for Washington to worry about continued American 
access to overseas oil 422 . In the aftermath of the Gulf War, American access to the 
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region was made easier. This provided U. S. forces with an ability to deploy in the 
Persian Gulf °' . 
The Carter Doctrine in 1980 formally committed the United States to 
preventing any "hostile power" from dominating the area. As the Clinton administration 
understood it, the chief threats in the post-Cold War order come from Iran and Iraq 
who are not only intrinsically hostile to Western influence in the area, but also 
espouse hegemonic ambitions in the region. Their record, according to U. S. officials, 
also includes the pursuit of ambitious weapons programmes, the promotion of 
terrorism, the suppression of human rights, the disregard for democratic governance 
and the aggressive behaviour toward their neighbours. 
The "dual containment" policy enunciated by National Security Adviser 
Anthony Lake and National Security Council Senior director for the Near East and 
South Asia, Martin Indyk, rejects the previous policy of tilting toward one country to 
contain the other (as was the case with Iran under Carter and with Iraq under Reagan 
and Bush) 424. "Dual containment" is predicated on the assumption that the U. S. 
European and Arab allies will strive to prevent Iraq and Iran from achieving Gulf 
hegemony or from fomenting regional conflict. In Iraq, the policy officially demands 
fulfilment of all U. N. Security Council Resolutions instituted after the Gulf War. The 
United States relies on drastic import and oil export restrictions and no-fly zones in 
the north and south of the country as instruments to fulfil those goals. In Iran, a 
change of regime behaviour on six key points is sought, among them cessation of 
terrorism, overt opposition to the peace process, and attempts to destabilise 
neighbouring states. To this end, Washington seeks to deny credit and military 
technology to Iran. 
"Dual containment" has generated debate on several grounds. Some point to 
the intellectual inconsistency of the approach charging that it lacks a strategic focus 
'=' Richard Cheney, who served as Secretary of Defense under Bush, said: "In a perverse sort of way, 
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on which country, Iran and Iraq, represents the greater problem425 . Others point that 
the policy fails to enunciate the real issue, which is the American long-term goal as 
regards the fate of both regimes: either overthrowing the incumbent leadership or 
merely modifying the behaviour of those regimes '2" . 
According to Gause, the main flaw of the policy concerns Iraq, since it does 
not anticipate or provide for a likely course of action. In fact, no one knows with 
certainty what is going to happen over the next few years, the most likely outcome 
being internal chaos. Gause also criticises the current U. S. policy on the grounds that 
it contributes to the weakening of the Iraqi state: in caseSaddam should fall, Gause 
contends, Iran would exploit its relationship with Iraqi Shiite groups thus becoming a 
key player in the future of Iraq. Gause further contends that "dual containment" 
requires the unlikely cooperation of Western and Arab nations who, for a number of 
reasons, are unwilling to isolate Iran and are calling for an easing of sanctions on Iraq. 
Even GCC states find a geopolitical imperative to prevent Iraq's disintegration 427 . 
Some analysts focus their attention on the consequences that accrue to 
American interests from the application of such policy. As Gause points out, one 
condition for the success of "dual containment" is a continuation, perhaps expansion, 
of the American military presence in the Gulf428 . The upgrading of the U. S. military 
forces in the region has several negative implications. As it stands, it represents a 
tremendous commitment that will place the United States at great risk of becoming 
entangled in regional conflicts. The enhanced American presence increases the cost 
and risks of American policy toward the Persian Gulf and aggravates popular 
resentment of U. S. meddling in regional affairs 429 . 
The June 25 1996 Dhahran bombing, the second attack on U. S. citizens in the 
Gulf in seven months, is indicative of what lies ahead. Devout Saudis, indeed the 
majority of Muslims, increasingly resent what they perceive to be U. S. encroachment 
on the sacred precincts of the faith. They want U. S. military forces out of the region. 
Therefore, the United States can expect to encounter increasing hostility toward 
American forces in the region and toward the Saudi regime that invited them there. 
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The attacks on U. S. citizens in Saudi Arabia and several recent developments 
in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Oman raise the spectre of violent change and potential 
efforts to disrupt regime-U. S. ties. The bombing of U. S. facilities, according to one 
analyst, "... should be viewed, not as a problem confined to Saudi Arabia, but as a 
symptom of a larger challenge to the U. S. presence in the Middle East"430 .A more 
sober assessment is that "the Gulf is ripe for dissent, not for revolution" and that "the 
challenge for GCC governments will be accustoming themselves and their societies to 
open dissent, which is a new phenomenon that some government officials will find 
disturbing" 431 . 
What seems nonetheless certain is that Middle Eastern politics are changing 
in ways that require new U. S. responses. Analysts notice the rising anti-American tide 
and advise U. S. diplomats to maintain a low profile in Saudi Arabia so as not to 
exacerbate anti-U. S. feeling. The American presence in that Gulf country has fuelled 
popular perceptions that the kingdom has lost much of its political independence. The 
high American profile has become a lightning rod for domestic discontent and has 
been used by militant Saudi dissidents to advance their primary goal: the overthrow of 
the Saudi government 432 
Among educated elites and the man in the street, support for Washington's 
tough posture against Iraq, is thin. One prevalent conspiracy theory in the Gulf, even 
among policy elites, holds that the United States assured the survival of Saddam 
Hussein after the Gulf War in order to justify an increased military presence in the 
region °. Gulf leaders are worried that if the United States continues to weaken Iraq 
politically and militarily, the only significant regional strategic counterweight to Iran 
may collapse, creating a massive power vacuum that would favour Tehran's 
intervention. However, GCC countries are wary of the U. S. "dual containment" policy 
since it antagonises Iranian leaders thus raising the potential for military confrontation. 
They criticise the U. S. unilateral policy initiatives toward Iran and would like 
Washington to consult them whenever it considers confronting or dramatically 
changing any of its policies toward Tehran 434 . 
U. S. disregarding of the threats in the region and its recent actions under the 
"dual containment" policy have created a sense that the coalition against Iraq has 
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weakened significantly. There is the widespread suspicion, particularly in the Arabian 
peninsula that the United States may be moving toward Iraq's dismemberment. Other 
events, such as the apparent stalemate in the Arab-Israeli conflict and rising tensions 
between Israel and Syria have revived fears that Israel, seeking to weaken the Arab 
world, aims, among other things, the dismemberment of Iraq's . 
The United States has also come under increasing criticism from Gulf states 
that question the underlying rationale for current U. S. defence policies. Many of them 
express resentment at perceived U. S. strong-arm tactics designed to pressure Gulf 
governments into implementing a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), pointing to the 
effect of this measure in pre-revolutionary Iran. A related criticism is that the 
Americans disregard the sensitivity of Gulf leaders and peoples. 
GCC officials criticise the United States for imposing a regional security threat 
assessment that is tailored to serve U. S. strategic, economic and corporate interests, 
but of questionable validity if measured against the yardstick of GCC national, 
regional and intra-regional interests. They argue that U. S. military sales are primarily 
designed to assist the United States economically in shoring up the military-industrial 
complex and that Washington overstates the nature of the threats to Gulf states in 
order to press them to buy expensive equipment" . GCC analysts contend that the 
October 1994 confrontation with Saddam Hussein, Operation Vigilant Warrior, was 
largely the result of U. S. strategic and domestic considerations. Gulf leaders resent 
being presented with enormous bills to cover defence costs. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and 
Bahrain - especially Saudi Arabia - face debt and the burden of having financed much 
of the operations against Saddam Hussein and are in the process of scaling back 
subsidies and services for their populations. 
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7. America's Encounter with Political Islam 
7.1. The Iranian Revolution 
7.1.1. Background to the Revolution 
America's encounter with political Islam took place in a most dramatic way 
during the 1978-79 Iranian Revolution and the subsequent events and it definitely 
contributed to shape certain public and official perceptions on Iran and on the nature 
of the Islamist movement. As Edward Djerejian put it: "ever since the Iranian 
Revolution in 1979 and the hostage crisis, U. S. -Iranian relations have been marked 
by outright hostility, suspicion, distrust, and failed efforts at initiating a dialogue" 437 
The United States entered Iran in the wake of World War II, when the Truman 
administration realised that protection of Iran was in the U. S. national interest. It 
proceeded to remove Soviet influence from that country and successfully pressed the 
U. S. S. R. to withdraw its forces from Azerbaidjan. American intervention on behalf of 
Iran created a reservoir of goodwill towards Washington. The Americans played well 
the role of a third force that would help maintain the nation's independence. 
America's credentials as a friendly power did not last for long. In 1953, the 
Americans participated with the British in the overthrow of the popularprime minister, 
Muhammad Musaddiq, who had nationalised Iranian oil, and the restoration ofReza 
Shah Pahlavi to the throne. James Bill affirms that "this direct covert operation left a 
running wound that bled for twenty-five years and contaminated America's relations 
with the Islamic Republic of Iran following the revolution of 1978-79" 43a. The 
population came to see the United States as an imperialistic, oppressive external 
power whose actions resembled those of Russia and Britain. 
The introduction of unprecedented amounts of military and economic aid and 
the influx of U. S. advisers coincided with an increase in political oppression and 
economic corruption in the country. By the early 1960s the Shah was gradually 
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hardening his system of control and, in 1963, he launched his controversial 
programme for modernising the country: the White Revolution. The plan antagonised 
almost all stratas of society and was highly resented by the clerics, because it 
attacked their power base, and by the old aristocracy, because of their opposition to 
land reform. 
The generous American aid was largely wasted and the misuse of funds 
increased the levels of corruption in society thus creating the impression, in the eyes 
of the masses, that Washington was behind the corrupt and oppressivePahlavi rule 
439. Popular outrage against the Americans was brought to unprecedented levels 
when, on October 1964, the Majlis (Iranian parliament) passed a law that provided 
American personnel and their dependants stationed in Iran with full diplomatic 
immunity. The outrage widened and deepened when, twelve days after, theMajlis 
approved a bill authorising the government to accept a $200 million loan provided by 
the Americans. The Iranian public immediately saw in this the Iranian government's 
pay off for accepting the new law of capitulations "o 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini made at this time his public debut as contestant 
of the Shah's regime and he launched a frontal attack on the Shah's policies. He said 
the Iranian people stood on "a lower level than that of an American dog" and roundly 
condemned the Shah and America for attempting to destroy the dignity, integrity and 
autonomy of Iran 44 . Khomeini's 
fiery speeches struck a chord among the masses 
that also viewed the whole episode as a humiliation to the Iranian people. This 
appreciation was coupled by the condemnation of the royal court's way of life and the 
imported values, which undermined Islamic principles. 
The 1960s witnessed the tightening of Iranian-American relations. Rubin 
affirms that American officials, preoccupied with the international implications of the 
United-States Iranian relationship, remained poorly informed on Iran's rising domestic 
difficulties. However, as early as 1973, Iran specialists such as MarvinZionis and 
Richard Cottam, were trying to draw attention to the potential troubles on the 
country's horizon. While acknowledging Iran's economic advances, they also pointed 
to the growing gap between rich and poor, the endemic corruption, andSAVAK's 
repression, all of which were alienating millions of Iranians from the Shah °42. 
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When in 1973 OPEC caused the price of oil to soar, Iran became one of the 
main beneficiaries. Only a few Iranians enjoyed the fruits of their country's 
development, however, as a result of rampant corruption and poor fiscal planning. By 
1977, "the mismanagement of the national economy had produced widespread 
unemployment, urban slums, the worst inflation ever, and visible signs of strain 
throughout the government apparatus" "' 
The year 1977 set the stage for the revolution. A number of factors account for 
the intensity of the popular discontent with the regime. The economic system was in 
the midst of a sharp retrenchment after the phenomenal economic growth of 1973-75. 
The situation in the cities was aggravated by a severe recession in some economic 
sectors that affected mainly the newly-arrived migrants. The runaway corruption that 
had accompanied the boom showed little sign of abating. The heavy-handed anti- 
inflation policy that that the regime inaugurated alienated the bazaar, the heart of the 
Iranian economy. 
On the political side, the partial liberalisation introduced by the Shah in 1977 
attempted to cope with growing dissent in an inconsistent and ineffective manner. The 
programme failed to transfer any real power to the secular and religious opposition, 
who became more vocal and organised in their protests against the government. 
Signs of a religious revival were also apparent among the general population. 
Khomeini was able to capitalise on popular frustration and used the idiom of religion to 
highlight their everyday problems and suffering. Throughout 1978, Khomeini issued 
proclamations from Najaf condemning the Shah, praising Islam, castigating the United 
States for its support of the monarch, and honouring those Iranians that who were 
demonstrating and rebelling against Pahlavi rule. Khomeini kept the pressure on, 
pushing relentlessly to end the Pahlavi dynasty. The opposition solidified under the 
hammer blows of the police and military forces. The revolutionary wave became 
unstoppable and led to the overthrow of the Shah. 
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7.1.2. The American Failure to Anticipate the Revolution 
The events that led to the revolution caught Washington by surprise and 
constituted a monumental intelligence failure. Not only did it fail to prevent the 
traumatic collapse of Pahlavi rule, it also damaged the power and credibility of the 
United States in this critical part of the world. Perhaps more important, it overruled the 
prospects of constructive U. S-Iranian relations in the post-Shah period. Later 
President Carter would express his "dissatisfaction with the intelligence community 
failure to warn the administration of the political crisis in Iran"444. In December 1977, 
during a visit to Tehran, Carter had referred to Iran as "an island of stability in a 
turbulent corner of the world" '45. This line reflected the view of the majority of 
Washington's political establishment. 
As late as June 1978, Sullivan went to Washington and delivered "very 
optimistic reports... that the Shah was firmly in command and quite capable of dealing 
with the problem" 446 and this sense of confidence indulged him in an extended home 
leave during the summer. The belief that the Shah would remain in power despite the 
wave of protest was the prevailing view of the Embassy and the possibility that he 
might be forced out of office as a result of the crisis was dismissed 447. 
The CIA also felt secure about the Shah's grip on power. An August 1977 
study concluded that "the Shah will be an active participant in Iranian life well into the 
1980s, and that "there will be no radical change in Iranian political behaviour in the 
near future "44'. An August 1978 intelligence assessment asserted that "Iran is not in a 
revolutionary or even a 'pre-Revolutionary situation" 449. The Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA), linked to the Department of Defense, shared the same assumption. As 
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late as September 1978 its prognosis was that the Shah is expected to remain 
actively in power over the next ten years" 450. 
However, and as David suggests, "enough information was available to high- 
level policymakers at least by November 1977 to have moved the Carter 
administration to seriously examine the possibility of profound instability for the one- 
man government in Iran " ". Such information came mostly from the State 
Department, through its Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), from the 
academic community and from American diplomats posted in Tehran, namely John 
Stempel, the political officer of the U. S. Embassy. He concludes that "the great weight 
of responsibility must lie on decisionmakers who failed to effectively use the 
information that was available to them"452 . 
Gary Sick explains that Washington's inactivity and inability to draw the proper 
conclusions from the on-going events had to do with "the paralysis of bureaucratic 
structures in high-risk situations" 45'. He argues that if the revolutionary events had 
taken place in an area of the world with less strategic importance, there would have 
been "little reluctance to speculate about a range of possible outcomes, including 
revolutionary overthrow of the existing power structure. No one in the bureaucracy 
from the ambassador to the Washington analyst, wished to be the first to "make the 
call" that the shah was on his way out. As a consequence, each individual and each 
organizational element procrastinated, waiting for incontrovertible evidence before 
pronouncing such a fateful judgement" "54. 
The "wishful thinking" tendency explains the predominant procrastination 
strategy that gripped the administration between the outbreak of anti-Shah violence in 
November 1977 and the rapid deterioration of the Shah's government that set in after 
the 8 September 1978 Black Friday massacre'55. A more realistic assessment of the 
situation emerged in the late months of the year. On 9 November Ambassador 
Sullivan sent a secret cable to the State Department stating that, while the U. S. 
Embassy believed the Shah, backed by his armed forces, could "face down" the 
is° Id.: p. 6. 
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threat of Ruhollah Khomeini, the United States should be beginning to "think the 
unthinkable" - that is, Iran without the shah and under the leadership of Khomeini'56. 
Sick argues that the administration did not endorse "the kind of steps that 
Sullivan seemed to be suggesting - preparing the way for easing the shah and his 
senior command out of the way as painlessly as possible while beefing up the position 
of the moderate opposition - could not be concealed... There was simply no high-level 
support for such a policy shift - from the president, from Brzezinski, from (Defense 
Secretary) Brown or from Vance. The official policy of total support for the shah was 
bent on the assumption that the shah was capable of acting vigorously and decisively 
- an expectation that also proved to be unfounded and based largely on wishful 
thinking... " 457. 
Bureaucratic rivalries and the conflict of personalities within the administration 
resulted in further confusing the situation. The differing assessments inevitably 
generated confusion in decision-making. Bill argues that the task of the President was 
complicated by the fact that he "was inundated with conflicting information, much of 
which was filtered by Brzezinski" 458 which resulted in Carter leaving the Shah without 
an explicit direction. 
Conflicting perceptions and the paralysis that got hold of the executive 
thwarted attempts to build ties to the opposition movement in Iran. Sullivan eventually 
came to the conclusion that a transition to power was inevitable and that if relations 
with Khomeini and the United States were improved there might be a minimum of 
bloodshed and a more optimal context for U. S. - Iranian relations459. However "Carter 
vetoed any direct American contacts with Ayatollah Khomeini ... . After seriously 
considering approving a mission that was to be headed by former State Department 
official Ted Eliot to meet with Khomeini in Paris, Carter backed away when 
Brzezinski, through the means of clever bureaucratic tactics of stalling and intrigue, 
smothered the idea"160 
Contacts with the Iranian opposition had been proscribed inthe mid -1960s 
and remained the policy through the 1970s. It was taken for granted that it was not in 
the interests of the United States to establish contacts in Iran that could upset the 
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"mutually beneficial relations between Tehran[that is, the Shah] and Washington"°s'. 
Harold Saunders reckoned later that "during this period we did, on occasions, limit our 
contacts with certain elements of Iranian society. We did that out of sensitivity to our 
relationships with the Iranian government. It perhaps in a few instances deprived us of 
a feeling for the intensity of individual feelings about certain issues" S6z 
In fact, and as a January 1979 staff report of the House Select Committee on 
Intelligence highlighted, "U. S. close identification with the Shah limited the 
opportunities for U. S. officials to hear from Iranians who opposed him thereby causing 
Iran to resemble a closed society from the U. S. perspective" 463 Thus, reporting 
critical of the Shah was curtailed. On the other hand, the strong ties thePahlavis had 
over the years built with large segments of the American political and financial elite 
and with the media had created the impression that U. S. interests in Iran were 
coterminous with those of the Pahlavi regime d64 
The report concludes that "long-standing U. S. attitudes toward the Shah 
inhibited intelligence collection, dampened policymakers appetite for analysis of the 
Shah's position, and deafened policymakers to the warning implicit in available current 
intelligence" 465. The inability of the Carter administration to develop a clear picture of 
the situation in Iran iss and to devise a consistent policy, placed it in the awkward 
position of having to deal with an Islamic revolutionary government it was ill-prepared 
to discuss with. It also fostered the feelings of distrust and ignorance on the part of 
American policymakers and impaired the prospects of dialogue between the two 
governments in the post-Shah era. The Iranian revolutionaries, for their part, 
capitalised on this situation to make their particular views on the new domestic order 
prevail. 
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7.1.3. Deepening the Rift: The Failure to Establish a Connection and the Hostage 
Crisis 
In the aftermath of the Revolution, the Americans did little in the way of 
establishing constructive ties with the new Iranian government and toning down the 
anti-American tone of the Revolution. Using the limited Iranian contacts at its 
disposal, the Carter administration attempted to develop a new policy towards 
revolutionary Iran. The fundamental obstacle in the path of normalisation between the 
U. S. government and the Provisional Government of Iran was the crisis of mutual 
confidence. 
America's attempts to build ties with the Provisional Government of Iran were 
undertaken in a very delicate environment. Once again, the Americans reached out to 
the moderate, Westernised elements that were the dominant force in the early months 
of the revolution 467. They found willing interlocutors in the Bazargan government, 
namely in the persons of Abbas Amir Entezam, the deputy prime minister, and 
Ibrahim Yazdi, the foreign minister. Entezam talked to American officials at various 
levels and suggested several steps the United States could take to demonstrate its 
sincerity towards the new Iranian government. As the Americans dragged their feet on 
those issues, the Bazargan government accused Washington of "playing a waiting 
game " 468. Another very important prejudicing factor was that Embassy officials made 
no efforts to call on Ayatollah Khomeini. A carryover from the time of the Shah - when 
Brzezinski blocked plans for direct contacts with Khomeini - was that the United 
States persisted in failing to establish any meaningful relationships with the major 
extremist religious leaders. 
In the context of widespread instability and certain counter-revolutionary 
activity, Iranian negative perceptions about American intentions developed into 
suspicion about the U. S. hand behind every trouble. A host of counterproductive acts 
and ill-timed policies of the Carter administration contributed to theembitterment of 
the relations with the Iranian government. Iranians were especially sensitive to the 
rumours of CIA and general U. S. intelligence activity in undermining the new regime. 
Two events, which came to light after student groups gained access to secret 
documents on occupying the U. S. Embassy in Tehran, highlighted the Americans 
11 R. K. Ramazani, The United States and Iran: The Patterns ofb fluence (NY: Praeger, 1982), p. 165. 
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manoeuvres in Iran: the CIA plan to co-optAbol Bani Sadr, the first elected president 
of the Islamic Republic; and the contacts with important members of the moderate 
faction (from the Liberation Movement), namely Yazdi and Entezam 'b9. 
America's misguided policies played directly into the hands of the hard - line, 
extremist factions of the Iranian regime which were able to use that evidence as a 
powerful political tool to dislodge the moderates, who were now demonstrated to be in 
collusion with the U. S. government. The conspiracy mentality was still in the 
ascendant phase and was fuelled by Khomeini who accused the United States of 
" hatching plots to overthrow the new Iranian regime 0. 
The final blow to the rule of the moderates and to the reinstitution of bilateral 
U. S. - Iranian relations, was the admission of the Shah to the United States. Under 
strong pressure from the Shah's powerful friends (namely theRockefellers, Nixon and 
Henry Kissinger), Carter decided on humanitarian grounds to admit the Shah to the 
United States for medical treatment "'. 
A second simultaneous event further heightened theconspirational paranoia in 
Iran: the meeting in Algiers on the 1st November of Bazargan and Yazdi with 
Brzezinski, on the anniversary of the host country's independence. The meeting, 
broadcast on Iranian television, sparked a wave of demonstrations in Iran. On 
November 4, a group of nearly five hundred extremist students attacked the U. S. 
Embassy in Tehran, initially taking sixty-one Americans hostages. 
Khomeini initially did not endorse the move but, realising its popularity, used it 
to consolidate the extremists' hold on power and to oust the Bazargan government. 
One month after the Embassy take-over, the constitution, which established Ayatollah 
Khomeini as Fagih, was passed by a huge majority. This episode of U. S-Iranian 
confrontation is a classic case of what political scientists call "extemalisation" in which 
"state-to-state conflict is primarily caused and driven by domestic politics" 472. Analysts 
have concluded "the revolution's rabid anti-Americanism was largely a result of a 
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power struggle in which the radicals used conflict with the U. S. to defeat the 
moderates" ". 
The hostage crisis, which would last for 444 days, was one of the most 
humiliating episodes in American history. As the months passed and the prospects for 
negotiations became dimmer, the Carter administration realised that "thehostages' 
fate had become entangled in the internal political manoeuvring of various factions in 
Iran ""°. Only in the late summer of 1980, when the parliament was seated and a new 
government was in power, did the Iranians concentrate their attention and started 
negotiating. Meanwhile, the U. S. government had frozen Iranian assets in the United 
States, severed bilateral diplomatic relations, imposed sanctions on Iran and 
cancelled all entry visas for Iranians. When all these measures failed, president Carter 
approved a military rescue mission to save the hostages. The mission not only failed 
but met with disaster, leaving eight members of the crew dead "5. 
The hostage crisis enabled the mullahs to consolidate their rule. It helped them 
marginalise their rivals, dominate the parliament and appoint a prime minister of their 
choice. Further, the mullahs had embarassed the United States and established their 
revolution as the only movement capable of standing up to Washington in the Middle 
East. In terms of bilateral relations, the hostage crisis left a heavy legacy of distrust 
and anger that has persisted over the years. 
Both the Carter and Reagan administration reflected the difficulty in adjusting 
to the new reality produced by the appearance of political Islam. Both failed to 
consider the implications of the Iranian Revolution as it had evolved. There was no 
systematic effort to consider the question of what the effects were for U. S. objectives 
in the Middle East and South Asia as a consequence of the consolidation of a militant 
Islamic government in Iran. The general view was that Iran was a second "evil 
empire", a "barbaric country" as Reagan put it in 1987 176. 
Washington's support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war, in spite of theformer's role 
in the beginning of the hostilities, reinforced the Iranian leaders' conviction about 
American double standards and it increased Iran's alienation from the United States. 
To Iran's leaders, the United States was continuing its hostile, counter-revolutionary 
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policy and apparently intended to resort to any means to destroy the Islamic Republic. 
The anti-Iranian mood prevalent in the Reagan administration reflected also the 
concern about a perceived Iranian threat to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikdoms. 
The Reagan's administration sense of impotence coupled with a lingering 
inability to develop a clear picture of the Iranian situation, helped promote the ill-fated 
arms for hostages initiative of 1985-86. The underlying misleading rationale was that it 
was possible to initiate contacts with more "moderate" elements within the Iranian 
government and even to help strengthen their position vis-a-vis the more extremist 
factions 47 . American misperceptions about 
Iran had once more led to a disastrous 
policy and, in the process, had worsened the prospects for the improvement of U. S. - 
Iranian relations. 
The Iranian Revolution and subsequent events also contributed to the 
formation of an image of political Islam as a revolutionary, disruptive and anti-Western 
force. Senator John Glenn echoed this general perception when he affirmed in 1981 
during a congressional hearing: "... this whole thing is the first time, in modem days 
at least, that we have seen a whole nation perpetrate what in effect is a terrorist 
activity and base it in large part on fundamentalist religious beliefs" 478 
7.2. The U. S. Support for the Mujahidin in the Afghan - Soviet War 
7.2.1. America's Stake in the Afghan War 
The United States involvement in the Afghan morass and support for the 
Afghan rebels took place in the Cold War scenario, as a response to the Soviet 
invasion. America's interest in Afghanistan, from the end of the Second World War 
was quite limited, since it was considered that the country had no value to American 
security interests 479. The Soviets, on the other hand, launched since the early 1950s 
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leading aid giver, sponsoring, in particular, the recruitment and equipment of the 
army, but also providing significant levels of economic aid. 
It was only in the late 1950s that the United states made a serious effort to 
reverse that trend: Washington maintained then a considerable presence and an 
active aid programme (to the tune of some $500 million) in Afghanistan, in an indirect 
but nonetheless very real competition for influence. But the prevailing view was that 
the Americans should not seek a closer relationship involving, for instance, a higher 
degree of military cooperation, since the Soviet Union most probably intended to let 
Afghanistan serve as an example of a non-aligned state living undisturbed in the 
Soviet vicinity 480. By the mid 1970s, American political presence had been curtailed 
dramatically, and economic aid was cut down to an insignificant $15 million in 1975. 
The declining U. S. clout coincided with significant inroads made by the communists 
in Afghanistan. 
By this time the Soviets had started to show their real intentions towards 
Afghanistan. In 1973, they sponsored the coup d'etat that overthrew the monarchy. 
In 1978 another coup d'etat took place, this time by the Khalqi (Masses) faction of 
the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), an operation that was 
meticulously planned by Soviet experts. By mid-1979 the Soviets were already 
deeply involved in Afghanistan with thousands of troops and advisers. 
Throughout most of this period, Washington remained largely silent about the 
massive human rights abuses and oppression to which the Afghan people were 
subjected. It was only after the abduction and murder of U. S. Ambassador Dubbs in 
March of 1979 that U. S. relations with the regime were downgraded and the aid 
programme curtailed, though not completely eliminated. By the end of the year, at a 
time when U. S. intelligence services had overwhelming evidence that an invasion 
was about to begin, the State Department refused to characterise Soviet forces in 
Afghanistan as "combat troops" and Under Secretary of State David Newson 
reportedly objected to a press backgrounder on the subject "on the grounds that this 
might be seen by the Soviets as U. S. meddling in Afghan affairs" 4,31. In December 
1979, noting the precarious position of the communist regime in Kabul, the USSR, 
claiming that they had been invited in by the Afghan government, invaded 
480Charles F. Dunbar, "U. S. Policy Toward Afghanistan", in Noor A. Husain and Leo E. Rose (eds. ), 
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Afghanistan, killing the incumbent prime minister and installing the Parcham leader, 
Babrak Amal, in his place. 
The full-scale Soviet invasion finally elicited a strong response from 
Washington, which had until then adopted a rather passive position482. The invasion 
was described by Carter as "the most serious threat to world peace since the Second 
World War... " °. The view taken by Carter that the invasion was a strategic challenge 
to American interests led to the enunciation of the Carter Doctrine which warned 
against Soviet aggressive intentions vis-a-vis the Persian Gulf. Brzezinski, whose 
perspectives underlaid Carter's approach, considered the April coup "as the opening 
gambit in a Soviet master plan for achieving hegemony in Southwest Asia" and that 
"it would be followed in due course... by the incorporation of Afghanistan into the 
Soviet orbit and ultimately by political and military moves to subjugate the oil- 
producing statesi484 . 
Vance's appraisal of the Soviet motivations differed. He thought Moscow's 
objectives were "primarily local, and related directly to perceived threats to its national 
security" ". He saw the regional "fundamentalist Islamic resurgence" as an external 
threat to the internal stability of Soviet Central Asian republics and the security of its 
southern borders. The immediate aim of the Soviet invasion was the weakness of the 
incumbent Afghan regime which might create a context where Islamic fundamentalists 
would take power. This in turn would likely be followed by the spread of the Islamic 
fundamentalist rule to other nations along Russia's southern border ". 
7.2.2. Bolstering the Islamist Resistance 
The perceived threat posed by the Soviet invasion led Carter to give the CIA 
the green light for an American-orchestrated covert assistance programme to bE 
" Quoted in Alexander Alexiev, The United States and the War in Afghanistan (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, January 1988), p. 7. 
Poullada, op. cit. : pp. 55-6. 
Quoted in Gabriella Grasselli, British and A, nerican Responses to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1996), p. 121. 
J8d Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, Out of Afghanistan (NY: Oxford University Press, 1995), p, 
32. 
Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 388. 
'S6Ibid.: p. 396. 
148 
financed in part by congressional appropriations and in part with Saudi Arabian help. 
As in other instances of U. S. policy in the Arab world, the American response to the 
Afghan war was solely driven by preoccupations with the Soviet influence and, by 
doing so, it failed to appreciate fully the dynamics of the conflict from the perspective 
of its direct interveners. The overriding need to bolster the Afghan resistance led the 
United States to provide uncritical support to the most extremist factions of the 
mujahidin, a policy that the United States would subsequently regret. Chosen solely 
on the basis of expediency and short-term usefulness in support of what was 
conceived as America' s national interests, they later went their own way and turned 
against U. S. interests. Aid started out at relatively modest levels of S30 million in 1980 
and $50 million in 1981 487 . 
In the Carter administration, the motivation for providing aid to the Afghan 
resistance groups was not the intention to drive out the Soviets, since it was taken for 
granted that Afghanistan was lost to communism. U. S. policy aimed only to impose 
costs that might discourage the Soviets from further adventures and to keep the 
Soviet Army from consolidating its position in Afghanistan and moving against 
Pakistan °B8 Pakistan agreed to serve as the conduit for the gradually expanding aid 
but only after tough bargaining with Washington. 
In the process, Washington let Pakistan assume control of the entire 
operation. The Pakistani Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) not only 
administered the distribution of aid, but also insisted on controlling and directing the 
military operations of the mujahidin. Rubin explains the American's limited direct 
involvement in the distribution of aid as deriving from the fact that Washington was 
not looking for political alternatives to the Kabul regime, but merely inflicting damage 
on the Soviets: "The United States was particularly indifferent about which groups 
might have more popular support, to be more amenable to a political settlement, or be 
more likely to form a stable government" 489 . 
Islamabad favoured fundamentalist Islamic groups in the allocation of aid. 
Pakistan had been the driving force behind the development of Afghan fundamentalist 
groups. Under the monarchy, they were not a significant force. Based primarily in 
ethnic minorities, especially the Tajiks, they were opposed to Pushtun domination 
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because of their ideological rejection of tribalism, a characteristic that contended with 
their goal of creating a unified Islamic state. 
Due to the harsh repression under communist rule, the fundamentalists, 
numbering a few hundred adherents, were forced to flee to Pakistan. There they 
forged an alliance with Pakistan fundamentalists and Pakistani intelligence agencies 
that was to become central in the context of the Afghan conflict. The Pakistanis used 
the Afghan fundamentalists in their rivalry with Kabul. The predominantlyTajik Jamiat- 
i Islami '90, trained by the ISI -a derivation of the Pakistani Jamiat-i Islami - and 
another fundamentalist faction also recruited in 1974, Hizb-i Islami, '91 were later to 
become the principal beneficiaries of Pakistan-administered U. S. aid 492 . 
With the communist take-over in Kabul in 1978, Hizb-i Islami and other exiled 
fundamentalist groups, took advantage of the stream of Afghan refugees flowing into 
Pakistan to enlargen their ranks. They recruited cadres among the refugees with the 
help of the ISI and affluent fundamentalist groups in the Gulf region and throughout 
the Middle East. The Islamists consistently received more aid than other Islamist, 
traditionalist or nationalist groups. Rabbani's Jamiat, Hekmatyar's Hizb-i Islami and 
Saayafs Ittihad-i Islami 493 received the largest share of aid at the expense of four 
other groups headed by traditionalist Muslim personalities with tribal allianceS494 . In 
bolstering the fundamentalist factions, Zia was also legitimating his Islamisation 
agenda 4. 
In 1980 the Pakistani regime, attempting to organise the Afghan resistance, 
officially recognised six Islamic parties 4ý11 as representatives of the refugees and 
mujahidin. At Saudi Arabia's insistence, a seventh was added - that of Saayaf. Parties 
with other credentials were left out or encouraged to join existing groups. Yousaf, 
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director of ISI's Afghanistan operations during 1983-87 affirmed that "it was then a 
firm principle that every commander must belong to one of these seven parties, 
otherwise he got nothing from ISI"'97. Elaborating on the Pakistani's method of 
evaluation of the Afghan groups merit, Rubin says that "the ISI explicitly excluded as 
criteria for aid the extent of a party's political support among Afghans or its potential 
for establishing a stable governmenti498. Thus only the more radical Islamist groups 
were favoured. 
Pakistan was not the only party to the process of filtering Afghan groups that 
served its interests. The Saudis were highly involved in the Afghan operation and they 
"treated Afghanistan as a religious issue and deferred to their own religious 
establishment, which preferred the Islamists, and particularly the Salafis among 
themi49'. 
ISI involvement in the Afghan war effort became the single largest programme 
of the agency. It operated seven training camps where a grand total of 80,000 
resistance fighters were trained during the course of the war. According to Yousaf, the 
flow of one thousand a month in 1984 increased steadily in number. The training 
camps became known as the "University of Shad. Many Islamists got there in touch 
with radical interpretations of Islam and the training in arms that they acquired 
enabled them, once they disbanded and returned to their countries, to engage in 
Islamist-inspired activity against the state. 
In the United States there was never much concern over the fact that 
fundamentalists had gained control over the resistance and in the process had 
overrun more moderate elements. InYousaf's account there was "endless bickering" 
and "never-ending" friction between the ISI and the CIA but primarily over the 
question of the control of the aid programme and only secondarily over the role of the 
fundamentalists 500 
. 
Assistance to the mujahidin by the United States, China, Saudi Arabia, and 
other donors increased gradually. American aid - probably the most significant - did 
not give the fighters the capacity to mount an efficient campaign against the Soviets. 
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Part of the problem lay in the fact that the United States refused to supply the 
resistance with truly effective modern weapons that would have allowed it to achieve 
its combat potential. 
Beginning in the second half of 1984, the U. S. Congress and especially the 
Senate, where support for the Afghan cause was unanimous and truly bipartisan, 
became increasingly concerned about the seemingly ineffective assistance to the 
resistance. A resolution was introduced mandating a large increase in U. S. assistance 
and, more important, making the supply of effective weapons possible 501. 
In the early months of 1984 Representative Charles Wilson, literally forced the 
CIA to expand the Afghan programme, pushing for a massive increase in 
appropriations for the 1984-85 fiscal year. The $30 million that had initially been 
requested by the CIA shot up to $120 million. Wilson's success in quadrupling the 
Afghan programme opened the way for burgeoning increases to $250 million in 1985, 
$470 million in 1986, and $630 million in 1987502 . As a result of this congressional 
victory, President Reagan signed a national security directive, NSDD 166, which 
stipulated that it was U. S. policy to help the Afghan resistance drive out the Soviet 
forces "by all available means" 503 
The increasing aid permitted substantial improvements in resistance 
capabilities on the ground, and in the fall of 1986 in the air as well, with the first 
deliveries of sophisticated American anti-air missiles changing the nature of the war in 
several important ways. The U. S. -made Stingers and the less effective British 
Blowpipe missile greatly enhanced the operational effectiveness and survivability of 
resistance units, as well as extracting a steep price from the Soviets in terms of 
aircrafts lost and casualties. The coming to power in the Kremlin of Mikhail 
Gorbatchev created a new context that led to the signing in April 1988 of the Geneva 
Accords, by which the Soviets pledged to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan 
within nine months. 
In the United States, the previously unshakeable support for the Afghan policy 
began to waver. In the fall of 1989, the State Department challenged the large share 
of aid that went to Hikmatyar and Saayaf, as well as the Peshawar parties exclusive 
status as conduits for assistance. The State Department questioned not only the 
fundamentalist group's effectiveness and their opposition to a negotiated settlement, 
S01 Harrison. op. cit.: pp. 155-6. 
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which in the circumstances, seemed to require the sidelining of extremists. In 1989, 
Representative Anthony Beilenson, chairman of the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence called for an end to all assistance to fundamentalist 
groups. He assessed the U. S. policy towards the Afghan resistance in the following 
terms: "Some of the largest and best equipped factions are made up of Islamic 
fundamentalists whose goals for a new Afghanistan are in stark contrast with our own. 
We may have been willing to ignore the ideology of the rebels while they were fighting 
the Soviets, but now that they are fighting only their countrymen and are trying to form 
a new post-occupation government as well, we face an entirely different situation that 
demands a cut-off of our military aid" 504 . 
The Bush administration decided that preference should be given to regional 
or local military shuras inside Afghanistan, although, in practice, the arms pipeline 
continued to strengthen the Afghan groups that U. S. policymakers wanted to drop. In 
1990, Congress allocated only S280 million, a 60 percent reduction of the previous 
year's outlay 505. It was only after the abortive 1991 coup that led to the dissolution of 
the USSR that Moscow and Washington cut off all weapons supplies. Despite 
opposition from the CIA, the United States terminated all deliveries as of the end of 
fiscal year 1991. 
The United States support to the Afghan Islamists was a major foreign policy 
blunder since Afghanistan became a breeding ground of Islamic extremists. What is 
now regarded as the "Afghan menace" is just one more example of how maladroit the 
Americans are in choosing local allies that ultimately threaten U. S. interests 506. 
Pakistani officials estimate that at least 2800 foreign Muslims were still in 
Afghanistan in 1993. Veterans of the Afghan War have now surfaced in a dozen 
different countries. They have returned home and have become the spearheads of 
radical Islamist movements in Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Egypt, Sudan and many 
other places. Many of them are undergoing training by Iranian Revolutionary Guards 
in Sudanese camps. Extremists trained in Afghanistan have also struck against 
American interests: some were involved in the World Trade Centre bombing and, 
allegedly, in the 1995 bombing of the National Guard facility in Riyadh. 
There was never much reflection in Washington on the fact that the 
fundamentalists might become a liability to American interests. Krakowski, advisor to 
S04 Kurt Lohbeck, Holy Mar, Unholy Victory (Washington, D. C. : Regnery Gateway, 1993), p. 173. 
505Id.: p. 105. 
153 
Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, stated flatly that "no one at State was 
interested" 507. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger is quoted as saying "we knew 
we were involved with Islamic fundamentalists. We knew they were not very nice 
people, that they were not at all people attached to democracy. But we had this 
terrible problem of making choices"508. He says that the United States considered the 
possibility of cultivating moderate elements and that "there was some attempt to do 
that, but that the real point is that we had to make choices" 509. 
The strange cooperation between fundamentalists and Western intelligence 
agencies was never openly questioned until the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. One U. S. 
official argued against the continuation of the arming of the Afghan resistance in the 
following terms: "There's the issue of narcotics trafficking, attitudes toward women, 
human-rights violations, the shadow of Islamic fundamentalism" -510. Congressional 
debates on Afghanistan show, however, a glaring lack of reflection on the nature of 
the Afghan Islamists groups Washington was supporting. There is a notable absence 
of analysis on the kind of principles they upheld, the interests they represented and 
their international connections. This is because, as Barnett Rubin explains, "the 
debate about policy in Afghanistan continues to unfold within a bi-polar conceptual 
framework derived from the Cold War, which is true to the realities of neither 
Afghanistan nor the contemporary international system" 5". 
It seems as if among American policymakers there was never a consensus or 
even an awareness on the kind of challenges Afghan Islamists might pose after the 
Soviet withdrawal. As informed an observer as Rubin declared in 1990: "I do not 
subscribe to the view that the U. S. should necessarily fear or oppose Islamic political 
movements in Afghanistan" who fight not only for the "self-determination" of their 
country, but also "for their own version of an Islamic state"512. In the late 1980s, the 
strongest voice against the continuation of military aid to themujahidin was Selig 
Harrison, a senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment, who pointed out before 
Congress the "Islamic fundamentalist obscurantism of many of the resistance groups" 
506 Godfrey Jansen, " "The Afghans" - An Islamic Time Bomb", Middle East International, a. 438,20 
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and their ideological incompatibility with "American values" 513. Beyond these 
considerations, he stressed the far-reaching consequences of "supporting 
fundamentalist groups that are attempting to destabilize Central Asia" 51. 
American intelligence agencies were not also fullycognizant of the reality. In a 
1991 RAND study on Afghanistan, expert Graham Fuller doubted themujahidin would 
engage in terrorist activity against U. S. interests since they "recognize the role that 
the United States played in supporting the anti -Soviet jihad"515: "Afghan Islamists 
maintain no distinct and outstanding grievance that is likely to lead to such an attack 
on the U. S. interests" 516. As in other episodes of American foreign policy, only time 
and experience would prove how wrong the Americans were. 
7.3. The Shia Holy War Against the United States: America's Intervention in Lebanon 
7.3.1 The Radicalisation of Lebanese Shiites 
American setbacks in Lebanon must be set against the background of the 
disintegration of the country, the radicalisation of the Shiite community and Iran's 
intervention in the factional fighting. Although the 1982 Israeli invasion is at the origin 
of Lebanon's descent into chaos and facilitated Iran's involvement in Lebanon affairs, 
a number of the other factors made Lebanon susceptible to foreign intervention and a 
risky precinct for Americans. 
The chronic weakness of the Lebanese state stemmed from the imbalance of 
political power among its sectarian groups. The Maronite Christians and the Sunni 
Muslims had shared power uneasily since Lebanon was granted its independence in 
1946. The Shiite community was excluded from power-sharing schemes and its 
existence largely ignored. The system reflected the population divisions that existed in 
the 1940s but, less than thirty years later, it became outmoded. Between 1956 and 
s" U. S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Recent Developments in U. S. Policy Toward 
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1975, the Shiite population tripled, from 250,000 to 750,000, making it Lebanon's 
largest single confessional community 51. 
The Lebanese political system was never altered to reflect these changes. The 
poor, less-educated, and politically - disorganisedShia were powerless to redress the 
event. Residing in the underdeveloped southern half of Lebanon, they suffered 
discrimination and felt alienated from the mainstream of Muslim politics and society. 
The radicalisation of the Shia in Lebanon heightened in the 1980s at Iranian 
instigation. In 1981 Islamic Amal, an offshot of the Shia secular party, Amal, was 
created. Shortly thereafter, another faction split fromAmal, and under the leadership 
of Abbas Mussavi and the spiritual guidance of Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, an 
activist Shia leader, came to be known as the Hizbollah, or the party of God. 
An offshoot of the Iranian Hizbollah, the party served Khomeini's purposes of 
exporting the revolution and its terrorist activities were a planned and deliberate 
instrument of Iranian foreign policy. Hizbollah became known and feared for the use 
of "martyrs", willing to kill in the service of the faith, in a crusade against "impiety" and 
the "infidels". Fadlallah, the mentor of the Lebanese Hizbollah, committed to the 
transnational ideology of Shia activism, corroborated the basic underpinnings of 
Khomeini's thought. He said that "we do not hold in our Islamic belief that violence is 
the solution to all types of problems; rather, we always see violence as a kind of 
surgical operation that a person should use only after trying all other means, and only 
when he finds his life imperilled... "'1e . 
Hizbollah provided Iran with a crucial opening to consolidate and expand its 
influence in the Middle East. Iran exploited and co-opted the spontaneous support of 
Lebanese Shiites, whose human distress and hopelessness made them the most 
receptive of all Shiites to the export of the Islamic Revolution 519 
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7.3.2. The Escalation of the Terror Campaign Against the United States 
The 1982 events, including the Israeli occupation of the Shiite south, the 
massacre of Palestinians by Maronite militiamen in league with Israel, and the 
deployment of American and French troops near the Shiite slums of Beirut, led to the 
escalation of Shia terrorism in Lebanon. 
In the circumstances, Hizbollah and affiliated Shia groups willingly mobilised 
for what they considered "the last stages of our Holy War to end the domination of 
Lebanon by Cross-worshippers and their Crusader masters" 520. Fadlallah envisioned 
Hizbollah's role as "a battle with vice at its roots", the first root being in theShia 
leader's view, the United States. The party's manifest stated that "Imam Khomeini, 
our leader, has repeatedly stressed that America is the cause of all our catastrophes 
and the source of all malice... We will turn Lebanon into a graveyard for American 
schemes" 521. Hizbollah's ambitions also included the ousting of theMaronite regime 
and the crushing of Israeli forces. 
The deployment of a Multinational Peacekeeping Force (MNF) comprising 
military units from the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy to Lebanon in 
order to protect the Palestinians and to restore some semblance of order, was met 
with a series of terrorist operations. In March 1983, a detachment of Italian soldiers 
was attacked by Shia operatives, a group of U. S. Marines was fired upon and a 
French paratroop unit was targeted. The incidents continued throughout April, when a 
two-man command drove a car loaded with explosives into the chancellery of the 
United States in Beirut, killing 69 persons. 
Shia violence against Western targets escalated as the United States became 
increasingly mingled in the inter-communal fighting. U. S. military forces provided the 
Lebanese Army with support in its offensive against Shia militias and their Druse 
allies during September 1983. 
In response to this situation, Shia militias unleashed an intensified campaign 
of terrorist suicide car and truck bombings in October and November designed to 
drive the U. S. forces from Lebanon and destroy the MNF arrangement. On 23 
October, simultaneous suicide truck bombings rocked the U. S. Marine headquarters 
at Beirut Airport, killing 241 Marines, and the French paratroop headquarters in that 
'2° Taheri, op. cit.: p. 11. 
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city, killing 58 persons. A similar attack was staged on the Israeli military government 
building in Sidon, on 4 November, resulting in 67 deaths 522. 
The 1983 attacks were claimed in the name of Islamic Jihad, which, according 
to Taheri, was not in fact a single terrorist entity, but a front or coalition of individual 
Shia groups operating at the behest of Iran under a common framework. Islamic Jihad 
was a cover name for operations carried out by Hizbollah, sponsored by Iran, with 
additional support provided by other Middle Eastern countries" 573 . 
Taheri contends that terrorist activities in Lebanon were supervised in Tehran 
by Fazl-Allah Mahalati, who was in charge of "one of the largest terror groups in the 
Middle East" 524. Within months of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the first Iranian 
Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) were dispatched to Lebanon, ostensibly in support of 
the beleaguered PLO forces. The IRGC quickly established a forward headquarters at 
Baalbek in the predominantly Shia Bekaa Valley and a general headquarters just over 
the border in the Syrian village of Zebdani. The Zebdani headquarters, in fact, was 
transformed by the Revolutionary Guards into their largest single base of operation 
outside Iran. With the IRGC firmly entrenched in Lebanon, direct and immediate 
contact had been established between Teheran and sympathetic Shia extremist 
groups in that country, the most affected by the collapse of the state and of the 
violence that ensued 525 
The individual terrorist organisations that are believed to have carried out 
operations under the banner of Islamic Jihad include Hizbollah, al-Dawa and 
Jundollah (soldiers of God). According to Taheri, although dependent on Tehran for 
spiritual guidance and instructions the groups acted independently and mostly without 
coordinating the activities among themselves: "with the exception of some key 
operations which involved Syrian and Iranian Intelligence services, at least at the 
planning level and in providing necessary logistical support, the groups in question 
seemed to have almost total operational independence" Szs 
There is reason to believe that the nerve centre of Islamic Jihad operations in 
the Middle East in the early 1980s was Iran's Embassy in Damascus. Syria shared 
Iran's aims and was willing to accept a tactical alliance with Tehran in order to get rid 
5=` Quoted in Kramer, op. cit. : p. 545. 
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of hostile foreign forces in its Lebanese backyard. With an operational budget in 1983 
of some S400 million - the largest of any Iranian legation - the Iranian Embassy in the 
Syrian capital also had a staff of over 200 persons. The Ambassador, Ayatollah Ali- 
Akbar Mohtashami, reportedly enjoyed direct access to Khomeini in his role as 
coordinator of Islamic Jihad activities =27. 
Shia terrorist operations eventually forced American and French forces into a 
full retreat from Lebanon in 1984. The violence also pushed Israeli forces back to a 
narrow "security zone" in the south. From 1984 onwards, and due to increased 
security measures that made bombing attacks more difficult to execute, Shia terrorist 
activity concentrated on kidnappings and hijackings. 
An American airliner was hijacked in 1985 to secure the freedom of Lebanese 
Shiites held by Israel, and two hijackings of Kuwait airliners in 1984 and 1988 to win 
freedom for Lebanese Shiites held by Kuwait for the bombings there. Islamic Jihad 
and other groups affiliated with Hizbollah abducted dozens of foreigners in Lebanon: 
13 in 1984,23 in 1985 and 11 in 1986, the number declining ever since. The five 
Americans abducted in 1984 by the Islamic Jihad were used to coerce the United 
States into pressuring Kuwait to release the aforementioned Shia terrorists held in 
that country 528 
The terrorist campaign against the United States symbolised the growing anti- 
American mood in the Arab world, largely as a result of the American support to 
Israeli policies. Islamist acts of terror shocked the Americans and left policy makers in 
disarray. Hermann Eilts, a former American ambassador to the Middle East, 
explained this state of affairs by pointing out that "the road to confrontations of the 
type that we have experienced" have come as a surprise because "issues involving 
Islamic fundamentalism have been handled on a policy level by essentially 
uninformed and superficial individuals" 529. Referring to the issue of Islamic 
fundamentalism as the grounds for those acts, he said "the whole issue of religion as 
a factor in politics is not one that plays a very prominent part in our thinking" 530. 
The Islamic crusade inspired by Iran succeeded in creating an energetic wave 
of militancy, bringing with it varying degrees of instability throughout the region, as 
well as outside the Middle East. The United States approached the crusade basically 
s=6 Taheri, op. cit. : p. 125. 
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from the standpoint of mere violence. Representative Steven Solarz defined the 
general perception when, during the 1985 congressional hearings on Islamic activism, 
he stated: "Islamic fundamentalism poses a problem for the United States ... when 
terrorists who appear to be motivated by the ideology of fundamentalism engage in 
actions which put at risk the lives of American interests and which threaten 
established American policies" 531. Islamist-inspired violence came, furthermore, to be 
indissociably associated with the image of political Islam. 
The second consequence of the terrorists acts against Western targets, was 
to assume that the Iranian hand was behind every trouble, and that Tehran 
constituted an immediate threat to the stability of pro-Western allies and to the Gulf 
region. The belief in the Iranian-orchestrated campaign of subversion led the United 
States, on the one hand, to gradually side with Iraq in the first Gulf War, and, on the 
other, to strengthen cooperation with its Arab allies. 
7.4. The United States and Political Islam: A Flexible Approach 
As the preceding sections highlight, American approach to political Islam was 
not a monolith and undifferentiated, but depended on the type of movement and the 
latter' s disposition towards American interests. 
Looked at superficially, American dealings with political Islam proved to be a 
bitter affair and the setbacks infringed by Islamists hard to swallow. Terrorism and 
hostage-taking by Shia groups such as Islamic Jihad and Hizbollah in Lebanon, and 
the occupation of the American Embassy in Iran by a group of students atKhomeini's 
behest, were acts that moved the problem of Islamic activism to the centre of 
American consciousness. Amorphous fears of a threat emanating from Islamic 
religious "fanatics" and the feeling of helplessness, symbolised by the pitiful attempt in 
April 1980 to free the American Embassy hostages by force, were widespread among 
the Americans. 
However, during the 1980s there was one instance of long and systematic 
cooperation with Islamist Afghan groups against the Soviet Union. The mujahidin 
53 Id.: p. 149. 
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received approximately $3.5 billion in arms and other aid from the CIAý32, regardless 
of their political orientation or Islamist zeal. In this way, the most radicallslamist group 
- Hekmatyar's party-received the lion's share of American aid. For a long time, it did 
not seem to worry the Americans that Hekmatyar's party was openly anti- American, 
that it committed all sorts of human rights abuse, quite apart from the fact that he was 
also trafficking in heroin on the side. And it was only after the Soviet retreat from 
Afghanistan, in fact, when both superpowers cooperated closely in the run-up to the 
1990-1 Gulf war, and when Hekmatyar's party took Saddam Hussein's side in the 
conflict, that the Americans acknowledged his well-known crimes, reduced their 
support for him and finally ended it. 
Therefore, it seems clear that it was not religious character, nor cultural 
tradition that was a problem for Washington's foreign policy, but actions which 
threatened Western, specifically, American interests. The U. S. Middle Eastern 
policies are primarily determined by the analysis of economic and power interests, not 
by the evaluation of a religion. Islamist tendencies were largely irrelevant to American 
foreign policy, as long as they constituted no threat to certain vital interests, such as 
the oil question, the maintenance of pro-Western regimes, Israel, and regional 
stability. Within this setting, Washington saw "good" and "bad" Islamists. During the 
1980s, when American policyrnakers and strategists considered the Persian Gulf as a 
key region, their primary concern was the Soviet threat, not Islam, and the latter was 
effectively used as a weapon against communism. 
s'= "The Dario Side of Islam", Time, 4 October 1993: p. 62. 
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8. The Intellectual Backdrop: Approaches to Political Islam 
8.1. The Nature of the Islamist Challenge 
In the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 political Islam was seen 
and evaluated mainly as a Shia and Persian phenomenon and as the mainspring of 
Islamic uprisings and revolution. The fears of Iranian-inspired widespread 
destabilisation were reinforced by Iran's call for a worldwide Islamic revolution and to 
topple unislamic governments; Shia uprisings and riots in 1979 in the oil-rich eastern 
province of Saudi Arabia and the seizure of the Grand Mosque by militants in Mecca; 
attempted coups and bombings of foreign embassies in Bahrain and Kuwait in the 
early 1980s. Following Israel's invasion of Lebanon, the radicalisation of the Shia 
population and the emergence of extremistShia Islamist groups, such as Hizbollah, 
further strengthened those perceptions. Shia extremists were responsible for the 
suicide truck bombings of American, French and Israeli military in Lebanon in October 
1983 and the subsequent rash of kidnappings of foreigners in Lebanon. 
Although the most visible from the Western perspective, Islamist radicalism 
was not exclusively Iranian: in 1981, the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat was 
assassinated by members of an extremist group. Moreover, "revolutionary Islam", as 
Olivier Roy calls it 533, was not the only or the most pervasive feature of political Islam. 
Actually, during the 1980s, "Islamic revivalism [had] become part of the mainstream 
Muslim society, producing a new class of modern educated butislamically oriented 
elites ... " 
534. The pressures for more Islamic-oriented societies was common among 
the middle and lower classes, educated and uneducated, professionals and workers, 
young and old, men and women. 
Islamists have scored points almost everywhere in pushing governments to 
adopt Islamist measures and to tolerate their hold over professional unions, university 
campuses, and inner-city neighbourhoods. These developments have also forced 
rulers from Morocco to Malaysia to become more Islamically sensitive, to co-opt 
religious institutions or leaders and to enhance their Islamic legitimacy. Arab rulers 
have employed Islamic rhetoric and symbols more often, expanded support for 
533 The Failure ofPolitica! Islam (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994). 
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Islamic institutions, increased religious programming in the media, and been more 
attentive to public religious observances such as the fast of Ramadan. In the 1980s, 
Islamists forced an amendment to the Egyptian Constitution introducingSharia as the 
main source of legitimisation and engineered the Sharia's actual imposition in 
Mauritania in 1983 and in Pakistan in 1985. They pressuredAlgeria's FLN to amend 
the family code in 1984 and forced changes in Sudan's penal code while Gen. 
Numeiry was still in power ". 
By the end of the 1980s, a series of events have coalesced to givelslamists 
more prominence in the political scene of their countries. One of the most important 
was the climate of economic distress caused by the decline in the quality of life over 
the course of the decade. A sharp economic crisis prompted governments to engage 
in partial openings of the political system. Actually, the effort by Arab governments to 
undertake political liberalisation was mainly the result of the adoption of structural 
adjustment programmes. 
Popular disillusionment with incumbent regimes, over internal problems or 
their handling of inter-Arab issues, eroded the legitimacy of governments. Protests 
over their poor performance came to a head with the Gulf crisis, with Arab 
governments being questioned also for lack of assertiveness in face of the Western 
intervention against Iraq. 
Signs of modest change in the wake of riots and demonstrations in Egypt, 
Tunisia, Jordan, Algeria and Morocco were visible. In Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan and 
Algeria relatively open parliamentary elections enabled Islamists to access official 
political life by democratic means. Islamist activists even held cabinet positions in 
Sudan, Pakistan, Jordan and Malaysia. 
In most Muslim countries, Islamist political activity has been carefully 
monitored and controlled since Islamists are considered the major opposition to 
incumbent regimes. This was particularly the case in Algeria, where the military 
aborted the electoral process in order to impede Islamists from gaining power. The 
suppression of the latter has led to their radicalisation. In these circumstances, the 
extremists groups have since engaged in a ferocious war against the state. 
The fact that political Islam is, in the current context, mainly a protest 
movement, is nothing new and has in fact become a pervasive pattern in 
contemporary Arab politics. The unexpected development is the waylslamist protest 
FSpoSito, "The Persian Gulf War... ": p. 344. 
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has been directed against an avowedly Islamic state: the case of Saudi Arabia. In 
1995 and 1996, Islamic extremists have conducted acts of terror against regime and 
U. S. interests and local security forces have been unable to prevent them. Political 
radicals using Islam as their banner are gaining support and influence in the Arabian 
peninsula '. They demand the establishment of truly Islamic governments, an end to 
the rule by corrupt, unlslamic leaders, and the elimination of foreign, especially U. S. 
influence. These developments are ominous portents for the United states in view of 
the huge political and economic investment it has made in the area. 
Islamist gains in Turkey also caught Western observers by surprise. A 
modem, westward-looking and comparatively liberal state, Turkey is considered a 
secular beacon in a sea of Muslim states. In March 1994, Refah, the Islamic Welfare 
Party, took 18 percent of the votes in local elections and won the mayoral races in 
Istanbul and Ankara. The December 1995 parliamentary elections gave thelslamists 
a narrow victory over the leading centre-right parties and enabled them to join the 
governmental coalition. Following the June 1996 disintegration of the coalition 
government, the Islamists emerged as the senior party of the coalition headed by 
prime minister Necmettin Erbakan. 
The results alarmed Western policymakers, due to Refah's domestic and 
foreign policy agenda. Erbakan's political agenda contemplated the reversal of the 
secularist path and the application of Sharia law. The Islamists have harshly criticised 
American foreign policy, Turkey's close ties with the West, its membership in NATO 
and its efforts to join the European Union and they have vowed to extricate Turkey 
from the Western orbit 53'. 
It seems however that Erbakan will not take any action to achieve these 
things. He has adopted a pragmatic approach and softened his stance considerably 
on many issues. Since the December elections he has talked of "respect for 
democratic and secularist principles of AtatGrk" 538 and continued efforts towards 
integration in Europe. Equally important is the fact that the army would hardly remain 
neutral were the principles of Atatürk's republic violated. The Islamist victory in 
Turkey marks, nonetheless the turning of a new page in thecountry's history, as it 
puts the secularist political philosophy behind it. 
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8.2. Divisions Within the Academic Community 
In the United States, the debate on political Islam has been polemic and has 
produced a variety of views, reflecting the multiple divisions within the academic and 
policy communities. Although the representations of Islam in the American media tend 
to be stereotyped, superficial or selective, the discussion involving scholars or experts 
on Islam is more sophisticated and the arguments more substantiated. This debate 
has not been confined to academic circles, but has been eagerly embraced by think- 
tanks, which often intend to successfully put across their message. The results have 
filtered into the policymaking processes, where political Islam has arisen as a major 
foreign policy issue, especially under the Clinton administration. The emerging policy 
on political Islam is to a large extent the result of the confluence of the views of 
experts on the best way for the United States to approach that phenomenon. 
While most analysts agree on the nature and origins of the phenomenon, there 
is however little consensus on the likely direction of thelslamist movement or on how 
best to approach political Islam. The emerging consensus is thatlslamist movements 
tend to be an indigenous, homegrown response to the socioeconomic and political 
circumstances of Arab countries for which the incumbent governments are 
responsible53s . The Islamist movements are broadly a response to ineffectual 
governance at home. Most Arab governments have proven unable to satisfy the 
demands of their peoples and have failed to meet the socioeconomic needs of their 
societies. They have blocked calls for democratisation, restricting political 
participation, and proven insensitive to the need to effectively incorporate Islam as a 
major signpost of national identity. 
A survey of the different approaches to political Islam, brings out two schools 
of thought regarding political Islam: an accommodationist and a confrontational 
school5'° . Within each school, the analyses that make up for the argument present 
different nuances but the bottom-line and the elicited policy recommendations are 
similar. What clearly sets the difference of approach of both schools is the 
appreciation of the following parameters: the nature of thelslamist movement and its 
ideological blueprint; its views on the domestic and regional situation and its agenda 
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for change; its views of the West and its stance toward the U. S. interests in the 
Middle East. 
8.2.1. The Case for Accommodation 
The accommodationist school considers that the Islamic movement is not a 
threat but a healthy grassroots response to the failure of Arab governments to tackle 
growing socioeconomic problems. A main proponent of this approach is John 
Esposito, a leading American expert on Islamic groups, who maintains that the West 
should not brand Islamists as pariahs simply because initial efforts to create 
enlightened Islamic entities and movements in the Middle East have not succeeded. 
The thrust of this argument rests on the fundamental assumption that the Islamic 
revival is a complex phenomenon and encompasses a variety of movements, the 
diversity of which calls for a nuanced Western approach 541 . 
According to Esposito, there are great differences among those labelled as 
fundamentalists in the West. He concedes that armed, violent groups such as the 
Gama' at al-Islamiyya in Egypt, Hizbollah in Lebanon, and the Armed Islamic Group in 
Algeria jeopardise stability and violate human rights in the Middle East. But he points 
out that such groups are only the extremist fringe of Islamic movements and that 
political Islam is a multifaceted and dynamic force. This point was presented by 
Esposito and John Voll in an article published in 1994 in theMiddle East Quarteriy". 
They affirm that "some who are identified as Islamic fundamentalists... are not 
extreme militants, and that it is in the interests of democratization and of the United 
States that those groups not be treated as if they were on the violent fringes of 
society rather than representing the views of a significant portion of many Muslim 
societies"543 . 
He argues further that there is ample space for accommodation between Islam 
and democracy. Rather than attacking political Islam, he says, the governments of the 
West ought to be nurturing Islamic moderates. If Islamists enter coalition governments 
with the military and elected officials, they will be forced to compromise and abandon 
Esposito, The Islamic Threat : p. 212. 
u= "Islam's Democratic Essence" (I), n°3, September 1994: pp. 3-11. 
"Islam and Democracy: Rejoinder" (I), n°4, December 1994: p. 71. 
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some of the rigidity that characterises them in opposition. Esposito believes that, 
although Islamic leaders tend to be critical of U. S. policies, in the last instance they 
"will generally operate ... on the basis of national interests and demonstrate a 
pragmatic flexibility that reflects acceptance of the realities of a globally 
interdependent world" 544 . 
Esposito contends that the gravest flaw in the U. S. approach to the Muslim 
world and Islamic movements is the failure to differentiate between those that are 
moderate and those that are violent. This attitude "can undermine U. S. policy in the 
region" since it "convinces many Muslims that the United States is simply anti- 
Islamic". He also condemns the U. S. ideological bias against Islam. The author 
exhorts the U. S. government to accept or at least tolerate the ideological differences 
between the West and Islam. In light of the requirednuanced approach to the Islamist 
movement, he urges the United States to "take care to avoid being seen as 
intervening or as opposing the activities of Islamic organizations where such 
programs or activities do not directly threaten U. S. interests" 546 . 
James Piscatori argues that the Western tendency to think of Islam as a 
monolithic bloc has obscured the diversity of ideological interpretations and of actual 
religious practice in Muslim societies. The misrepresentation of Islam - equating it with 
"fundamentalism" - has contributed to the propagation of an image of Islamic 
movements as inherently anti-Western". He says that the views which build on the 
notion of the confrontational nature of Islam "must be set against the complex history 
of interaction between Islam and the West". This is because, he argues, "civilizations 
rarely, if ever, act as monolithic entities with single-minded, doctrinally-defined 
interests or passions. As Islamic history demonstrates political pluralism has been the 
norm within the Muslim world. and between it and the West and there has been a 
pattern of alternating cooperation and competition, alliance and violent 
confrontation"548 
He argues that the differences among Islamicstates and movements are often 
profound and that one must distinguish between movements and not view all of them 
as a threat to the West. In his opinion, Islamist groups are "neither simply 
sas Id.: p. 209. 
Esposito, "Islamic Movements, Democratization, and U. S. Foreign Policy", in P. Marr and W. Lewis 
(eds. ), op. cit. : p. 188,201. 
s'6 Id.: p. 203. 
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revolutionary nor merely accommodationist" and the continuous adaptation of their 
ideas and strategies "belie the simplicity of an "illiberal" or "angry" Islam""9. He 
contends that the politicisation of religion does not pose a serious threat to global 
order in terms of internationally coordinated action against the West. If, on the one 
hand, it may enable extremist Islamist movements to establish connections across 
international borders, it also exposes them to democratic participatory ideas and 
practices 0. 
A similar view is defended by the RAND senior analyst Graham Fuller who 
believes political Islam to be the most pervasive and powerful force in the Muslim 
world and not necessarily antagonistic to the West. Fuller says that given the 
"disastrous status quo", the Islamist movements are the only opposition groups 
actually able to politicise and mobilise elements of the population in states where this 
has never happened before 55'. He does not view them as necessarily negative but 
surely as "historically inevitable and politically tamable. Over the long run it even 
represents ultimate political progress toward greater democracy and popular 
government" 552 . 
Fuller argues that Islamists have already been forced to talk in terms of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and justify why they are not enforcing 
democratic practices, and he cites the cases of Sudan, Iran and even Pakistan. He 
thinks that Islamists who have "ideologically totalitarian visions" are essentially a small 
minority 553 . In any case, should they come to power they would be forced to 
compromise with political reality as they would have to negotiate with political 
opponents and would be accountable to the people. Fuller further affirms that a 
weakening of the Islamist appeal would surely result: "Islamists may come up with 
some interesting thoughts, or some useful approaches in certain areas, but Islam 
does not have any unique answers" 5"' 
J. Piscatori. "Religion and Realpolitik", in Piscatori (ed. ), Islamic Fundamentalisins...: p. 13. 
549 Id.: p. 18. 
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Fuller thinks that Islamist forces should not be excluded from the political 
system, since the longer they are kept out, the more extreme they will grow. He 
advocates a "phased introduction" of Islamic forces into the system. This would test 
their capacities and their competence and expose them to public scrutiny. The author 
thinks that the opening up of the political system to as many Islamic parties as 
possible, would enlarge the debate and expose their shortcomings. In fact, he argues 
"one of the biggest problems within Islamic society so far is that there has not been 
honest critique of the shortcomings and weaknesses of other Islamic movements. 
Islamists have been very coy and unwilling to talk about these sensitive issues, 
especially when they are out of power, because they feel this quest for solidarity" 555 . 
Fuller advises Washington not to impede the coming to power of thelslamists 
since such a move would only augment the anti-West sentiment in the Arab world. He 
counsels the United States to give the process a little time and to let it run its course. 
In the end, the public in the Middle East will be the main judge to "whether Islam really 
has the "right stuff" to operate in the political scene for long" '. 
Shireen Hunter believes that if Islamists came to power they would have little 
choice but to adopt a policy of accommodation toward the West and come to terms 
with it. They would "be faced with the same economic and technological shortcomings 
and needs that face current governments" 557 . From this perspective, any adverse 
effect on the West's economic interests - for instance, the disruption and manipulation 
by the Islamists of the supply and price of oil - would work against their countries' 
interests and would be short-lived 558 . 
Hunter criticises the current U. S. policies to Islamists which she characterises 
as "denial" and "containment": the former consisting of denying the Islamists the 
involvement in the political process of their respective countries; the latter, applied to 
Islamist regimes (Iran and Sudan), is a strategy of economic weakening and political 
isolation She points to the danger of combating and marginalising them. She 
states: "this policy does run the risk of further radicalizing Islamist movements, 
polarizing the Arab world along secular-Islamic lines, delaying the process of reform, 
and thus increasing the risk of violent confrontation and chronic instability"'°° . She 
sss Id. : p. 28. 
ss6 "No Long-Teri ... ". 557 Hunter, The Rise of Islamist Movements", op. cit. : p. 345. 
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concludes her reasoning by saying: in the coming years the major challenge to the 
West in dealing with the Islamist phenomenon will be to devise a mixed strategy of 
containment and dialogue strategy which would minimize short-term risks to its 
interests while allowing for long-term political liberalization, Islamic reformation and 
Islamic accommodation with the West! " . 
Richard Murphy has a very critical view of Washington's position regarding the 
evolution of the political situation in the Middle East and thelslamist role. He believes 
that for the foreseeable future politics in this region is "likely to mean more "Islamic" 
politics" ' and he acknowledges the challenges posed by Islamic groups that have 
anti-Western leanings, criticise the United States foreign policy, openly confront Israel 
and reject the peace process. However, he thinks that the enforcement of thestatus 
quo by Washington will, in the long run, be detrimental to American interests since 
political change is inevitable. He affirms that it "is not that Muslims are not "ready" for 
democracy", but rather that "Washington is not ready for the choices that they would 
probably make"". The Americans, he says, in order to assure orderly transformation 
in the region, should encourage friendly Arab regimes to open up their political 
systems in an evolutionary way ". 
Leon Hadar advises the U. S. government to adopt a policy of "benign neglect" 
toward the coming political changes in the region sr'5 . He says that Washington should 
not continue, through aid and military support, to provide incentives for maintaining 
autocratic regimes. Such regimes, such as Saudi Arabia, should reform the political 
system in order to address popular grievances. The failure to do so makes it look that 
Washington is interested in the maintenance of repressive regimes, a perception that 
fans the Arabs' animosity towards the United States. 
Hadar defends that "disengaging from the Saudis and other Middle Eastern 
despots will ensure that when new regimes come to power, they will not direct their 
wrath against Washington" 566 America's attempt to shore up Arab regimes under 
assault from Islamist forces would also have major implications in domestic terms: 
"Clinton's geo-economic strategy with its goal of shifting resources from the military to 
the civilian economy, does not fit with a costly involvement in the Middle East, which a 
56" Id. : p. 34 7. 
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crusade against Islam would certainly entail"' . The United States should rather 
adopt a pragmatic policy of maintaining friendly relations with the new Islamic 
governments instead of isolating them. 
Hadar thinks that the rise of Islamic regimes in countries like Algeria or Egypt 
is inevitable and constitutes a transitional phase in the ongoing process of 
transformation of the old order in the Middle East. He deems that, once in power, the 
zealotry and extremism of the Islamist groups will be tempered by political realities. 
Their ideological rigidity and theocratic agenda will also be challenged by the need to 
deliver on their promises, the most difficult being economic development. 
The "benign" nature of the Islamist movement is also highlighted by Robin 
Wright who views it as a "constructive alternative" and remarks that "a growing 
number of Islamists are now trying to reconcile moral and religious tenets with modern 
life, political competition and free markets"" . Wright asserts that "Islam is now at a 
pivotal and profound movement of evolution, a juncture increasing equated with the 
Protestant Reformation" 569 
. This is also the viewpoint of Hooshang Amirahmadi who 
thinks that Islam is now in a state of flux and that the outcome of the actual debate on 
Islam will produce a variety of solutions capable of reconciling Islam with the modem 
570 world 
A host of other academics have put forth views countering the generalisations 
and over-simplifications about modem Islamic movements. American scholars who 
have written and spoken widely on the subject include John Voll (Georgetown 
University), James Bill (College of William and Mary), John Entelis (Fordham 
University), Richard Bulliet (Columbia), Charles Butterworth (University of Maryland) 
and Augustus Richard Norton (Boston University). They generally assert that the 
failure to make distinctions among the many Islamic movements and the stereotyping 
of Muslims as violence-prone radicals will strengthen the extremists at the expense of 
the vast majority of moderate and responsible Muslims. They note that the failure to 
reckon the diversity of the Islamist movement creates distortions and 
misrepresentations and complicates the ability of the U. S. government to carry out a 
constructive foreign policy. 
566 Ibid. 
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Most of them argue in favour of the inclusion of Islamists in the political 
sphere, as long as they renounce the use of violence. Far from hijacking democracy, 
they argue, the inclusion of Islamists would deepen the democratic process. It would 
not only reinforce the position of the moderates but would bring all Islamists into 
dialogue with the political system, encouraging them to be more pragmatic and less 
millenarian in their definition of political goals. The integration of Islamists into the 
political system through legal parliamentary means is preferable to letting the 
Islamists come to power through violence. Legal integration, they argue, at least 
favours the triumph of Islamists who respect parliamentary process. The question is 
thus not so much whether Islamists would come to power but rather how they would 
come to power 57 . 
8.2.2. The Case for Confrontation 
The confrontational school argues that political Islam is inherently hostile to 
the Western world and is on a collision course with the latter. The West cannot mollify 
the Islamic world by promoting democratic ideals because there is no convergence of 
values between the two cultures. On a policy level, confrontationalists argue that as 
undemocratic and unpalatable as Arab authoritarian governments are today, the 
Islamist alternative might be worse. The contention here is that the Arab world is not 
ready for democracy. Proponents of this school would thus argue against opening up 
the political system to Islamist parties too soon since they are likely to "hijack" 
democracy. According to this rationale, Islamists are instrumentalists whose aim is to 
exploit the democratic system for their own long-term, non-democratic ends. 
A related interpretation has been developed by Harvard's Samuel Huntington 
in a different context - that of international relations theory. According to Huntington, 
security problems in the post-Cold War world will henceforth parallel the fundamental 
divides between the world's civilizations. With opposed and competitive ideologies, 
the Judeo-Christian West is destined to conflict with the Muslim Near East and, 
perhaps, with the Muslim world in general. 
5' See, for instance the conclusions of the debate on "Civil Society and the Prospects for Political 
Reform in the Middle East", Conference Report, 30 September -2 October 1994, Queenstown. MD: pp. 
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Huntington's analysis is based on the premise that the traditional geopolitical 
way of looking at international relations - balances of power among nations or blocs - 
is being supplanted by a geocultural set of conflicts. The core of global politics will 
increasingly be the interaction between the West and non-Western cultures, the 
underlying assumption being that the fault lines between civilizations will determine 
the battle lines of the future 5'z . 
Huntington affirms that the increasing contact between cultures brought about 
by the media and travel has intensified consciousness of the awareness of differences 
between civilizations as well as commonalties within civilizations. The economic 
modernisation process and social change driving and accompanying this growing 
contact between cultures has separated people from their traditional local identities, 
weakening the state as the primary source of that identity in the post -colonial era. 
Religion - mainly in the form of fundamentalist movements - and a return to roots 
would increasingly move in to fill the gap in most places: "The revival of religion ... 
provides a basis for identity and commitment that transcends national boundaries and 
unites civilizations" 573 
Civilizational conflicts are thus likely for a number of reasons. Huntington 
argues that though Western mass culture has spread across most of the globe, 
Western concepts of individualism, liberalism, human rights, equality, liberty, law, 
democracy, free markets, separation of church and state, differ fundamentally from 
those prevalent in Islam, Confucian, Hindu or Buddhist cultures. In fact, the 
propagation of Western values as "universal" has helped instead to stimulate 
reactions such as the religious fundamentalism taking hold in Islamic societies. 
Huntington notes that, in the case of Islam, he considers it a "militant religion", 
there is no distinction between what is religious and what is secular. This theocratic 
proclivity makes it inordinately difficult for Islamic societies to accommodate non- 
Muslims and for Muslims to easily fit into societies where the majority is non- 
Muslim574 
Huntington anticipates that in a scenario that pits "the West against the rest", 
an Islamic-Confucian connection is very likely, its main feature being their 
philosophical opposition to Western liberalism. At the moment, the conflict between 
the West and the Confucian-Islamic states focuses largely on the question of 
s'. Huntington, op. cit.: p. 22. 
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armament and on the latters attempt to assert their right to acquire and deploy 
whatever weapons they think necessary for their security575 . This connection serves 
the purposes of China and North Korea on the one hand, and several Middle Eastern 
states on the other. 
A parallel trend is that Western societies are spiritually decadent. The same 
analysis is made by Brzezinski who denounces the "culture of permissive cornucopia" 
in America that jeopardises the underpinnings of American superpower statu S 576. 
Brzezinski considers that apart from moral implosion in the domestic front, the West 
will be faced with the dangers caused by instability in large stretches of the globe. 
Like Huntington, he acknowledges the existence of clashing civilizations along a 
geographical perimeter that stretches in an oblong shape across the map of East 
Asia. This "geographical vortex of violence", seized by political awakening and 
possessed with ethnic and religious fervour, is where the West is likely to see the next 
use of nuclear weapons 57 . 
A major version of the confrontational thesis is the one that emerged in recent 
years and that equates Islamic fundamentalism with the communist threat. Adherents 
to this position claim that fundamentalism is as dangerous as communism was in its 
heyday. Like communism, political Islam rejects the social, economic and cultural 
underpinnings of the West. Just as communism thrived as an international movement 
fostered by a revolutionary regime in the Soviet Union, Islamic fundamentalism thrives 
as an international movement fostered by an odd regime in Tehran. Islamic 
fundamentalists have singled out the West as their main enemy, just as the Marxist- 
Leninists did, and are committed to destroying it. They bring to their struggle not 
simply the ideological zealotry that was one of the characteristics of Soviet 
communism, but also the religious zealotry of Jihad that propounds the use of 
violence and terrorism as major means of combating the "infidel" West 578 . 
The equation of Islamic fundamentalism with communism has been made 
most forcefully by Daniel Pipes in the pages of his journal, the Middle East Quarterly, 
as well as at various forums. He affirms: "fundamentalist Islam is a radical utopian 
movement closer in spirit to other such movements (communism, fascism) than to 
578 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Islamic - Confucian Connection", New Perspectives Quarterly (10), n° 
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traditional religion" 579. According to this author, fundamentalists believe that the great 
conflict of this age is between the West and Islam580 and they see their movement as 
standing in direct competition with Western civilization in a fight for "global 
supremacy" 58' 
Pipes likened the struggle to the Cold War, saying it was the American Right 
who won the Cold War by standing up to the USSR, and it can do the same against 
Islam 582 
. He opposes a dialogue with "good" or 
"bad" fundamentalists, since he 
believes that "while fundamentalist groups and ideologies differ from each other in 
many ways, all of them are inherently extremist and all despise ourcivilization" 583 . 
According to Pipes, the fundamentalists' insistence that the Sharia be applied in 
Muslim countries and that Muslim rule be extended are aggressive by nature and thus 
incompatible with Western interests. 
In light of this analysis, he urges the U. S. government "not to cooperate with 
fundamentalists, not encourage them, and not engage in dialogue with them. We 
should not work with fundamentalists but stand up against them"5&t . Pipes makes 
four recommendations for U. S. policy to combat the new "green" menace: (a) confront 
the fundamentalists; (b) pressure fundamentalist states - Iran, Sudan, and 
Afghanistan - to moderate their policies; (c) assist those Muslims who stand up to the 
fundamentalists; (d) back governments in the region who are combating 
fundamentalism, like Algeria. Pipes alerts to the dangers of democratising Arab 
countries too quickly and he points to the case of Algeria, where the hasty convening 
of elections brought anti-democratic forces to the fore. He argues for a more modest 
approach, deferring the goal of democratisation to the distant future. The priority, he 
defends, should be the formation of a civil society and, only when it comes into 
existence, are elections appropriate 585 
Martin Kramer has made a parallel argument, in which he argued that militant 
Islamic groups, by nature, can not be democratic, pluralistic, egalitarian or pro- 
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Western'". In an article published in Commentary, Kramer notes that Islamic law is 
not legislated but divinely revealed, that in an Islamic state theSharia is the overriding 
criterion for governing and that in Islam the sovereignty belongs to God and not to the 
people. The author concludes that an Islamic state, such as it is suggested by 
587 fundamentalist thinkers, is not amenable to democracy . 
Fundamentalists, argues Kramer, unreservedly affirm that Islam is superior to 
democracy. Islamists do not accept the principle of political pluralism and he points to 
al-Turabi, whose tract on the Islamic state argues that such a state has no need of 
party politics or political campaigns. He also notes the opportunistic nature of the 
Islamist groups in their vying for power. "There are those in these movements who 
allow that believers may participate in elections, envisioned as a kind of referendum of 
allegiance to a regime of divine justice, which would eventually bring Islam to power. 
But once established in power, the fundamentalists would be remiss in their Islamic 
obligation were they to let it slip from their hands. Anomocracy of Islamic law cannot 
envision its own disestablishment" 588 
Kramer affirms that Islamic movements work against Western interests and 
that they are irredeemably opposed to the peace process, since their ultimate aim is 
the elimination of Israel. He also notes that the Islamists' alliance with the West (in the 
case of the United States cooperation with Sunni fundamentalist groups in Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan) is circumstantial and motivated by tactical 
considerations. Kramer flatly asserts that "for fundamentalists, the identity of the 
enemy has remained constant since Islam first confronted unbelief" 5" 
The other danger posed by Islamic fundamentalism is, in Kramer's viewpoint, 
the creation of a co-ordinated transnational movement that fosters subversion and 
instability on a global scale. This commentator notes that "fundamentalist movements 
have an irresistible tendency to think and act across borders "510. The modem means 
of communication and transportation greatly enhance the dissemination ofislamist 
ideology and the work of underground, clandestine groups whose aim is the creation 
of a "global village of Islamic fundamentalism" 591 . 
'S6 See. for instance, Martin Kramer, "The Drive for Power", ý11iddle East Quarterly (111), n°2, June 
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Kramer accuses Western intellectuals of self-deception regarding the true 
aims of Islamist groups. He asserts that "the refusal to see Islamic fundamentalism in 
this context, or to take seriously the discourse of the Islamists, is evidence of the 
persistent power of the West to create a wholly imaginary Islam"592. In the academic 
and intellectual community, the prevalence of the view that fundamentalism 
constitutes a movement of democratic reform "assures the West that no society on 
earth has the moral resources to challenge the supremacy of Western values"593 . 
According to Kramer, the Islamist victory in the 1991 Algeria's parliamentary elections 
should have been understood as a caveat to "Western democracy doctors, with their 
blithe promise that the fundamentalist appeal would fade in a truly free balloti594 . 
Instead, Kramer remarks, the Algerian elections demonstrated that free elections in 
the Muslim world would rather serve Islamists' aim and were more likely to produce 
fundamentalist rule than not. 
Judith Miller, in an article published in Foreign Affairs, also cautions against 
the reckless promotion of democracy in the Middle East and she argues that 
"America's mindless, relentless promotion of elections immediately is likely for now to 
bring to power through the ballot box those who would extinguish democracy in the 
name of Allah" 595 . Like Pipes, she recommended the pursuit of "more modest goals: 
increased political participation in government and the need for a freer press and freer 
public debate in all countries in the region" 5. 
Miller says that those in the West that defend universal human rights, 
democratic government, political tolerance and pluralism, and peace between Arabs 
and Israelis, should be aware of the threat posed by the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism and its dissemination on a global scale. Miller argues that in spite of 
their rhetorical commitment to democracy and pluralism, in private Islamists reject 
both. She observes that "their basic ideological covenants and tracts, published 
declarations and interviews (especially in Arabic) appear to make these pledges 
incompatible with their stated goals of establishing societies under Islamic laws and 
according to Islamic values" 59' . There is simply no way around the fact that 
"Islamists are likely to remain anti-Western, anti-American and anti-Israeli" and that an 
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"Islamic state as espoused by most of its proponents is simply incompatible with 
values and truths that Americans and most Westerners today hold to be self- 
evident"598 . She concludes that an American dialogue with such Islamic 
forces is a 
waste of time 599. 
Bernard Lewis, a renowned historian of the Middle East, argued in a 1993 
article published in The Atlantic Monthly that the nature and history of Islam and the 
relationship between Islam and temporal power do not make liberal democracy and 
Islam natural bedfellows. Islam, he explains, has been characterised through history 
by the absence of any legal recognition of corporate persons or the legal person, 
which is at the heart of the representative institutions embodied in Roman Law. The 
Islamic state was a theocracy where the legitimacy bestowed upon the ruler derived 
from God. The latter thus enjoyed an authority that could not be challenged since 
defying it amounted to defying God. Autocracy was thus the norm. 
Lewis makes the point that the Islamists' discourse does not really address the 
question of democracy as it is understood in the West, as Islamic thought does not 
make room for such concerns. The fact remains that Islamists talk about Islamic 
government rather than democracy and when they speak of the "rule of law", they are 
referring to the unalterable law of Islam60° . He maintains that 
in the current context 
the Islamists' emphasis on elections obscures the fact that they view it as an end in 
itself: "they make no secret of their contempt for democratic political procedures and 
their intention to govern by Islamic rules if they gain power. Their attitude toward 
democratic elections has been summed up as"one man, one vote, once" "so" . Thus, 
"the pressure for premature democratization", he argues, "can weaken existing 
regimes" and "lead to their overthrow, not by democratic opposition, but by other 
forces that then proceed to establish a more ferocious and determined dictatorship"5°Z. 
Peter Rodman, a former staff member of Reagan's National Security Council, 
has repeatedly pointed to the un-democratic intentions of the current Islamic 
movements. Rodman sees in Islamism as a "radical", "atavistic force hostile to all 
ý9s Id. : p. 45.54. 
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Western political thought" so3 . He argues that Islamic parties invoke 
democracy 
merely as a means of capturing power and to produce militant Islamic regimes that 
are, in fact, inherently anti-democratic: "Islamic parties seek (out of moral conviction) 
to make institutional changes that would negate the possibility of their removal once in 
power, not only through political action but by reshaping educational and cultural 
life"604. Even Entelis, reflecting on the case of the Maghreb, says that political Islam is 
not so much a theology but rather a "political ideology' that uses religion to mobilise 
public support, being ultimately "incompatible with democracy" 605 
8.3. Political Islam as a Security Concern 
As the Cold War came to an end, America's foreign policy establishment 
started re-evaluating the security doctrines in light of the new international realities, 
namely the emerging challenges to the new world order. Possible new threats 
included instability in Europe - ranging from German resurgence to new Russian 
imperialism, environmental degradation, nuclear proliferation, narcoterrorism, and 
Islamic fundamentalism. Eventually, the perception of political Islam as "the enemy", 
or, in a benign version, as a security threat, made its way into military thinking and 
shaped the debate on the role of NATO in the new environment. It concerned not only 
the European Alliance members, worried with their troubled neighbourhoods, but also 
the United States, whose overriding interest is the safety of its European partners. 
In the United States, the preferred scenario involved a reformed NATO led by 
the United States in order to ensure the security of the Western Alliance. The 
uncertainty of the European environment seemed to warrant the continuity of the 
organisation, whose tasks would henceforth include protecting Europe against the 
new threats on its doorstep. There was talk of an imminent religious war threatening 
the former Yugoslavia right in the middle of Europe and of a Muslim theocratic state in 
Bosnia. The New Republic said there was a cultural rift running through Europe: "a 
603 Rodman's intervention in the panel discussion on "Islam and Democracy: A Dilemma for U. S. 
Policy", in Y. Mirsky and E. Rice (eds. ), op. cit. : p. 44; See also Rodman, "Co-opt or Confront 
Fundamentalist Islam? ", Middle East Quarterly (1), n° 4, December 1994: p. 64. 
604 Ibid. 
. 
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cultural curtain is descending in Bosnia to replace the Berlin Wall, a curtain separating 
the Christian and Islamic worlds" Sos 
NATO's mission would also be redefined to include responding to out-of-area 
threats, such as the ones in North Africa and the Middle East607. The American- 
European unity, based on the common political and cultural history of what the 
Economist characterised "Euro-America", -a civilizational complex in Huntington's 
manner - 508, would still be an imperative . "Euro-America", according to this view, 
should hold together in order to face the challenges posed by other areas of the world, 
such as "Islamistan". This scenario anticipates the scaling of cultural and political- 
military tensions between the two civilizations, as the economic and social situation in 
"Islamistan" deteriorates. The 19 states that lie between Morocco and Iran, with their 
young, increasingly poor populations, are vulnerable to radical, anti-Western 
ideologies, particularly to Muslim fundamentalism. The militancy of those social 
groups would, consequently, be exported to Euro-America through immigration, 
terrorism, and new gulf wars. "Excitable governments" would easily acquire chemical 
weapons and medium-range missiles giving them the capacity to strike at European 
territory. Moreover, with its control over oil and large military forces, Beedham argues, 
"Islamistan" directly threatens the core interests of Euro-America 609 
In the wake of the Gulf War, the growing electoral power oflslamist groups in 
Algeria - which became apparent in that country's open election - pointed to the 
potential for dangerous political explosions in the Maghreb. As revolutionary socialist 
institutions, including Algeria's ruling party, went politically bankrupt and Tunisia's pro- 
Western political elite declined, Islamism emerged as a powerful alternative. The huge 
anti-American and pro-Iraqi demonstrations that took place in Rabat, Algiers, and 
Tunis during the Gulf crisis had some effect in the neutral, even pro-Saddam, 
positions adopted by the incumbent governments. Those positions increased 
European concern about the potential popularity in the Maghreb of radical 
movements, a mix of the anti-Westernism and Islamic fundamentalism. 
These events have given credence to the view that "with the end of the Cold 
War, the Mediterranean, which had often been considered Europe's strategic 
606 R. D. Kaplan. "Ground Zero - Macedonia: the Real Battleground", 2 August 1993: p. 16. 
607 Hadar, Quagmire : p. 123,129. 
608 Brian Beedham. "A Standing Alliance", The Economist (316), no 7670,1-7 September 1990, 
supplement: pp. 5-6. 
609 B. Beedham, "The Case for Holding Together", The Economist (316), n° 7670,1-7 September 1990, 
supplement: pp. 3-5. 
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backwater, is now a region where the Alliance may be most likely to face new 
challenges" 510 
Even the Americans who, when they think of the Mediterranean, think first and 
foremost of the Eastern Mediterranean (above all Greece and Turkey as well as the 
Black Sea region) and see it as a transit zone to both the Middle East and the Persian 
Gulf, have shown a new awareness of the region. In the new international 
environment, practical American interest in the Mediterranean is gathering pace very 
rapidly and is giving rise to new perspectives and new policy concerns, alongside 
traditional security issues. Much of the new interest in the Mediterranean flows from 
its role as a centre of region and conflict 6'. 
The U. S. renewed consciousness of the Mediterranean as an area of 
geopolitical consequence, was expressed by Secretary of Defense, William Perry at 
the February 1995 Munich Conference on Security Policy. There he stated: "While we 
must focus on Russia and the East, real, immediate challenges to NATO allies have 
been mounting in the South", and he added: "we must all come to grips with the 
threats to our interests posed by the growth of instability and extremism in North 
Africa and elsewhere. This is not just a Southern European problem" 612. The remarks 
of the then U. S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO 
Affairs, Joseph Kruzel, at the February 1995 AFSOUTH meeting, further elaborated 
on that point: "For NATO, the Mediterranean, rather than the Elbe, has become the 
front line for a variety of security issues ranging from the spread of extremism and 
uncontrolled migration to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction ... " 
61 
. 
These statements highlight the factors that account for the now widespread 
view among Alliance members that candidates for future European security crisis are 
located in the Mediterranean, particularly in the sensitive region of North Africa. 
Instability and social extremism in the Maghreb are likely to increase primarily as the 
result of population growth and economic decline. In fact, the North African population 
(excluding Egypt) is expected to double by the year 2025614. Demographic pressures 
coupled with diminishing prospects for economic growth is the main feature of a 
6'0 Ronald D. Asmus, F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian 0. Lesser, "Mediterranean Security: New 
Challenges, New Tasks", NATO Review (44), n° 3, May 1996: p. 25. 
61 Ian 0. Lesser, "Southern Europe and the Maghreb: U. S. Interests and Policy Perspectives", 
Mediterranean Politics (1), n°2, Autumn 1996: p. 231,238. 
61= Quoted in Rodrigo de Rato, Draft Interim Report, North Atlantic Assembly, Sub-Committee on the 
Southern Region, AM 295, PC/SR (95) 2, October 1995: p. 6. 
613 Id.: p. 9. 
61 Asmus, Larrabee and Lesser, op. cit. : p. 25. 
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region where populations grow faster than their economies. This situation fuels 
growing migrations to European Union (E. U. ) countries, creating economic, political 
and social problems for the most countries and exposing them to "thespillover of 
political violence from inter and intra-state conflicts across the Middle East. The 
spectre of Palestinian terrorism in Europe has been replaced by the new reality of 
bombings and assassinations carried out by opposition groups, anxious to extend the 
scope of their battle against existing regimes" 6'S 
The prospect of the spread of WMD, a leading post-Cold War security interest, 
is nowhere anticipated more keenly than around the Mediterranean. Systemic, 
regional and political turmoil reinforces proliferation risks in North African's . The 
potential advent of a radical Islamic regime in Algeria, with its nuclear ambitions and 
missile interests, could accelerate WMD acquisition and worsen the outlook for their 
use in times of crisis. Lesser and Tellis point that violent political change in the 
Maghreb could create the setting for broader WMD-based alliances in the Middle East 
(Algeria-Syria-Iran, for instance). 
As WMD and long-range missile systems proliferate in North Africa, traditional 
distinctions between European, North Africa, even Middle Eastern security, become 
blurred. In effect, the spread of long-range weapons enables possessor states far 
from centres of conflict to play a role in events far from their borders. On the other 
hand, the vulnerability of European population centres (especially in the context of 
ballistic missile threats) is likely to change the calculus of cooperation in ways that will 
directly affect U. S. strategies: European countries may be less willing to offer support 
and facilities for contingencies in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf 61. 
In the often unstated views of Alliance members, the greatest challenge facing 
NATO is how to deal with political Islam as a leading force for change, perhaps violent 
change within key North African states. This concern was expressed in an awkward 
manner by the former Secretary-General of the Organisation who, in 1995, voiced 
concern at the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in North Africa and the Middle East. 
Claes declared that the Alliance was now as worried about Islamist extremism as it 
61 Id. : p. 26. See also F. Stephen La rabee and Carla Thorson, Mediterranean Security (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 1995), p. 9. 
616 Gregory L. Schulte, "Responding to Proliferation: NATO's Role", NATO Review (43), n° 4, July 
1995: p. 15. 
617 Asmus, Larrabee and Lesser, op. cit. : p. 25; Lesser, "Southern Europe ... ": pp. 236-7. 
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used to be about Communism 5" . These declarations were fiercely criticised by 
several Alliance members who charged the Secretary - General for misrepresenting 
the organisation's view of Islam and some diplomats pointed out that launching a 
"new crusade" against Islam was dangerous and misleading619 . Maghrebi countries, 
on the other hand, fear that NATO is looking for a new enemy to legitimate itself in the 
post - Cold War period and that fundamentalism may become that enemy 520 . 
NATO members are concerned that Islamic fundamentalism may prove to be 
the final catalyst of the multiple risks currently building up on the southern shore of the 
Mediterranean. Within the Alliance, some have since the early 1980s monitored the 
development of the Islamist movement. Starting in 1993, the Sub-Committee on the 
Southern Region, a division of the North Atlantic Assembly, issued the first of a series 
of reports on "Fundamentalist Tendencies and the Future of Democracy in North 
Africa". It analyses the origins and nature of the phenomenon and presents the policy 
options available to Western governments. 
The final report 621 expressed Western concerns for the rise of Islamic 
radicalism in North Africa, in view of the threat it poses to the stability of a number of 
countries, above all Algeria. According to the author of the report, the development of 
political Islam menaces Alliance countries in at least three different ways: 
- "the hostility of Islamist movements, especially of the revolutionary brand, to 
Western values, fuels the concern that those movements could increasingly resort to 
terrorist violence against citizens and assets of Alliance members"; 
- "... Islamist groups could undermine public confidence in democracy in Muslim 
countries as well as in European countries with strong Muslim communities ... "; 
- "increasing violence and measures to counter it could lead to large-scale refugee or 
migrant movements to Europe, expanding on the flow that is already visible from 
Algeria" s22 . 
ass Roger Boyes, "Muslim Militancy is Next Big Threat Says NATO Chief", The Times, 3 February 
1995: p. 13. 
619 Shada Islam, "NATO: Direct Dialogue", . Middle East International. n°195,3 March 1995: p. 12. 620 Pedro Moya, Cooperation for Security in the Mediterranean, North Atlantic Assembly, Sub- 
Committee on the Mediterranean Basin. NA 83, CC/MB (96) 1, May 1996: p. 2; Sergio Balanzino, 
Deputy Secretary General of NATO subsequently said: "Let me state clearly that NATO does not see 
Islam as a threat, and does not need to find a new role or conjure up new threats to keep itself busy"; 
quoted in Larrabee and Thorson, op. cit. : p. 4. 
62' Pedro Moya. The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism and the Future of Democracy in North Africa, 
North Atlantic Assembly, Sub-Committee on the Mediterranean Basin, AL 199, CC/MB 94 (4), 
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The heart of the matter is whether Western countries could condone 
governments based on Islamist tenets, even if they cannot be expected to conform to 
the democratic model, as the "extremist" or "radical" Islamist movements advocate. 
The rapporteur points that Alliance members fear the "Iranization" of North Africa and 
that is the reason why they have tacitly accepted the governments' crackdowns on 
Islamist movements in, for instance, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. 
The author dwells on the case of Algeria to highlight possible Western courses 
of action in relation to political Islam. He affirms that the tacit preference of Western 
governments for authoritarian regimes may bring dividends in the form of short-term 
stability, but it is likely to be a wrong bet in a long-term perspective. Not only does this 
policy give the impression that the West is hypocritical and has "double standards", 
but it also fosters extremism and the recourse to violent means by groups opposed to 
the incumbent governments. The rapporteur concludes that economic, social and 
political conditions in the Maghreb make the development of an Iran-style or Sudan- 
style scenario possible and that Alliance countries, for their part, can only have an 
indirect influence in the outcome of the events 623 . Economic cooperation between 
Maghrebi and European Union countries and the opening of Western markets to 
goods from other Mediterranean countries are essential prerequisites for removing the 
economic, social and political conditions on which Islamist movements thrive. 
These realisations have bolstered the view that the Alliance needs an outreach 
programme for the region. On 8 February 1995, NATO announced its readiness to 
open up a dialogue with countries bordering the Mediterranean, including Egypt, 
Israel, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan. The dialogue was meant to "lower 
the conflict potential in the Mediterranean through increased mutual knowledge and 
enhanced interaction" 6,24 
Besides these very general principles, there is currently no clear consensus, 
within NATO, or within the dialogue countries, on what the content or ultimate aim of 
this initiative should be. A U. K. diplomat stated its view that "we see it as more than a 
channel for North African states to discuss security questions. We are not seeking to 
advise them how to stem fundamentalism" "ZS . Another 
interpretation is that NATO 
seeks "to reduce a propensity for maverick behaviour by showing we are no threat"626. 
The bottom line seems to be determining whether NATO, throughcooperation, could 
6=' Id.: p. 18. 
6's Moya, "Cooperation for Security 
... 
": p. 2. 
6's The Guardian, 9 February 1995. 
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help address the security concerns of Mediterranean states, thereby ensuring that 
instability in that sensitive region is reduced to a minimum. 
8.4. The "Green Peril": The Making of a Threat 
The perception of political Islam as a threat dates back to the 1980s. The 
fabrication of the "Green Peril" however is coterminous with the end of the Cold War 
and is the result of the confluence of a variety of interests and perceptions. With the 
Soviet collapse, there resulted a void in U. S. strategic thinking as the system put in 
place to confront the "red threat" lost its purpose627. U. S. policy and defence planners 
devoted themselves to the task of searching for a new organising principle for a 
strategy 628 . In practice, this search amounted 
to devising a new focus for the U. S. 
defence and military apparatus. In an inventive twist, the American security 
community made the point that the collapse of the superpowerbipolarity has made 
the world a more complex place and that global threats will emerge unpredictably. In a 
January 1996 edition of the New York Times, Elaine Sciolino wrote: "The end of the 
Cold War sparked a kind of intellectual contest to identify the biggest and most 
credible new enemy. There was unfair trading. Global warming. Computer terrorism. 
The spread of weapons of mass destruction. Drugs. But none of these caught fire. 
Even ethnic hatred did not capture Americans' imaginations... . But one threat has 
629 resonated in the public mind: Islamic holy war" 
It was not just popular imagination that fanned the myth of a threatening Islam: 
political interest groups - the governments of Israel, Pakistan, Tunisia, Algeria, Turkey 
and Egypt, among others, wanting popular support - propagandise about the Islamic 
danger. Pro-Israeli think-tanks and groups warrant the Islamic phobia. Conservatives 
advocate a policy of combat and containment of the Islamists. 
626 The Times, 9 February 1995. 
6=' Interview with Hooshang Amirahmadi. New Brunswick. N. J., 10 October 1996. 
6" Interview with Zalmay Khalilzad. Washington D. C., 15 October 1996. 
629 "The Red Menace is Gone. But Here's Islam", The blew York Tieres. 21 January 1996: p. 1 (section 
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According to Hadar, the process of creating the "Islamic threat" delusion is 
simultaneous with the end of the Cold War and was accelerated after the Gulf Wat °. 
That period coincided with the occurrence of a series of events and the manifestation 
of several trends that evidenced to many analysts and to the media in general the 
potential of the Islamic menace. These events " included: the electoral victory of the 
anti-liberal Islamic FIS in Algeria; the popularity of Islamic parties in Tunisia; terrorist 
attacks by radical Muslim groups in Egypt; the uncertainty over the situation in the 
newly independent Central Asian Republics; the civil war in Sudan and the alliance 
between Tehran and Khartoum; Iran's penetration in Africa and in Central Asia and its 
military build-up; Arab support for Bosnian Muslims. 
The 1993 bombing of the World TradeCenter clearly added a new dimension, 
portending that terrorism - in the public mind, the Islamic "jihad" - would "strike terror 
into the hearts of God's enemies" 632. The media echoed the fears of the creeping 
encroachment of Middle Eastern violence. According tothe New Republic, the World 
Trade Center bombing "should be the occasion to recognize that the violent habits of 
the Middle East are gradually slipping across our borders'6". The blind leader Sheikh 
Abdel Rahman seemed the emissary of a global threat to America and its way of life. 
All the above mentioned events produced, in the words of The Washington 
Post columnist Jim Hoagland, an "urge to identify Islam as an inherently anti- 
democratic force that is America's new global enemy now that the Cold War is 
over'634. Amos Periemutter, a professor of political science at the American 
University, compared in the pages of the same newspaper, Islamic radicalism with the 
ideology of fascism and Nazism of the 1930s and characterised it as "authoritarian 
anti-democratic, and anti-secular' 635 . Its goal is the establishment of a "totalitarian 
Islamic state" in the Middle East, he argued, suggesting that the United States should 
make sure that the movement is put down at its inception: "The Western world ... 
610 Leon T. Hadar, "The 'Green Peril": Creating the Islamic Fundamentalist Threat", C4TO Policy 
Analysis, n° 177,27 August 1992: p. 1,4. 
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cannot permit the replacement of one form of totalitarianism with another; the Soviet 
model with an Islamic one" 636 
Like the Red menace of the Cold War era, this line goes, the Green Peril 
spread its tentacles around the world, undermining the legitimacy of Western values 
and subverting political systems. "The cosmic importance of the confrontation would 
make it necessary for Washington to adopt a long-term diplomatic and military 
strategy; to forge new and solid alliances; to prepare the American people for a never- 
ending struggle that will test their resolve; and to develop new containment policies, 
new doctrines, and a new foreign policy elite with its `vise men" and "experts"" 6" . 
The "line of the day" was that political Islam "may be comparable to the threat 
of communism", since it is "intrinsically, irredeemably anti-Western and has as 
tremendous an ideological appeal as communism in its early days"638 . According to 
Krauthammer, it would be a mistake to deal with Islamic fundamentalism as 
represented by Iran and its derivatives "with anything less than a pure "stick 
approach"" 
639 
. The right way of tackling 
it "is a policy of severe containment, isolating 
Iran as much as we can and dealing severely with its allies in Algeria, the occupied 
territories, Egypt, and elsewhere" 640 . In a Cold 
Warrior vein, Krauthammer affirmed 
that a "policy of appeasement would be a terrible mistake in dealing with a threat as 
serious as this one" 641 
Other analysts pointed that the alleged threat from Iran and militant Islam is 
different from the one posed by communism. Islamists were portrayed as irrational 
and "fanatical" people whose very nature made it impossible to co-opt them into 
balance of power arrangements by inducements and whose religious obduracy 
created a psychological mindset that proved immune even to diplomatic or military 
threats. The impact of the coming struggle between that force and the West would be 
unprecedented and was portrayed as a zero-sum game that would result in the defeat 
of one of the sides. 
636 Quoted in Arthur L. Lowrie, "The Campaign Against Islam and American Foreign Policy".. 1liddle 
East Policy (N), n° 1/2, September 1995: p. 212. 
637 Hadar. "The "Green Peril"": p. 3. 
63s Panel discussion on "The Emergence of Political Islam", in JohnWilner and Dan Blumenthal (eds. ), 
op. cit. : p. 24. See also C. Krauthammer, "America's "GreatSucess Story"", Middle East Quarterly, n" 
4, December 1994: p. 76. 
639 Ibid. 
. 
64° Id.: p. 25. 
641 Ibid. . 
187 
Thus, any comparison between communism and political Islam failed to 
apprehend the intrinsical nature of the latter. Robert Satloff, a member of the 
Washington Institute, remarked that "the useful comparison and contrast with the 
Soviet Union is that although political Islam doesn't have the power of the state, great 
armies, or nuclear weapons ... many of its adherents have a much greater sense of 
personal mission (ex: suicide bombings) ... it's a new danger and a new 
face of an 
ideology-driven mission that we didn't see in the Cold War' 642. Fuller provides a more 
refined explanation to this view. He says: "as a nation we are culturally ill-equipped to 
understand the passions of religious policy. American political science, based on its 
Western "rational actor" school of political analysis, knows not what to make of 
religious zealotry, suicide bombings, and the concept of martyrdom as an integral part 
of the political process" 643 . American inability to come to terms with 
these 
conceptions thus inflated the perception of Islam as an alien, threatening religion. 
Hadar has described the process that led gradually to the creation of the 
"Islamic threat" paradigm, and stressed the role played by the media in that 
development 644 . He likened it to the "efforts 
by some of Washington's iron triangles 
as well as by foreign players during the months leading up to the 1990-91 Persian 
Gulf crisis" that "succeeded in building up Saddam Hussein as the "most dangerous 
man in the world"" 645 
According to Hadar, the creation of the fiction is set off by government officials 
and lobby organisations who leak information usually under the guise of "unnamed" or 
"mysterious" sources. The information thus disclosed on a tentative basis reflects 
debates and discussions taking place within government. Journalists then start 
investigating those leads and end up finding collaboration from foreign sources that 
help the press uncover further information substantiating existing suspicions The flow 
of information is augmented by intelligence reports and the expertise of government 
officials that, in the case of political Islam, used questionable evidence and 
exaggerated credible information to create a conspiracy theory from isolated events: 
they warned of Iranian subversion in Central Asia, the export of terrorism to North 
Africa and Egypt, and a Khartoum-Tehran connection. Think-tank studies, op-ed 
pieces, congressional hearings and policy conferences amplify the phenomenon, 
642 ibid. . 643 G. Fuller, "The Appeal of Iran", The National Interest, n° 37, Fall 1994: p. 92. 
644 See Hadar, op. cit. : p. 2 and Lowrie, op. cit.: pp. 212-3. 
6" The process is described in Hadar, Quagmire, Chapter 2 and 3. 
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adding to it new perspectives. Thus, the "Islamic threat" myth acquires a public, 
official and academic dimension and becomes institutionalised 646 
The political Islam debate in the United States has become one of the hottest, 
most controversial debates in academic circles mirroring the Cold War period debate 
on how strong and monolithic the communist menace was. The debate is dominated 
by two currents: one sees Islam as an aggressive civilization bent on confronting the 
West. The other current says that it is a big mistake to see political Islam as a unified 
threat, rather than as an encompassing ideology that inspires local bids for power. 
The debate is nurtured by think-tanks studies and academic publications that add 
colour and variety to the debate, putting forward practical policy options but, more 
often, being no more than intellectual exercises. 
Every major university and research centre has come up with contributions to 
the on going debate. The Council on Foreign Relations, hardly a source of radical 
thinking, has come under fire for its monthly newsletter, "Muslim Politics Report", a 
forum for the exposition of a broad range of thinking by Islamic experts and leaders. 
The pro-Israel think-tank, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, has for 
several years now surveyed the development of thelslamist movements in the Middle 
East, mainly from a perspective of their implications for the peace process and for 
Israel. Over the last few years, the Washington Institute has also focused on the 
challenges posed by political Islam to U. S. interests 647 . 
Prominent among the think-tanks contributing to the debate on the Islamic 
threat is the conservative Heritage Foundation in Washington, which on 21 July 1994, 
discussed the "Islamic threat to North Africa. The conference analysed the rise of 
Islamism in North Africa and stressed the effectiveness of the Tehran-Khartoum axis 
in the spread of Islamic radicalism 648. The Heritage Foundation has produced a 
number of reports on the countries where political Islam is simmering. The reports 
point to the ideological, subversive, military and, mainly, terrorist threat that radical 
Islamism poses to America, advocating a tough, non-compromising stance on the part 
of the U. S. government 649 
64' Hadar, op. cit. : p. 4 and "What Green Peril? ", op. cit. : p. 30. 
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Political Islam came to be viewed in the United States as a, or the, major 
threat, in the post-Col War international environment. In the words of Graham Fuller 
"political Islam - Islamic fundamentalism - is on the march, and it scares Washington 
more than any other political force since the heyday of messianic communism" 650 . 
Esposito asserted that for many political Islam seemed the ideal candidate for 
the post-Cold War villain role 65" : "the fear in the 1980s that Iran would export its 
revolution has been superseded by the larger fear of an international pan-Islamic 
movement" 652. The predominant Western stereotype of Islam as a threat was 
analogous to creating, in the wake of the collapse of communist ideology, a second 
"evil empire" 653 . As David Ignatius put 
it, "it's big; it's scary; it's anti-Western; it feeds 
on poverty and discontent", adding that "it spreads across vast swaths of the globe 
that can be colored green on the television maps in the same way that communist 
countries used to be colored red" 654 . 
Alarmist views on the kind of threat political Islam poses to the Western world 
abound in Congress where the former is often equated with terrorism. A 
representative view is put forth by Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Africa, who presided over the 1995 congressional hearings on "The 
Threat of Islamic Extremism in Africa" and on "Terrorism in Alge 
ria" . She referred to Islamic activism as "one of the most serious 
threats to Western 
security": "Islamic extremism and militant groups pose a direct threat to regional 
stability, to the fragile democracies of the African continent, and to U. S. security 
interests. They are sworn to fight the "Great Satan America" for the global supremacy 
of Islam. They overtly challenge U. S. leadership and that of its allies by making them 
primary targets of their hatred and their hostility" 655. 
In the opening session of the hearing on Algeria, she quoted a secret report of 
French Defence Ministry stating that "Islamic terrorism is becoming an international 
affair aimed at destabilizing Arab oil-producing countries, traditional monarchies, and 
650 Fuller, op. cit. : p. 93. 
651 John Esposito, "Political Islam: Beyond the Green Menace", Current History (93), n° 579, January 
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moderate pluralistic republics" 65°. Islamist terror in Algeria, she affirmed, is but "the 
first phase of the "intifada" ... believed to encompass 
half a dozen countries. Hit 
squads are now operating with the full blessing of some underground authorities 
which have accepted this decree, legalizing the death by assassination of all those 
who oppose their extremist interpretation of certain laws, and who favor secular 
systems of government. Intelligence agencies have also discovered a proliferation of 
various cultural and charitable organizations which frequently did serve as fronts for 
terrorist cells and arms-smuggling centers throughout the world"657. Political Islam is, 
in the minimum, considered a major source of instability in the post-Cold War world. 
Republican Senator John McCain says: "The clash of Islamic fundamentalism with the 
values of democratic society should offer enough of a geopolitical challenge to keep 
us busy and history's end uncertain for at least the near term" 658 
Hadar contends that the members of the powerful pro-Israeli lobby had been 
arguing even before the Gulf War that a major threat to the West would be the rising 
political power of Muslim fundamentalism. A confrontation between Western and 
Islamic forces would thus constitute a probable source of conflict requiring continued 
U. S. involvement in the Middle East and buttressing Israel659 . In effect, the 
Green 
Peril would serve to restore Israel's role as America's strategicasset which was put in 
question with the end of the Cold War and that was put in evidence during the Gulf 
War. Strategists in Israel conjured up the theory that the demise of the Soviet threat in 
no way diminished Israel's strategic value to the United States. The military strength 
of the Jewish state could, in the new environment, serve as a deterrent to radical Arab 
regimes and help buttress pro-Western regimes under assault fromlslamist forces 660 
: "Israel could thus become the contemporary crusader nation, a bastion of the West 
in the struggle against the new transnational enemy, Islamic fundamentalism" 66' 
The campaign against the Islamic menace was initiated by the Likud 
government, but the Labour government underYitzhak Rabin took it to new heights. 
Rabin tried to make the point that Israel's "struggle against murderous Islamic terror" 
656 U. S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Terrorism in Algeria: Its Effect on the 
Country's Political Scenario, on Regional Stability, and on Global Security (Washington. D. C.: U. S. 
Government Printing Office, 1996), pp. 2-3. 
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'5' Leon T. Hadar, "The Rise of the Middle Eastern Bogeyman", CATO Foreign Policy Briefing, n° 2,5 
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is "meant to awaken the world which is lying in slumber"662 . He called "on all nations, 
all peoples to devote their attention to the great danger inherent in Islamic 
fundamentalism" 663 Rabin concentrated his attacks on Iran: Tehran was depicted as 
replacing Moscow as the centre of ideological subversion and military expansionism. 
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the need to "contain" Iran became all the 
more pressing as the emergence of several Central Asian republics opened up 
opportunities for Iranian thrusts of a resurgent Iran exporting revolution throughout 
much of the Muslim world. They disclosed Tehran's plans for controlling the oil-rich 
Gulf, destroying Israel and threatening areas on the periphery of a new "arc of crisis" - 
the Horn of Africa, Southern Europe, the Balkans and the Indian subcontinent 664 
Iran's ambitious military plans have sparked considerable concern in Israeli 
circles that Tehran seeks to establish regional hegemony by building its military 
capabilities far beyond its legitimate defence needs. Iran's missile build-up is 
considered especially worrisome given Tehran's determined efforts to build weapons 
of mass destruction. Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons makes it, according to 
Israeli Professor Shlomo Aharonson, the most threatening of Israel's "remote" 
enemies (which also include Iraq, Libya and Algeria) 665. Starting in 1993, shortly after 
Bill Clinton was sworn in as president, the media in Israel and the pro-Israel lobby in 
the United States began a coordinated effort to enlist America into an alliance against 
Iran. Several news stories in the Hebrew press set the tone for the campaign to 
demonise Iran 666 
Those media articles laid out the military intelligence's assessment of Iran's 
capabilities and set forth scenarios for a confrontation with Tehran. One intelligence 
official surmised that "Israel alone could not deter Iran so it should try to create the 
situation so that it will appear similar to that of Iraq before the Gulf crisis ... we should 
hope that, emulating Iraq, Iran will ... start a war [with 
its Arab neighbours]" 66' 
Ahronson also concluded that Israel cannot mobilise its entire army to fight a ground 
` Quoted in Leon T. Hadar, "Reviving the Strategic Consensus: The Time Against Islam", The 
Washington Report on Middle East rf}airs (XII), n°2, July/August 1993: p. 18. 
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war in Iran, in line with its doctrine of a pre-empire first strike" 668. Likewise, Israel's air 
force is not capable of devastating Iran with conventional weapons. The viable 
alternative, in the case of Iran, is that "Israel will have to rely not so much on 
conventional components of the Israeli army as on nuclear deterrence, long-range 
missiles and improved cooperation with the U. S. and some neighbouring states, like 
Egypt or Turkey" 669 
Policy-makers in Israel believe that the United States, Israel and Turkey( of 
the secular kind) have a common interest in establishing a stable regional alignment 
of secular, moderate and pro-Western regimes in the Middle East and in curbing 
Islamic fundamentalism. The formation of coalitions with friendly Arab countries would 
enable Jerusalem to accomplish this goal and, above all, to contain Iran. With the 
prospect of normalising relations with its Arab neighbours at hand, Israel sees itself as 
performing the task of precluding anything that might encourage extremist forces to 
follow in the footsteps of the Iranians or the Algerians. One military officer puts it that 
"its location at the centre of the Arab-Muslim Middle East predestines Israel to be a 
devoted guardian of stability in all the countries surrounding it. Its[role] is to protect 
the existing regimes: to prevent or halt the processes of radicalisation, and to block 
the expansion of fundamentalist religious zealotry" , 170 . In this sense, Israel considers 
it is performing a vital service to the West in guaranteeing regional stability, thus 
performing its traditional role of strategic asset for the United States 67 . 
Israeli politicians have by and large equated the Islamic threat with the Iranian 
threat and, in doing this, they have convinced Washington that Tehran is the 
ideological and logistical centre of a conspiracy to subvert the West and to undermine 
U. S. interests 672. Israel's campaign to persuade Washington to contain Iran by 
adopting a tougher policy were noted in early 1995 by the Washington Post that 
reported: "Israel is attempting to convince the United States that Iranian-inspired 
Islamic extremism and Iran's military rearmament drive have become a major threat to 
the stability of the Middle East and the interests of the West" 67' . The story also 
revealed that the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith and the American Jewish 
Committee (AJC) had released studies warning of the Iranian threat, with the latter 
18 Quoted in Shahak, op. cit.: p. 16. 
669 Ibid. 
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asserting that "we cannot run away or avoid the possibility that Iran by the end of the 
decade may become the `dominant" force in the Middle East" 674 
Such propaganda began to filter into the policymaking processes of the Clinton 
administration, so that by March 1993 Secretary of State Christopher was publicly 
calling Iran "a dangerous country" and an "international outlaw' because of what he 
claimed was its support for international terrorism and its efforts to develop nuclear 
and other weapons of mass destruction , 615 These declarations were the beginning 
of a harsh anti-Iran policy and the escalation of the anti-Iran campaign that included: 
- the inclusion in April 1993 of Iran in the State Department's annual report on 
terrorism, citing Tehran as "the most dangerous sponsor of terrorism" in 1992, with 
over twenty acts attributable to it or its surrogates; 
- the announcement by Martin Indyk of the "dual containment" policy, that set forth 
Washington's goal of containing Iran. Indyk stated: "If we fail in our efforts to modify 
Iranian behaviour, five years from now Iran will be much more capable of posing a 
real threat to Israel, the Arab world, and Western interests in the Middle East" 676 
The anti-Iran fever was patent in Congress where AIPACworked hard during 
early 1995 preaching against Iran. Its efforts were largely successful, namely in the 
Conoco affair. The American oil firm, Conoco had been negotiating with the Iranians 
for three years to develop two offshore oilfields near Iran'sSirri Island in the Persian 
Gulf and the Iranians had finally agreed to reasonable terms. Conoco promised to 
bring in investment of $600 million to be paid off in returns from the development of 
the field. In the days following the signing of the contract, the Israeli press published a 
report that altered the course of events. The report quoted military sources and stated 
that Iran would within three years have the capacity to make nuclear weapons. 
According to Le Monde Diplomatique Israeli and American experts had 
concurred in the evaluation that it would take Iran at least from seven to fifteen years 
to be ready to make nuclear weapons 677 . The 
Israeli newspaper Haaretz later 
revealed that the story was a deliberate "leak" aiming at inciting Washington to stop 
Iran from buying nuclear reactors from Russia and China 678 . In the United States, the 
673 Neff, op. cit. : p. 88. 
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subject caused uproar and Congress was dominated by whatNeff described as an 
"anti-Iran fever" 679 . AIPAC compiled and 
distributed to congressmen a booklet 
outlining Israel's case against Tehran and calling for a complete halt to all trade with 
Iran. In early Spring bills were introduced in both houses not only banning any U. S. 
business with Iran, but also banning Americans from doing business with any 
company worldwide that conducts business with Iran. The Republicans seized the 
opportunity to launch an offensive against the administration, accusing Clinton of 
being too "soft" with the Iranians. Thus, in April 1995 President Clinton announced, at 
a meeting of the World Jewish Congress, the imposition of comprehensive sanctions 
on Iran, prohibiting all commercial and financial transactions with that country. 
Under a bill introduced in the Senate during the Summer by New York 
Republican Senator Alphonse d'Amato, and signed by a further 31 senators, the chief 
executives of firms involved in energy trade with Iran would be barred from entering 
America, U. S. purchases of the firms' products would be prohibited and exports by 
their U. S. subsidiaries banned. It would also give the president the discretion to bar 
loans to such firms and refuse their imports. A similar bill was introduced in the House 
by New York Republican Benjamin Gillman and California Democrat Howard Berman, 
and also sponsored by 31 others680 . This constituted the 
background to the approval 
of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act: it penalises foreign companies that provide 
investments over $40 million for the development of petroleum resources in Iran or 
Libya. 
Former Ambassador Andrew I. Killgore affirmed that the U. S. policy on Iran is 
largely an alignment with the perceived interests of Israel: "The simplest explanation 
of Washington's anti-Iranian policy is domestic politics. Bill Clinton believes that he 
cannot be re-elected without overwhelming media and financial support from the 
Israel lobby ... Thus he and Warren 
Christopher are ready to "buy" Israeli 
exaggerations of the dangers emanating from Iran, whether they really believe them 
or not" 681. Likewise, David D. Newsom, former Undersecretary of State under Carter 
wrote: "the U. S. action can only be fully understood in the light of a fundamental 
objective of Washington's policy in the Middle: the security of Israel", since "it is Israel 
682 that feels most threatened by Iran" 
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The Israelis have thus constantly prodded the United States to take steps, 
either by itself or through its allies, to destabilise Iran. The aim is to put on as many 
economic and political screws as possible and pressure other countries and 
international institutions such as the World Bank to isolate Iran683 . According to an 
Israeli official, the surest way to weaken Iran is by worsening the economic 
conditions: "the already shaky Iranian regime could be overthrown by economic 
sanctions, or at least some method of making it hard for Iran to export oil, 90 per cent 
of its economy" 684 . 
Hadar has highlighted the role of the media in the creation of the "Iranian 
threat" myth. He observed that in the occurrence journalists amplified the 
phenomenon giving credence to the new stories in the Hebrew press that laid out the 
Israeli position. According to Hadar the process starts with the Israeli officials which 
are followed by leaks to the press attributed to Israeli "military" and "intelligence" 
sources elucidating the threat Iran, through its support to the Islamists, poses to 
various Arab regimes. Other Israeli-inspired reports provided details of Iranian 
aggressive designs referring namely to Tehran's ties to Sudan, Hamas and to Muslim 
groups in the West, including in the United States. The dissemination of that myth 
counts with the effective assistance of AIPAC and other pro-Jewish organisations. 
Syndicated columnists, "terrorism experts" and members of Congress provide the 
intellectual and institutional legitimacy to this view 68 . 
In Congress, powerful Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and a strong 
supporter of Israel, became one of the most vocal and hysterical critics of Iran. He 
has called it "a permanent, long-term threat to civilised life on this planet ... a terrorist 
state ... committed to defeating the West in any way 
it can "616 . He warned Americans 
that Iran's efforts to acquire WMD could enable it "to annihilate Tel Aviv and in the 
long run to annihilate Chicago or Atlantai68' . Gingrich was the moving power 
behind 
the December 1995 directive approved in Congress that ordered the CIA to launch an 
$18 million covert action programme against Iran. 
Congress has thus been the locus of the campaign, driven by Republicans, to 
castigate Iran for its maverick behaviour. Sudan has also come under increasing 
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attack with a strong lobby in Congress pressing for the upgrading of sanctions against 
that country. Sudan has been included in the list of rogue states since 1993: it has 
been accused of fostering Islamic insurgency and terrorism in theMaghreb and in 
Africa, of implication in the assassination attempt, in June 1995, against President 
Mubarak in the Ehtiopian capital, and of being involved in the second plot of the World 
Trade Center conspiracy. Esposito, during a congressional hearing, affirmed that the 
tendency to "demonize" Iran and Sudan has been identical and mounting: "In some 
recent hearings that I was involved in, it seems to me there was a kind of quick fix 
here the way we had years ago with Qadhafi" 588. He also affirmed that "a lot of the 
accusations about what is going on ... remain unsubstantiated" 
sag 
Interest groups have also been involved in anti-Islamist lobbying. Pro-Israeli 
organisations have fuelled suspicions that terrorist groups opposed to the peace 
process established a nerve centre on U. S. territory. Pressure from pro-Israeli 
lobbyists arguably swayed a number of Congressmen into initiating a witch-hunt for 
alleged Hamas activists. This drive grew in intensity when Israel arrested several 
Palestinian Americans and charged them with being part of Hamas' U. S. network. 
Some members of Congress repeated Israeli claims that over the past several years, 
Hamas has been conducting operations from several locations in the United States 
and that the movement is engaged in fund-raising activities in U. S. cities. 
Jewish organisations have campaigned openly for the February "Omnibus 
Counter-Terrorism Act of 1995", a bill that facilitates crackdown on Islamist political 
activities in the United States. The bill prohibits fund-raising in American territory by 
"terrorist" organisations, creates special deportation courts for actions related to 
terrorist activities and increases the punishment for "international terrorism" in the 
United States. The legislation follows an executive order, issued bypresident Clinton 
on 24 January, freezing the assets of 12 organisations and their leaders, who Clinton 
said threatened the peace process. 
Malcom Heinlein of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish 
organisations has stated that members of his organisation had been working for 
months with the FBI and other officials in the legislation fi90 . Significantly, the 
American Jewish Committee urged the government to "develop counter-terrorism 
688 U. S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Recent Developments in North Africa 
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legislation approaches - perhaps embodied in an omnibus terrorismbill ... " 
691. Pro- 
Israeli groups called on the government to take tougher measures against 
international terrorism which is 'largely perpetrated by fanatical Islamic groups" and 
"poses a substantial threat to Jews, to the U. S., and to the entire West" 692 . 
As the peace process falls apart due to terrorist attacks against civilians, 
Israeli leaders, threatened by the violent acts of Hizbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad 
have also tried to enlist the United States and Europe in the battle against Islamic 
fundamentalism. Prime minister Netanyahu, exploiting the resulting erosion of Israeli 
support for the negotiations, has tried to make a case that Arafat has become 
completely unimportant, since he can not possibly stem the tide of Islamic terrorism. 
In the face of the growing Iranian-inspired terrorist wave that threatens Israel and 
other Arab states, the Likud leader has shown off Israel's role as a deterrent against 
Islamic extremism. This role would help it regain its status as a main strategic asset 
for the West. This other angle of this reasoning serves Netanyahu's rejectionist 
stance. As Baram puts it: "The Hamas fighters are motivated by Iran, Israeli 
"concessions" lead nowhere, and the best policy is to cling to Eretz Israel. This is 
new politics geared to the same old goals ... " 
693 
Growing American fears about political Islam have also played into the hands 
of foreign governments that, for a variety of reasons, exploit U. S. concern with Islamic 
fundamentalism. Esposito says that "fear of fundamentalism, like fear of communism, 
has made strange bedfellows. Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt join Israel in warning of a 
regional and international Islamic threat" 694 . The 
"Islamic threat" is an "excuse for 
increasing authoritarianism and violations of human rights and the indiscriminate 
suppression of Islamic opposition, as well as for the West's silence about these 
actions" 695 . The "green menace" is thus a convenient way 
for a leader to explain 
away opposition based on a country's economic, social, and political inequities. It is 
also an argument in favour of the continuation of U. S. support to regimes whose 
strategic value weakened with the end of the Cold War. 
Elaine Sciolino reports that in visits to Washington, Benazir Bhutto of 
Pakistan, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Tansu Ciller of Turkey, all told president 
Clinton that "the greatest threat to their governments came from globally linked 
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fundamentalism". Hadar affirms that the convergence of Arab and Israeli views on 
purported threat from political Islam, is a re-enactment of "strategic consensus", only 
this time against Islam ". Sciolino remarks that they risk "sounding like one-time 
American friends, such as President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines and Shah 
Mohammed Riza Pahlevi of Iran, who resisted reform to the very end presenting 
themselves as bulwarks against Communism" s97 . 
Egypt, like Israel, is also concerned that the end of the Cold War, combined 
with the economic difficulties in the United States, might produce a mood in the 
American public and Congress conducive to the reduction of the aid the United States 
has accorded Egypt ever since the signing of the Camp David Accords. The Egyptian 
president brands the Islamic threat every time the issue is discussed: "WhenMubarak 
evokes al-Jihad and asks the United States for money, he has an easy task: the 
spiritual head of al-Jihad and Gamaa is none other [than] the Sheikh Abd al- 
Rahman"698, allegedly the head of the World Trade Center conspiracy. 
Cairo has repeatedly voiced concern of Tehran's role as instigator oflslamist- 
instigated instability in Egypt and accuses Iran of financing the extremist Islamic 
groups. The Egyptian government has also called attention to the Tehran - Khartoum 
axis and to their subversive activities in the Middle East and North Africa. Egyptian 
leaders view Khartoum as a major transit point and base for a number of Iranian- 
inspired groups. Egypt accused Sudan of complicity in the unsuccessful attempt to 
assassinate the Egyptian president in Adis Ababa on 26 June 1995. Surviving 
assailants captured by Ethiopian police incriminated the Sudanese government, 
dominated by the National Islamic Front, in planning the crime and training the 
assailants. 
The Islamic threat argument is exaggerated by Egyptian leaders who fear the 
loss of Cairo's strategic significance and cast Islam as larger-than-life enemy 
stretching its tentacles around the globe. On the aftermath of the World TradeCenter 
bombing, president Mubarak on a visit to Washington, used that event to make his 
point. He portrayed the terrorist act in New York as part of a global, Iranian-financed 
conspiracy that not only threatened Egypt, but was also aimed at the United States, 
and urged the formation of a "global alliance" against this menace 699. 
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As the Islamist wave gained consistency and came to dominate the political 
discourse in many Arab countries, policy makers in the United States came to 
recognise the need to address the phenomenon with subtlety. The confrontational 
approach and the propaganda surrounding the myth of an "Islamic threat" offended 
the susceptibilities of the Muslim community, creating the impression that, now that 
the United States had conquered communism, the next opponent in the firing line 
would l 6e Islam. Thus, a differentiation evolved recognising the legitimate and genuine 
nature of political Islam and setting it apart from Islamist groups or movements that 
espouse violence and extremism in the pursuit of their aims. This distinction was 
politically useful and enabled Washington, on the one hand, to oppose any Islamic 
group that resorted to violent tactics and challenged regimes with a pro-Western 
inclination, and on the other, to resist any regime of the Iranian type. 
200 
9. U. S. Policy Towards Political Islam 
9.1. U. S. Policy Towards Political Islam: The Reagan and Bush Foundations 
U. S. policy toward political Islam incubated during the Reagan administration, 
which began a year after the 1979 revolution in Iran and ended just before a wave of 
Islamist electoral victories took place in the Middle East. There was not apparently the 
need to develop a comprehensive policy on this subject. By and large, political Islam 
was considered a hostile, fanatical force although the circumstances in Afghanistan 
led the American government, driven by practical considerations, to ally itself with 
Islamist groups in their fight against the Soviets. 
During the eighties, political Islam was viewed primarily from the perspective 
of Shia revolutionary drive and quest for power through acts of violence and 
subversion. An aggressive policy of containment against the Islamic Republic of Iran 
and its cohorts seemed to suffice. 
Administration officials" views of Islamism were unsophisticated. Put in a 
straightforward way, they alluded to it in hostile terms. Assistant Secretary of State 
Richard Murphy referred to political Islam's "revolutionary and sometimes violent 
nature", and characterised it as an "ideology of an extreme nature' °°. Undersecretary 
of State Michael Armacost labelled the Islamic Republic of Iran a "messianic, radical 
state" 701. George Shultz referred to political Islam as a form of "radical extremismi°°2. 
President Reagan considered Iran a second "evil empire". These statements 
suggested a growing awareness of the challenges posed by Islam although they did 
not result into a comprehensive policy. 
By the late 1980s, the face of political Islam began to change and the Gulf 
crisis mobilised its latent power. Islamist electoral victories came to a head in 
December 1991 in Algeria, when the Islamic Salvation Front swept the first round of 
Algeria's parliamentary elections. As the Islamists successfully adopted a legalistic 
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approach - seeking power through the ballot, not the bullet - they created a set of 
quandaries for American policymakers. The basic dilemma was encapsulated in the 
"democratisation vs. upholding of the status quo" formula. 
9.2. The Policy Formulation 
Until recently, the argument was dominated in public policy statements and 
writings by those who believed political Islam to be a primary security concern for the 
United States. The "Islamic threat" became a popular term in some State Department 
offices and a coterie of writers and policy-makers described Islam as a new seedbed 
for anti-Western aggression, replacing communism "' 
The Bush administration seemed to understand the complexity of the 
phenomenon and of the challenges posed by radical Islam in areas where the United 
States has vital interests. Edward P. Djerejian, Assistant Secretary of State for Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs in the Bush administratio, realised that "a coherent 
policy framework toward Islam has become a compelling need as foreign policy 
challenges erupt involving an "arc of crisis" extending from the Balkans, the 
Caucasus, North Africa, the Middle East, and Central and South Africa"704. Djerejian 
further justified this necessity by pointing out that the traditionalrealpolitik approach 
which prevailed during the Cold War was insufficient to deal effectively and 
comprehensively with the challenging realities of the current international system, 
political Islam being a case in point 705 
In June 1992, Djerejian unveiled America's policy toward Islam, an approach 
thoughtfully drafted by State Department officials and experts. In a speech known as 
the "Meridian House Declaration", Djerejian said the United States had nothing 
against Islam, "one of the world's great faiths" and "a historic civilizing force among 
the many that have influenced and enriched our culture". He added that America 
"does not view Islam as the next"ism" confronting the West", and he stressed that, in 
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the U. S. government's perspective, "the Cold War is not being replaced with a new 
competition between Islam and the West" 106 
These points were obviously addressed to the domestic and international 
Muslim community. They were intended to assuage them by dispelling the views, 
frequently put forth by U. S. officials, that Washington considers Islam as a hostile 
religion and the Muslims as fanatics and terrorists. They were also intended to make 
clear that the United States is not engaged in an anti-Islamic crusade. Many of the 
United States"s allies are themselves regimes which belong to the Islamic cultural 
area, some of them are even considered "fundamentalist", such as Saudi Arabia. 
Should the United States adopt a confrontational approach regarding Islam, they 
would encounter considerable problems of credibility, or would put off important allies. 
Djerejian recognised that the diversity of the Islamist movement required a 
diversified approach. On the one hand, he argued, Washington had nothing against 
Islamists, that is, "believers living in different countries placing renewed emphasis on 
Islamic principles". But Washington would oppose those who used religion as a cover 
for extremism and violence. "Stated simply", Djerejian concluded, "religion is not a 
determinant - positive or negative - in the nature or quality of our relations with other 
countries. Our quarrel is with extremism, and the violence, denial, intolerance, 
intimidation, coercion and terror which often accompany it"707 . 
Djerejian's distinction was politically useful for the administration. It enabled 
Washington, on the one hand, to oppose any Islamic group that espoused violence 
and challenged moderate pro-Western regimes, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. It 
made possible, on the other hand, to resist groups opposed to the peace process and 
anti-American Islamic regimes in power - such as Sudan and Iran - which met his 
criteria of being violent, intolerant and coercive708 . The doctrine also provided room 
for American support to "good" Islamic groups - those seeking to overturn communist 
or fundamentalist states (such as the mujahidin rebels in Afghanistan). 
The doctrine further hinted at a stance. What the United States wanted, he 
explained, was for Middle Eastern nations to broaden political participation for their 
societies, as an important contributor to long-term stability. The United States does 
not look with favour on those who use the democratic process to come to power, only 
to destroy that very process in order to retain power and political dominance: "While 
rob Edward P. Djerejian, "The U. S. and the Middle East in a Changing World", U. S. Department of State 
Dispatch (3), n°23,8 June 1992: p. 446. 
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we believe in the principle of "one person, one vote"", he said, "we do not support 
"one person, one vote, one time""709 
Whereas Arab regimes should engage in "real political dialogue", Islamist 
movements vying for a place in government should accept a number of prerequisites 
for being allowed into domestic politics. Support for free elections, Djerejian noted, 
was one of the six requirements listed as necessary conditions for American 
recognition and support - the first, but not the only one. The Assistant Secretary of 
State affirmed: "Those who are prepared to take specific steps toward free elections, 
creating independent judiciaries, promoting the rule of law, reducing restrictions on the 
press, respecting the rights of minorities and guaranteeing individual rights will find us 
ready to recognize and support their efforts, just as those moving in the opposite 
direction will find us ready to speak candidly and act accordingly" 70 . 
The "Meridian House" speech and Djerejian's subsequent declarations while 
Assistant Secretary of State clarified U. S. attitudes towards political Islam. They 
became the official position on this subject in both the Bush and Clinton 
administrations. The "accommodationist" tilt was confirmed in subsequent speeches 
and in congressional testimony "' and were publicly sanctioned by Robert H. 
Pelletreau - Djerejian's successor- "Z former Secretary of State, Warren 
Christopher, 713 Anthony Lake, the National Security Adviser, 74 and Bruce Riedel, 
deputy assistant secretary of defence for Near East and South Asian affairs 75 
703 Ibid. . 709 Ibid. . Ibid. 
. 711 Djerejian, "U. S. Policy in the Middle East", US. Department of State Dispatch (4), n °11,15 March 
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the Middle East", in United States Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Developments in 
the Middle East (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing ice, 1993). 
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regional security". W. Christopher, "U. S. Commitment to the Middle East Peace Process". Address to 
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The policy formulation showed understanding of the complexforces at work in 
Muslim society and the need to address them in a constructive way. The declarations 
of U. S. officials have, by and large, corresponded to the nuanced approach of the 
"accommodationist" school led by John Esposito, one of the most heard academics in 
policy circles 76 and whose views were not estranged from the elaboration of the U. S. 
policy towards Islam. They are the result of the realisation that political Islam is a 
"very complex movement" 717 that defies conventional wisdom and requires a 
sophisticated approach. Pelletreau affirmed in 1994, during a congressional hearing: 
"It is a complex phenomenon. It is one that we are studying quite carefully. We have a 
group within the State Department composed of a number of officials who are looking 
at the way political Islam exists in different countries "718. By emphasising the elusive 
nature of political Islam, he referred to the need for a seasoned approach on the part 
of State Department officials: "So we are actively studying and learning and 
developing our approach, refining our approach on this subject" 79. 
Official pronouncements on political Islam draw clear distinctions between 
extremist movements and the Islamic revival as a whole, and caution against tarring 
the entire movement with the brush of extremism. He said: "We have declined to take 
a sort of overall, broadly limiting and broadly molding approach toward this 
phenomenon and have looked at it ... in each country, in each circumstances where it 
arises. I think we need to keep ... our own minds open about the various forms that 
political Islam or Islamic militancy can take, whether, in some cases, these 
movements or parties in given countries define themselves in a way that excludes 
themselves from broader participation or whether they are willing to participate in a 
broader constitutional structure or within a broader social compact as they are in 
some countries, such as Jordan for example" 720. 
Pelletreau affirmed that, in approaching Islam, the United States avoids 
repeating the views put forward "both in scholarship and public discussion, that Islam 
39,27 September 1993; "Remarks by Tony Lake, National Security Adviser to the President, at the 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy", Federal News Service, 17 May 1994. 
75 Riedel said: "the Pentagon rejects the argiunent that a clash of civilizations is imminent between 
Islam and the West. There is no Green Menace to replace the Reds", Middle East Quarterly (III), n°3, 
September 1996: p. 87. 
X16 See U. S. Congress: Recent Developments in : Forth Africa : p. 22. "' Id.: p. 9. 
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r_o Id.: p. 9. 
205 
equals Islamic fundamentalism equals extremism" n' . He stated that "if we treat 
Islamic political activism as a monolithic political movement implacably or unalterably 
opposed to the West, we run a risk of alienating the broader Muslim world and 
paralyzing our own ability to act with discrimination and effectiveness"' . Rather, the 
United States sees multiple Islamic movements seeking to reform their societies, with 
considerable diversity in expression and aims. American officials have stressed that 
Muslims in general are peaceful and not violence-prone. They point to the rulers of 
Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, moderate pro-Western leaders, as examples of 
believers who incorporate the tenets and teachings of Islam into the way they rule. 
They also make clear that it is not the intention of the U. S. government "to exclude 
moderate, tolerant, peaceful Islamists who seek to apply their religious values to 
domestic political problems and foreign policy" 'r' . 
The Clinton administration gravitated toward a more comprehensive analysis 
that deepened, for instance, American understanding of the motivations behind 
resurgent Islam. Pelletreau's 1996 speech on "Islam and U. S. Policy" admitted that 
Islamic extremism "suggests that people in the region are dissatisfied with their 
current lot and leadership" and that "very often, they are reacting against the existing 
order" rather than aiming at the creation of a genuine Islamic state. This realisation, 
implying an overt recognition of the existing regime's shortcomings, prompted 
Pelletreau to "encourage governments in the region to take steps toward advancing 
the rule of law, enhancing local governance, and developing democratic 
institution S, 1724. 
Another aspect of Washington's nuanced approach has been an 
acknowledgement that there is no monolithic international effort behind Islamic 
movements. David C. Welch, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern 
Affairs affirmed: " Islamic militancy is not a coherent or unified international political 
movement. It is but one of several responses to the perceived inadequacies of 
existing governments, and this anti-government sentiment is often very nationalistic in 
character' 725. This notwithstanding, U. S. officials have repeatedly expressed serious 
concern over Iran's exploitation of extremist elements, and over Sudan's destabilising 
role in North Africa. 
r' Pelletreau. "Islam and U. S. Policy". 
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America's tolerance of Islamist activism, affirmed Pelletreau, will stop as soon 
as Muslims use the cover of Islam to oppress minorities, preach intolerance, or violate 
human rights 726. Recent declarations have gone a step further by narrowing the 
Islamists' freedom of action in the political and social realm. They stipulate that the 
United States will deal firmly with governments or groups that affect issues of 
importance to the United States. such as the peace process, terrorism, free markets 
and stability. Pelletreau hinted that Washington would take a tough stance against 
Islamic militants that challenge U. S. leadership and that of its allies: "there is little 
prospect for working productively with groups and individuals who are so intensely 
anti-Western that they aim not only to eradicate any Western influences in their 
societies, but to resist any form of cooperation with the West ormodemizing influence 
at home n727. In the case of Algeria, where radical Islamists are major contestants for 
power, Pelletreau stated firmly: 'those who say that the United States is resigned to 
or willing to condone a victory of extremism in Algeria are wrong. The goal of U. S. 
policy toward Algeria is to avoid such developments" 728. 
9.3. The Democracy Conundrum 
Critics of the U. S. policy point that the conceptual differentiation between 
"moderate" and "extreme" Islamists - reserving a different treatment for both - 
overshadows the fact that even moderates have an agenda that antagonises Western 
interests. Sattloff remarks that "the tough part is what to do about the challenge to 
Western interests that comes from Islamists who may share goals with extremists but 
opt for different means" 729 . Miller questions 
"how would Washington view such 
groups as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan, Ghannoushi's al-Nahda 
movement in Tunisia and the FIS in Algeria, all of which have vowed repeatedly to 
. establish their Islamic states by playing by domestic rules? " 
730 
r6 "Dealing with the Muslim Politics ... 
": p. 3. 
'`7 Ibid. 
. r' Recent Developments 
...: p. 
5. 
7' Robert Sattloff, "An American Strategy to Respond to Political Islam", in Y. Mfirsky. Matt Ahrens 
and Jennifer Sultan (eds. ), Challenges to U. S. Interests in the Middle East: Obstacles and Opportunities 
(Washington, D. C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1993), p. 34. 
no Miller, op. cit. : p. 47. 
207 
Islamist call for the cleansing from Muslims lands of all traces of Western 
society, a feeling that is widespread even among the masses. Others point to the 
cunning tactics of Islamist groups that enable them to conceal their true nature and 
intentions. Gera says that "Islamists are sufficiently well-versed in Western discourse 
to assuage Western concerns" 731. He adds that there is frequently a "division of 
labor" between the moderate or political wings of Islamist groups and the violent ones. 
It is thus moderation only in tactics (e. g. on the means to attain power and create an 
Islamic state: through violent revolution or through gradual, social evolution) and not in 
the ends, that remain the attainment of power in order to transform society, in light of 
the idealised Islamic order 72 . 
Critics argue that such mainstream Islamist movements as the Muslim 
Brotherhood call for the strict application of the Sharia in a future Islamic state, a 
situation that would entail the violation of the prerequisites set forth byDjerejian for 
the creation of a democratic society. 
The promotion of democracy and human rights has been proclaimed one of 
the three pillars of the Clinton administration's foreign policy. Officials have repeatedly 
stated that the administration's commitment to the "global revolution for democracy" is 
a part of a strategy for laying the foundations for a more just and stable world. The 
defence of democracy and human rights is understood as a part of U. S. efforts to 
improve American security and thus strengthening American interests. Clinton has 
often declared that a democratic world is a safer world, where nationscooperate and 
conflict becomes an exception. Democratic countries "are much more likely to be 
reliable partners in diplomacy, trade arms accords and global environment 
protection"733. Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, Robert Pelletreau, 
stated that in the Middle East democracy is regarded as "an important and necessary 
contributor to long-term stability" , and as a necessary requisite 
for having "peaceful, 
stable and prosperous partners in this important region" 734. 
American officials have admitted that in the Middle East the persistence of 
authoritarian government has been an all too present reality. Regional conflict and 
instability have been wielded by autocratic governments as an excuse to suppress 
"' Gideon Gera, "An Islamic Republic of Algeria? " (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, 1995), p. 25. 
"= Ibid. . " Warren Christopher, Senate Confirmation Hearing, 13 January, 1993, quoted inMirsky and Ahrens 
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domestic opposition and stifle free expression. This situation, declared Pelletreau, 
"fuels extremism, whether of a secular or Islamist variety, which works against U. S. 
interests as well as the broader interests of the Middle Eastern states"735 . Clinton's 
agenda (during his first term of office) for the region contemplated not only the 
protection of vital resources and conflict resolution but also the support for human 
rights, pluralism, women's and minority rights and popular participation in government. 
These "worldwide issues", stressed Djerejian, "constitute an essential part of the 
foundation for America's engagement with the countries of the Near East" 76 
In the Meridian House speech, Djerejian clearly articulated the view that an 
infallible way of stemming the flow of Islamic extremism is the broadening of political 
participation. Pelletreau subsequently listed "promoting more open political and 
economic systems, and respect for human rights and the rule of law" as one of seven 
American objectives in the Middle East 737. He explicitly stated the Clinton's 
administration commitment "to help countries make the arduous transition from 
authoritarianism to freedom and to work to create institutions that will make leaders 
accountable and responsive to their peoples' aspirations" 738. 
Testifying before Congress, Djerejian affirmed that U. S. engagement in favour 
of more open political systems is not a mere propaganda slogan, and that even in the 
case of friendly states such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, U. S. officials do not fail to 
mention those issues with the local authorities: "No matter what the relationship, if the 
countries are close friends of ours, we press the issue"79 . Pelletreau welcomed the 
encouraging signs of change in several Middle Eastern countries towards popular 
political participation: the significant political openings and elections in Jordan, Kuwait 
and Yemen, and the appointment in Oman, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia of consultative 
councils to provide an avenue for broader participation70 . The United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) has funded a multimillion-dollar project on 
"governance" in the region and to strengthen the institutions of civil society in ways 
that promote democracy. 
"S Robert H. Pelletreau, "American Objectives in the Middle East", Remarks before the CENTCOM 
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However cogent and appealing, this U. S. policy is not without several 
problems one of which is how far and how fast to push the agenda for democracy and 
human rights in the face of a fear of Islamic backlash and extremism. Jonathan Paris 
highlights "the potential conflict in U. S. policy that might occur by encouraging 
democracy in the Arab world on the one hand, and containing radical Islamic 
fundamentalism and promoting the Arab-Israeli peace process on the other""'. In 
fact, the Islamic world brings into question Washington's straightforward assumption 
that the promotion of democracy on a global scale is in the national interest of the 
United States. While in some countries the democratisation process may enhance the 
legitimacy of current regimes and promote stability, in others it may contribute to bring 
to power, through democratic elections, Islamic parties that will undermine U. S. 
interests 742 
In spite of a rhetorical commitment to democratisation, many are sceptical of 
how that process in the region could guarantee American political and economic 
interests. The debate on democracy in the Middle East has become thorny due to the 
sensitivity of the issues involved. Richard Murphy defined the dilemmas that 
Washington faces when dealing with this question as the "democracy conundrum", 
and he affirmed: "Nowhere in the world do the cross-pressures ofAmerica's interests 
and America's ideals present starker choices"'-'. In general, he goes on to say, "the 
United States faces the difficult task of balancing between its principles - support for 
free and fair elections - and its particular interests in supporting some incumbent 
regimes and delegitimizing others"'°°. 
The United States can not be certain what will happen to countries like Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait, vital to U. S. economic interests - oil, markets and recycling of 
petrodollars into investments in Western countries - if democratic government should 
take over. Washington is worried about the Islamist challenge to the U. S. -perceived 
new world order and American hegemony in predominantly Muslim regions. Surely if 
democratic states are established in the Middle East, they will make it much harder 
for any Western coalition to destroy the industrial base and infrastructure of a country 
like Iraq. The Jordanian experience during the Gulf War showed that when the 
masses are free, they can affect the course of government policy. It logically ensues 
Paris, op. cit. : p. 553. 
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that Washington would rather keep in place the existing dictatorships, who are at least 
constrained in varying degrees by judicious calculations and the international order. 
Former Secretary of Defense and CIA chief James Schlesinger spoke for 
more than himself when he questioned "whether we seriously desire to prescribe 
democracy as the proper form of government for other societies. Perhaps the issue is 
most clearly posed in the Islamic world. Do we seriously want to change the 
institutions in Saudi Arabia? The brief answer is no: Over the years we have sought to 
preserve those institutions, sometimes in preference to more democratic forces 
coursing throughout the world" 75 . In a similar vein, Jean 
Kirkpatrick affirmed: "The 
Arab world is the only part of the world where I've been shaken in my conviction that if 
you let people decide, they will make fundamentally rational decisions" 76 . Even 
Pelletreau recognised the exceptional nature of the Middle East when he affirmed that 
the region "presents unique challenges to the growth and acceptance of democratic 
principles" 747 . 
Martin Indyk, the former director of the Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, an influent pro-Israeli think-tank that has looked into the challenges posed by 
political Islam, and a senior member of the Clinton administration, summarises well 
the "stark choices" U. S. officials face: "rely on the democratic process to moderate the 
behaviour and objectives of the fundamentalists; or treat democracy in the Middle 
East as a luxury that friendly regimes cannot afford because it enables anti- 
democratic forces to seize power"'. Indyk affirms that the most comfortable choice 
would be to take no stand at all, but he recognises that in the Middle East context it 
would only make things worse. An effort to promote democracy in the region should, 
he recommends, give priority to a "minimalist" approach: "the U. S. should seek to 
focus first on supporting the building blocks of democracy - i. e. - fundamental human 
rights of free speech, assembly, religion and"due process" - whose achievement and 
implementation are necessary prerequisites for democratic elections" 79 . 
Another dimension of the democracy dilemma, is that the process of 
democratisation in the Arab world would likely constitute a threat to the peace 
process. It is widely believed that a resolution of the Arab-Israeli peace process would 
remove one of the main causes of extremism in the region, thus underminingislamist 
"The Quest for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs (72), n° 1,1993, p. 20. 
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appeal. Paris remarks that "as the process of democratization advances in the Arab 
world, criticism of both established regimes and Israel is likely to increase, especially 
if the peace process achieves mixed results. The conventional wisdom that only Arab 
democracies can make lasting peace with Israel may not be true on a substantive 
level, given the elite/street schism toward Israel, nor on a procedural level, in that 
dictators have wider latitude to reach an agreement with Israel that does not have to 
be approved beforehand by the voters" '50 . 
The promotion of human rights poses similar problems to U. S. policy-makers. 
Clinton has agreed that the quest for human rights must sometimes "be tempered with 
prudence and common sense" 751 .A Senior 
State Department official said it would be 
pointless for instance to cut off weapons sales to Saudi Arabia as a pressure tactic to 
extend the rights of Saudi women: "They wouldn't do it. [Instead] they would buy from 
France and Britain and Germany. It would lose U. S. jobs" 752. Officials cite other 
instances in which it may be hard to enforce human-rights policies. In the case of 
Algeria, they point out that the United States is in a difficult position in pressing that 
country to restore democracy because it does not want to bolster indirectly the 
Islamist cause 753 . There 
is a common understanding that, in foreign policy, human 
rights are not the only consideration and that strategic, diplomatic, and economic 
interests may prevail. 
For U. S. policy-makers, democracy in the Arab world is equivalent to trouble. 
In the case of moderate, pro-Western regimes like Egypt, Jordan or Saudi Arabia, 
U. S. officials are apt to share the incumbent leaders' interpretation that the Islamic 
extremists are the most pressing threat. Esposito points out that "for leaders in the 
West, democracy raises the prospect of old and reliable friends sometimes referred to 
as client states being transformed into more independent and less predictable nations 
should Islamists come to rule, '1. They see a fundamentalist victory in these 
countries as a deadly blow to Western interests and as the first domino, after which 
the rest of the Arab world might well succumb to fundamentalist revolution. So long as 
i50 Paris, op. cit. : p. 564. 
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repression works, there is little impetus for American officials to reassess the policy of 
firm support for those regimes" . 
Hadar criticises Washington for applying double standards according to its 
priorities. He says that "when it comes to free elections in Algeria or Egypt, 
Washington suddenly begins to lament over the `dilemmas" and the "difficult choices" 
but, it does not seem to express a similar sense of sorrow when the regimes in 
Algeria and Tunisia repress their own citizens"756 . 
Murphy says that the rhetoric of 
"democratic enlargement" is used selectively and dropped whenever it might 
endanger superior American security and economic goals. In the case of pro-Western 
regimes, Washington is willing to remain silent when sham elections are held or anti- 
democratic practices are used. When genuine elections are held in countries that 
oppose the United States, such as Iran, then the American government labels them 
antidemocratic 757. He urges the U. S. government to be less hypocritical regarding 
the democracy issue, an attitude which consistently disappoints human rights and 
pro-democracy movements who look to Washington for support and that enrages 
Islamists 758. 
Karabell remarks that "the United States has adopted what it believes to be 
the lesser of two evils. Better the pro-Western military or authoritarian governments 
than an Islamic state like Iran. This is an interesting spin on theKirkpatrick doctrine of 
the 1980s that it was better for the United States to countenance military governments 
than allow for the possibility of a communist takeover" 75' . 
This fact enables Hadar to 
conclude that Washington's profession of faith in democracy (and precautions against 
political Islam) "masks clear political interests and has little to do with concerns over 
the status of liberty in the Middle East. Such rhetoric is used tomobilize support for 
the pro-Western autocratic regimes and by extension to secure U. S. hegemony in the 
region ... 
" 760 
The Clinton administration, despite its initial global democracy project and 
language of Wilsonian idealism, has been careful in the advocacy of the 
"democratisation agenda" in the Middle East761 . Washington's preference is 
for the 
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maintenance of the status quo, ahead of support for democratisation Esposito argues 
that "the status quo bias is "rationalized by the claim that both Arab culture and Islam 
are anti-democratic, " citing the absence of democratic tradition and the "paucity" of 
democracies in the Muslim world" "I . Esposito, speaking at a congressional hearing, 
stated that the United States should send "a clear signal to our... allies and to Islamic 
movements out there, that if we, for example believe in democratization, that is not 
just democracy for the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but it is also for the 
Maghreb, for the Middle East and the broader Muslim world"'s' 
Esposito reckons that a significant first step has been taken in the case of 
Algeria where the U. S. government urged the leadership to establish a dialogue with 
the moderate Islamist opposition. However, he points out, this position also "needs to 
go beyond Algeria to indicate that we are not taking this position because Algeria is 
not terribly important in the larger scheme of American military-economic-political 
interests i764. He doubts the American government would be so forthcoming in the 
case of Egypt where U. S. interets are more critical. Speaking in the context of the 
Maghreb, he says that "it would signal something significant if, in the case of Tunisia 
and Morocco as well, we articulated the same kind of nuanced position on Algeria 
regarding the opposition; that governments should open up and talk to moderate 
Islamist movement"765 
Indyk points to the examples of Egypt and Jordan to draw some principles as 
to the way of managing successfully the Islamist challenge without endangering the 
survivability of the incumbent regimes. He says that the best option would be limiting 
the political sphere to secular parties and channelling Islamic activists into the social 
and economic spheres where their welfare activities are highly appreciated, a strategy 
that in fact, is tantamount to their political marginalization Only in the last instance, he 
advises, should one co-opt non-violent, mainstream Islamic movements into political 
life766 
Murphy points out the potential of the "Turkish model", after the 1995 
parliamentary elections, which has demonstrated how to accommodate Islamist 
political activity and avoid "the dangerous polarization of politics into an autocratic 
secular government and a violent underground Islamist opposition so characteristic of 
Quoted in Sisk, op. cit. : p. 11. 
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many Arab states" 76'. The incorporation of Islamist groups was the result of a 
prolonged democratic practice that allowed the development of strong political parties 
across the electoral spectrum. This resulted in compliance oflslamists to the rules of 
pluralism. Murphy sees Turkey as a model that other Middle Eastern countries should 
emulate and that the United States should promote 768. It epitomises the ideal 
situation, which is the opening up of political systems in an evolutionary way. 
9.4. Islamist Terrorism 
Islamist movements pose other kind of challenges to U. S. policy-makers 
which have to do with the use of violence and terrorism. Actually, the Middle East is 
the major source of state-sponsored international terrorism. Five of the seven states 
that have been branded by the U. S. government as sponsors of international 
terrorism- Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Syria - are located in the region 769 . Moreover, 
twenty-two of the forty-one major international terrorist groups described in the State 
Department's annual report on global terrorism are based in the Middle East7° . In 
the 1990s, terrorism by extremist individuals or groups claiming to act for religious 
motives has been on the upsurge. This is particularly the case with Islamic 
extremists"' . In the last few years, they have attracted the 
Americans' attention as 
they have stepped up the attacks on U. S. targets. The trend has been confirmed by 
the World Trade Center bombing and the uncovering of a plot to launch a wider terror 
campaign on American territory; the continuing attempts by Islamic extremists to 
undermine the Middle East peace process, and the attacks against U. S. targets in 
Saudi Arabia, fuelling concerns that more serious challenges to the U. S. presence in 
the region lie ahead. 
The World Trade Center bombing underscored to Americans the degree to 
which radical Islamic extremists have supplanted radical nationalists, such as the 
PLO, as the chief Middle Eastern terrorist threat to the United States. The bombing 
767 Murphy and Gause, III, op. cit.: p. 4. 
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clearly snapped the United States to attention and was an ominous announcement 
that terrorism could touch the United States directly. The jury that convicted Sheikh 
Rahman and his followers found that the jihad organisation conspired to wage war 
against the United States - not simply to bomb its civilian population, murder its 
politicians, hold its law enforcement officials hostage, and break imprisoned members 
of the group out of American jails. Although exaggerating the threat out of its 
proportions, the fact is that the jury's pronouncement reflected the average 
American's perception that "all of these activities were part of a greater whole - an all- 
out attack on America itself, aimed not merely at American engagement in the world 
at large, but at American freedoms, ideals and the American way of life" ". 
News stories and intelligence reports have indicated that radical Islamic 
movements have found sanctuary in the West among Muslim immigrants. The World 
Trade Center bombers were all either recent immigrants or illegal aliens. Although 
they may have been drawn to America by economic opportunities, many of them take 
advantage of the Western political systems to travel freely, organise politically, raise 
funds, recruit new members, support underground opposition movements in their 
home countries, and sometimes to direct terrorist activities. It is believed that the 
United States has become, for several years now, a safe haven forHizbollah, the 
Islamic Group, Algerian fundamentalists, and Palestinian fundamentalists" . 
The loosely linked informal webs of Islamic militants, often organisedin small 
groups around a charismatic cleric, are harder to track and infiltrate. Pentagon 
analysts agree the main problem now is the increasing number of fragmented and 
freelancing Islamic extremist groups supported by private sources "' . The 
"privatization of the support of terrorism" makes it difficult to identify the people 
responsible for terrorist acts 775 .A major sponsor of 
international terrorism isOsama 
bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi exile based in Afghanistan who seeks to overthrow the 
Saudi regime. He is believed to be funding Islamic terrorism in Egypt and elsewhere, 
and the Islamic group, an Egyptian underground that has staged terrorist strikes to 
destabilise President Mubarak's regime. 
772 Andrew McCarthy, "Jihad in an Open Society", in Alicia Gansz and John Wilner (eds. ), Fighting 
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Privately financed terrorism seems to be one of the several unforeseen 
consequences of the Afghan war, called by some journalists the "University ofJihad' 
and a breeding ground of Islamic terrorists. Thousands of Muslims from roughly forty 
countries flocked to Afghanistan following the 1979 Soviet invasion. Pakistani officials 
estimate that at least 2800 foreign Muslims were still in Afghanistan in 1993 75. 
An expert on terrorism explains the modus operandi of these militants: "Now 
you don't have a group, you have an old boys' network where people keep in touch. 
This is not something that can be penetrated, because they may just come together 
for one operation and disperse again. They don't have to have an office and a car 
pool and stationery. All they need are their modems - one in the Philippines, one in 
New York and one in Peshawar - and you've got your group""' .A Pentagon official 
noted that "today's terrorists don't have to depend that much any more on states for 
access to financing or the technological means" 78 . 
At least three of the six bombers of the World TradeCenter had fought in the 
war in Afghanistan against Soviet and Afghan communists. Sheikh OmarRahman 
also made at least three visits there since 1980 and two of his sons reportedly fought 
there. A Washington Post news story states that among the ultra-radicals that 
spearhead the opposition against the ruling Saudi family, are the 15,000 militants who 
fought in Afghanistan, where some received CIA-organised military training and 
forged links with radical leaders from a number of Arab countries. It also reveals that 
of the four Saudis who confessed to the 1995 November's bombing at the National 
Guard facility in Riyadh, three were veterans of the Afghan conflict. One of them 
confessed to having been influenced by a radical Muslim preacher and militant that he 
encountered in Afghanistan 79 
Besides the homefront, America's most critical role is defending the Middle 
East peace process. Hamas attacks, meant to derail the peace process, began 
accelerating shortly after Yasser Arafat and the late Yitzhak Rabin shook hands on 
their 1993 historic agreement. Hamas' most recent bombs are increasingly lethal as 
'76 Edward Gargan. "Where Arab Militants Train and Wait", The New York Times, 11 August 1993: p. 
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greater technological sophistication makes it more difficult to protect mass civilian 
targets, the main aim of Hamas' attacks 780 . 
Following the four bombings that rocked Israel in late February and early 
March 1996, President Clinton convened the Sharm el-Sheikh conference. The 
conference launched a process to expand joint efforts against terrorism throughout 
the region. President Clinton and Shimon Peres signed a new anti-terrorism accord 
that will strengthen cooperation between the two governments. In addition, the United 
States promised Israel $100 million in extra aid to fight terrorism 781 . 
The U. S. 
government also began to bolster the counterterrorism capabilities of the Palestinian 
Authority. With American support, Israeli and Palestinian security services started 
cooperating in a joint campaign to root out the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank 
and Gaza 732 
Americans believe that Iran plays a leading role in the campaign of violence to 
disrupt the peace process. The 1995 Patterns of Global Terrorism identifies Iran as 
"the premiere state sponsor of the international terrorism" responsible for "the 
planning and execution of terrorist acts both by its own agents and by surrogate 
groups". Iran's great success, which dates back to the early 1980s, came in war-tom 
Lebanon, where it helped to create, finance, train and equip Arab fundamentalists for 
political violence. 
Hizbollah, an Iranian-sponsored and Syrian-backed terrorist group based in 
Lebanon, perpetrated the October 1983 bombing of the U. S. Marine barracks in 
Beirut. It is considered in the words of former CIA Director James Woolsey, the 
"world's principal international terrorist organization"" . 
The movement has tried to 
disrupt the peace process by provoking clashes with Israel that Hizbollah hoped 
would bring Israel into conflict with Syria and Lebanon. Hizbollah has also supported 
radical Palestinian groups opposed to peace. They are united by their opposition to 
any territorial compromise with Israel and by their fears that a successful peace 
agreement will weaken them politically. The late 1980s Palestinian uprising in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip created an opportunity forHizbollah to develop de facto 
alliances with rejectionist Palestinian groups such as the Islamic Jihad. The uprising 
1995 Patterns of Global Terrorism; see "Middle East Overview". 
Donald Neff, ""Peace Summit" Ends in Tame Compromise", Middle East International, n° 522,29 
March 1996: p. 3. 
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also helped spawn another militant group, Hamas, with which Hizbollah and Iran are 
also reported to have developed strong ties" . 
Katzman asserts that Hizbollah is gaining the ability to mount a sustained, 
coordinated, and well-organised terrorist campaign all over the globe. The 1994 
bombings against Jewish and Israeli installations that in nine days swept Argentina, 
Panama and Britain are believed to be the handiwork of the organisation. The 
expansion of the organisation's terrorist infrastructure abroad to such places as 
Sudan, Europe, and Latin America aims at hedging against any peace settlement that 
requires Hizbollah's dismantlement. Katzman contends that the movement has timed 
its acts of vengeance to adversely affect the Middle East peace process's . 
In December 1996, and in the aftermath of the Israeli operation, "Grapes of 
Wrath", the Iranian Supreme National Security Council decided to strengthen the 
military and financial capacity of the movement. Tehran's annual contribution to 
Hizbollah passed from $80 to S100 million. The Iranians have substantially increased 
the pace of delivery of Sagger anti-tank missiles and of upgraded Katiousha 
rockets'. 
Iran has also established good working relationships with several Sunni 
fundamentalist groups since 1990, including Hamas, Islamic Jihad for the Liberation 
of Palestine, the Islamic Group of Egypt, and similar groups in Algeria, Jordan and 
Tunisia. The opening of Arab-Israeli peace talks at the Madrid Conference in October 
1991 gave Iran and Palestinian extremists a common interest in disrupting the U. S. - 
sponsored negotiations by escalating terrorists attacks against Israel. Iran invited a 
Hamas delegation to attend an October 1992 international conference held in Tehran 
to coordinate opposition to the peace process. Iranian authorities subsequently 
agreed to help train Hamas terrorists and permit Hamas to open an embassy in 
Tehran 78' . 
Iranians meet frequently with all other major radical groups opposed to the 
peace process, including Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the PFLP-GC (Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command). It provides them with money - up 
`8' James Phillips, "The Challenge of Revolutionary Iran", The Heritage Foundation Back-grounder, n' 
24,29 March 1996 (electronic file transfer): p. 3. 
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to several million dollars a year in the case of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and others. Iran 
also supplies them with arms and material support, training, and, in some cases, 
operational guidance. Iranian-trained terrorists have frequently infiltrated Israel and 
the Palestinian territories 788 . 
Iran's links to Sudan are a major concern for U. S. authorities. Iran has become 
the chief supporter and ally of Sudan's National Islamic Front, a Sunni fundamentalist 
movement that came to power following Lt. Bashir's 1989 coup. Sudan, Africa's 
largest state, offers Iran a strategic foothold to outflank Saudi Arabia and extend its 
revolutionary influence throughout North Africa and the Horn of Africa. Iranian- 
Sudanese cooperation escalated following President Rafsanjani's December 1991 
visit to Sudan 789 . Hundreds of Iranian military advisers and 
Revolutionary Guards 
were dispatched to Sudan to help train the Sudanese army and internal security 
forces. 
Egyptian intelligence officials claim to have evidence that Iranians train 
terrorists in about twenty camps that come mainly from Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia. 
Sudan has enabled Iran to expand its contacts with Egyptian groups that can easily 
infiltrate the porous Sudanese-Egyptian border, seeking to overthrow the Egyptian 
government. The powerful Islamic extremist groups Hamas, Islamic Jihad and 
Hizbollah have all sent members for training. Open offices, like the oneHamas keeps 
in the Ammarat district of Khartoum, presumably facilitate the ingress, training, and 
egress of the foreign nationals 790 
Terrorism has also struck the American presence in the Gulf region. The 
deadliest terrorist attack against U. S. interests in the Middle East since the 1983 
bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut took place on 13 November 1995 in Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia. A vehicle bomb badly damaged the headquarters of the National Guard 
training centre, killing seven persons, including five U. S. citizens. A worse attack 
occurred on 25 June 1996 when nineteen more Americans were killed by a truck 
bomb that exploded in front of a residence for U. S. airmen at Dhahran, in eastern 
Saudi Arabia. Defense Secretary William Perry, fearing more such attacks, took the 
decision of putting American servicemen on the highest security alert 791. 
ý$ Christopher, op. cit. : p. 23. 
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The attacks signalled a rise in Islam-based political opposition that surfaced 
soon after the Gulf War. Since the end of the war, the expanded American military 
presence has become visible, raising controversy among many Saudis who think it is 
haram to have the infidel soldiers in Saudi Arabia. American troops have become the 
main targets of the Islamic radicals in what they regard as a holy war against the 
corrupt Saudi ruling family. These events which caught the Americans off guard seem 
to portend serious challenges to U. S. interests in the region 792 . 
The Clinton administration, increasingly frustrated in its efforts to thwart 
terrorism in the Middle East, 793 is considering a more activist policy that could include 
pre-emptive strikes and expanded covert counterterror operations against Arab 
groups and states that sponsor terrorism. CIA Director John Deutch said in 
September 1996 that the CIA was drawing a list of military options to present to 
Clinton "to act against terrorist groups directly either to prevent them from carrying out 
operations or to retaliate against groups we know are responsible for operations"" . 
The debate over how to combat terrorism came up during the electoral campaign 
amid charges from Republican presidential Bob Dole and his party that the Clinton 
administration has been too soft on Middle East state sponsors of terrorism 1"5. 
Growing concern over the security challenges posed by terrorism has, in fact, 
led the administration to spearhead efforts to combat terrorism on a global level. In 
December 1995, the American government convened a ministerial meeting in Ottawa 
with the G-7 countries and Russia to develop common strategies for fighting terror. 
And, in April 1996, President Clinton joined Russian president Yeltsin and other 
leaders in Moscow, where they agreed on new steps to prevent nuclear materials 
from failing into the wrong hands 716 . New legislation, 
including the 1996 Terrorism 
Prevention Act, provides law enforcement with new tools to fight terrorism. Among 
other things it stipulates a ban on fundraising activities in the United States by 
terrorists and terrorist-linked organisations and lists procedures for expediting the 
deportation of aliens convicted of felonies 711 . 
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The administration has alternately adopted policies of containment, pressure 
and dialogue - or a mixture of the three - depending on the diplomatic needs of the 
moment, the willingness of U. S. allies to cooperate and the other issues at stake in 
relations with Middle Eastern states that sponsor terrorism. While a combination of 
U. N. sanctions and military pressure has largely succeeded in curbing the terrorist 
activities of Libya and Iraq, U. S. efforts to curtail Iran's involvement through economic 
boycotts and joint allied Western pressure have failed. Some analysts argue that 
more forceful actions taken against rogue states, such as Sudan and Iran, still can 
make a significant difference. Military strikes against terrorist "safe heavens" are one 
of the suggested actions 798 . 
U. S. strategists are divided over whether terror-sanctioning states or 
independent terrorist groups should be the primary targets of more aggressive U. S. 
action. Officials also disagree over whether military action - an option fraught with 
potential problems - would prove more effective than traditional diplomatic tools such 
as sanctions and boycotts against governments the State Department considers 
terrorism sponsors. In any case, the fight against terrorism is bound to get more 
complicated as U. S. intelligence officers and counterterrorism agents increasingly 
have to deal with a murky network of home-grown, privately financed and largely 
independent groups freely going around. 
9.5. The Presidential Endorsement 
The U. S. policy on Islam has been strongly endorsed bypresident Clinton who 
has engaged in a sustained effort to improve relations between the United States and 
the Islamic faith 799. Inspired partly by political considerations and partly by the 
president's personal religious convictions, the effort is aimed at convincing the world's 
one billion Muslims that America is not opposed to their faith and at convincing non- 
Muslim Americans that Islamic doctrine and culture are not hostile to U. S. values. The 
message from the Clinton administration is that the vast majority of Muslims are not 
violent fanatics but ordinary people going peacefully about their business, and that 
98 Ottaway, op. cit. p. A 25. 
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they have nothing to fear from Islam. This point is made consistently in policy 
statements, responses to world events and symbolic gestures. 
The U. S. government has carefully avoided linking terrorist crimes to the 
Muslim religion. The roundup of Muslim suspects in theWorid Trade Center bombing 
reinforced the popular impression of Islam as a menace, as do attacks on foreigners 
by Muslim extremists in Algeria and Egypt. U. S. officials have affirmed that the United 
States is opposed to terrorism and threatening behaviour wherever it occurs, not to 
Islam as a faith. "Islamic terrorists have captured our attention", State Department 
counterterrorism coordinator Philip C. Wilcox affirmed. "These groups share a 
common opposition to secular Arab government, to Israel and the West. They are a 
threat. But those groups who practice terror under the flag of Islam are a small 
minority, rejected by the great majority of Muslims". He added: "Nor do we regard 
Islamic extremism as the wave of the future" 800 . 
During Clinton's visit to Indonesia in November 1994, his major public 
appearance was at the main mosque in Jakarta. Asked why he had visited the site, 
Clinton said "I have tried to do a lot as I have travelled the world ... and say to the 
American people and the West generally that even though we have had problems with 
terrorism coming out of the Middle East, it is not inherently related to Islam - not to the 
religion, not to the culture" 801. Clinton stressed this is "something our people in 
America need to know, it's something people in the West, throughout the West, need 
to know" 802 . 
When president Clinton addressed the Jordanian Parliament in 1994 he 
stressed the same idea: "though we know in every comer of the world ... there are 
those who insist that between America and the Middle East there are impassible 
religious and other barriers to harmony, that our beliefs and cultures must somehow 
inevitably clash. America refuses to accept that our civilizations must collide ... We 
respect Islam ... " 
503 
. 
Clinton himself revised the text drafted by his speech-writers to 
deliver the same message in personal terms 804 . 
Like his senior officials, the president defined extremists not as the ordinary 
Muslims but as "the forces of terror and extremism, who cloak themselves in the 
soo Quoted in Thomas W. Lippman, "To Islam, An Olive Branch", The Washington Post, 28 December 
1994: p. A 18. 
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rhetoric of religion and nationalism, but behave in ways that contradict the very 
teachings of their faith" 805. 
President Clinton's positive appraisal of Islam was reiterated in March 1995, 
at a joint press conference with Morocco's King Hassan II. The president concluded 
his opening remarks by stating: "I share this conviction that Islam can be a powerful 
force for tolerance and moderation in the world, and that its traditional values - 
devotion to family and to society, to faith and good works - are in harmony with the 
best of Western ideals" 806. In both countries, Clinton's praise of Islam and its 
"traditional values" was akin to advocating the ruling monarch's brand of Islam. 
On the homefront, the Clinton administration has made more friendly gestures 
toward American Muslims than any previous administration. The President sent 
greetings to Muslims during the fast of Ramadan and the First Lady hosted a 
celebration of Id al-Fitr in the White House in April 1996. In the Autumn of 1995, Vice 
President Al Gore visited a mosque, and in 1995 the first Muslim chaplain to serve the 
10 000 Muslims in the U. S. armed forces was sworn into the Air Force 807 . 
The estimated four million Muslims in the country are becoming more 
assertive. Islam is a religion expanding rapidly in the United States. There is a 
growing sense of solidarity among Muslims, partly due to the adversity stemming from 
such crises as the Gulf War, the World TradeCenter bombing, and the Oklahoma city 
bombing. Black Muslims, more than one-third of the Islamic community, were 
energised by the Million Man March in Washington. They want to change their lack of 
clout and secure a toehold in the American power structure 808 . 
The President received a delegation of Arab Americans in the White House to 
discuss a wide range of issues, both domestic and international. The First Lady, 
Hillary Clinton, has played a particularly active role in building bridges with the Muslim 
community and, in visits abroad, has emphasised American respect for Islam. The 
National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, received a delegation of Muslims to discuss 
the ramifications of the Bosnian crisis. Moreover, American Muslim Council 
Representatives have met both State and Justice Department officials to voice their 
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concerns over the anti-terrorism bill and to lobby against provisions which were felt to 
be unfair towards Muslims. President Clinton's gestures towards Muslims were 
sufficiently high profile to provoke a hostile article by Stephen Emerson in the Wall 
Street Journal in March 1996, raising the spectre of "Friends ofHamas in the White 
House". The article alleged that some of the president's Muslim guests were friends of 
Hamas and supporters of the Palestinian movement 11 . 
sog Ali Mazruý . Between the Crescent and the Star-Spangled Banner. American -uslims and U. S. 
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10. Political Islam and Foreign Policy Priorities 
10.1. Explaining the Challenges 
Political Islam has become a major issue in U. S. foreign policy, particularly the 
challenges posed by extremist groups or Islamist regimes that are believed to 
threaten U: S. interests and allies by engaging in subversive or terrorist activities. In 
fact, political Islam has generally been seen mainly through the prism of violence, and 
"Islamic fundamentalism" equated with "terrorism" mainly Iranian. Arab and Islamic 
"terror" has become the U. S. administration's main preoccupation these days and one 
of the main issues in the 1996 presidential election. 
The United States has been particularly concerned with countries where 
Islamist movements have shaped domestic and regional dynamics in ways that are 
adverse to Washington's interests: that is the case of Iran, Sudan, the Arab-Israeli 
peace process and Algeria. 1996 witnessed the upgrading of Washington's punitive 
policies against the Iranian and Sudanese regimes and the Islamist movements 
opposed to the peace process. In the case of Algeria, the U. S. policy has abandoned 
its passive approach in favour of a more proactive one. Clinton's tightening of 
sanctions against those regimes - and, in the case of Iran, the imposition of sanctions 
on third parties that invest in that country - are largely a reflection of the highly- 
charged and emotive climate in the United States in the aftermath of the downing of 
TWA flight 800 and of the bomb in Atlanta. The bombing of the U. S. facilities in al- 
Khobar enabled commentators and certain sectors in the U. S. policy apparatus to 
unambiguously denounce those countries and groups which are accused of promoting 
terrorism and instability designating Iran as the main culprit. 
Washington's approach to terrorism is also heavily influenced by the political 
agenda of Israel and its lobbysts and supporters in the U. S. political and media 
establishments. In the attempt to portray Iran as a threat to the world, Israeli president 
Ezer Weizman accused Iran of being behind the terrorist explosion in Dhahran. He 
presented no evidence to support his allegations. There is some truth in the Syrian 
analyst's assertation that "all manner of pro-Israeli American politicians and self-styled 
"experts on terrorism" have been pointing the finger at those countries and groups 
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which Israel wants to find pretext to act against. Hence, accusations have already 
been levelled against Iran, Iraq, Syria and Hizbollah. Sudan and Libya cannot be far 
behind"810. 
Iran tops the list of the U. S. outlaw states. Tehran is the depository of 
Washington's fierce mistrust and hostility due to the frustrating episodes of the Iranian 
Revolution, the hostage affair and the failed attempt in the mid-80s to cultivate ties 
with the Islamic Republic. America's complaints against the Iranian regime include: 
Tehran's involvement in terrorism, particularly that which undermines the peace 
process in the Middle East; its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and 
conventional arms buildup which could, if realised, pose real threats to the Persian 
Gulf states; its attempts to subvert friendly U. S. governments in the region and its 
unfortunate human-rights record. 
The international campaign against Iran is fuelled by Israel but even Egypt 
joined the chorus by accusing Tehran of sponsoring a subversive organisation active 
among Egypt's tiny Shiite minority 81 . In the aftermath of the al-Khobar 
bombing 
there was talk in political, defence and media circles, chiefly in the United States and 
Israel, of a new international coalition, along the lines of the Gulf War alliance, which 
would confront the "Iranian threat" and prevent Tehran from building its military forces 
and developing its offensive capabilities 812 . 
The Islamist Sudanese regime is likely to face tougher sanctions as it has 
been increasingly pointed as a terrorist state. It reportedly hosts terrorist training 
camps for large numbers of "Afghan Arabs" and provides refuge for a number of 
extremist groups. Sudan has been depicted as a Trojan horse which Iran is using to 
penetrate neighbouring states by helping it open embassies in a number of West 
African states. These subsequently prove to be merely a front for Iranian intelligence 
and the promotion of Iranian and Shiite influence. 
The Egyptians have been particularly vocal in their complaints against 
Khartoum and they allege having solid evidence proving that the Sudanese authorities 
are directly involved in training terrorists and sending them to Egypt31 . The U. S. 
administration has been receptive to these charges and its heightened concern about 
31OAI-Quds, quoted in "Who was the Real Target in al-Khobar. The U. S. or Saudi ArabiaT', Mideast 
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Sudan inspired a three-day visit by the director of the CIA, John Deutch, to the 
Ethiopian capital in order to orchestrate a campaign against Khartoum. More 
important, Washington has been providing military aid to Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda 
as front-line states that border Sudan and because of their role in helping the 
Americans contain the Sudanese regime 814 
A major concern of the United States is the weight of the Islamists in the 
offensive they have launched to put an end to the peace process. Washington has 
developed a multi-pronged effort to thwart that offensive which includes: the setting up 
of an international diplomatic campaign to support the peace process and to condemn 
Palestinian terror, the provision of financial and material aid to Israel to crack down on 
terrorists; the approval of tough new measures aimed at cutting off fund-raising in the 
United States for Hamas and the Islamic Jihad; and the tightening, at the international 
level, of surveillance of Middle East groups. A related consequence has been the 
mounting outcry against Iran which is believed to give support to Palestinian groups 
that oppose the peace process and to the Lebanese Hizbollah. 
A different set of considerations have attracted U. S. attention to the case of 
Algeria whose regime is besieged by violent Islamist movements. Algeria concerns 
the United States in a different way since it has not traditionally been in the American 
sphere of influence and Washington has relatively few direct interests in that 
Mediterranean country. However, the Americans are deeply worried about the 
strategic implications of a possible Islamist takeover for U. S. interests in the wider 
Middle East, especially the impact on pro-Western regimes in the region and on 
European allies. The outcome of the ongoing struggle in Algeria is not indifferent to 
Washington although it has adopted a policy of equidistance regarding the internal 
development of the situation. Faced with a possible victory of Islamist forces and/or 
breakdown, American policy-makers have of lately moved to a more interventionist 
approach. 
31 Al-Ahram, quoted in Mideast Mirror, n° 228,24 November 1995: p. 15. 
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10.2. America's Priorities and Policy Options 
10.2.1. The Peace Process 
American attitudes toward political Islam are shaped to a large extentby the 
Islamist groups' rejection of the peace process and their attempts to undermine it. 
Terrorist attacks and suicide bombings against civilians in Israel have fuelled the 
perception that political Islam and its sympathisers are the main forces undermining 
the peace process. They have shaped the negative images oflslamism in Congress, 
media and in the U. S. public at large. Richard Murphy says that "the United States 
does not take lightly expressions of determined opposition to the peace process". This 
is because, he goes on to explain "the United States has for the past generation, 
made major investments of political will in the Middle East" 8'5 
The peace process is obviously one facet of America's protective role toward 
its favourite Middle Eastern ally - Israel - and is a major condition for the creation of a 
stable Middle East. Sick argues that "our interest in the peace process drives our 
policy on every other aspect of the Middle East. Everything else is subordinated to 
that, sometimes in very unhealthy ways" e's 
Since the signing in 1993 of the Oslo accords and related agreements, the 
peace process has come under serious challenge from groups that either oppose its 
nature or dispute the PLO's role and direction of the process. The leading opposition 
groups are Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. In an attempt to derail the peace deal with 
Israel, they have claimed responsibility for suicide bombings that have killed nearly 
200 Israelis and wounded many others. Their attacks reflect the frustrations of many 
Palestinians over the slow implementation of self-rule inJericho and the Gaza Strip, 
as well as a perception that the new Palestinian authority led byYasser Arafat is 
increasingly dependent on Israel. 
Hamas, the strongest opposition Palestinian group sprouted shortly after the 
Palestinian uprising in 1987, has built an effective organisational infrastructure in the 
West Bank and Gaza. The military wing, formed in 1990, played a major role in 
8U "Prospects for Improved US-Iranian Relations", in H. Amirahmadi (ed. ), Revisiting Iran's Strategic 
Significance in the Emerging Regional Order (New Brunswick. NJ: U. S. -Iran Conference, 1995), p. 70. 
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assassinating Palestinians suspected of collaborating with Israel before turning its 
arsenal against Israel. Hamas' politically-motivated violent attacks against Israeli 
targets in the West Bank and Gaza, as well as in Israel, are devised to force 
Jerusalem to start negotiations with Hamas. Additionally, Hamas' pressures on the 
PNA and Arafat are intended to force him to consider serious power sharing with that 
Islamic movement8' . 
The Palestine Islamic Jihad considers itself "a resistance movement against 
foreign occupation" 818 and refers to Israel as "an illegitimate entity created by armed 
force, dispossession and terror' 819 . The movement argues that 
for peace to be 
achieved the "aggression" and "injustice" that was inflicted on the Palestinian people 
when their land was "usurped" must end by returning the territory to their legitimate 
occupants 820 . Armed struggle is viewed as a "political and military necessity" to 
create a "balance of terror" with Israel and teach it that its systematic repression of the 
Palestinians will not go unanswered 121 . The leader of the 
Islamic Jihad, Damascus- 
based Ramadan Abdallah Shallah stated that his group, which has carried out suicide 
bombings against Israeli targets, would not give up military action until the Palestinian 
people regained their legitimate rights - which he defined as an Islamic Palestine, 
"from the [Jordan] River to the [Mediterranean Sea]" 82 . 
The spate of terrorist attacks that rocked Israel during February and March 
1996 and left 62 Israelis killed, constituted the harshest blow to the peace process 
yet. Hamas launched the assaults in revenge for the Hebron massacre and for the 
Israeli-sponsored assassination in February of Yahia Ayyash, the alleged brain behind 
a spate of Hamas suicide operations that, between April 1994 and August 1995, 
claimed 50 Israeli lives. 
The attacks aggravated the conditions in the occupied territories as Israelis 
reinforced the closure of Palestinian towns - virtually turning them into crowded 
ghettos - and imposed collective punishments. The bombings discredited the Peres 
"' Ziad Abu-Amr, "Palestine's Islamic Alternative", , Middle East Insight (X), n° 2, January/February 
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government and opened the way for the hard-line Likud government of Benjamin 
Netanyahu. 
The other victims of the terrorist operations were Arafat and the PNA. Both 
came under pressure from the Israeli government and the United States to crack 
down on Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. Martin Indyk voiced the demand that "Arafat 
must dismantle Hamas' infrastructure in the self-rule areas. We[Israel and the U. S. 
government] want less of the carrot and more of the stick in the PNA's actions against 
Hamas" 82 
. These pressures 
have forced Arafat to create a draconian security 
apparatus whose repressive actions in the self-rule areas have elicited much popular 
anger. 
The hastily arranged Sharm al-Sheikh summit on terrorism, convened in the 
wake of the suicide bombings by president Clinton, brought together the leaders of 
the United States, Israel, the leading Arab and European nations and Japan with the 
ostensible purpose of discussing ways of combating terrorism and reinforcing the 
peace process with security and financial assistance. In reality, and as Israel's prime 
minister had declared before the summit, it was no more than a show of solidarity with 
Israel and an implicit backing of its stands and policies824 . The gathering resulted not 
only in the strong condemnation of all acts of terror against the peace process but 
also in the American pledge to commit at least $100 million as part of an anti-terrorist 
pact to be fashioned with Israel 325 
Far more important than the pronouncement about terrorism was the clear 
message that the mere convening of such a meeting sent to several constituencies 
behind terrorist acts, namely Hamas and Iran. The United States announced tough 
new measures aimed at cutting off fund-raising in the United States forHamas and at 
tightening surveillance of Middle East groups. The conference was a prelude to the 
imposition of sanctions against Iran, which has long topped a list of governments that 
the United States contends support terrorism. 
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The Israel prime minister denounced Iran in the strictest termsand called for 
concrete international action against the "terrorist snake". "This terrorism is not 
anonymous. It has a name, it has an address", he said. Terrorism he charged, has 
bank accounts, it has an infrastructure, it has networks camouflaged as charity 
organizations. It is spearheaded by a country - Iran". Peres further affirmed that "it is a 
regime that initiates, promotes and exports violence and fanaticism - Tehran has 
become the capital of terror" 826 
Peres' diatribes against Iran and the implication that "a conclusion must be 
drawn how to contain it" 827 were viewed by Arab analysts as an "ultimatum against 
Iran" and the escalation of the campaign against Tehran. In fact the overwhelming 
animosity in Washington's political circles towards Tehran is largely a function of the 
latter's role in sabotaging the Palestinian-Israeli entente. Sick argues that the 
American hostility toward the Islamic Republic "plays extremely well in the capitals of 
our two principal allies in the peace process, Egypt and Israel" B28 . 
The prevailing assessment is that after Netanyahu's election, Iran has been 
trying to entice Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, Muslim radicals of Hizbollah in Lebanon, 
and secular Arab rejectionist groups to forge a "united front" against the peace 
process 829. During the April 1996 offensive that Israeli forces launched to end cross- 
border rocket attacks on northern Israel, Tehran sent large provisions of weapons to 
the Hizbollah that kept it resupplied 830 . 
As the peace process falters and the split in Israeli society grows, the 
extremist forces are emboldened. The current mood in Israel has already encouraged 
Hizbollah to plan even more attacks on the IDF and its client South Lebanon Army 
(SLA) in the coming months '33' . Washington's traditional support for Israel and 
backing of the peace process will continue to make the difference. However, its blind 
endorsement of Israeli actions - as during its wanton attacks on Lebanon - does little 
to bolster Israel's position and only increases the widespread feeling of outrage in the 
Arab world. 
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10.2.2. Algeria 
For the past few years, Algeria has been torn apart by political violence 
emanating from radical Islamist groups bent on overthrowing the secular, military 
government. The outcome of the struggle in Algeria will have repercussions beyond 
its borders. It will influence the debate, currently taking place in the Arab world on the 
fate of democracy and development and on the role of Islam in the politics of the 
Middle East. Which way it tips will have a profound impact on Western interests in the 
Middle East and beyond 832 . 
Algeria's crisis dates back to the late 80s when the socialist-oriented regime 
came under challenge due to widespread discontent over the regime's 
mismanagement of the economy and resentment of the ruling elite's corruption and 
dictatorship. In 1988, the country was the scene of violent riots, triggered by an 
increase in prices of basic goods that was mandated by the IMF. The regime's 
response was partial liberalisation: it decided on constitutional reform, authorising new 
political parties, freeing the press to publish almost anything, and pushing forward 
with economic reform. President Benjedid reversed the government's policy of 
repression as a way to balance rivals within the ostensibly pro-regime FLN (Front 
National de Liberation) and legalised the growing Islamist movement, the various 
strands of which organised themselves as the Front Islamique de Salut (FIS). 
The real test of the popular appeal came in elections for local and provincial 
assemblies in June 1990. The FIS did remarkably well, winning 4.3 million votes out 
of an electorate of 12.8 million (33.7 percent, with 34.8 percent of the eligible voters 
abstaining) e33 . Almost all of the major towns came under 
FIS control. Although only 
recently organised, the FIS had managed to bring together in a relatively structured 
party the areas of influence of the numerous informal groups that claimed to be based 
on Islam. By using not only the network of mosques, but also teachers from various 
levels and disciplines, it had very rapidly built up an opposition force that could readily 
be stirred into action. 
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During the Gulf War, the FIS abandoned its tactics of reserve and prudence 
and found itself facing the army. The movement capitalised on popular outrage to 
proclaim the illegitimacy of the government and attack the army a''' . After great 
controversy and internal splits, the regime decided to go ahead with parliamentary 
elections in 1991. Although the FIS received one million fewer votes than the previous 
year (3.3 million), and only 24.5 percent of registered voters actually voted for the FIS 
(the abstention rate was 41 percent), the FIS won 47.3 percent of the vote in the first 
round of balloting 835 . The army reacted to the latter's imminent parliamentary victory 
by cancelling the second round of voting and voiding the election altogether. In early 
January 1992, the hard-liners in the military declared martial law, banned the FIS and 
set up a transitional authority. 
The self-proclaimed mandate of the Higher Executive Committee was to 
expire on December 1994, but no end to the violence was in sight, and the conditions 
for a return to parliamentary political life were far from being filled. In early 1995, the 
army named Defence Minister Liamine Zeroual for the vacant presidency. He twice 
attempted to broach the issue of readmission of the FIS to the constitutional process. 
However, the army commanders overruled Zeroual and aborted the process by 
resuming the military offensive against the rebellion and so scotching any prospect of 
a truce a". 
The escalation of the civil war in 1994 and 1995 has been marked by a lethal 
campaign by the extremist Groupe Islamique Armee (GIA), most of whose founding 
members are believed to be "Afghanis". Consolidation of many armed groups under 
the wing of the GIA reportedly occurred in the early summer of 1994. The GIA has 
been responsible for most of the killings of women, journalists, intellectuals, foreigners 
and was responsible for the hijacking of an Air France jet in December 1994. The GIA 
"has adopted an intransigent revolutionary posture, has regularly denounced the very 
idea of negotiations or compromise with the state ... "837. The Islamic Salvation Army 
(Armee Islamique du Salut, AIS), which is the armed branch of the FIS, has been 
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willing to countenance negotiations between the FIS and the regime. Its terrorist 
attacks have been directed against the security forces and state employees 838 . 
The crisis in Algeria has had a deep impact upon E. U. countries, mainly 
France and the countries of southern Europe who fear that political turmoil in the 
Maghreb will unleash destabilising political, economic and social forces. 
The divergences opposing Paris and Washington on the subject of Algeria 
were particularly noted. These differences were visible throughout much of 1994 when 
French officials, especially Interior Minister Charles Pasqua insisted on a 
"eradicationist" approach predicated on the assumption that all Islamists are 
extremists. Pasqua advocated a policy of crushing all Islamists on French soil and of 
helping the military regime in Algiers to do so. American diplomats began discrete 
talks with Anwar Haddam, a high-level FIS representative based in Washington. The 
ostensible purpose of the talks was to pull the FIS into political dialogue with the 
regime that might lead to a political settlement. The dialogue would also improve the 
chances of good relations with the FIS if and when it came to power"- a lesson 
gleaned from the Iranian revolution 
The U. S. cautious policy on Algeria has been driven by memories of Iran, 
where the Americans ignored growing opposition to the pro-Western regime of Shah 
Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, which was toppled in 1979 by Islamic militants, and where 
it has been branded as the "Great Satan" ever since. Determined not to be burned 
again, Washington engaged in exploratory talks with the FIS in order to position itself 
for a possible Islamist takeover and to ensure that such an occurrence would not 
irremediably hurt American interests&3°. The French criticised the State Department's 
initiative saying that it inflated the Islamists' real strength. 
Actually, Washington's position on the Algerian crisis has antagonised Algiers, 
since it has called for the development of a more democratic system and the 
broadening of political participation to encompass all factions, including Islamist 
leaders who reject terrorism. The U. S. government has repeatedly stressed the need 
to respect human rights and advised the Algerian regime to implement economic 
reforms. U. S. officials also criticised the military's rough tactics in handling the Islamic 
extremists: "Algeria's leaders cannot ease this crisis through over-reliance on 
repressive policies. In the absence of serious political change, violence is likely to 
338 Id. : p. 257; Brahim Younessi, "L'islamisme algerien: nebuleuse ou mouvement social? ", Politique 
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escalate and to threaten Algeria's stability""'. Behind the policy is a conviction that a 
political settlement is the only basis for domestic peace in Algeria. 
In reality, and as Garcon points out, Washington's and Paris' evaluation of the 
situation are not that different. What differs are the public expressions of the analyses 
made on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as perceived role of thelslamists and of 
the opposition in general 842. Quandt and Pierre remark that "few in Washington really 
wanted to see the FIS succeed in toppling the regime in Algiers, just as few in Paris 
were confident that the `eradicators" could prevail. The biggest difference was that for 
the United States, the whole issue of Algeria was quite remote, whereas for France it 
was close to the top of the foreign policy agenda ... " 
". 
In fact, Washington's apparent position of neutrality - calling on the regime and 
opposition forces to engage in dialogue - helped protect American lives and seemed 
to warrant the prospect for constructive relations with the Islamists if they come to 
power. In reality, Washington's stance toward the Algerian situation has been 
characterised to a great extent by a certain ambiguity. Following the cancellation of 
the 1991 electoral process, American officials abstained from condemning the 
military's act and issued no public demand that the elections be reinstated. The 
ambivalent State Department response showed respect for French positions. Above 
all, it reflected the difficult choices it faced in Algeria between the principle of 
democracy, which it has long championed, and a regime that democracy could 
produce which could prove inimical to Western interests. Actually, just days before the 
parliamentary elections, Bush administration officials were sticking to a familiar line: "If 
what results in Algeria emerges from a democratic process we will work with it. We 
want to engage with whatever regime holds power' 8'° . 
Responding to criticism that the United States was taking sides, State 
Department spokeswoman Margaret Twiliter, conveying a more neutral position, 
declared: "We are not going to take sides on whether [ Algeria's High Security 
Council] are indeed operating within their Constitution or, as the opposition claims, 
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they are not"8a5 . Washington thus declined to remind the Algerian government that 
constitutional guarantees should be respected ßi6. 
Washington has since taken a milder position regarding the military 
government. It has endorsed Algeria's efforts to transform the economic system. The 
United States supported the economic reform programme which the Algerian 
government is implementing in co-ordination with the IMF. It is also joined with other 
creditors in rescheduling Algeria's public debt through the Paris Club 8" . 
Other changes in the U. S. policy have also become evident. Initially, American 
appreciation of its interests and the nature of its ties to Algeria seemed to warrant a 
disinterested U. S. policy. For reasons of geography and history that country is not in a 
traditional area of influence of the United States. U. S. interests in Algeria and North 
Africa in general have been less significant than in the broader Middle East. These 
facts comforted U. S. officials in that the development of the domestic situation in 
Algeria would not touch on major U. S. interests and consequently would not require 
American involvement to solve the conflict" . Also, the realisation that Washington 
lacked the traditional instruments of diplomatic leverage (like economic or military 
assistance) led U. S. officials "to appreciate the limits of U. S. influence in Algeria" "49 . 
The relatively limited U. S. economic involvement in Algeria has been mainly in 
the energy sector. Over the years, U. S. firms have helped Algeria develop its oil and 
gas resources. The Export-Import Bank has guaranteed $2 billion in loans to private 
American corporations, including loans for gas liquefaction plants and to the Europe- 
Maghreb pipeline. Annual U. S. exports of machinery and services to Algeria's 
hydrocarbon sector amount to approximately $300 million. In addition, Algeria 
received S550 million in loans for the import of agricultural commodities as part of the 
Commodity Credit Corporation programme The United States has not provided 
military assistance to Algeria but Algerian military officers have participated in military 
educational training in the United States '. 
Even these facts seem to be changing. The combination of political legitimacy 
(conferred by the 1995 elections) and the continuing improvement of economic 
8J5 Ibid. 
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legislation has assuaged international companies which have been flocking to 
Algerian shores attracted by the still unexplored potential of gas and oil resources. 
Atlantic Richfield is committed to a $1.5 billion plus contract for developing oil fieldsas'. 
U. S. statements on its strategic interests in the event of an Islamist takeover 
in Algeria have emphasised regional stability. Pelletreau affirmed that "beyond the far- 
reaching consequences for Algeria itself, further radical Islamist gains there could 
embolden extremists in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco - key U. S. allies in the region"852. 
Lewis argues that Moroccans and Tunisians regard the Islamic Salvation Front as the 
principal threat to the stability of their countries: "The Tunisians feel strongly that the 
decision by the government in Algiers to cancel the second phase of elections in 
December 1991 was prudent" . Both Tunisia and Morocco have suffered terrorist 
attacks at the hands of Algerian Islamists. Egypt, which has managed to survive an 
upsurge of Islamist terrorism since 1992, would also face the possibility of Algerian 
aid to Egyptian Islamists channelled through Sudan. Egypt's principal worry, explains 
a Western diplomat, "is that if Algeria becomes a revolutionary Islamic state, you can 
expect an alliance with Iran and Sudan, and that would really scare the moderate 
Arab regimes" I. 
Although at present it seems unlikely that an Islamist takeover in Algeria would 
initiate a North African domino effect, the triumph of the Islamic movement in Algeria 
would harden other Islamic movements outside the country and increase pressure on 
other regimes in the region. Even pro-Western Arab countries such as Jordan and 
Turkey watch developments in Algeria with interest. An Islamic success in Algeria 
would embolden other Islamic revolutionaries, providing a psychological boost to 
those who might see it as a vindication of Islamism and a harbinger of things to come 
in their own countries 865 
A paramount security concern of the United States is the possible impact of 
developments in Algeria on Europe, creating a tide of refugees in France, Italy and 
Spain. Across French society, especially and inside France's ruling institutions, there 
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is a growing worry since France retains deep emotional ties to its former colony and is 
now home to at least 4 million Muslim immigrants, mainly from Algeria. The 
widespread perception is that an Islamic revolution in Algeria could have devastating 
consequences, inundating France with Algerian refugees, strengthening the country's 
right-wing parties and turning its Muslim immigrant community into a dangerous fifth 
column '. 
France has been the target of Algerian terrorists because of its long colonial 
ties in the Maghreb. The 1995 attacks, which killed 8 and wounded 151, were 
attributed to the GIA which blames France for its support of the Algerian government. 
In December 1996 a bomb planted in a Paris train station killed two people and 
wounded more than 100. This has forced French authorities to tighten security 
measures. Starting in 1993, the French police raided Islamic networks and uncovered 
arms caches. The raids have evidenced the extent of informal Islamist networks 
composed of French-born, ethnic Maghrebians that extend beyond France's 
borders' . 
Given the incumbent Algerian's government support for the Arab-Israeli peace 
process, an Islamist regime in Algeria would be expected to join other extremist 
groups opposed to the peace process. A related U. S. concern is that, in that 
eventuality, Islamist rulers would not discard terrorism as an instrument of policy. An 
Islamic Algeria, like Iran and Sudan, is likely to become a haven and base forlslamist 
terrorist groups. The Algerian "Afghanis" have already established links with a wide 
variety of other Islamists, both during the war in Afghanistan and in training camps in 
Pakistan and Sudan. Furthermore, exiled FIS leaders have made contact with a wide 
array of Islamic radicals in Europe 8. 
Americans are particularly worried about the possibility that a radical-leaning 
Algeria would acquire weapons of mass destruction. In 1991, U. S. intelligence 
agencies discovered a nuclear research reactor that Algeria was building secretly with 
Chinese assistance. A nuclear-armed revolutionary Algeria would pose a critical 
threat to NATO allies, regional friends and American forces in the Mediterranean 
basin 859 
. Already, Algeria has a significant military capability with Kilo submarines 
and SU-24 bombers and the largest military in North Africa after Egypt. A power 
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vacuum in North Africa or a hostile government coming to power in Algeria would thus 
complicate U. S. operations worldwide. In fact, the United States depends on sea 
lanes of communications from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Suez Canal to allow the 
rapid deployment for naval forces from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean and the 
Persian Gulf. Likewise, air operations during initial deployments to the region and in 
support of operations during a conflict depend onoverflight and basing rights in North 
Africa ". 
The above considerations highlight the fact that Washington does have a 
major stake in the outcome of the struggle inside Algeria "' since anlslamist takeover 
would undermine U. S. interests in a number of ways862 . Algeria can not be weighed 
alone in terms of the damages to U. S. interests. What is going on in Algeria involves 
issues extending beyond its borders and affecting the evolution of the Muslim world. It 
is a debate between those who perceive Islamic resurgence as a threat to Western 
civilisation and those who defend that it accommodates humanitarian and democratic 
values ". Quandt and Pierre assert that "Algeria ... is something of a test case for 
whether democracy, Islamic populism, or military dictatorship will be the wave of the 
future in the Arab world 864 . 
This testing ground has major implications for the United States. This 
realisation has already produced changes in Washington's approach to Algeria, 
especially after the 1995 presidential elections that confirmedZeroual's position and 
constituted a setback to extremist forces. A more proactive U. S. policy - as 
recommended in the Carnegie Endowment report on Algeria - is in the making. It 
transcends the former official rhetoric that, while reflecting a rational approach, offered 
little follow - through action. 
In December 1995, President Clinton wrote to the newly-elected president 
offering to support him as he takes steps to broaden and accelerate the policy of 
national reconciliation, political dialogue and economic reform "5 . In March 1996, 
Robert Pelletreau travelled to Algiers where he heard PresidentZeroual reaffirm his 
commitment to national reconciliation through dialogue. Pelletreau also met with a 
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range of opposition political leaders . U. S. Ambassador Ronald Neumann - 
mirroring U. S. concern with the pattern of censorship and seizure of Algerian 
newspapers by the Algerian government - visited, in late 1996, the complex housing 
the embattled journalists where he championed the idea of a free press. The United 
States has now become a more active third party although it does not seem to be 
interested in supplanting France's role. 
10.3.2. Iran 
The Clinton Administration has taken an extraordinarily tough line against Iran, 
as it is considered the chief threat to American security interests in the Middle East. 
The "demonisation" of Iran stems from the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the resultant 
hostage crisis. The image of U. S. citizens held hostage for 444 days was seared into 
the public mind. Americans listened as Khomeini called the United States the Great 
Satan and they watched as a succession of terrorist attacks targeted U. S. citizens. 
16Iran became, in Esposito's words, "a country that many Americans loved to hate" '. 
Under the Clinton administration, the "demonisation" process has reached a 
new height and, in fact, the governmental stance mirrors public debate, where Iran, 
Islamic fundamentalism and Muslim terrorism became inseparable. Iran has become 
the "rogue state", par excellence. The areas of disagreement between Washington 
and Tehran encompass five major issues: (1) disturbing acquisition of weapons by 
Iran; (2) Iran's sponsorship of international terrorism and assassination of its political 
foes; (3) a hostile attitude toward the Arab-Israeli peace process; (4) subversion 
directed against its neighbours; (5) violations of human rights '68. 
The spiralling of the conflict " between the two countries dates back to the 
end of the Bush administration. This administration had in fact showed no particular 
"' Pelletreau. "U. S. Policy Toward Algeria" Statement before the Senate Subcommittee on Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Washington, D. C., 16 April 1996: p. 2. 
867, "Islamic Movements, the Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations, and the Role of Regional Players", in 
Hooshang Amirahmadi and Eric Hooglund (eds. ), U. S. -Iran Relations: Areas of Tension and, 1lutual 
Interests (Washington, D. C.: Middle East Institute, 1994). p. 29. 
" Peter Tamofi's statement, U. S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, U. S. Polk}' 
Toward Iran (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1996), pp. 7-8. 
869 Richard Cottam, "American Political Dynamics and Iran", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and James A. 
Bill (eds. ), The Clinton Administration and the Future of US. -Iran Relations (Aliddle East Insight - 
Policy Report no 3,1993), p. 9. 
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hostility towards Tehran. Secretary Djerejian had, for instance, made an important 
speech calling for good relations between the United States and IranB7° . During the 
last months of the Bush administration a tendency began to crystallise, one that 
considered Iran a focal point of threat for U. S. policy in the Middle East. 
James Bill and Richard Cottam observed that in early 1993 "an image of Iran 
that is increasingly stereotypical is beginning to appear from Israeli leaders and the 
Israeli press. This suggests that very important pressure is also likely to be manifest 
on United States' policy toward Iran" 87 . The Los Angels rimes quoted Israeli 
spokesmen as stating that "Iran has to be identified as EnemyN° 1". According to this 
article, "the whole Israeli political and intellectual establishment, in fact, has been 
galvanized to put across this message" 872. The concerted campaign involved well- 
known newspaper commentators, individuals and groups in the United States. Gulf 
leaders joined the chorus of censure by depicting Iran as the orchestrator of 
subversion in their countries. Arab states, led by Egypt, pointed to Iran's rearmament 
activity in the Gulf as conclusive proof of Iran's expansionist and hegemonic drive°7 . 
These allegations, although often exaggerated for political purposes, have 
nonetheless a very accurate basis. 
Much of the concern surrounding Iran's intentions has to do with Tehran's 
building up of its military capabilities. Iran's weapons procurement programme, 
underway since 1989, aims at rebuilding, expanding and modernising its armed 
forces. Since the 1979 revolution, its forces have been weakened by political purges, 
huge losses of up to 60 percent of its major weapons systems in the eight-year war 
with Iraq, and shortages of spare parts for U. S. and Western arms supplied before 
1979 874. Rafsanjani's government allocated, in January 1990, $2 billion per year for 
five years to buy advanced weapons. Iran has acquired weapons mainly from Russia, 
China and several Eastern European states although financial constraints have forced 
it to cancel a number of contracts and dramatically cut procurement. 
870 Ibid. . 8' Ibid. ; James Bill, "Opening Remarks", in Amirahmadi and Bill (eds. ), op. cit. : pp. 5-6; Bill. "The 
United States and Iran: Mutual Mythologies", Middle East Police (II), n° 3,1993: p. 98. s'= Parks, op. cit. : p. 2. 
Gary Sick. "U. S. Interest in Iran and U. S. Iran Policy" inAmirahmadi and Hooglund. op. cit. : pp. 
19-21; Sick's intervention in the debate on "Iran's New Role in Politics of the Region", in Amirahmadi 
(ed. ), Revisiting Iran's Strategic Significance : p. 31. 
674 Michael Eisenstadt, Iranian Military Power (Washington, D. C.: The Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy, 1996), pp. 35-6; Phillips, "The Challenge of Revolutionary Iran" : p. 5. 
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These developments are viewed as natural by some analysts who point out 
that "seen from Tehran, the entire region is unstable"875. In the aftermath of the Gulf 
War, the United States stepped up its involvement in the region through a series of 
bilateral defence arrangements with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar. 
Tehran was furthermore excluded from GCC security arrangements87' . Compared 
with its Gulf oil-rich neighbours, Iran's build up is modest B" . 
Yet, Iran's military plans have sparked considerable concern that Tehran 
seeks to establish regional hegemony by building its military capabilities far beyond its 
legitimate defence needs 878 . Iran's long-term objective 
is to acquire a modern air 
force of roughly 300 advanced combat aircraft; a modern army with 5,000 to 6,000 
tanks, 2,000 self-propelled artillery pieces, and thousands of armoured personnel 
carriers, and a navy upgraded with three advanced RussianKilo - class submarines 
and scores of fast patrol boats armed with missiles a'9 . 
Iran's conventional capabilities are still modest and a greater financial effort 
would be required in order to equip it with, for instance, strong offensive capabilities 
"0. In fact, since the end of 1991 overall military expenditures have been declining 
and since 1993 they have not exceeded $1 billion881 .A more legitimate U. S. concern 
is the fact that Iran also purchased hundreds of ballistic missiles and the technology 
to produce them from North Korea and China. Tehran has acquired at least 300 
SCUD-B surface-to-surface missiles with a range of approximately 185 miles, and an 
unknown number of improved SCUD-Cs, with a range of approximately 370 miles. 
Iran's missiles can reach major population centres across the Persian Gulf. Iran 
reportedly has also agreed to buy 150 North Korean Nodong 1 missiles with an 
estimated range of over 600 miles. These surface-to-surface missiles are capable of 
S75 Shaul Bakhash, "Iranian Political Dynamics and the United States", in Amirahmadi and Bill (eds. ), 
op. cit. : p. 13; Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "Iran's National Strategy", Jane's International Defense 
Review (27), April 1994: pp. 35-7. 
s'6 Amirahmadi, "Containment or Collision? ", Middle East Insight (XI), no 5. July/August 1995: pp. 
27-8; "The Spiralling Arms Race", Middle East Insight (10), n° 2, January/February 1994: p. 47. 
''' Shahram Chubin, Iran's National Security Policy (Washington. D. C.: The Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1994), pp. 34-6. See Sick's critical view on the Gulf's amts race and on Saudi 
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delivering conventional, chemical, or nuclear warheads on targets as far away as 
Israel 382 
Iran's missile build up is especially worrisome given the possibility of marrying 
chemical warheads and biological warheads on long range missiles. Eisenstadt 
affirms that "Iran has the most active chemical warfare program in the developing 
world" 883. The CIA estimates that Iran has produced and stockpiled up to 2,000 tons 
of chemical warfare agents. Iran also has an active biological warfare programme and 
has tried to buy biological agents from Europe 'a' . 
But the West's chief worry is Iran's effortto develop nuclear weapons, which 
has been making progress under the cover of Iran's civilian nuclear power 
programme. Iran has attempted to acquire materials and technologies potentially 
useful to the production of nuclear weapons in a number of countries. American 
intelligence analysts have reported that Iranian acquisition teams have shopped for 
weapons - related nuclear equipment and nuclear scientists from poorly guarded 
facilities in the former Soviet Union, concentrating on Azerbaijan, Kazakhastan, 
Turkmenistan, and Ukraineels. 
There is some disagreement among experts as to Iran's progress in that 
direction but the minimal assessment, as put forward by Gary Sick, is that "Iran has 
almost certainly embarked on an effort to acquire what might be called the precursor 
infrastructure for a nuclear weapons project" ". There have also been several 
estimates about how long it would take Iran to produce a bomb. The CIA estimate 
says eight to ten years 887 
. 
Washington's fierce hostility towards Iran, largely Congress-driven, will not 
abate as long as Tehran remains the main supporter of terrorist groups opposed to 
the peace process. Israeli analysts attribute a rise in terrorist activity, and an 
increasing tendency for Iran to become directly involved, to Tehran's determination to 
scuttle the Middle East peace process. "Iran's message forHamas and Islamic Jihad 
Nye's statement, U. S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Relations, U' S. Policy Toward Iran 
and Iraq (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1995), p. 22: Phillips. op. cit. 
Eisenstadt, op. cit. pp. 28-30. 
33' Op. Cit. : p. 26. 
... Phillips, op. cit.: p. 3. 
885 Eisenstadt, op. cit. : pp. 14-6. 
1116 Op. Cit. p. 16. 
S8' Ibid. . 
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and Hizbollah is the same: make terror and lots of it", says an Israeli military officer 
888 
Although not taking direct orders from Iran, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad 
receive from Tehran considerable military and economic support. Clawson estimates 
that Hamas and the Islamic Jihad receive $20 to $30 million annually in financial 
support and military training from Hizbollah and Iranian instructors in Lebanon, Sudan 
and Iran 889. According to Israeli intelligence, approximately 1001-lamas fighters have 
received military and terrorist instruction at Iranian bases. Iran reportedly paid a cash 
bonus of $120,000 to Hamas following a series of bloody suicide bombings in Israel in 
February and March 1996 890 . 
Iran also provides the Lebanese Hizbollah with a variety of political, military, 
and economic support - including as much as $100 million annually in arms and 
financial assistance (though the stipend dropped to $60 million in 1995). Several 
hundred Revolutionary Guards, the militant shock troops of the Iranian revolution, 
work closely in support of Hizbollah in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. Iran resupplied the 
movement with 500-900 Katyusha rockets during Operation Grapes of Wrath in April 
1996 191 All these activities contradict Rafsanjani's pledge that "practically speaking, 
we do not take any action against the peace plan"ems . Hizbollah's list of terrorist acts 
include the 1983 bombing of the U. S. Embassy in Beirut, the 1983 bombing of the 
U. S. Marine barracks at Beirut Airport, and the kidnapping of most of the 15 American 
hostages held in Lebanon. 
Iran's involvement in terrorist activities continues under various guises. Some 
of them have highlighted the high degree of coordination among diverse Iranian 
government agencies and entities. The September 1992 assassination in Berlin of the 
Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran's chief, Sadegh Sharafkandi, exposed, according to 
a French official, that "the whole Iranian state apparatus is at the service of these 
operations" 893 Terrorist actions are thus decided at the top of the Iranian government. 
The key groups involved in planning and executing terrorist attacks are the 
ý$ Thomas Sancton, "Iran's State of Terror', Time (148), n°20,11 November 1996: p. 84. 
Eisenstadt, op. cit. : p. 74. 
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Revolutionary Guards, headed by Moshen Reza'i, and the Intelligence Ministry, 
headed by Sheikh Ali Fallahian "" . 
In recent years, Iran has stepped up terrorist attacks against Iranian exiles. 
More than a dozen Iranian dissidents have been assassinated in European cities 
since 1987, including the August 1991 murder of former Iranian Prime Minister 
Shapour Bakhtiar and the September 1992 murders of four Kurdish opposition leaders 
in the "Mykonos" restaurant in Berlin. In recent years, the locus of Iran's terrorist 
campaign has also moved from the main European capitals to its periphery and to 
Pakistan, Iraq and Turkey 8' . 
Iranian-supported terrorists have been particularly active against targets in 
Turkey. The Turkish Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the murder of an Israeli 
diplomat and the bombing of an Istanbul synagogue. It also is believed to be 
responsible for a series of murders of Turkish journalists and of members of Iranian 
opposition groups. The Turkish government indicated that Turkish militants were 
trained in Iran 11 . 
The number of Iran-backed assassinations is actually on the rise - about 14 in 
1996, compared with five for all of 1995897. U. S. intelligence agencies and dissident 
groups believe that Iranian agents may be preparing to increase their firepower in 
future hits. In March 1996, Belgian authorities found aspecially-designed high-calibre 
mortar launcher with a range of more than 630 meters in an Iranian ship docked in 
Antwerp. The ordnance is believed to have been intended for use in Iranian terrorist 
898 operations in Euro; ý:. 
Iranian efforts have also been directed toward subversive pro-Western 
regimes. Egypt has repeatedly charged Tehran of fomenting instability and of 
providing support to Islamic radicals. It has viewed with increasing concern the Iranian 
partnership with Sudan, which has allowed Tehran to use its territory as a forward 
base for exporting the Islamic revolution to North and Black Africa399. The Algerian 
prime minister Ahmad Ouyahya said Iran "provides the biggest financial backing to 
sva Sancton, "Iran's State 
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Eisenstadt, op. cit. : p. 66. 
s96 "Turkish Probe Says "Iranian Hit Team" Killed Israeli Embassy Guard in Ankara", SWB ME/25-84 
NED, 12 April 1996: p. 8. Sami Kohen, "Turkey Says Iran is Base for Terrorist Training", The 
Christian Science Monitor, 11 February 1993: p. 6; Phillips, op. cit. : p. 4. 
Sancton, id. . s's Ibid. 
. s" "Interior Minister Accuses Iran of Plotting Against Egypt", STYE, M E/2846 MED, 18 February 
1997: p. 15. 
246 
the terrorist groups that are waging war against the Algerian state "go . In December 
1995, Jordan expelled an Iranian diplomat from Amman for trying to incite Jordanians 
to murder Israeli tourists visiting that country901 . In Bahrain, which was the target of 
an abortive revolution in 1981, the authorities arrested a group of suspects in 
connection with an alleged pro-Iranian plot to topple the government. One of the 
suspects confessed the Bahrainis were trained by pro-Iranian Hizbollah guerrillas in 
Lebanon 502. Saudi authorities suspect Iranian involvement in the al-Khobar bombing 
that took 19 lives 903 . 
Washington is also concerned with the Iranian presence in Bosnia. The 
relationship between Bosnia and Iran was allowed to develop during the war, in large 
part because of the embargo which drove the Muslim government into alliances with 
some of the world's most radical states, as well as terrorists movements. The Clinton 
administration has led a campaign to wean the Muslim-ledBosnian government from 
its war-time dependence on Iran, which smuggled hundreds of tons of weapons into 
Bosnia between 1993 and 1995. The training of a unit of theBosnian army, called the 
7' Muslim Brigade, was undertaken by Iran and was modelled after that of the 
Iranian-backed Hizbollah organisation in Lebanon. Fearing the creation of a terrorist 
foothold in Europe and the possibility of attacks against U. S. troops in the NATO force 
now enforcing peace in Bosnia, Washington demanded that all foreign forces must 
depart as part of the 1995 Dayton accord 904 
In responding to the challenges posed by Iran, Washington has employed both 
multilateral measures to "contain" and induce it to change its policies as the "Dual 
Containment" policy lays out. They have included economic pressure (in the form of 
partial trade bans and in May 1995 a total trade ban), a ban on arms transfers, 
restrictions on the transfer of dual-use and nuclear technology, a ban on loans and 
credits, and efforts to block all lending to Iran from international financial institutions 
such as the IMF and the World Bank 905. 
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Iran has dominated the U. S. foreign policy agenda as well as the minds of top 
policy-makers, especially former Secretary of State, Warren Christopher. The 
question of Iran was put on the agenda of the summit talks between Presidents 
Clinton and Yeltsin in Washington in September 1994. In order to put the Americans 
at ease, Yeltsin felt the need to assure them publicly that Russia had no intention of 
signing new arms agreements with the Islamic Republic. And again in May 1995 
president Clinton asked Yeltsin to cancel a S1 billion sale of light water nuclear 
reactors to Iran, which Russia refused to do. In June of the same year President 
Clinton pressed, again unsuccessfully, the G-7 (Group of Seven) meeting at Halifax, 
Canada, to follow the U. S. trade embargo, in light of "Iran's continuing support for 
terrorism, including support for acts which undermine the Middle East peace process, 
as well as its intensified efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction"906 . Given 
the U. S. allies' reluctance to follow that path, Washington approved the "Iran-Libya 
Sanctions Act of 1996" that imposes sanctions on foreign companies that engage in 
specific economic transactions with Iran or Libya. 
The U. S. attempt to build an international consensus regarding the threat 
posed by Iran has largely failed. Russia, China and North Korea have not stopped the 
transfer of dangerous arms and technologies to Iran. Russia and China have growing 
ties with Iran and they look toward that country as a source of valuable hard currency 
and a potential ally in a number of foreign policy areas907. America's major trading 
partners - Canada, Japan, and Europe - were outraged by Washington's unilateral 
heavy-handed approach. They are reluctant to adopt measures that will mean a loss 
of business for their companies. European countries favoured until April 1997 a policy 
called "critical dialogue" (Japan and Canada favour a similar approach), arguing that 
political dialogue rather than economic pressure are more likely to induce moderation 
in Tehran's policies 908. Germany was the most fervent advocate of continuing 
diplomatic contacts and business relations, arguing that the E. U. should not give in to 
U. S. pressure to isolate Iran. 
The European position regarding Iran has changed following the 10 April ruling 
by a German court implicating the Iranian political leadership in the assassination in 
Berlin in September 1992 of four Iranian opposition activists, including three senior 
906 Ibid. ; Adam Tarock, ' U. S. -Tian Relations: Heading for Confrontation", Third World Quarterly (17). 
n°1,1996: p. 149. 
907 Eisenstadt, op. cit.: p. 91. 
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Post, 27 June 1996: p. A 21. 
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leaders of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran. Within hours of the ruling, the E. U. 
presidency condemned Iran in the "Mykonos case" and declared its behaviour totally 
unacceptable. It invited the 15 members states to recall their ambassadors for 
coordinated consultations on future relations with Iran09. Although emphasising the 
gravity of the affair, E. U. officials were adamant that there will be no move to impose 
sanctions against Iran 910. 
Critics are pointing out with increasing urgency that the U. S. policy toward Iran 
has been a miserable failure. This feeling is espoused by large part of the academic 
community. Those participating in the many conferences and debates that have 
discussed the issue 91 have favoured initiation of some sort of dialogue between the 
two countries and the need to cut into the "spiral conflict" in order to dissipate the 
misperceptions 912. Analysts point that the U. S. policy toward Iran fails to recognise 
that country's strategic importance in the Gulf and that its fosters scenarios of 
uncertainty and instability. Amirahmadi says that "the present Dual Containment 
policy is counter-productive because discord between Iran and the U. S. curtails the 
capability of both countries and strengthens hardliners on both sides, while placing 
American corporations at a disadvantage in the face of competition from Europe and 
the Pacific Rim ... " 
913 
In the United States, "there is an understandable restlessness in the foreign 
policy community to the effect that the hard-line U. S. strategy of "containing" Iran is in 
need of revision" 914. The policy has been criticised by personalities in the U. S. foreign 
policy establishment. Former national security advisers, Zbigniew Brzezinski and 
Brent Scowcroft, and former Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Murphy, wrote in 
Foreign Affairs that "U. S. Persian Gulf policy is at an impasse... The policy of 
unilateral U. S. sanctions against Iran has been ineffective and the attempt to coerce 
909 Saeed Barzin. "Bitter Fruits of Afykonos", . diddle East International, n° 548,18 April 
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others into following America's lead has been a mistake". They charge that the policy 
is "strident" and instead of isolating Iran it is driving the United States and its allies 
apart and Iran and Russia closer together 9t5. 
The May 1997 victory in Iran's presidential election of moderate former culture 
minister, Mohammad Khatami, has reinforced the views of analysts who have been 
urging the Clinton administration to rethink the long U. S. drive to isolate Iran. They 
have pointed out that the administration should respond with new overtures, even if 
rhetorical 916. The latter has followed the election and its aftermath with a keen 
interest. A State Department official declared that a change in U. S. policywill depend 
on real changes in Iran' s behaviour in those areas that have been a source of 
concern to the American government 91. 
The prospect of domestic evolution in Iran is not likely to mark a turning point 
in U. S. harsh policy towards Iran. Domestic considerations will make this very difficult. 
Fuller and Lesser highlight this fact by pointing out that "any alteration now will require 
a change of mindset in Congress, where the issue has been politicized and 
entrenched" 918. Conservative politicians and pro-Israeli groups want the United 
States to take unilateral military action against Tehran if it is found to have been 
involved in the June 1996 bombing of U. S. military facility in Saudi Arabia 9t9. 
10.3.3. Sudan 
Sudan, under military rule and the spiritual leadership of Sheikh Hasan al- 
Turabi, has became a main concern of the United States has been branded one of the 
most dangerous terrorist regimes not only in Africa, but in the entire Muslim world. 
Sudan has become the centre ofmujahidin networks and activists who were forced to 
leave Pakistan. It is now the training and logistical headquarters for the so-called 
"Afghanis" wherever they fight in the 1990s. A key supporter of the "Afghanis" is 
Osama bin Laden, the Saudi businessman who served as an Islamic recruitment 
"Differentiated Containment", Foreign Affairs (76), n. 3, May/ June 1997: p. 28,20. 
9l6 See the opinions of Richard Murphy and traditional advocates of U. S. efforts to contain Iran. like 
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agent for Afghanistan and maintains an office in Sudan. Bin Laden has large land 
holdings south of Khartoum that Western intelligence agencies suspect have been 
used as military training camps for Islamic fundamentalists 920 . 
Sudan's guest list includes: two radical Palestinian groups, the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine; the fundamentalist Palestinian group Hamas; the Iranian-backed Islamic 
Jihad; the outlawed FIS; Tunisia's Nahda; Yemen's Al-Islah; and Egypt's Gamaat 
Islamiyya. 
Turabi created in 1991 the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC) to 
serve his ambitions to lead the Sunni world of Islam and to substitute for the 
conservative Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). Seeking to project its 
influence beyond its borders, Sudan has joined forces with Tehran thus becoming 
Shiite Iran's first ally in the Sunni Muslim world. Critics of Sudan's behaviour affirm 
that "Islamists chose Sudan to become a staging ground for their ideological conquest 
of Africa" 921 . In effect, Sudan is geographically ideal as a base for the export of 
Islamism. It has a long border with Egypt, a country that is the object ofTurabi's 
contempt. It is very close to Saudi Arabia, a rival in terms of leadership of the Islamic 
world. It is the gateway to black Africa, which is seen by the fundamentalists as 
promising missionary territory _` . 
The relationship has taken off since a visit to Sudan in December 1991 by 
Iran's leader Hashemi Rafsanjani. Rafsanjani reportedly committed $17 million of 
financial aid to Sudan on the spot, but he also agreed to pay China S300 million for 
weapons to be supplied to Sudan. Iran also agreed to deliver a million tons of oil 
annually, free of payment 923. Iran is to dispatch thousands of "construction mujahidin", 
a paramilitary organisation, to Sudan to help build logistical infrastructure. Port Sudan 
provides the Iranian navy, and its three new Russian-built attack submarines, with its 
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only mooring facilities outside Iran 924. Iran has shipped contingents of Revolutionary 
Guards to Sudan that are operating training camps for Islamic extremists. The guards 
are also drawn from the "Qods [Jerusalem] Force", which is responsible for 
extraterritorial activities, including terrorist operations. 500 cadets of the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard are fighting alongside the Sudanese government's troops 
against the opposition on Sudan's eastern and southern fronts925 . Iran's man in 
Khartoum is Ambassador Majid Kamal, Tehran's top agent in Beirut during the 1980s, 
who played a key role in the creation of the Shiite terrorist group Hizbollah 926 
Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak is convinced that at least some of the 
mounting terrorism in his country is orchestrated from Sudan. He says Sudan has 
trained and gives refuge to Islamic extremists active in Egypt and that it is the source 
of a vast illegal arms traffic to Egypt. These protestations have grown since June 
1995 when President Mubarak was nearly assassinated on a trip to Addis Ababa. 
Apparently, Sudanese citizens were directly involved, working with the Egyptian 
gunmen in the attack on Mubarak and his guards in the Ethiopian capital. 
Sudan's subversive activities have become a source of great concern for its 
neighbours. All of the eight states it borders have complained about Sudanese 
interference or subversion, usually via extremist organisations of locallslamists who 
receive funding or weapons from Khartoum. This is most blatant in the case of 
Algeria92' and Eritrea, which has repeatedly complained to theU. N. about an Islamist 
insurgency that is totally dependent on Sudan928 .A string of bombings in Ethiopia's 
capital also points to Sudanese involvement929 . Kenya 
has similar complaints, and 
so has Uganda. Poorly policed borders between Sudan and some of its neighbours 
allowed it to smuggle in weapons. Refugee camps constitute an easy ground for 
recruitment of would-be extremists 9'0 . 
Israel has taken a keen interest in Sudan since the sharp rise of bombings 
attributed to Hamas. Khartoum has made no secret of its warm relations withHamas 
r'4 Amir Taheri, "Sudan: An Expanding Civil War with an Iran Connection", International Herald 
Tribune, 9 April 1997. 
925 "Iranian Military Aid Reportedly Arrives in Sudan", SWVB, ME/2846 MED, 18 February 1997: p. 17. 
926 Richard Z. Chesnoff et al., "Bad Company in Khartoum", U. S. News & World Report, 30 August/6 
September 1993: p. 45. 
92' "Sudanese Opposition Official Alleges Sudanese Islamic Front Role in Algeria". SNB. ME/2314 
MED, 27 May 1995: p. 14. 
g'g Durän, op. cit. : pp. 60-4. 
929 Judith Matloff, "Ethiopia Edgy Over Violent Islamic Militancy Seeping In", The Christian Science 
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930 Hannan, "Sudan's Neighbors Accuse It of Training Terrorists": p. 19. 
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though it denies that the group has training camps. The group's representative in the 
Sudanese capital boasts that Sudan has been "very supportive of our operations"' . 
Sudanese officials contend that they have an open society for Arabs and that they 
can not be condemned for the actions of those who simply pass through their country. 
The reality, according to U. S. intelligence reports, is that the "government's policy is to 
let terrorists in without a visa, and to grant them passports"932 . Sudan's performance 
in support of Islamist terrorism led the U. S. government to place it in March 1993 
State Department list of nations that support terrorism. Washington's decision to 
formally condemn Khartoum's government was taken after U. S. officials told Sudan in 
December 1991 to close the training camps and cut its terror links to Iran. Sudanese 
diplomats have denied everything. 
Evidence also pointed to the role of Sudan in the second plot of the World 
Trade Center conspiracy, the plan to bomb the United Nations headquarters, two New 
York commuter tunnels and to assassinate prominent political figures. Members of the 
Sudanese delegation to the U. N. were apparently directly involved with one of the 
leading perpetrators, another Sudanese 933 . According to the 
U. S. News & World 
Report, "U. S. authorities have firm evidence that Sudanese spiritual leaderHassan al- 
Turabi personally informed Sudan's U. N. ambassador that although the two had 
diplomatic cover, they were in fact intelligence operatives" 934 . 
The Sudan issue has risen right up the U. S. agenda, with a strong lobby in 
Congress for maximum sanctions. During the September 1994 congressional hearing 
on the situation in North Africa , Esposito asserted 
that there was a concerted 
campaign to demonize Sudan, even in the absence of concrete evidence to condemn 
it. Referring to the role of Congress in this campaign, he affirmed: "We take a country 
like Sudan and suddenly we totally demonize Sudan" 935. If indeed this thrust is to 
intensify, the composition of the experts panel summoned to testify in the April 1995 
hearings on "Islamic Extremism in Africa", is revealing. The hearings brought together 
some harsh critics of Sudans policies: Steven Emerson, author of the contested T. V 
documentary, "Jihad in America"; Jason Isaacson, a member of the pro-Israeli 
American Jewish Committee, and Khalid Duran, editor of "Transstate Islam", a 
931 Ibid. ; Steve Emerson, "Militant Islam and the West", U. S. Congress. House Committee on 
International Relations, The Threat oflslamic Extremism in Africa: p. 41. 
93' Peter Ford, "N. Y. Bomb Plot Renews Charges of Sudanese Terrorist Ties". The Christian Science 
Monitor, 28 June 1993: p. 3. 
"' Emerson, op. cit. : p. 40. 
934 Chesnoffet al., op. cit. : p. 45. 
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quarterly journal with an anti-Islamist orientation. They unanimously pointed to the 
Sudan's efforts to instigate subversion on a wide international level. 
The Security Council has echoed these charges. It condemned Sudan in 
January 1996 for terrorist activity and, by implication, involvement in the assassination 
attempt of President Mubarak. The condemnation, which was unequivocal and 
unanimous, translates "the seriousness of Khartoum's position and the 
persuasiveness of the evidence originally put to the Council by Ethiopia-936 . 
Council's 
Resolution 1044 considered the attack against Mubarak "as aimed, not only at the 
president of Egypt, and not only at the sovereignty, integrity and stability of Ethiopia 
but also at Africa as a whole" 937 
During the course of the year, the U. N. imposed "diplomatic sanctions" and an 
air embargo on Sudan contrary to the U. S. will, which is now calling for stiffer 
sanctions. Sudanese leaders, though, have not changed their position since Ethiopia 
officially asked Khartoum to hand over the three suspects of the assassination 
attempt denying all along knowledge of their whereabouts. Meanwhile, the United 
States has decided to send military aid to Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda to help them 
"contain Sudan". Washington says that the aid is for the three governments, which 
have all publicly called for the overthrow of Khartoum's National Islamic Front and all 
actively helped the Sudanese opposition 938 
93 5 
936 Gill Lusk, "Sanctions in the Air", . Middle East International, no 519,16 February 1996: p. 12. 9" Ibid. 
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11. The American Position Towards the Islamist Movement in Egypt and Jordan 
11.1. The Islamist Challenge in Egypt and Jordan: U. S. Considerations 
The rising popularity of Islamic political movements has developed into one of 
the most important issues facing the Middle East. It has generated a great deal of 
analysis and many different conclusions, with some seeing it as a radical, extemally- 
driven force, and others viewing it as a natural and indigenous reflection of Islamic 
sentiment and as a yearning for democracy. 
U. S. official pronouncements on Islam display a good deal of ambiguity in 
current U. S. policy toward the Middle East and the issue of political Islam. Within the 
U. S. government, a nuanced approach has been advocated and even President 
Clinton has stressed that Islam is not viewed by the United States as the next great 
"ism" confronting the West or threatening world peace. He has repeatedly stated that 
the target of U. S. animosity is not Islam, but extremism. 
On the other hand, the same officials make conflicting statements which 
underlie a structural mistrust and suspicion of political Islam, an attitude which is 
widely shared by most Americans, who tend to see Islam in terms of its extremists. 
The aforementioned ambiguity in U. S. policy toward Islam, is displayed in the 
declarations of Edward Djerejian, former Assistant Secretary of State for Near 
Eastern Affairs, in relation to the American reaction to the cancellation of the electoral 
process in Algeria. Despite Washington's professed neutral stance, Djerejian 
remarked that, at the time, the prevailing feeling was that "the Algerian situation was 
so confrontational and polarized that to let the Islamists in would have amounted to a 
legalistic takeover through the framework of an electionn93'. He further declared that 
the Bush administration stated its "opposition to the Islamists coming to power, but 
only if the Algerian regime embarked on a dual-track policy": broadening the political 
dialogue and embarking on economic reforms 9'° . 
It seems that the general but mostly unstated view at the top echelons of the 
American government is that political Islam constitutes a threat to pro-Western 
regimes and that their coming to power would endanger Western interests in the area, 
939 Djerejian, "One Man, One Vote... ": p. 14. 
2ýý 
namely access to oil. This being the case, American policymakers can hardly remain 
indifferent to the developments in Egypt and Jordan, whereislamists constitute major 
opposition forces. In both countries, the mainstream Islamist movement is tamed and, 
at the moment, under the control of the regime. In the case of Jordan, thelslamists 
have been allowed into the political process but their margin of manoeuvre has been 
highly limited and their capacity to voice dissenting opinions restricted. Egypt has 
opted for channelling Islamists into social and economic welfare activities and 
hindering them from entering the official political process. Contrary to Jordan, where 
the extremist fringes are effectively silenced, the Egyptian government has been 
faced with a widespread insurrection of radical Islamist groups that pose a real 
challenge to the state. 
U. S. preoccupation with the implications of Islamist activity at a wider level led 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1993 to draft a study aiming to "assess 
whether and how its programs will affect the political composition and basic security 
of traditional friends and allies in the region"941 . The report was all the more relevant 
as it was felt compelling to articulate the new administration's commitment for 
democracy and human rights with the question of the Islamists' bid for power 942 . 
Faced with their political ambitions and increasing legitimacy in the context of 
a widespread discrediting of the existing regimes, the Clinton administration has 
adopted a cautious approach towards issues that are at the forefront of the Middle 
Eastern political agenda, especially liberalisation and democratisation. Quandt 
remarks that the democratisation agenda is now primarily a "rhetoric" issue and that 
"the application of this theme to the Middle East is halfhearted at best "W. This is 
because "it may produce a negative backlash, versus promoting ideas and practices 
that may produce stable, reliable, and prosperous friends for the United States" 944 . 
Egypt and Jordan, to different degrees, highlight the U. S. dilemmas and the 
preoccupation with the potentially disrupting effect of an Islamist takeover in those 
countries. This concern has been reflected primarily in the fact that Washington has 
revealed a preference for the status quo, ahead of support for democratisation in 
940 Ibid. . "' U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Battle Looms: Islam and Politics in the 
Middle East (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. v. 
94' Ibid. 
943 "New U. S. Policies for a New Middle East", in David Lesch (ed. ), The Middle East and the United 
States (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), p. 416,417. 
94" Id. : p. 417. 
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those countries 945. The Americans have shown "less interest in pushing the 
"democratization agenda", for fear that it might be the Islamists who exploit any 
openings" 946 . On the other hand, the 
U. S. government has by and large respected 
President Mubarak's and King Hussein's handling of the Islamists. Jordan and Egypt 
are even considered model cases in the way they manage thelslamist challenge. The 
practice of co-opting non-violent, mainstream Islamic movements - set against the 
background of the partial liberalisation of the political system - has moderated slam ist 
positions and largely worked in favour of those regimes. 
11.2. Egypt 
U. S. -Egyptian relations have been characterised by the periodical eruption of 
strains that generate a climate of tension. Under the present U. S. administration, 
Egypt has been increasingly at odds with the United States over a number of issues. 
Cairo's disagreements with Washington centre mainly on the peace process and the 
direction that the latter wants to impose to it. Egypt views the United States as being 
so biased towards Israel on this issue that it is trying to impose arrangements that 
uphold Israel's security alone and ignore that of Egypt and the Arabs. Cairo is highly 
critical of the limitless support Washington provides to Israel to the point of giving it a 
free hand to blitz Lebanon, provoke Syria and besiege the Palestinian Authority. 
Egypt's distancing from Washington was heightened when Egyptian diplomacy 
pushed Israel's nuclear weapons to the top of its list of priorities and refused to sign 
the chemical non-proliferation treaty until Israel signed the nuclear NPT. Lately, Cairo 
has been very concerned with the kind of Israeli-dominated regional order Washington 
seems to be promoting in the Middle East. The alarm voiced by Egypt is over the axis 
Israel is developing with pro-Western Turkey and Jordan, alleging that it seeks to 
supplant the leadership role Egypt has traditionally played in the region, and to 
threaten both Iran and Syria 947 
94i Esposito quoted in Timothy Sisk Islam and Democracy (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Institute of Peace, 
1992), p. 11. 
946 William Quandt, message to the author, 9 January 1997. 
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In the United States, a number of people have put forth the view that Egypt 
has lost its strategic value as far as American interests are concerned. After Egyptian- 
American relations reached their zenith after the war for the liberation of Kuwait, some 
research centres - namely the Washington Institute for Near East Policy - began 
promoting the idea that Cairo had lost its regional capabilities. RobertSatloff, that 
Institute's executive director, argued that Palestinian-Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli 
peace, along with Israel's budding relations with the Arab Maghreb and the Gulf 
States, make the shrinking of Egypt's role inevitable. The idea was also promoted that 
Islamist violence against the Egyptian state has put the country on the Algerian road 
of no return 948 . 
Other assessments have been presented which point to the growing concern 
in the United States that the "political investment" Washington has made in the Middle 
East generally is too big and unrewarding, and that more of the U. S. administration's 
attention should be focused on Europe and the Pacific Rim. The current American 
tendency to be less involved in the peace process and to leave the parties to work out 
a settlement themselves, is viewed as contributing to the waning of Egypt's role. As 
far as the other major U. S. interest in the Middle East is concerned - oil - no role for 
Egypt in safeguarding Gulf security and, by extension, the stability of the overall 
regional order is in view. Proponents of this current see Egypt's importance to U. S. 
foreign policy as diminishing and advocate a commensurate reduction in U. S. aid to 
Egypt. 
The existence of a strong Islamist movement has also featured high on the list 
of U. S. concerns and they have fuelled American doubts about Egypt's political and 
economic stability. This, in turn, has reinforced the views of those who argue in favour 
of U. S. disinvestment on the grounds that Egypt "ultimately belongs to an alien Arab- 
Islamic culture that Americans fear, and that it has not"Westernized sufficiently" in 
terms of either economic or political liberalization" '49 . 
In June 1996, Djerejian voiced the U. S. government's preoccupation with the 
Islamist challenge to Mubarak's regime and he commented that "the violence of 
Islamic extremists in Egypt is a matter of serious concern to us ... "950 . 
But the 
generalized view in the U. S. government is that "the Muslim extremists do not 
9'18 Ibrahim Nafei, "A New Look at Egyptian-American Relations", Mideast AMirror (9), n° 63,31 March 
1995: pp. 13-3. - 
9'9 Al-Hayat quoted in Mideast Mirror (10), no 148,31 July 1996: p. 16. 
9so "Developments in the Middle East", Statement before the International Relations Committee, 
Washington, D. C., 12 June 1996: p. 5. 
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constitute an immediate threat to the stability of Egypt, although they continue to pose 
a serious problem for public security and the economy. The extremists do not have 
sufficient public support to challenge the government or its institutions at this time and 
popular abhorrence of terrorist tactics makes it unlikely they will gain such support in 
the near future" 951. 
In connection with the question of political Islam and the way the Egyptian 
government handles it, the United States has frequently expressed its doubts on the 
wisdom of the current heavy-handed approach used by Cairo. The U. S. State 
Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices have registered the charges 
against the Mubarak government of torture, use of excessive force and the conducting 
of unfair trials. U. S. officials and congressmen have echoed these concerns by 
arguing that "the Egyptian government runs the risk of going too far in its 
counterattack against the Jemaat " 952 and that "if the government's response 
becomes oppressive against violent and nonviolent Islamists alike, it could backfire" 
953 
Samuel Lewis, former director of the Departmentof State Policy Planning staff 
and a counselor to the Washington Institute, criticised the Egyptian government's 
approach saying it is "trying to use only the "stick" and they are beating themselves 
over the head" 954. Krauthammer, speaking at a Washington Institute's roundtable on 
the issue of political Islam, expressed the commonly held view that "other than with 
police power, it is going to be very difficult for the Egyptians to pull themselves 
together to deal with a serious threat" '. 
In light of this appreciation, the Americans have thus urged the Mubarak 
regime to respect human rights and to make political and economic reforms, so as to 
reduce the level of discontent in Egyptian society. Lee H. Hamilton, chairman of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, questioned in October 1994 the wisdom of the 
social and economic policies of the Egyptian government, which apparently deepen 
the gap between the social classes, a situation which, according to him, "might very 
well be feeding a situation which leads to Islamic extremism" 95°. Some have 
suggested that the U. S. assistance programme in Egypt should be geared towards 
9s' U. S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Developments in the Middle East October 
1994 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 132. 
952 Senate report, op. cit. : p. 19. 
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strengthening the Egyptian system of justice and the efficiency of the legislative' . 
Following the charges of government manipulation of the 1995 parliamentary 
elections, the State Department said it "hoped" Cairo would look into allegations of 
fraud and take the necessary steps. Many U. S. congressmen went on record 
questioning the fairness of the Egyptian elections, and some suggested that future 
U. S. aid to Egypt should be linked to Cairo taking serious steps towards 
democratisation "e 
. 
Washington's open criticism of the Egyptian human rights record is understood 
in Cairo as a little more than a pretext to meddle in its internal affairs. What it shows in 
reality is the U. S. government alarm about the way Cairo has been muzzling and 
excluding the legally sanctioned opposition, the underlying message being that 
democratisation is vital for Egypt's stability. 
In spite of these realisations, the Americans would not cross the red line and 
be too vocal in their criticisms or press the Egyptian government to put its record 
straight. Mubarak successfully resists the delicate suggestions of U. S. officials that he 
liberalise because he knows that rather than jeopardise Egyptian stability the United 
States will grudgingly acquiesce in his refusal to make more than token changes to 
Egypt's political system. 
The Egyptian president deflects American criticisms by pointing to Algeria. He 
says that his first priority is rooting out subversive Muslim groups. Then, maybe he will 
consider allowing more democracy in Egypt"59 . American commitments to the 
Middle 
East peace process, to the security of Israel, and to stability in the pivotal Arab ally in 
the region make it well high impossible for U. S. officials to contemplate any policy that 
might plunge Egypt into chaos and to provide Islamists with a chance to gain power. 
In fact, the opinions that question Egypt's continued importance to the United 
States, although quite disseminated, are not shared by the Clinton administration nor 
do they represent the dominant view within the U. S. establishment. The Americans 
hold the view that the U. S. policy in the Middle East hinges upon Egypt. Because of 
its role in maintaining regional stability and its traditional leadership in the Arab world, 
Egypt's importance to the United States remains intact. And the fact is that, despite 
all its shortcomings, the Egyptian handling of the Islamist challenge has so far been 
effective. Martin Indyk, former director for Middle Eastern affairs at the National 
9sa Developments in the Middle Esst. p. 40. 
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Security Council and U. S. ambassador to Israel, praised the Egyptian approach for 
channeling Islamist activity into the social and economic sphere and for co-opting only 
non-violent, mainstream Islamist movements into political life 960. 
Mubarak is aware of this appreciation and he knows U. S. officials are apt to 
share his interpretation that the Islamic extremists are the most pressing threat and 
that a fundamentalist victory in Egypt would be a disaster for American interests in the 
region' . The Islamic threat 
is perhaps the best justification Mubarak invokes for 
asking the United States for money. He has so far succeeded in maintaining the 
significant quantities of annual U. S. economic and military assistance. It is indeed 
noteworthy that "as American economic aid to all nations has been reduced, 
eliminated or "under review" in the past several years, U. S. aid to Egypt ... has 
retained its second-place position" 962 . This is all the more remarkable as 
the foreign 
aid budget has been cut dramatically (by about 40 percent) since 1992, the 1996 
reduction being 10 percent `63 . During 
Mubarak's visit to Washington in late July 
1996, there was quasi-agreement on keeping U. S. economic aid at its current level in 
the foreseeable future, that is, around $2.2 billion 964 . 
11.3. Jordan 
Since the end of the Gulf War, Jordan has largely restored its relations with 
the United States through its participation in the Middle East peace process and 
enforcement of U. N. sanctions against Iraq. Starting in 1992, the King moved slowly 
to distance Jordan from Iraq and in October 1994, the King signed a peace 
agreement with Israel which ensured that the country returned to the centre of 
regional politics. 
With the signing of the accord, Jordan regained its place as one of the most 
pro-Western of Arab leaders as well as the much-needed U. S. assistance for solving 
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the desperate economic situation of the country. President Clinton agreed to cancel 
$702 million of Jordan's debt to the United States, nearly three-quarters of what the 
Kingdom owes the United States. The administration also encouraged other Western 
nations to accept debt relief to Jordan. In addition, the United States offered new 
military equipment, the encouragement of U. S. investment and help in ending the 
boycott from the Gulf states, support for water projects, the lift of the blockade of the 
Gulf of Aqaba and increased foreign aid '. 
Cooperation with the U. S. -led peace process was just a part of Jordanian 
participation in the Pax Americana that is in the making. It aims at creating a stable 
Middle East, with Israel as the driving political and economic force, and with the Arab 
states at peace with her 66 . In the U. S. perspective, 
Jordan is central to this project. 
The Kingdom's quiet border with Israel has helped to establish a working relationship 
between the two countries, as evidenced by the creation of numerous economic joint- 
ventures and the climate of normalisation in bilateral discussions. 
This has enabled president Clinton to announce in November 1996 that 
Jordan was to be given special military status, that of a major non-NATO ally of the 
United States. With the change in status, Jordan will be able to receive improved 
military assistance and to modernise its armed forces, a cherished Jordanian 
aspiration. The Kingdom took delivery of $100m of military hardware from the United 
States on December 1996, under the enhanced ExcessDefense Articles programme. 
Included in the equipment received were: 18 helicopters, 50 M-60 tanks, 250 trucks, 2 
M-4 boats, an air-sea rescue vessel and machine guns. The delivery of a C-130H 
aircraft and of 16 F-16 fighters are scheduled to be completed by the end of this 
year'6'. 
By and large, the United States is happy with the internal situation in Jordan, 
whose stability is maintained by a deft monarch. Contrary to Egypt, Jordan has since 
1989 undergone impressive political liberalisation and might be considered perhaps 
the most democratic country in the Arab world. It has been highly questionable 
whether this liberalisation is authentic and not merely tactical. The fact remains that 
the parliament wields real political power, there is some freedom of expression in the 
media, popular demonstrations are allowed and an open political debate is raging. 
965 Stephen Zunes, "The Israeli-Jordanian Agreement", Middle East Policy (III)4no 4,1995: pp. 60-1. 
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Jordan is looked on as an example of a country that has been able to establish 
a relatively successful modus vivendi with the Islamists. It has ensured all nonviolent 
Islamists a meaningful outlet in Jordan's political system, as demonstrated in their 
brief participation in the cabinet and in the last parliamentary elections. At the same 
time, this system has permitted the King to closely monitor Islamist expressions of 
dissent and to limit their opposition. Djerejian presented Jordan as a "model" for Arab 
countries in the way of dealing with the Islamists. The fact that "King Hussein decided 
... that the Muslim Brotherhood should be allowed to compete in elections and join in 
the parliamentary structure ... resulted in the moderation of the 
Islamist movement 
because they became accountable before the electorate for their record of 
governance" 968 . Pelletreau also commended the Jordanian approach 
for integrating 
Islamists in a broader constitutional structure, " and, by doing so, being able to tame 
them. 
The Washington Institute, an influential pro-Israeli think-tank which has 
attentively monitored the development of political Islam, has considered Jordan as a 
success case, as the only Middle Eastern country that is dealing intelligently and in a 
balanced manner with political Islam. Samuel Lewis says the Jordanians "have an 
advantage because their king can say he is the descendant of the Prophet, which 
helps in dealing with the Islamists. But Jordan has also been wise politically in that 
they gave the Islamists a little power, let them show that they had no solutions, and 
thus reduced their appeal at the polls. They also keep a very close eye on any 
potential subversion " 970. Robert Satloff, the Institute's executive director, says that 
the difference in the "Jordanian model is that the Islamists are allowed to participate in 
the government but they can never win complete control because Jordan is a 
monarchy... " , and concludes: "The Jordanians have worked out their own answer, 
but 
we don't know if other states can follow that model yet" 97 . 
Washington sees Jordan's stability as hinging on the figure of the King. 
Therefore, the question of the successor to the throne and his ability to manage a 
orderly transition, dominate U. S. concerns over the evolution of that Middle Eastern 
country. 
%9 Djerejian, op. cit. : p. 14. 
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In the West, Islamism has come to be seen as a disruptive force that threatens 
friendly Arab regimes, has a strong anti-Western bias, is anti-democratic and the main 
source of subversive and terrorist activity. Events such as the terrorist bombings and 
assassinations that rocked the main European capitals in the 1980s, the Rushdie 
affair, and the Islamist savage war against the Algerian state, have fuelled these 
feelings. The Americans' negative image of Islam was seared into the public mind in 
the wake of the Iranian Revolution, the hostage crisis and the succession of terrorist 
attacks that targeted U. S. citizens -a result of the wave of anti-Americanism that 
swept the Arab world. After the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing and the 
uncovering of the Islamic network led by Sheik OmarAbdel Rahman that conspired to 
launch other terrorist attacks, the American's imagination was captured by the 
possibility of an Islamic jihad against the United States. 
Many intellectuals have seen these acts of terrorism and the ubiquitous 
Muslim diatribes against the West as part of a deepening conflict between an 
aggressive Islam and a defensive Western civilisation. In fact, the demise of the 
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War bolstered the views of some analysts that 
Islamic activism would emerge as the next threat to the Western world. Huntington 
placed this conflict in the context of a general confrontation resulting fromcivilizational 
fault lines. 
This dissertation has highlighted how political Islam came to be identified as 
one of the major security threats evidencing the anarchic nature of the new 
international order. It was picked on by many in the American security and defence 
community as the new global enemy thus justifying a mission and a budget and 
continuing American leadership in the post - Cold War world. Other variants of the 
"Islamic threat" theory were put forward. They basically affirmed that fundamentalist 
Islam is a movement closer in spirit to communism and fascism than to traditional 
religion. It is by nature anti-democratic, fanatical, anti-Semitic and anti-Western. 
According to those theories, Islamists see their movement standing in direct 
competition to Western civilisation and challenging it for global supremacy. The 
coming confrontation would thus require from Washington a long-term diplomatic and 
military strategy and the development of new containment policies of political Islam. 
These views gained wide currency in the media and eventually prevailed in 
public opinion and in the political debate. In looking closely into the Islam-bashing 
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campaign, this study brought to light that a host of political interest groups and entities 
fanned the myth of a threatening Islam. Chief among them was Israel. The Labour 
government under Yitzhak Rabin stridently alerted to the need to combat "murderous 
Islamic terror", and depicted Iran as the centre of ideological subversion and of 
military expansionism. The Israelis disclosed Tehran's plans for controlling the oil-rich 
Gulf, destroy Israel and threaten areas on the periphery of a new "arc of crisis" 
involving the Horn of Africa, Southern Europe, the Balkans and the Indian 
subcontinent. Pro-Israeli organisations in the United States have amplified these 
charges. They have also been the driving force behind the tightening of sanctions 
against Iran and the crackdown on Islamist political activities in the United States. 
Growing American fears about political Islam have also played into the hands 
of foreign governments, such as in the case with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and 
Pakistan. The "green menace" is a convenient way for a leader to explain away 
opposition based on a country's economic, social, and political inequities. It is also an 
argument in favour of the continuation of U. S. support to regimes whose strategic 
value weakened with the end of the Cold War. 
The debate in the media on the nature of political Islam and of the threats 
posed by it was nurtured by academic studies and think-tanks publications on the 
subject. The debate produced a variety of views reflecting the multiple divisions within 
the academic and policy communities. This study has highlighted the two major 
schools of thought regarding political Islam that have emerged. The 
accommodationist school considers the Islamic movement not as a threat but as a 
healthy grassroots response to the failure of Arab governments to tackle growing 
socio-economic problems. It is premised on the assumption that the Islamic revival 
encompasses a variety of movements, that Islam is compatible with democracy and 
that Islamic moderates, with whom the West can talk, do exist. The confrontational 
school argues that political Islam is inherently hostile to the Western world, that 
Islamists are only rhetorically committed to democracy and pluralism and that their 
real aim is the establishment of a religious dictatorship. Proponents of this school thus 
urge the U. S. government not to cooperate with fundamentalists and not engage in 
dialogue with them, but rather to stand up against them. 
The Bush administration seemed to realise the need to build a coherent policy 
framework towardslslam that dealt comprehensively with the challenges posed by this 
rising religion in areas where the United States has vital interests. The policy, first 
enunciated in June 1992, stated the U. S. government did not consider Islam as a 
263 
hostile religious and civilisational force. The policy differentiated mainstream Islam, 
genuine in nature and generally peaceful, from thelslamist groups and movements 
that espouse violence and extremism in pursuit of their aims. The latter would be 
actively opposed by the United States. 
The policy, developed and refined under the Clinton administration, showed 
understanding of the complex forces at work in Muslim society and avoided tarring the 
entire Islamic movement with the brush of extremism. The present inquiry has 
however demonstrated that this U. S. policy is largely rhetorical and fails to address a 
number of important issues such as when, in what circumstances and how the United 
States would agree to enter into dialogue with Islamist groups, especially if they came 
to power in states with a pro-Western orientation. 
The policy is rather an abstract construction, a theory, since it has never been 
put to the test. Enunciating it was an important step in the way of recognising the 
reality of political Islam but the fact remains that the act itself had no major 
consequences. In fact, the majority of Islamic movements in Arab states of high 
strategic importance to the United States are "contained" and hardly on the verge of 
gaining power. In the Middle East, Turkey has been an exception since 1995 when 
the Refah party became a member of the governmental coalition. This Islamistsucess 
was the result of the consolidation of democracy which enabled the Islamists to be 
reincorporated into the political system. In the last few years, the Refah party has 
attained political legitimacy and has adopted the procedural rules of democracy. The 
party has also adopted an increasingly more secular platform and a more pragmatic 
approach. At least for the moment, the prospect of an Islamic, anti-Western oriented 
regime seems to be ruled out. 
In the Arab countries that were analysed in this dissertation, an Islamist 
takeover would create an altogether different context forcing U. S. policy-makers to 
face a challenging situation which would obviously vary according to the nature of the 
Islamist movement in presence. The need to evolve responses to that situation would 
provide the real test to the aforementioned policy and would dictate the extent of U. S. 
compliance to it. 
In the case of Egypt and Jordan, the present work has shown that the United 
States overriding interest is the maintenance in power of the incumbent regimes 
whose stabilising role, position regarding the peace process and pro-Western 
orientation make them important regional allies. The U. S. government has implicitly 
and explicitly shown its preferences for President Mubarak and King Hussein - 
266 
notwithstanding their authoritarian and undemocratic practices - to thelslamists, lest 
the Islamists challenge important U. S. interests in the Middle East. In order to 
safeguard the incumbent regimes, the Clinton administration has toned down its 
promotion of the "democratisation agenda" for fear that the opening up of the political 
systems would give the Islamists an opportunity to gain power. In following this line, 
the United States is acting in accordance with the U. S. traditional stance in the Middle 
East: the defence of the conservative forces and the upholding of the status quo. 
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